共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a “second‐mover advantage.” In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental standard levels. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of fiscal competition. Four distinct outcomes can be characterized by varying the marginal cost to firms of an environmental externality: (1) the outcome may be efficient; (2) the developing country may be a “pollution haven”—a place to escape excessively high environmental standards in the developed country; (3) the developing country may “undercut” the developed country and attract all firms; (4) the developed country may be a pollution haven. 相似文献
2.
We characterize equilibria in a private‐provision public‐good game where individuals are allowed arbitrary contribution levels and the level of the public good equals the least contribution made by an individual. Equilibrium comparative statics are derived for the interim Pareto‐dominant equilibrium. First, improvements in the cost distribution of even only one player benefit all. Second, even with such “weakest‐link” public goods, for which greater similarity of preferences would seem to facilitate coordination, decreased heterogeneity can actually decrease payoffs. Indeed, increasing the riskiness of cost distributions has an ambiguous effect on welfare. Two mechanisms are provided for improving equilibrium payoffs: Technology transfer and cheap‐talk communication. While substantial welfare gains are possible, examples show that (a) technology transfer may be futile if a “regularity” condition is not satisfied and (b) cheap talk may be useless if the language for communication is not sufficiently rich. 相似文献
3.
This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays. 相似文献
4.
While the “proximity-concentration” theory suggests a positive relationship between trade cost and foreign direct investment (FDI), there is ample evidence showing a negative relationship between them. We show that the possibility of exporting back to the home country from a host country, which is often referred as “home-country export platform FDI”, may generate a negative relationship between trade cost and FDI. Market demand and product market competition may play important roles in this respect. 相似文献
5.
Academic research is a public good whose production is supported by the tuition‐paying students that a faculty's research accomplishments attract. A professor's spot contribution to the university's revenues thus depends not on her spot research production, but rather on her entire cumulative research record. We show that, under a broad range of education market conditions, a profit‐maximizing university will apply a “high” minimum retention standard to the production of a junior professor who has no record of past research, but a “zero” retention standard to the spot production of a more senior professor whose background includes accomplishments sufficient to have cleared the “high” probationary hurdle. But if and when those education market conditions change, tenure‐based contracts may cease to be optimal. 相似文献
6.
We use a North–South model with property right differences and resource dynamics to study the effects of trade on resource use and welfare. Autarky is likely to Pareto‐dominate free trade in the long run when the environment is quite fragile, and the result is reversed when the environment is quite resilient. Trade may cause an environmentally poor country to “drag down” its richer trading partner, when they degrade their stocks which would be preserved under autarky. It may enable the environmentally richer country to “pull up” its partner, when they preserve their stocks which would be degraded under autarky. 相似文献
7.
We set up an oligopolistic model with two exporting firms selling to a third market to investigate the welfare implications of trade liberalization when the exporting firms are forward‐looking. The results show that with cost asymmetry trade liberalization encourages the exporting firms to engage in tacit collusion, which may not only be detrimental to the domestic welfare, but also to the consumer surplus of the importing country. Moreover, we find that tacit collusion is less sustainable if the government of the importing country imposes a lower (higher) tariff on the more (less) efficient exporting firm. If a nonforward‐looking or a forward‐looking cost‐efficient domestic firm exists in the importing country, then trade liberalization also encourages tacit collusion. 相似文献
8.
Richard E Ericson 《Journal of Comparative Economics》1984,8(1):1-24
A formal model of intermediate product reallocation through Second Economy markets in a centrally planned economy is discussed. The principal result is that there exists an equilibrium allocation determined in these Second Economy markets in spite of fixed official prices and centrally monitored trading at these prices. It is always a constrained Pareto optimum with respect to the initial plan-generated allocation. Hence, Second Economy markets can effectively and “second best” efficiently ration the intermediate-product “sellers' market” of a centrally planned economy. 相似文献
9.
International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels. 相似文献
10.
To analyze the effects of simultaneous tariff reductions by multiple importing countries on prices, we construct a simple three‐country model where a good is produced by a monopolist with nonconstant marginal cost and imported by two countries. We compare two representative tariff‐reduction formulas: the “fixed‐amount” and the “uniform percentage” reductions. The uniform percentage reductions may increase the consumer price in the importing country, whose initial tariff is lower. Thus, importing countries with relatively low tariffs may prefer a bilateral trade agreement to a multilateral one to ensure consumer gains. 相似文献
11.
According to conventional home market effects, free trade tends to shrink the market share for a smaller economy in differentiated manufacturing goods, and in the extreme, leads to a complete hollowing out of the industry. Departing from the original Helpman–Krugman modelling assumptions behind the home market effects, we introduce a technology advantage in terms of the difference in fixed cost and/or marginal cost between trading partners and prove that home market effects will be offset and even reverse if a small economy has better technology than another country. With a higher elasticity of substitution, the marginal cost advantage becomes more important if it is to dominate the home market effect. We also show that even with an identical country size, the intra‐industry trade addressed in the existing literature may not occur; it will occur only if the technology differential lies within a certain range that is positively affected by the level of transport cost. 相似文献
12.
Political processes may bring about Pareto improvements by increasing income inequality in a society that produces a public good by voluntary contributions. Proportional taxation funds a “governing agent.” The most endowed agent is the Condorcet winner for governing agent. When the tax rate can also be chosen by a vote, the ideal point of the agent with median initial endowment is the Condorcet winner under Cobb–Douglas utility. If Pareto improvements are possible, this ideal point corresponds to Pareto improvement. Pareto improvement may also be possible, even when a Leviathan set taxes, if there is deadweight loss from taxation. Pareto improvements are indeed always possible in “large” societies. On the other hand, no improvements may be possible if the initial distribution of wealth is very unequal in a “small” society, and Condorcet winners may not exist for other utility functions. 相似文献
13.
