Sequential selling mechanisms

Summary In this paper we attempt to formalize the idea that a mechanism that involves multilateral communication between buyers and sellers may be dominated by one that involves simple bilateral communication. To do this we consider the well known problem in which a seller tries to sell a single unit of output to a group ofN buyers who have independently distributed private valuations. Our arguments hinge on two considerations. First, buyers communicate their willingness to negotiate with the seller sequentially, and second, buyers have the option of purchasing the good from some alternative supplier. It is shown that the seller cannot improve upon a procedure in which she offers the good to each buyer in turn at a fixed price. The seller reverts to multilateral communication if possible, only when no buyer is willing to pay the fixed price. In reasonable environments buyers will be too impatient to wait for the outcome of a multilateral negotiation and all communications will be bilateral.In many problems in mechanism design, informed traders have no alternative to participation in the mechanism that is offered by its designer. The best mechanism from the designer's point of view is then the one that is most efficient at extracting informational rents, that is, a simple auction. In a competitive environment it is likely to be costly for buyers to participate in an auction or any other multilateral selling scheme in which the seller must process information from many different buyers because alternative trading opportunities will be disappearing during the time that the seller is collecting this information. Buyers might be willing to participate in an auction, but only if they could be guaranteed that the competition that they face will not eliminate too much of their surplus.At the other extreme to the auction is a simple fixed price selling scheme 1. The seller simply waits until he meets a buyer whose valuation is high enough, given the opportunities that exist in the rest of the market, for him to be willing to pay this price. The seller extracts the minimum of the buyer's informational rents since the price that a buyer pays is independent of his valuation. Yet the seller might like this scheme if adding a second bidder to the process makes it very difficult for him to find a buyer with a valuation high enough to want to participate.In the presence of opportunity costs, the seller faces a trade-off between his ability to extract buyers informational rents and his ability to find buyers who are willing to participate in any competitive process. In practice this trade-off will impose structure on the method that is used to determine a price. In markets where there are auctions, limits are put on buyer participation. In tobacco auctions bids are submitted at a distinct point in time from buyers who are present at that time. In real estate auctions time limits are put on the amount of time the seller will wait before making a decision. These restrictions on participation are presumably endogenously selected by the seller (possibly in competition with other mechanism designers) with this trade-off in mind.On the other hand, markets in which objects appear to trade at a fixed price are rarely so simple. A baker with a fixed supply of fresh bagels is unlikely to collect bids from buyers and award the bagels to the high bidder at the end of the day. Buyers are unlikely to be willing to participate in such a scheme since they can buy fresh bagels from a competitor down the street. Yet despite the fact that bagels sell at a fixed price throughout the day, most bakers are more than willing to let it be known that they will discount price at the end of the day on any bagels that they have not yet sold. Selling used cars presents a similar problem. Each potential buyer for the used car is likely to have inspected a number of alternatives, and is likely to know the prices at which these alternative can be obtained. A seller who suggests that buyers submit a bid, then wait until the seller is sure that no higher offer will be submitted is asking buyers to forgo these alternative opportunities with no gain to themselves. To avoid the rigidity of the pure fixed price scheme most used cars are sold for a fixed price or best offer. These examples suggest that the best selling mechanism may involve a complex interplay between participation and surplus extraction considerations.The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formalism within which the factors that determine the best contract can be evaluated. We consider the best known environment from the point of view of auction design in which there are a large number of buyers with independent private valuations for a unit of an indivisible commodity that is being sold by a single supplier who acts as the mechanism designer. We modify this standard problem in two critical ways. First, we assume that the seller meets the potential buyers sequentially rather than all at once. Secondly we assume that buyers have a valuable alternative that yields them a sure surplus. This creates a simple bidding cost that is effectively the expected loss in surplus (created by the disappearance of outside alternatives) that the buyer faces during the time that he spends negotiating with the seller.These simple assumptions allow us to calculate the impact of competition and communication costs using completely standard arguments from the mechanism design literature. We are able to show that with these assumptions the seller's expected surplus will be highest if the object is sold according to the following modified fixed price scheme: the seller contacts each of the potential buyers in turn and either offers to negotiate or announces that he no longer wishes to trade. If he offers to negotiate and the buyer agrees, the buyer immediately has the option of trading for sure with the seller at a fixed price set ex ante. If the buyer does not wish to pay this fixed price, he may submit an alternative bid. The seller will then continue to contact new buyers, returning to trade with the buyer only if no buyer wishes to pay the fixed price and no higher bid is submitted.It will be clear that in our environment, both the simple fixed price scheme and the simple auction are feasible. The simple auction prevails when the fixed price is set equal to the maximum possible valuation, while the simple fixed price scheme occurs when the fixed price is set so that buyers are willing to participate if and only if they are willing to pay the fixed price. Our results will show that a simple auction in never optimal for the seller. The seller can always strictly improve his payoff by moving to a scheme in which there is some strictly positive probability that trade will occur at the fixed price. On the other hand, there are reasonable circumstances in which the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than the one she gets by selling at a fixed price. It is shown that for any positive participation cost, there is a large, but finite, number of potential buyers so that the seller cannot achieve a higher payoff than what she gets by selling at a fixed price. Two simple, but important continuity results are also illustrated. As the cost of participation in the mechanism increases (decreases), the probability with which the seller's unit of output is sold at a fixed price goes to one (zero) in the best modified fixed price mechanism for the seller.Our paper is not the first to generate such a modified fixed price scheme. Both McAfee and McMillan (1988) and Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) come up with similar schemes for the case in which the seller must bear a fixed cost for each new buyer that she contacts. There are two essential differences between our model and theirs. First, as the cost is interpreted as the opportunity cost of participation in the mechanism, it is reasonable to imagine that the seller advertises the mechanism ex ante. Another way of putting this is that the seller pays a fixed rather than a variable cost to communicate the mechanism to buyers. This makes it possible to assume that the mechanism is common knowledge to the seller and all the buyers at the beginning of the communication process. For this reason we can make our case using completely standard arguments. Secondly, the mechanism in the opportunity cost case plays a different allocative role than it does in the case when the seller bears a cost. The mechanism must decide whether buyers should communicate with the seller or pursue their alternative activities, as well as who should trade and at what price. It is this allocative role that makes bilateral communication superior to multilateral communication in a competitive environment. These differences allow us to show, for example, that a simple fixed price scheme is undominated for the seller when the number of buyers is finite. As shown by McAfee and McMillan, this is only possible when the number of potential buyers is infinite when the seller bears the cost of communication.Remarkably, the existence of opportunity costs to buyer participation is not, by itself, sufficient to explain why sellers might prefer bilateral communications mechanisms. Samuelson (1983) and McAfee and McMillan (1987) show that when buyers must pay a fixed cost to submit a bid, which is equivalent to giving up a valuable alternative, a seller cannot expect to earn more than she does in a second price auction (though Samuelson shows that the reserve price may depend on the number of potential buyers). One of the contributions of this paper is to show that the assumption that buyers make their participation decisions simultaneously is critical to this result. Simultaneous entry decisions means that whether or not any particular buyer is assigned to the alternative activity is independent of any other buyer's valuation. With sequential communication the seller is able to relax this constraint. It is precisely the enlargement of the class of feasible mechanism that breaks down the optimality of the simple auction.The second author acknowledges the support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the CRDE at the Université de Montreal.     

