UNION–FIRM BARGAINING AGENDA REVISITED: WHEN UNIONS HAVE DISTINCT PREFERENCES

In this paper we revisit the issue of the scope of bargaining between firms and unions by considering a more general union's utility function with distinct preferences and sequential negotiations. First, we compare exogenously given labour market institutions; i.e., right‐to‐manage (RTM) and sequential efficient bargaining (SEB). We show that the conventional wisdom, which states that firms always prefer RTM, no longer holds. In fact, when unions are adequately wage aggressive and have strong enough bargaining power, firms may prefer SEB negotiations; however, firms switch their preference to RTM when unions are very strong. Moreover, we show that a conflict of interest between the parties may emerge when unions are sufficiently employment oriented as well as sufficiently wage aggressive and not too strong or too weak in bargaining. Second, we analyse the endogenous choice of the bargaining agenda. We show that a rich plethora of equilibria may occur and new situations of conflict/agreement of interests between the bargaining parties arise in particular when unions are sufficiently wage‐aggressive.     

FIRM DYNAMICS IN AN URBAN ECONOMY *

We develop a new dynamic general equilibrium model to explain firm entry, exit, and relocation decisions in an urban economy with multiple locations and agglomeration externalities. We characterize the stationary distribution of firms that arises in equilibrium. We estimate the parameters of the model using a method of moments estimator. Using unique panel data collected by Dun and Bradstreet, we find that agglomeration externalities increase the productivity of firms by up to 8%. Economic policies that subsidize firm relocations to the central business district increase agglomeration externalities in that area. They also increase economic welfare in the economy.     

INFORMATION,RISK SHARING,AND INCENTIVES IN AGENCY PROBLEMS

This article studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or dealt with by a contract on the outcome, so information systems are used for incentives only. When the outcome is noncontractible, a risk‐averse principal relies on imperfect information for both incentives and risk sharing. Under the first‐order approach, this article relaxes Gjesdal's criterion for ranking information systems and finds conditions justifying the first‐order approach when the principal is risk averse and the outcome is noncontractible.     

LOCATION OF PUBLIC FIRM IN THE PRESENCE OF MULTINATIONAL FIRM: A MIXED DUOPOLY APPROACH*

By incorporating a multinational private firm into the mixed duopoly model with Hotelling‐type spatial competition, we show that the private firm's nationality is a matter of the public firm's location. As the share of foreign capital increases in the private (multinational) firm, the public firm moves to a central place. The effects of price regulation and sequential location choice are also discussed.     

PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING

Reputation is possible in a small community, but in the Smith-Lippmann-Hayekian Great Society people are mainly strangers. I model credit reporting as a system of formalized and surgically-precise gossip. In the Great Society credit reporting makes possible reputations, which make possible credit relationships. But forming a credit reporting system is no simple matter. Historically it has been local gossip in the small community that has made possible credit reporting "gossip" in the Great Society.     

THE REVENUE‐SHARING RULE FOR INTERCONNECTION CHARGES*

In this paper we explore the economic principle behind the revenue‐sharing rule for interconnection charges. Our main finding is that symmetric firms can collude by splitting the revenues equally. We further characterize the optimal revenue‐sharing ratio and discuss the relationship between optimal ratio and the optimal access price. We also show that the revenue‐sharing rule can have the perverse effect of inducing a firm to raise its own costs in order to gain a higher share of revenues.     

DIRECTED SEARCH AND FIRM SIZE*

Standard directed search models predict that larger firms pay lower wages than smaller firms, contrary to the data. This article proposes one way to obtain this positive size–wage differential in a directed search setting. I posit that there is an optimal size associated with a firm: A firm suffers a penalty by not operating at its optimal size. I show that if this penalty is sufficiently large the size–wage differential will be obtained. My model also gives a new way to look at the data because it highlights the importance of the distinction between intended and realized firm sizes.     

FIRM SIZE AND EFFICIENCY IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY*

The South African motor vehicle industry has historically been considered a critical industry in the South African economy and the target of numerous government policies designed to protect it and/or increase its international competitiveness. This study examines the cost performance of firms in this industry according to their size, using data categorised by output level. The results are consistent with statistically significant economies of scale at the lowest output levels and a cost inefficiency averaging from about seven to nine per cent for all firms. The findings also suggest that all else equal, the smallest firms and the largest firms have lower unit costs than mid‐sized firms. While this work suggests that policies that would give incentives for the smallest firms to increase their scale of operations might help to reduce their unit costs, further investigation needs to be done with respect to why firms in the mid‐level size categories appear to be less efficient.     

FIRM FRAGMENTATION AND URBAN PATTERNS*

We document several empirical regularities regarding the evolution of urban structure in the largest U.S. metropolitan areas over the period 1980–90. These regularities relate to changes in resident population, employment, occupations, as well as the number and size of establishments in different sections of the metropolitan area. We then propose a theory of urban structure that emphasizes the location and internal structure decisions of firms. In particular, firms can decide to locate their headquarters and operation plants in different regions of the city. Given that cities experienced positive population growth throughout the 1980s, we show that firm fragmentation produces the diverse set of facts documented in the article.     

MEDIA CAPTURE AND INFORMATION MONOPOLIZATION IN JAPAN*

We investigate the unique institution of the Japanese press industry called the kisha club system. By tracing through its history, we show how the kisha club system has developed as a result of the government's attempt to control the media, and the media's incentive to use the opportunity provided by the government to limit rivalry within the industry. By providing a simple model that links the distribution of political power and the media capture, we explain why this institutional arrangement has been so persistent in Japan.     

A HIERARCHICAL THEORY OF THE FIRM*

This paper provides a mathematically coherent and concise formulation of the Williamson market-failure approach and, hence, develops models for single-level and multilevel firms and organizations. These models optimally determine the extent of integration for each viable link on every hierarchical level, When the models are reformulated in terms of four operational parameters that determine integration, applied benefit-cost methods can be utilized, in practice, to model a firm. Both static and dynamiclmodels-are presented.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR COMPANY PRESIDENTS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN*

Kaplan (1994 ) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents’ stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents’ wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977–2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay–performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from ?2.1% to 14.8%.     

信息产品的共享及其组织方式:一个经济分析

本文通过引入一个现实案例(Napster)来讨论信息产品的共享问题。首先,我们解释了信患产品共享产生的原因;然后,我们对此进行了福利分析,并证明:如果信息产品的共享采取俱乐部这种组织方式,不仅消费者的福利水平可以得到提高,生产者同样也有向市场提供信患产品的激励,换言之,帕雷托意义上的效率改进是可能的。