Social welfare,parental altruism,and inequality

When individuals have heterogeneous and persistent degrees of one‐sided parental altruism, inequality may grow large and standard social welfare criteria are problematic. If the planner selects Pareto optimal allocations based on some target level of consumption inequality, the solution implies an aggregation of individuals' utilities that is strongly asymmetric and biased toward the less altruistic dynasties. If instead, the planner uses a symmetric utilitarian criterion, the solution is likely to generate a large degree of long‐run inequality (even relative to laissez‐faire competitive equilibria), it can only be decentralized with negative estate taxes or lower bounds on bequests, and it is time‐inconsistent.     

Social welfare orderings for ratio-scale measurable utilities

Summary. This article characterizes all of the continuous social welfare orderings which satisfy the Weak (resp. Strong) Pareto principle when utilities are ratio-scale measurable. With Weak Pareto, on both the nonnegative and positive orthants the social welfare ordering must be representable by a weakly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function while on the whole Euclidean space the social welfare ordering must be strongly dictatorial. With Strong Pareto, on the positive orthant the social welfare ordering must be representable by a strictly increasing Cobb-Douglas social welfare function but on the other two domains an impossibility theorem is obtained. Received: July 31, 1995; revised version August 7, 1996     

On the impossibility of complete Non-Interference in Paretian social judgements

We study a principle of ‘Non-Interference’ in social welfare judgements. Non-Interference captures aspects of liberal approaches (particularly a Millian approach) to social decision making. In its full generality, Non-Interference produces an impossibility result: together with Weak Pareto Optimality, it implies that a social welfare ordering must be dictatorial. However, interesting restricted versions of Non-Interference are compatible with standard social welfare orderings.     

Multidimensional Inequality Across Three Developed Countries

This paper produces comparable estimates of multidimensional inequality for the U.S., Germany, and Australia. Two alternative approaches with differing interpretations are employed. The first method projects all facets of welfare onto a single variable which is then analyzed using standard univariate techniques. The second approach establishes equivalent‐income distributions that would lead to an equalization of welfare, such that the difference between this counterfactual and the true income distribution can be measured. This difference is then interpreted as the degree of income redistribution required to offset welfare inequality. Using data on permanent incomes, health scores, years of education, and leisure times, we observe much higher levels of inequality in the U.S. than in Germany or Australia. Our results are highly statistically significant and hold over a large variety of weighting specifications.     

COOPERATIVE MANAGERIAL DELEGATION,R&D AND COLLUSION

Existing literature on managerial delegation indicates that collusive outcomes can be obtained in an oligopoly game through cooperative managerial delegation. In contrast, this paper shows that, if managers are delegated to choose R&D, in addition to choosing production levels, full‐collusive outcomes cannot be achieved through cooperative delegation. Moreover, (i) under cooperative delegation, semi‐collusion always yields lower profit, higher R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than that in the case of competition and (ii) cooperative delegation leads to a higher profit lower R&D, higher price and lower social welfare than the no delegation case, irrespective of product market conduct.     

MEASURING VARIATIONS IN LIFETIME WELFARE EX ANTE AND EX POST: SOME EXPLORATORY CALCULATIONS

Whereas longevity‐adjusted consumption measures have become increasingly used as indicators of lifetime standards of living, it remained unnoticed that those measures, by relying on period – rather than cohort – life tables, constitute indicators of expected – rather than actual – lifetime standards of living. In order to estimate the actual gap between ex ante and ex post measures of lifetime welfare, this paper computes, for 19th‐century European economies, longevity‐adjusted consumption measures based on period and cohort life tables. It is shown that the gap between ex ante and ex post measures is statistically significant, and that attempts to reduce it are likely to be unsuccessful, because standards of living tend to exhibit, over temporal horizons as long as a human life, structural breaks, which make the ex ante measurement of lifetime welfare highly speculative.     

Teach a man to fish? Education vs. optimal taxation

Abstract In models of redistribution, differences in human capital are often the relevant source of heterogeneity among individuals. Presumably, the distribution of human capital can be manipulated through education spending. This paper examines the use of education as a redistributive tool when there is a non‐linear tax system in place. The results show that taxation, whether under full or asymmetric information, substantially reduces the redistributive role of education spending in maximizing social welfare. This points to a conflict between the equalization of utility and human capital outcomes.     

The Normative Problem of Merit Goods in Perspective

Abstract

In his Theory of Public Finance (1959), Musgrave invented the concept of merit wants to describe public wants that are satisfied by goods provided by the government in violation of the principle of consumer sovereignty. Starting from Musgrave’s mature discussion (1987), I construct two categories to classify the explanations of merit goods. The first strand of thought attempts to justify merit goods within the New welfare economics, by modifying its assumptions to accommodate irrationality, uncertainty, lack of information, and psychic externalities. The second category encompasses more radical departures from consumer sovereignty, drawn from philosophical critiques of economics. In the third part of the paper, I argue that the two strands might be represented by a non-individualistic social welfare function. I also show how this solution echoes Musgrave’s early views on public expenditures before he coined the concept of merit wants. From an historical perspective, the survival of the concept highlights the persistence of a social point of view in welfare economics.     

