Collective Voice under Decentralized Bargaining: A Comparative Study of Work Reorganization in US and German Call Centres

This article compares the process of and outcomes from work reorganization in US and German call centres, based on four matched case studies in the telecommunications industry. Both German cases adopted high‐involvement employment systems with broad skills and worker discretion, while the US cases relied on a narrow division of labour, tight discipline and individual incentives. These outcomes are explained by differences in institutional supports for collective voice. Works councils in the German companies used their stronger participation rights to limit monitoring and encourage upskilling at a time when US managers were rationalizing similar jobs. Findings demonstrate that industrial relations institutions can have a substantial influence on employment systems in work settings characterized by decentralized bargaining and strong cost pressures.     

Works Councils,Collective Bargaining,and Apprenticeship Training – Evidence From German Firms

In this paper, we investigate the effects of works councils on apprenticeship training in Germany. The German law attributes works councils substantial information and co‐determination rights to training‐related issues. Thus, works councils may also have an impact on the cost‐benefit relation of workplace training. Using detailed firm‐level data containing information on the costs and benefits of apprenticeship training, we find that firms with works councils make a significantly higher net investment in training compared to firms without such an institution. We also find that the fraction of former trainees still employed with the same firm 5 years after training is significantly higher in the presence of works councils, thus enabling firms to recoup training investments over a longer time horizon. Furthermore, all works council effects are much more pronounced for firms covered by collective bargaining agreements.     

U.S. High‐Performance Work Practices at Century's End

This study examines the incidence, industry differences, and economic environment of work practices in the United States in 1994 and 1997 using census data from a nationally representative random sample of establishments. Self‐managed work teams were used by a majority of workers in some sites. Work‐related meetings had higher incidence. A high‐performance work organization is used in about 1 percent of establishments. There were significant industry differences associated with globalization, namely, imports and exports.     

Unions and Collective Bargaining in the Wake of the Great Recession: Evidence from Portugal

Against the backdrop of its industrial relations architecture, characteristic of the ‘southern European group’ and intimately linked to the recommendations of the Troika, this paper examines four key aspects of Portuguese collective bargaining. First, it provides definitive estimates of private sector union density for that nation. Second, it models the determinants of union density at firm level. Third, it yields estimates of the union wage gap for different ranges of union density. The final issue examined is contract coverage. The received notion that the pronounced reduction in the number of industry‐wide agreements and extension ordinances of late is to be equated with a fall in coverage is shown to be a chimera, the number of workers covered by new and existing agreements remaining largely unaffected by the economic crisis. The reduced frequency of new agreements and extensions is instead attributed to downward nominal wage rigidity in low‐inflation regimes.     

Interest Arbitration and the Narcotic Effect: Evidence from Three Decades of Collective Bargaining in Ontario

We study whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration, that is, a narcotic or addictive effect or, alternatively, positive state dependence, in public sector contract settlements. We use contract data from three sectors (police, firefighters and hospitals) in the Canadian province of Ontario, which covers 1981 to 2012. The length of our study period yields much longer bargaining histories than previously used, which should provide more compelling evidence on whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration to settle bargaining impasses over time. We obtain our estimates using a dynamic probit model with random effects that models the initial conditions. Our estimates indicate — across all the sectors we consider and some robustness checks — that there is a narcotic effect in interest arbitration usage despite very different average propensities to use arbitration across sectors.     

Firm‐Level Collective Bargaining and Wages in Greece: A Quantile Decomposition Analysis

This article analyzes the effect of firm‐level contracting on the wage structure in the Greek private sector. Using a matched employer–employee dataset for 2006, unconditional quantile regressions and relevant decomposition methods, we identify a wage premium associated with firm‐level contracting, which follows a hump‐shaped profile across the wage distribution. Further, the wage differential between workers under firm‐level and broader‐level collective agreements can be primarily attributed to the differences in the regime‐specific wage setting structure, for those below the median of the unconditional wage distribution, and to differences in worker and firm‐specific characteristics for those in the upper tail.     

We Want Them All Covered! Collective Bargaining and Firm Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Germany

This article establishes a link between the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry and collective bargaining coverage of the firms in the industry. In a stylized unionized oligopoly model, we show that differences in productivity levels can affect the design of collective wage contracts a sector‐union offers to heterogeneous firms. Using German linked employer–employee data, we test a range of our theoretical hypotheses and find empirical support for them. The dispersion of sector‐level labour productivity decreases the likelihood of firms being covered by a collective bargaining agreement on the industry level, but increases the likelihood of firms being covered by firm‐level agreements. The results hold for different subsamples and (panel) estimation techniques.     

