Sources of inefficiency in representative democracy: Evidence on public investments across nations

Besley and Coate (1997 and 1998) exposit a formal model of dynamic fiscal policy that highlights the problem associated with the temporal mismatch between the incidence of benefits and costs. Their analysis focuses in part on the conditions that may result in inefficient public investment decisions in a representative democracy. This paper employs cross-national data to investigate implications of the Besley-Coate model. The findings indicate that several political institutions significantly affect public investments, including term lengths, staggered term expiration dates, and the separation of power between the executive and legislative branches. The findings also suggest that fiscal arrangements for redistributive payments may increase public investments. Received: March 2000 / Accepted: May 2000     

The failure of Ricardian equivalence under dynastic altruism

This paper investigates the theoretical accuracy of the Barro [Barro, R.J., 1974. Are government bonds net wealth? Journal of Political Economy, 82, 1095–1117] debt neutrality proposition. We first identify a discrepancy between the transversality condition of a social planning problem and the one of altruistically linked overlapping generations. Then, this discrepancy is exploited to construct public debt policies which affect the competitive equilibrium allocation even when bequests are strictly positive in all periods: a violation of Ricardian equivalence.     

RS-485总线通讯技术在红外线报警系统中的应用

文章介绍以PC机和AT87C52单片机组成主从式多机通信系统,并采用串行通信能力较强的RS-485通信方式完成多个下位机向上位机传递信息的任务,并给出了各个模块的有关电路图,以及各部分工作的软件设计方法和要求。     

No Plan B: But is There a ‘Third Way'?

This paper reviews the argument for a slowdown in the fiscal consolidation policy of the UK government. It reviews the existing literature and the evidence of the interwar period in the UK where a recovery occurred without a relaxation of the tight fiscal regime of the period. It argues that even in a zero‐lower‐bound, the evidence for a plan B is weak. Given that there may have been significant capacity destruction, the paper suggests a third way that calls for a supply‐side framework that sets the condition for an improvement in long‐term growth and productivity.     

Exact computation of max weighted score estimators

We show that exact computation of a family of ‘max weighted score’ estimators, including Manski’s max score estimator, can be achieved efficiently by reformulating them as mixed integer programs (MIP) with disjunctive constraints. The advantage of our MIP formulation is that estimates are exact and can be computed using widely available solvers in reasonable time. In a classic work-trip mode choice application, our method delivers exact estimates that lead to a different economic interpretation of the data than previous heuristic estimates. In a small Monte Carlo study we find that our approach is computationally efficient for usual estimation problem sizes.     

Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting

This paper examines various circumstances under which decentralized pollution policies can be efficient both in federal settings and in multi-region settings with labor mobility. We consider a model in which pollution control policies are set by regional governments non-cooperatively and pollution damages are borne by the residents of all regions. We characterize the efficiency of pollution policies, and of population allocation among regions, in a variety of scenarios, including when pollution policies are enacted before interregional transfers are determined by the federal government and before migration occurs; when migration decisions are taken before policy decisions; in the absence of a central government if regional governments can make voluntary interregional transfers; when decisions over pollution control policies are followed by voluntary contributions by regions to a national public good; when regions can commit to matching the abatement efforts of each other; and when regions can commit to specific levels of abatement contingent on the emissions of other regions not exceeding some maximum level.     

Hospitals’ strategic behaviours and patient mobility: Evidence from Italy

This study explores the behaviour of hospitals in Lombardy in attracting patients from outside the region and investigates the effects on the quality of care to regional patients, where treatment of the latter is constrained by a budget cap while extra-regional patients represent an unconstrained source of revenue. The data suggest that hospitals use waiting time and length of stay to attract extra-regional patients. Regional patients in both private and public hospitals with higher proportions of extra-regional patients are characterized by lower mortality rates and reimbursement costs. These results suggest that the market for extra-regional patients has no negative effects on resident patients. Finally, the pattern of reimbursement for extra-regional care generates a financial flow in favour of wealthier regions, exacerbating the North–South divide in the National Health Service. Some form of regulation for extra-regional mobility is advisable to reduce the gap.     