Alfons J. Weichenrieder 《Bulletin of economic research》2004,56(2):189-200
This paper considers the efficiency of a contestable natural monopoly if consumers are heterogeneous and the monopolist can differentiate prices imperfectly. The paper shows that a “no‐distortion‐at‐the‐top” result, which is standard in models with restricted entry, may also appear in a contestable market. Depending on cost and demand structures, first best efficiency can also be a sustainable equilibrium. However, due to the existence of a continuum of equilibria, first best efficiency is not guaranteed. Most notably, even a stable “distortion‐at‐the‐top” result is possible. 相似文献
14.
《Journal of Economic Theory》1987,41(1):54-67
It is a well-known fact that if damaging externalities occur, nonconvexities will necessarily arise in the underlying economic environment rendering questionable the relevance of standard market approaches to the allocation problem. In response to this state of affairs, we define and study a generalization of the Lindahl Equilibrium concept that allows for nonlinear pricing systems in which the marginal outlay may depend on the quantity purchased. This “Generalized Lindahl Equilibrium” attains local pareto efficiency for its associated allocations and is able to support (in the usual sense) any pareto efficient allocation that satisfies a regularity condition. 相似文献
15.
Udayan Roy 《Review of International Economics》2005,13(4):757-769
I discuss a generalized Heckscher–Ohlin–Vanek (HOV) model in which consumption requires time as well as money (as in Becker's theory of the allocation of time) and the amount of work that a worker can do per unit of time—her “ability”—varies from country to country. High ability implies high income per hour, which implies a high value of time and, therefore, high consumption of the good that is more “time‐saving.” Therefore, if domestic production of this good is not commensurately high, it would have to be imported. In this way, I demonstrate that international differences in worker ability constitute an independent source of gains from trade. The model is able to explain several observed features of North–South trade that are not explained by the HOV model. The theoretical possibility of a Leontief paradox‐type trade pattern is also demonstrated. 相似文献
16.
《Journal of public economics》2007,91(5-6):993-1021
This paper analyzes the efficiency consequences of lobbying in a production economy with imperfect commitment. We first show that the Pareto efficiency result found for truthful equilibria of common agency games in static exchange economies no longer holds under these more general conditions. We construct a model of pressure groups where the set of efficient truthful common agency equilibria has measure zero. Second, we show that, under fairly general assumptions, the equilibrium will be biased against the group with the highest productivity of private capital, reflecting the fact that, on the margin, less productive groups find lobbying relatively more rewarding. Finally, as an application, if lobbies representing the “poor” and the “rich” have identical organizational capacities, we show that the equilibrium is biased towards the poor, who have a comparative advantage in politics, rather than in production. If the pressure groups differ in their organizational capacity, both pro-rich (oligarchic) and pro-poor (populist) equilibria may arise, all of which are inefficient with respect to the constrained optimum. 相似文献
17.
Wisarut Suwanprasert 《Review of International Economics》2020,28(3):760-798
I study the impact of the most favored nation (MFN) principle of the GATT/WTO on bilateral trade agreements in the New Trade model. The paper offers four main predictions. First, a bilateral trade agreement without external tariff adjustments hurts the outside country, while a bilateral trade agreement under MFN benefits the outside country. Second, the MFN principle may cause a free‐rider problem. Third, a Pareto‐improving bilateral trade agreement under MFN does not exist if initial tariffs and the elasticity of substitution are sufficiently low. This suggests that the MFN principle may prevent bilateral trade agreements in the future when tariffs are already low and that the definition of “like products” in the MFN rule is welfare improving only if it covers only goods that are closely substituted. Fourth, in the future when tariffs are low, multilateral negotiations and preferential trade areas will become more desirable. Using a calibrated 10‐region 33‐industry model, I show that around 30% of bilateral trade agreements that would be agreed upon in the absence of the MFN rule could not be agreed upon if the MFN rule is imposed. 相似文献
18.
Multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities. We argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities—committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost. The increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits. We argue that this theory also has implications for the “make or buy” literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization. 相似文献
19.
Jie Ma 《Review of International Economics》2013,21(5):984-995
This paper analyzes policy competition for a foreign‐owned monopolist firm between two asymmetric countries. In particular, one country has a larger economy than the other country. At the same time, the small country produces an intermediate good for the final good production, while the large country does not. We show that whether a country will win foreign direct investment (FDI) competition is determined by the interaction between relative transport costs of intermediate and final goods and the market size of the large country relative to that of the small country; and policy competition for FDI may Pareto weakly improve national welfare of the competing countries. 相似文献
20.
We study the interaction between nonprice public rationing and prices in the private market. Under a limited budget, the public supplier uses a rationing policy. A private firm may supply the good to those consumers who are rationed by the public system. Consumers have different amounts of wealth, and costs of providing the good to them vary. We consider two regimes. First, the public supplier observes consumers’ wealth information; second, the public supplier observes both wealth and cost information. The public supplier chooses a rationing policy, and, simultaneously, the private firm, observing only cost but not wealth information, chooses a pricing policy. In the first regime, there is a continuum of equilibria. The Pareto dominant equilibrium is a means‐test equilibrium: poor consumers are supplied while rich consumers are rationed. Prices in the private market increase with the budget. In the second regime, there is a unique equilibrium. This exhibits a cost‐effectiveness rationing rule; consumers are supplied if and only if their cost–benefit ratios are low. Prices in the private market do not change with the budget. Equilibrium consumer utility is higher in the cost‐effectiveness equilibrium than the means‐test equilibrium. 相似文献