Rent‐Sharing under Different Bargaining Regimes: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using Belgian linked employer–employee data, we examine how collective bargaining arrangements affect the relationship between firms' profitability and individual wages via rent‐sharing. In industries where agreements are usually renegotiated at firm‐level (‘decentralized industries’) wages and firm‐level profits are positively correlated regardless of the type of collective wage agreement by which the workers are covered (industry or firm). On the other hand, where firm‐level wage renegotiation is less common (‘centralized industries’), wages are only significantly related to firms' profitability for workers covered by a firm‐level collective agreement. Thus, industry‐wide contracts that are not complemented by a firm‐level collective agreement suppress the impact of firm profits on workers' wages in centralized industries.     

Competition & Innovation: Evidence from U.S. Patent and Productivity Data

Is there any evidence that innovation and technological progress are constrained by competition and fostered by monopoly power? Our results, based on a constructed dataset of U.S. manufacturing industries observed over more than two decades, suggest that this is not the case. On the contrary, using both patent statistics and productivity growth as alternative measures of innovation and technological change, we observe faster technological advances in more competitive markets. These results are robust to changes in the econometric techniques used to model nonlinearity in the competition‐innovation relationship and to alternative methods of computing market power.     

Policy-Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead Phasedown

Theory suggests that economic instruments, such as pollution taxes or tradable permits, can provide more efficient technology adoption incentives than conventional regulatory standards. We explore this issue for an important industry undergoing dramatic decreases in allowed pollution – the U.S. petroleum industry's phasedown of lead in gasoline. Using a duration model applied to a panel of refineries from 1971–1995, we find that the pattern of technology adoption is consistent with an economic response to market incentives, plant characteristics, and alternative policies. Importantly, evidence suggests that the tradable permit system used during the phasedown provided incentives for more efficient technology adoption decisions.     

Collective Bargaining,Inter‐Sectoral Heterogeneity and Competitiveness: A Cross‐National Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance

Research on the performance effects of bargaining remains inconclusive. One reason for this is neglect of heterogeneity of the bargainers, namely differences in exposure to world markets and their implications for international competitiveness. Since the effects of bargaining on competitiveness depend on coping with productivity differentials between the exposed and sheltered sector, we discuss how distinct bargaining structures interact with these differentials. Exposed‐sector pattern setting is predicted to be the only bargaining structure that is sensitive to productivity differentials. The findings from time series cross‐sectional analysis corroborate the expected impact on labour costs and the current balance, whereas no employment effects are discernible.     

Institutionalized Involvement: Teams and Stress in 1990s U.S. Steel

Is employee involvement universally either good or bad, a “best practice” or an exploitative tool—or do its effects depend on context? To shed light on this issue, I ask the following question: Do organizational–cultural factors determine whether employees are stressed by membership in teams? By constructing mixed‐effects models from a large mid‐1990s survey of U.S. steel employees, I find that team membership is linked to increased stress only when implemented in cultural contexts of conflict and distrust. I conclude that the unintended consequences of institutionalized formal practices depend on organizationally specific cultural conditions.     

Geography and power in an organizational forum: Evidence from the U.S. Senate Chamber

We examine the role that geography plays in structuring interactions within an organizational setting designed to promote broad patterns of interaction: the organizational forum. We propose that, within a forum, an individual's location structures his or her access to peer support, but individuals with power (i.e., those who control the flow of organizational resources) can transcend these geographic constraints. We examine these propositions with data collected on strategic actors in the U.S. Senate Chamber. Using a dyad fixed effects approach, time‐varying controls, selection‐on‐observables estimation, and quasi‐exogenous shocks to seating arrangements, we find support for our propositions. These results contribute to our understanding of strategic interaction patterns, with an emphasis on the geographic scaffold upon which strategic actions are constructed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Universal service subsidies and cost overstatement: Evidence from the U.S. telecommunications sector

Utility subsidies are often defended as promoting universal service. However, specific support formulas may be poorly targeted and/or designed. The U.S. high-cost loop support (HCLS) program (formerly referred to as the Universal Service Fund (USF)), has been a key component of the FCC's USF program. With proposed initiatives for universal access to broadband, it is useful to critically evaluate how the HCLS creates a moral hazard problem. This study finds that companies receiving HCLS subsidies have an incentive to report high costs to the FCC in order to qualify for still higher support payments. Using data from 1136 rural telecom firms in 50 states (1992-2002), this study shows that some companies respond to current incentives by overstating costs (or incurring higher costs) as they approach the subsidy cutoff points. Compared to the no-subsidy group, companies at the point of greatest subsidy jump appear to overstate costs more due to larger marginal benefits. Such perverse incentives need to be recognized in future universal service initiatives.     

The Innovation Value Chain in New Technology‐Based Firms: Evidence from the U.K.