A Measure Of The Trade‐Off Between Responsiveness and Nondictatorship for Arrovian Social Welfare Functions

If individuals are never indifferent between distinct alternatives then for any transitive‐valued social welfare function satisfying IIA, and any fraction t, either the set of pairs of alternatives that are socially ordered without consulting more than one individual's preferences comprises at least the fraction t of all pairs, or else the fraction of pairs that have their social ordering determined independently of everyone's s preferences exceeds, or is very close to, 1 ?t. The Pareto criterion is not imposed. (There is also a version of this result for the domain of preferences that admit indifference.)     

Interdependent welfare functions and optimal income distribution

The relationship between income distribution and social welfare is empirically analyzed, while explicitly allowing for the interdependence of individual welfare functions. The social welfare function is taken to be an additive function of individual welfare functions of income (WFIs). On the basis of Dutch data it is found that under certain conditions (such as absence of effects of income redistribution on productivity) an equal distribution of incomes is suboptimal. The interdependence of WFIs appears to have a pronounced effect on policy conclusions concerning the desirability of income redistribution vis-à-vis economic growth.     

The social cost of living index

Household cost of living indexes reflect household preferences; analogous indexes for groups of households require a corresponding concept of group preferences. In this paper I investigate the ‘social cost of living index’, a group index based on the Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. I first define the index and examine its properties under the assumption that the investigator constructing it expresses his distributional judgments in an explicit Bergson- Samuelson social welfare function; I then examine the ‘maximizing society’ and the ‘independent society’, two cases in which the index can be constructed from the information contained in the market demand functions. In these two cases a Laspeyres index (i.e. the fixed weight index based on the reference consumption pattern) is an upper bound on the exact social cost of living index. In general, however, the assumptions required to place bounds on the social cost of living index are much more likely to be satisfied than those required to place analogous bounds on a household's cost of living index.     

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ANALYSIS OF THEIR SOCIAL VALUE*

ABSTRACT: This article applies political economy theory to public‐private partnerships (PPPs). First, we propose that social welfare is the appropriate normative evaluation criterion to evaluate the social value of PPPs. Second, we specify the goals of PPP participants, including private‐sector partners and governments. Third, we review the observed outcomes of PPPs and analyze them from both a political economy perspective and a social welfare perspective. Fourth, based on a comparison of the actual outcomes of PPPs to normatively desirable social welfare outcomes, we propose some ‘rules for governments’ concerning the design of government PPP institutions and the management of PPPs. We argue that if governments were to adopt these rules there would be fewer PPPs in total, they would be more like traditional government contracts and there would be a greater likelihood of improved social welfare. However, political economy theory also explains why implementation of any reform will be difficult.     

A Welfare Ranking of Multilateral Reductions in Real and Tariff Trade Barriers when Firms are Heterogenous

Trade liberalization comes about through reductions in various types of trade barriers. This paper introduces, apart from the customary real trade costs (i.e. iceberg and fixed export costs), two revenue generating trade barriers (i.e. an ad valorem tariff and a trade license) into a standard heterogeneous‐firms‐trade model with Pareto distributed productivities. We derive analytical welfare rankings of all four liberalization channels for an equal effect on two openness measures, for any trade cost level and while all four barriers are simultaneously present, i.e. for any initial equilibrium. We show that when openness is measured at retail prices, not border prices, the welfare rankings are sensitive to the degree of efficiency in revenue redistribution, e.g. the share of tariff revenues wasted on rent‐seeking activities. As a result, multilateral tariff reductions can switch from the least to the most preferred mode of liberalization. Among the other three barriers we establish a universal welfare ranking for any strictly positive level of revenue redistribution and for either measure of openness.     

On the Growth and Welfare Effects of Defense R&D

In the United States, defense R&D share of GDP has decreased significantly since 1960. To analyze the implications on growth and welfare, we develop an R&D‐based growth model that features the commonly discussed crowding‐out and spillover effects of defense R&D on civilian R&D. The model also captures the effects of defense technology on (a) national security resembling consumption‐type public goods and (b) aggregate productivity via the spin‐off effect resembling productive public goods. In this framework, economic growth is driven by market‐based civilian R&D as in standard R&D‐based growth models and government‐financed public goods (i.e., defense R&D) as in Barro (1990). We find that defense R&D has an inverted‐U effect on growth, and the growth‐maximizing level of defense R&D is increasing in the spillover and spin‐off effects. As for the welfare‐maximizing level of defense R&D, it is increasing in the security‐enhancing effect of defense technology, and there exists a critical degree of this security‐enhancing effect below (above) which the welfare‐maximizing level is below (above) the growth‐maximizing level.     

