PUBLIC FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OVER GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES

Do preferences toward globalization strategies vary across public‐finance regimes? In this paper, we use data on individual preferences toward immigration and trade policy to examine how pre‐tax and post‐tax cleavages differ across globalization strategies and state fiscal jurisdictions. High exposure to immigrant fiscal pressures reduces support for freer immigration among U.S. natives, especially the more skilled. The magnitude of this post‐tax fiscal cleavage is comparable to the pre‐tax labor‐market effects of skill itself. There is no public‐finance variation in opinion over trade policy, consistent with U.S. trade policy having negligible fiscal‐policy impacts. Public finance thus appears to shape opinions toward globalization strategies.     

Migration,Unemployment, and Skill Downgrading

In this paper, we analyze the labor market impacts of immigration under flexible and rigid labor market regimes. A general equilibrium framework is developed, accounting for skill heterogeneity and labor market frictions, where unemployed medium‐skilled manufacturing workers are downgraded into low‐skilled service jobs, while low‐skilled service workers might end up unemployed. The analytical analysis shows that medium‐skill immigration decreases low‐skilled unemployment under the flexible regime, indicating a complementarity effect, while the rigid regime induces a substitution effect, leading to low‐skilled unemployment. Moreover, it leads to wage polarization. In a numerical analysis, the economic effects of different migration scenarios are quantified.     

Trade Liberalization and Wage Inequality: Evidence from India

We evaluate empirically the impact of the dramatic 1991 trade liberalization in India on the industry wage structure. The empirical strategy uses variation in industry wage premiums and trade policy across industries and over time. In contrast to most earlier studies on developing countries, we find a strong, negative, and robust relationship between changes in trade policy and changes in industry wage premiums over time. The results are consistent with liberalization‐induced productivity increases at the firm level, which get passed on to industry wages. We also find that trade liberalization has led to decreased wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in India. This is consistent with the magnitude of tariff reductions being relatively larger in sectors with a higher proportion of unskilled workers.     

The political economy of trade and migration: Evidence from the U.S. Congress

We compare the drivers of U.S. congressmen's votes on trade and migration reforms since the 1970s. Standard trade theory suggests that trade reforms that lower barriers to goods from less skilled‐labor abundant countries and migration reforms that lower barriers to low‐skilled migrants should have similar distributional effects, hurting low‐skilled U.S. workers while benefiting high‐skilled workers. In line with this prediction, we find that House members representing more skilled‐labor abundant districts are more likely to support trade and migration reforms that benefit high‐skilled workers. Still, important differences exist: Democrats are less supportive of trade reforms than Republicans, while the opposite is true for migration reforms; welfare state considerations and network effects shape votes on migration, but not on trade.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade

This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that connects the prevalence of intra‐industry trade with increased wage inequality from trade liberalization in both skilled and unskilled labor abundant countries. The Stolper–Samuelson effect is incorporated into an intra‐industry trade liberalization (intra‐ITL) hypothesis where skilled labor opposes protectionism in all countries engaged in intra‐industry trade because skilled workers gain at the expense of unskilled workers from multilateral trade liberalization within the skill‐intensive sector. We examine empirical evidence on whether skilled individuals are more supportive of trade liberalization than unskilled individuals across 31 countries with different levels of intra‐industry trade and skill endowments. We find that the extent to which countries engage in intra‐industry trade in high‐tech commodities is strongly linked with the intensity of opposition to protection by skilled labor. Regression results strongly support our hypothesis that skilled workers, almost everywhere, are more likely to support free trade.     

SPECIAL INTERESTS AND FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: THE CASE OF MEXICO

Financial liberalization is often believed to enhance economic growth. Yet in many cases a few powerful incumbents seem to capture most of the gains from the reform. In this paper, I construct a model with endogenous formation of special interest groups that could reap most of the benefits of financial liberalization. In particular, these groups lobby to limit entry by other firms, while taking advantage of improved borrowing opportunities. I then use the model to study the Mexican financial liberalization of 1988. Analysis of firm‐level panel data on manufacturing plants reveals patterns suggested by the model. Specifically, large firms in more concentrated or more corrupt sectors benefit more from liberalization. In addition, domestically owned firms gain more than firms with foreign ownership. I also propose a new way to measure corruption at the industry level based on the Mexican 10% profit sharing rule.     

PRODUCTIVITY MATTERS FOR TRADE POLICY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

In the growth literature that investigates the effect of trade liberalization on productivity, nearly all studies assume that trade policy is determined independently of productivity, and, hence, it is exogenous. I show, both theoretically and empirically, that this assumption is not valid in general. I find that in Colombia more productive sectors receive more protection and the sectors with higher productivity gains are liberalized less even in the presence of a large unilateral liberalization shock that affects all sectors. Researchers may be underestimating the positive effect of liberalization on productivity when they do not account for the endogeneity bias.     