Innovation is central to the survival and growth of firms, and ultimately to the health of the economies of which they are part. A clear understanding both of the processes by which firms perform innovation and the benefits which flow from innovation in terms of productivity and growth is therefore essential. This paper demonstrates the use of a conceptual framework and modeling tool, the innovation value chain (IVC), and shows how the IVC approach helps to highlight strengths and weaknesses in the innovation performance of a key group of firms—new technology‐based firms. The value of the IVC is demonstrated in showing the key interrelationships in the whole process of innovation from sourcing knowledge through product and process innovation to performance in terms of the growth and productivity outcomes of different types of innovation. The use of the IVC highlights key complementarities, such as that between internal R&D, external R&D, and other external sources of knowledge. Other important relationships are also highlighted. Skill resources matter throughout the IVC, being positively associated with external knowledge linkages and innovation success, and also having a direct influence on growth independent of the effect on innovation. A key benefit of the IVC approach is therefore its ability to highlight the roles of different factors at various stages of the knowledge–innovation–performance nexus, and to show their indirect as well as direct impact. This in turn permits both managerial and policy implications to be drawn.     

Long‐Run Patterns of Labour Market Polarization: Evidence from German Micro Data

The past four decades have witnessed dramatic changes in the structure of employment. In particular, the rapid increase in computational power has led to large‐scale reductions in employment in jobs that can be described as intensive in routine tasks. These jobs have been shown to be concentrated in middle‐skill occupations. A large literature on labour market polarization characterizes and measures these processes at an aggregate level. However, to date, there is little information regarding the individual worker adjustment processes related to routine‐biased technological change. Using an administrative panel dataset for Germany, we follow workers over an extended period of time and provide evidence of both the short‐term adjustment process and medium‐run effects of routine task‐intensive job loss at an individual level. We initially demonstrate a marked, and steady, shift in employment away from routine, middle‐skill, occupations. In subsequent analysis, we demonstrate how exposure to jobs with higher routine task content is associated with a reduced likelihood of being in employment in both the short term (after one year) and medium term (five years). This employment penalty to routineness of work has increased over the past four decades. More generally, we demonstrate that routine task work is associated with reduced job stability and more likelihood of experiencing periods of unemployment. However, these negative effects of routine work appear to be concentrated in increased employment to employment, and employment to unemployment transitions rather than longer periods of unemployment.     

Collective Bargaining and Technological Investment: The Case of Nurses’ Unions and the Transition from Paper‐Based to Electronic Health Records

Does the presence of a unionized nursing workforce retard US hospitals’ transition from paper‐based to electronic health records (EHRs)? After tying archival data on hospitals’ structural features and health information technology (IT) investment patterns to self‐gathered data on unionism, I find that hospitals that bargain collectively with their registered nurses (RNs) appear to delay or forego the transition away from paper, consistent with existing theory and research in industrial relations and institutional economics. However, this relationship is fully mediated by a hospital's payer mix: those serving a larger share of less lucrative, elderly, disabled and indigent patients are more likely to adopt EHRs if they are unionized than if they are not, a result that holds even at the median payer mix. Indeed, this accords with research on the interplay of labour and technology as the aforementioned dynamics are driven entirely by RN‐exclusive bargaining units for whom the new IT serves as a complement rather than as a substitute in production. Given the outsized role that unions play in the US healthcare sector, the overall sluggish performance of the sector, and the expectations that policymakers have for EHRs, evidence that these unions are welfare‐enhancing should be welcome news.     

High‐Involvement Work Practices and the Opportunities for Promotion in the Organization

Using the linked employer–employee component from the National Employer Survey, I examine the effect of employees’ participation in high‐involvement work practices (HIWP) on their opportunities for promotion within the organization. I find participation in HIWP to be positively related to promotion opportunities for individuals, especially for those in lower hierarchical levels and for the supervisors of these levels. In part, these findings can be explained by the new skills acquired while participating in these practices through formal training and informal on‐the‐job learning, and by the use of promotions as an incentive mechanism to motivate workers to engage in HIWP.     

Per-customer quantity limit and price discrimination: Evidence from the U.S. residential mortgage market

Theoretically, if firms face a regulatory per-customer quantity limit, they should have an incentive to discriminatively charge high-demand customers higher prices and make them just willing to buy a quantity equal to the limit. In the U.S. residential mortgage industry, mortgages with origination balances above the conforming loan limits cannot be guaranteed by government-sponsored enterprises, which make lenders face a per-customer quantity limit. This paper finds that borrowers bunching at the limit pay higher interest rates due to price discrimination. This study rules out the alternative explanation that those borrowers are of higher risk (lending cost) than other borrowers.