Spillovers,subsidies, and second‐best socially optimal R&D

This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and the cartelized research joint venture (or joint lab). We introduce the notion of a social joint lab, as a way for the planner to avoid wasteful R&D duplication. With no spillovers, the non‐cooperative scenario, the joint lab, and the second‐best planner's solutions coincide. However, with spillovers, all three scenarios yield R&D investments that fall short of the socially optimal level. To shed light on the role of the spillover level on these comparisons, we observe that the gaps between the market outcomes and the planners solutions widen as the spillover parameter increases. Finally, we establish that a social planner and a social joint lab solutions may be achieved starting from any of the three scenarios by offering firms respective suitably weighted quadratic R&D subsidization schedules.     

Welfare effects of short-sale constraints under heterogeneous beliefs

This paper examines the welfare effects of short-sale constraints in an overlapping generations model of a financial economy with heterogeneous beliefs by focussing on the case of rational beliefs in the sense of Kurz (Econ Theory 4:877–900, 1994). To measure the social welfare, we adopt a measure that is based on the ex post social welfare concept in the sense of Hammond (Economica 48:235–250, 1981), instead of the standard ex ante criterion, since heterogeneity in beliefs invalidates it. Simulation results indicate the existence of socially optimal short-sale constraints.     

Tax Havens,Growth, and Welfare

This paper develops an endogenous growth model featuring tax havens, and uses it to examine how the existence of tax havens affects the economic growth rate and social welfare in high‐tax countries. We show that the presence of tax havens generates two conflicting channels in determining the growth effect. First, the public investment effect states that tax havens may erode tax revenues and in turn decrease the government's infrastructure expenditure, thereby reducing growth. Second, the tax planning effect of tax havens reduces marginal cost of capital and hence encourages capital accumulation so as to spur economic growth. The overall growth effect is ambiguous and is determined by the extent of these two effects. The welfare analysis shows that tax havens are more likely to be welfare‐enhancing if the government expenditure share in production is low, or the initial income tax rate is high. Moreover, the welfare‐maximizing income tax rate is lower than the growth‐maximizing income tax rate if tax havens are present.     

On the Relevance of John Rawls's Theory of Justice to Welfare Economics

Mainstream microeconomic theory makes some use of John Rawls's Theory of Justicein discussing welfare economics and social welfare functionals. While various elements of his approach are usually mentioned, his basic point is generally taken to be his difference principle (maximizing the welfare of the worst off individual) applied as a decision principle for evaluating the equity of resource allocation.

To take the difference principle as the essence of Rawls's work is an error. The present paper reviews the basic argument of the Theory of Justice

compares it with the use that economists make of it, and concludes that in a number of quite specific ways Rawls's ideas are misrepresented and misused by mainstream microeconomists.     

Guaranteed Manufactured without Child Labor: The Economics of Consumer Boycotts, Social Labeling and Trade Sanctions

Does labeling products “Child‐Labor Free” provide a market‐based solution to the pervasive employment of child labor? This paper explores the promise of social labeling in the context of its four oft‐noted objectives: child labor employment, consumer information, welfare, and trade linkages, when competition between the North and South is based both on comparative cost advantage, and the use of child labor as a hidden product attribute. We show that (i) social labeling benefits consumers and Southern producers, whereas children and Northern producers are worse off; (ii) trade sanctions on unlabeled products deteriorates Southern terms of trade, but leaves the incidence of child labor strictly unaffected; and (iii) a threat to sanction imports of unlabeled Southern products discourages the South from maintaining a credible social labeling program. We also explore the question of whether social labeling should be viewed as a transitory or a permanent institution in developing economies.     

AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTS FOR AN ECONOMY OF THE YUGOSLAV TYPE

The system of social accounts described in this article is based on the following five principles: (1) Producers of goods and services are working organizations which represent groups of people or individuals organized for the purpose of earning a living by producing goods and services that satisfy individual or collective needs. Business, government, profit and nonprofit, corporate and unincorporated working organizations are treated in a uniform way. (2) Since the behaviors of the market and non-market sectors differ considerably, these two sectors are consistently separated throughout the accounting system. (3) There are four basic activities: (a) production, (b) consumption, (c) investment, and (d) income redistribution. These call for four separate accounts: (a) Working Organizations, (b) Households, (c) Community, including government and certain non-government institutions, and (d) Accumulation. The fifth account, Rest of the World, serves for balancing purposes. (4) The same classifications of transactions are used for activities and institutions, making possible complete matching of social product and financial flows accounts. (5) The system strives to achieve the maximum analytical flexibility. Some of its possibilities are visible from the classification of industries: A. Market (Material) Sector: 1. Agriculture, II. Forestry, III. Mining and Manufacturing, IV. Construction, V. Transportation, VI. Trade and Catering, VII. Handicrafts; B. Non-Market (Non-Material) Sector: VIII. Housing and Communal Economy, IX. Education, Culture, and Social Welfare, X. Public Services Social Organizations (Political, Religious, etc.), Finance and Insurance, Public Administration and Judiciary, National Defence. Sector A corresponds to the material definition of social product. Sectors A + B correspond to the SNA definition. Sectors A + B minus Industry × reflects the welfare definition. Further, Industries I-IV produce goods, V-VII market services, VIII and IX non-market services with welfare content, X intermediate nonmarket services, V-X all services.