金融支持国防知识产权成果转化问题及策略研究

国防知识产权成果转化应用是国防科技创新体系建设落地见效的关键环节,引入现代金融体系能够有效促进国防知识产权成果转化。目前我国国防知识产权转化工作在组织管理体制、工作运行体系、法规政策制度和信息化建设等方面初显成效,但仍面临整体转化形势不容乐观、金融支持体系尚未成熟等问题,根本原因在于国防知识产权与发明人割裂导致一般金融产品难以通过审核,使融资渠道狭窄;其保密性进一步加大了与金融机构间的信息不对称,使得金融资源配置效率低下;国防知识产权专用性较强,相应抬高了融资成本。为有效解决上述问题,提出3条改进措施,以实现对国防知识产权转化的金融支持,即①从顶层设计上优化解密脱密流程,明确发明人与知识产权的权属关系,细化财税优惠等支持措施;②加强政府财政税收政策支持,引导创新利用多元社会资本进入支持转化领域;③建立各主体参与的金融服务协调保障机制、监测评估体系,启动国防知识产权转化的金融支持试点工作,构建符合国情的国防知识产权转化金融支持体系。     

A monopolistic market for information

We analyze a model where traders buy information from a monopolistic seller, which is subsequently used in a speculative market. In order to overcome the dilution in the value of information due to its leakage through informative prices, the seller of information may prefer to sell noisier versions of the information he actually has. Moreover, to obtain higher profits, it is desirable for the seller to sell different signals to different traders, so that the added noise realizations do not affect equilibrium prices. One way of doing so, which does not require discrimination, is to sell identically distributed personalized signals to each of a large number of traders.     