Optimal dynamic tax evasion

We study optimal dynamic tax evasion in the framework proposed by Lin and Yang (2001) and Dzhumashev and Gahramanov (2011) with some modifications: a more flexible utility function, a more realistic audit process, and a penalty function which can be defined both on evaded income and evaded taxes. In the former case the elasticity between tax rate and tax evasion is positive, unless the subsistence consumption level is higher than a given threshold. In the latter case the relationship is usually negative , but the value of elasticity depends on the form of absolute risk aversion. In particular we show that for increasing relative risk aversion, for a tax rate higher than 50%, the elasticity may even become positive. US data are consistent with IRRA preferences.     

Property taxes and home prices: A tale of two cities

We explore the influence of property taxes on home prices, taking advantage of a policy experiment of property taxation in Shanghai and in Chongqing starting from January 2011. Using the approach suggested by Hsiao, Ching and Wan (2012) we estimate hypothetical home prices in the absence of property taxation for Shanghai and Chongqing using home prices in other cities and provinces. We show that the OLS generates consistent estimators when the price series are non-stationary I(1) processes. We apply the model to a panel of average home prices of 31 cities and provinces in China, and find the property-tax experiment lowered the Shanghai average home price by 11%–15% but raised the Chongqing average home prices by 10%–12%. An examination of the policy details and data on prices by home types suggests the post-treatment price increase in Chongqing can be driven by a spillover effect from high-end to low-end properties.     

电力专用数据网络向IPv6过渡的VPN部署

文章研究电力专用数据网络向IPv6过渡的关键技术：VPN技术,并对IPv4VPN技术和IPv6VPN技术进行分析比较,给出电力数据网络向IPv6过渡的VPN部署建议。     

The political economy of fixed regional public expenditure shares with an illustration for Belgian railway investments

Many local public goods are allocated by federal governments using fixed regional shares: every region is entitled a fixed share of the total budget for a particular type of public good. This paper explores two characteristics of this type of allocation. First, it shows that this type of allocation is relatively efficient as it puts a strict budget constraint on the decisive region. Second, we show that these fixed shares can be an equilibrium of different legislative bargaining processes. The working of the fixed sharing rules is illustrated for the allocation of railway investments in Belgium.     

Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods

This paper analyses the effects of taxation and subsidies in an economy with private provision of a public good. It is shown that in a situation where all individuals contribute, taxation affects the equilibrium allocation if and only if at least one individual's voluntary contribution to the public good has an impact on the aggregate tax payments of the others. We then consider linear nonneutral tax-subsidy schemes and analyse efficiency and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibria. We show that an efficient Nash equilibrium, where all individuals contribute, will in general not be unique, and establish a non-uniformity property which a tax-subsidy scheme must fulfil in order to induce a unique interior equilibrium that is efficient. Throughout the paper it is assumed that individuals fully understand and take into account the government's budget constraint. Received: 3 November 1997 / Accepted: 23 March 1999     

象山水电厂计算监控系统改造的论述

象山水电厂计算机监控系统由H9000系统集成和二次开发而成,是新一代分布式水电站计算机监控系统,具有良好的可靠性、可扩充性、可移植性和强大的异机网络互联功能,为电站实现“无人值班（少人值守）”的目标提供了有力的技术保障。     

Characterizing neutrality in the voluntary contribution mechanism

When public goods are provided by voluntary contributions, redistribution of initial holdings among an unchanged set of contributors will not alter the Nash equilibrium allocation.Constraint invariance, where a participant faces the same class of constraints even after her endowment is changed, impliesglobal neutrality under a generalized Nash equilibrium concept. Geometrically,path invariance, where the best response path does not move even after the endowment change, is equivalent to global neutrality assuming a sufficiently rich class of economies. We thank Shinji Ohseto, Hiroaki Osana and Stephen Turnbull for their comments. We are also grateful to an anonymous referee and an associate editor for their comments and suggestion. Research was partially supported by the Nomura Foundation for the Social Sciences and the Grant in Aid for General Research 03803008 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of Japan.     

Mixture models of choice under risk

This paper is concerned with estimating preference functionals for choice under risk from the choice behaviour of individuals. We note that there is heterogeneity in behaviour between individuals and within individuals. By ‘heterogeneity between individuals’ we mean that people are different, in terms of both their preference functionals and their parameters for these functionals. By ‘heterogeneity within individuals’ we mean that the behaviour may be different even by the same individual for the same choice problem. We propose methods of taking into account all forms of heterogeneity, concentrating particularly on using a Mixture Model to capture the heterogeneity of preference functionals.