Tax Competition and Economic Integration

This article examines the role of tax competition and economic integration in a core–periphery setting, where agglomeration forces are present. I present a New Economic Geography model, which accounts for firm entry/exit and international mobility of skilled labor employed in the public R&D sectors. In contrast to other literature on tax competition, I focus on its impact on labor migration and net earnings of skilled and unskilled labor. Economic integration is modeled as trade liberalization, an easing of factor mobility restrictions and technology diffusion. I find that tax competition favors skilled labor when trade costs are reduced. In contrast, unskilled labor benefits when factor mobility restrictions are eased and technology diffusion is enhanced.     

A Schumpeterian North–South Growth Model of Trade and Wage Inequality*

The paper presents a dynamic general‐equilibrium model of interindustry North–South trade that is used to analyze the effects of trade liberalization on the Northern wage distribution. Both countries have a low‐tech sector where consumer goods of constant quality are produced by use of unskilled labor. The North also has a high‐tech sector that employs skilled labor and features a quality‐ladder model structure with endogenous growth. Both innovation and skill acquisition rates are endogenously determined. In a balanced trade equilibrium, it is found that Southern‐originated (Northern‐originated) trade liberalization leads to an increase (decrease) in Northern wage inequality both between skilled and unskilled workers and within the group of skilled workers. The endogenous change in the Southern terms of trade determines the direction of change in unskilled wages in both the North and the South.     

Individual Characteristics,Behavioral Biases,and Trade Policy Preferences: Evidence from a Survey in Japan

Import liberalization is one of the most actively debated issues in trade policy. This paper examines how trade policy preferences are related to individual characteristics based on a survey in Japan. Among 10,000 surveyed individuals, people working in non‐agricultural sectors, those working in managerial occupations, or those above retirement age tend to favor freer imports. This paper also finds that people who are influenced by the status quo bias are likely to oppose import liberalization even after controlling for each individual's various characteristics, suggesting that neither income compensation nor insurance schemes are sufficient for expanding support for free trade.     

Anti‐immigration policy in the destination country and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source economy with or without unemployment

This paper is aimed at theoretically examining the consequence of the anti‐immigration policy adopted in the destination country on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in a source nation using a couple of two‐sector, specific‐factor general equilibrium models in both the presence and absence of unemployment. Emigration requires incurring some capital cost for professional skill formation on the part of every prospective emigrant that adds to the opportunity cost of emigration. The authority of the destination country determines the number of visas to be granted and hence directly controls the magnitude of skilled emigration from the source country. In the migration equilibrium, the expected skilled wage income abroad is equal to the opportunity cost of emigration. In both the presence and absence of unemployment of unskilled labor, the outcome of the policy on the wage inequality crucially hinges on both the magnitude of the fixed cost of emigration and the technological factors. In the specific‐factor Harris–Todaro model, the degree of imperfection in the unskilled labor market is an additional factor. Finally, some policy recommendations have been made for protecting the interest of the poor unskilled workforce.     

Structure and performance of the service sector in transition economies1

This paper examines the performance of the service sector in the Eastern European transition economies during the 1997–2004 period. The performance of the service sector as a whole and of its sub‐sectors is very heterogeneous within the region. Service sub‐sectors that are information and communications technology producers or users and those using skilled labour more intensively exhibit the highest labour productivity growth. Our estimates show a positive and significant effect of liberalization on service labour productivity growth that is stronger for sub‐sectors that are more distant from the technological frontier. Service liberalization is also shown to have a positive effect on labour productivity levels and growth of downstream manufacturing industries.     

印度利益集团对其贸易政策的影响

本文利用贸易政策形成的需求供给分析框架及利益集团影响贸易政策形成的机制，分析了印度利益集团对印度贸易政策确立与演变的影响。虽然印度各种利益集团的相互博弈在一定程度上影响了印度贸易政策的形成与发展，但利益集团发挥的作用是有限的，印度政党对利益集团的利用是充分的。印度历届政府经常利用利益集团之间的斗争，推进贸易自由化进程。     

Immigration, Unemployment and Pensions

This paper examines the impact of immigration on a host country with welfare state arrangements that support both the unemployed and the elderly. It is shown that low‐skilled immigration increases the unemployment rate. Furthermore, it harms the low‐skilled native population and benefits the high‐skilled natives and pensioners. Nevertheless, as under competitive labor markets, immigration generates an unambiguous gain for the native population as a whole. However, in contrast to the findings under full employment, this gain can be dampened by an expansion of the pension system.     

Trade between symmetric countries,heterogeneous firms,and the skill premium

Abstract This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization between symmetric countries on the skill premium. I introduce skilled and unskilled labour in a model of trade with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz (2003) and assume a production technology such that more productive firms are more skill intensive. I show that the effects of trade liberalization on wage inequality crucially depend on the type of trade costs considered and on their initial size. While fixed costs of trade have a potentially non‐monotonic effect on the skill premium, a drop in variable trade costs unambiguously and substantially raises wage inequality.     