What You Think You Know: The Effects of Prior Financial Education and Readability on Financial Disclosure Processing

Disclosures in advertising and other forms of marketing communication have been examined as a means to help consumers understand complex financial information and make more informed decisions regarding financial products and services. The authors extend inquiry into this supposition by looking at the readability of disclosures in relation to consumer financial literacy. In an experiment, it was found that while highly readable disclosures facilitate more accurate information processing for those with prior financial education, such disclosures might actually inhibit accurate processing for those without prior financial education. This suggests that policy cannot rely on mandated disclosure in marketing communications alone. Rather, disclosures in financial product or services communication can only be effective if such disclosures are paired with other forms of education leading to greater financial literacy.     

An update on legal aspects of plan communications

Plan communications can be a real challenge for trustees, unions and management, but effective communications are essential because they provide the link between plan sponsors' efforts to provide benefits and the actual receipt of those benefits by participants. Communication-related issues that must be considered by those responsible for keeping plan participants informed include ERISA provisions, the need for accurate information, disclosures concerning possible benefit plan changes, COBRA rights and HIPAA provisions.     

Corporate governance and default prediction: a reality test

Default prediction has commanded the attention of researchers for at least 50 years. This paper addresses several testable hypotheses regarding the relations between corporate governance and default prediction. We employ the conventional logistic regression to provide empirical evidence from U.S. default data over the period of 2000 to 2015. Empirical results are consistent with the following notions: First, default firms are associated with high ownership concentration, low shareholder rights, low financial transparency and disclosures, and less board effectiveness. Second, in-sample and out-of-sample tests support the incremental contribution of corporate governance information on default prediction, when compared with the models involving just financial information.     

Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable

Abstract.  This paper studies the incentives of an information seller to provide precise information when precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price. I show that the seller can verify her precision by employing a non‐linear contract. I derive the equilibrium fee for information as a function of the seller's incentives, the sales volume, and buyers' trading intensity. I also analyse the implications of allowing the seller to trade on her own account for truthfulness and precision choice. JEL Classification: G11, G14, D42     

Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty

This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.     

Asymmetric information in bilateral trade and in markets: An inversion result

I consider bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer with private valuations. The seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it price offer. If the seller observes the buyer?s valuation (symmetric information), bilateral trade is trivially efficient. If the seller cannot observe the valuation (asymmetric information), bilateral trade is inefficient. This bilateral trading game is embedded into a large matching market. In the steady-state equilibrium of the market game, the relation between the informational regime and efficiency is inverted: With small frictions efficiency obtains if information is asymmetric. If information is symmetric, however, the trading outcome can be very inefficient—even if frictions vanish.     

Price-setting power vs. private information: An experimental evaluation of their impact on holdup

This paper investigates the extent of the holdup problem in a buyer–seller relationship in which the seller has private information about his alternative opportunities. Theory predicts that, compared to a situation in which outside options are publicly observed, the seller obtains an informational rent whereas the buyer bears an informational loss. As a result the seller is predicted to invest more while the buyer is expected to invest less. In contrast to this, private information has no impact on the investment levels observed in the experiment. But actual investments do increase with the price-setting power of the investor. These findings are roughly consistent with a model in which agents are inequality-averse. Overall the results question some recent theoretical suggestions that private information rents might substitute for price-setting power in mitigating holdup.     

Intertemporal self-selection with multiple buyers

Summary We consider a monopolist selling durable goods to consumers with unit demands but different preferences for quality. The seller can offer items of different quality at the same time to induce buyers to self-select, as in Mussa-Rosen (1978), but is not artificially constrained to offer only one such menu. Instead the seller can offer without precommitment asequence of menus over time. In the two-buyer case where the seller has complete information about each buyer's marginal valuation for quality, the seller's profits exceed what can be obtained from a single menu and sometimes approximate the profits of a perfectly discriminating monopolist. In companion papers (Bagnoli et al., 1990, 1992), we show that these conclusions continue to hold (1) in the infinite-horizon case with any finite number of buyers and (2) in two-period examples where the seller has incomplete information about buyer preferences.     

Price and information disclosure in the private art market: A signalling game

In this paper, we model private art market agents’ strategic interactions in presence of two types of asymmetric information, about artwork quality and buyer’s knowledge, assuming the seller does not know how informed is the buyer while the buyer does not know the quality of the artwork before purchase. If the seller can choose either a high or a low price and the buyer can signal his type to the seller, we identify the conditions for both equilibria with pooling buyer signalling strategy and with separating strategy, as well as conditions for equilibria where the seller fixes the price according to the actual quality and where he posts prices trying to take advantage of buyer’s limited information. Finally, we identify the condition for the emergence of a “counter-lemon” result, where low-quality artworks and uninformed collectors exit the market, suggesting that seller uncertainty does not directly benefit the buyers, but it can impact the quality traded in the market.     

Monopolistic screening and uninformed buyers

In the standard monopolistic screening problem, buyers obtain information rent as a result of possessing private information; if a contract can be offered before the buyer knows his valuation, the seller can extract the full (expected) surplus. I consider a situation where the buyer may or may not have private information about his valuation at the time the contract is offered. Is the seller (strictly) better off as compared to the standard situation? The answer depends crucially on the specific model. In the 2-types model, unless the probability (that the buyer is uninformed) reaches a critical threshold, the seller is unable to benefit from the buyer's ignorance. In the continuum-types model, on the other hand, optimal expected profit is strictly higher than in the standard model whenever this probability is positive.     

Misled and mis-sold: financial misbehaviour in retail banks?

We use an audit methodology where auditors ask for tax saving instruments from banks and document the disclosures made on product features at the time of sale. In private sector banks with high sales incentives, the high commission product is recommended. In public sector banks, where there are deposit mobilisation targets, fixed deposits are recommended. Banks rarely make voluntary disclosures on product features. When specifically requested, information provided is inaccurate or incomplete. Our results demonstrate the challenges of mandating disclosures when buyers have little understanding of the relevance of product characteristics, and distributors are themselves ignorant or influenced by incentives. They also raise concerns regarding private sector banking without regulatory capacity.     

Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

We analyse a situation where a monopolist is selling an indivisible good to risk-neutral buyers who only have an estimate of their private valuations. The seller can release, without observing, certain additional signals that affect the buyers' valuations. Our main result is that in the expected revenue-maximizing mechanism, the seller makes available all the information that she can, and her expected revenue is the same as it would be if she could observe the part of the information that is "new" to the buyers. We also show that this mechanism can be implemented by what we call a handicap auction in interesting applications. In the first round of this auction, each buyer picks a price premium from a menu offered by the seller (a smaller premium costs more). Then the seller releases the additional signals. In the second round, the buyers bid in a second-price auction where the winner pays the sum of his premium and the second highest non-negative bid. In the case of a single buyer, this mechanism simplifies to a menu of European call options.     

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? An experimental test of adverse selection theory

In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from the symmetric information benchmark, while in the bad state, private information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses. While the results largely corroborate the theoretical predictions, we also find that private information may be welfare-enhancing in the good state.     

公司治理文化与会计信息披露互动：理论与案例

公司治理制度遵从民主决策和监督原则,公司治理文化的精髓是责任和诚信;会计信息披露是代理人与外部利益相关者沟通的制度安排,客观公正是会计信息披露的价值取向,公司治理文化与会计信息披露之间存在互动关系。公司治理文化模式取决于企业权力配置格局和治理主体的诚信。案例研究表明,公司治理文化对会计信息披露发挥了主导作用;会计信息披露不仅反映公司治理的结果,体现公司治理文化特征,而且还反作用于公司治理。     

Optimal auctions with information acquisition

This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information gathering. We develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers, who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation in the auction. We first demonstrate that the optimal monopoly price is always lower than the standard monopoly price. We then show that standard auctions with a reserve price remain optimal among symmetric mechanisms, but the optimal reserve price lies between the ex ante mean valuation of bidders and the standard reserve price in Myerson (1981). Finally, we show that the optimal asymmetric mechanism softens the price discrimination against “strong” bidders.     

Bundle and separate sales in auctions with entry

A seller sells dissimilar objects while taking the auction rule as given. Should the seller sell the objects separately or as a bundle? Generally, when the number of bidders is small bundling helps to stimulate the competition and raise revenue. In this paper, we show that if entry is costly enough the process of endogenous participation generates sufficient competition to make bundling unnecessary in auctions. Thus whether a bundle auction generates a higher or a lower revenue ultimately depends first on the level of the entry costs and then, possibly, on the number of potential bidders.     

Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition

Negotiations about a merger or acquisition are often sequential and only partially disclose to bidders information about each otherʼs bids. This paper explains the seller optimality of partial disclosure in a single-item private-value auction with two bidders. Each bidder can inspect the item at a nonprohibitive cost. If a revenue-maximizing seller cannot charge bidders for the information about the otherʼs bid, then the seller optimally runs a sequential second-price auction with a reserve price and a buy-now price. The seller prefers to keep the bids confidential and, sometimes, to hide the order in which he approaches the bidders.