Factor Endowments,Democracy, and Trade Policy Divergence

We develop a stochastic model of electoral competition in order to study the economic and political determinants of trade policy. We model a small open economy with two tradable goods, each of which is produced using a sector‐specific factor (e.g., land and capital) and another factor that is mobile between these tradable sectors (labor); one nontradable good, which is also produced using a specific factor (skilled labor), and an elected government with the mandate to tax trade flows. The tax revenue is used to provide local public goods that increase the economic agents’ utility. We use this general equilibrium model to explicitly derive the ideal policies of the different socioeconomic groups in society (landlords, industrialists, labor, and skilled workers). We then use those ideal policies to model the individual probabilistic voting behavior of the members of each of these socioeconomic groups. We use this model to shed light on how differences in the comparative advantages of countries explain trade policy divergence between countries as well as trade policy instability within countries. We regard trade policy instability to mean that, in equilibrium, political parties diverge in terms of the political platforms they adopt. We show that in natural resource (land)–abundant economies with very little capital, or in economies that specializes in the production of manufactures, parties tend to converge to the same policy platform, and trade policy is likely to be stable and relatively close to free trade. In contrast, in a natural resource–abundant economy with an important domestic industry that competes with the imports, parties tend to diverge, and trade policy is likely to be more protectionist and unstable.     

Selective Immigration Policies and Wages Inequality

We quantify the overall impact of immigration on native wages in France from 1990 to 2010. Our short‐run simulations indicate that immigration has decreased native wages by 0.6%. We find on average no impact of immigration on wages in the long run. However, we show that the long‐run effects of immigration on wages are detrimental to high‐skilled native workers and benefits to low‐skilled native workers. Our structural estimation allows us to evaluate the impact of “selective” migration policies. In particular, we find that selective immigration policies toward highly educated workers reduce the wage dispersion of French native workers.     

Testing creative destruction in an opening economy

This paper analyses the relationship between trade liberalization and economic growth using a Schumpeterian framework of technological innovation and applies it to sector‐level South African data. The framework examines direct and indirect effects of trade liberalization on productivity growth. Indirect impacts operate through a differential impact of trade liberalization on firms conditional on their distance from the international technological frontier. Results confirm positive direct impacts of trade liberalization. Results confirm also that the greatest positive impact of trade liberalization will be on sectors that are close to the international technological frontier and that experienced a low level of product market competition before liberalization.     

EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MANDATES AND THE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF LIKELY UNAUTHORIZED AND NATIVE WORKERS

As recent efforts to reform immigration policy at the federal level have failed, states have started to take immigration matters into their own hands and researchers have been paying closer attention to state dynamics surrounding immigration policy. Yet, to this date, there is not a clear understanding of the consequences of enforcing E‐Verify on likely unauthorized immigrants or on natives across the United States. This study aims to fill in that gap by analyzing the impact that the enactment of various types of E‐Verify mandates may have on the employment and wages of these groups. We find that the enactment of employment verification mandates reduces the employment likelihood of likely unauthorized workers. Additionally, it raises the hourly wages of likely unauthorized women. None of these impacts are observed among a similarly skilled sample of naturalized Hispanic immigrants. Finally, the enactment of E‐Verify mandates appears to raise the employment likelihood of alike non‐Hispanic natives, while raising the hourly wage of native‐born male employees, alluding to the potential substitutability of unauthorized immigrants and non‐Hispanic natives. (JEL J2, J3, J6)     

Skills,Tasks and the Scarcity of Talent in a Global Economy

The scarcity of talent is a tremendous challenge for firms in the globalized world. This paper investigates the role of labor market imperfection in open economies for the usage of talent in the production process of firms. For this purpose, I set up a heterogeneous firms model, where production consists of a continuum of tasks that differ in complexity. Firms hire low‐skilled and high‐skilled workers to perform these tasks. How firms assign workers to tasks depends on factor prices for the two skill types and the productivity advantage of high‐skilled workers in the performance of complex tasks. I study the firms’ assignment problem under two labor market regimes, which capture the polar cases of fully flexible wages and a binding minimum wage for low‐skilled workers. Since the minimum wage lowers the skill premium, it increases the range of tasks performed by high‐skilled workers, which enhances the stock of knowledge within firms to solve complex tasks and reduces the mass of active firms. In a setting with fully flexible wages trade does not affect the firm‐internal assignment of workers to tasks. On the contrary, if low‐skilled wages are fixed by a minimum wage, trade renders high‐skilled workers a scarce resource and reduces the range of tasks performed by this skill type with negative consequences for the human capital stock within firms. In this case, trade leads to higher per‐capita income for both skill types and thus to higher welfare in the open than in the closed economy, whereas – somewhat counter‐intuitive – inequality between the two skill types decreases, as more low‐skilled workers find employment in the production process.