成都创建国家环境保护模范城市的启示

成都市创建国家环境保护模范城市活动进一步改善了城市创业环境和人居环境,全面提升了城市服务功能与综合价值,提高了公众生活质量,使成都市初步走上了环境和经济相互促进,人与自然和谐共生的可持续发展道路,呈现出经济快速发展、环境清洁优美、生态良性循环的良好态势。从成都创建国家环境保护模范城市实践中,我们可以得到以下启示:创建国家环境保护模范城市是构建和谐社会,落实科学发展观,全面建设小康社会,提高城市综合实力与城市竞争力的前提;创建国家环境保护模范城市必须承担发展经济和保护生态的双重任务,并且需要建立持续增长的投入机制;国家环境保护模范城市建设更需要注重生态型社会的建设。     

An economic theory of leadership turnover

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of “kingmakers”, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

冲突管理方式对团队绩效的影响研究

通过实证验证了不同冲突管理方式影响不同类型团队绩效的研究模型与假设,并进行了讨论。采用陈国权（Guoquan Chen,2000）团队绩效以及Rahim和Magner开发的包括整合式、帮助式、支配式、折衷式、逃避式的冲突管理方式的5因子量表,通过有效的问卷调查,应用SPSS进行数据分析,进而验证工作团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著负影响;并行团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈显著正影响,支配式呈正影响,折衷式呈显著负影响,逃避式呈显著负影响;项目团队中整合式呈显著正影响;帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响;管理团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著正影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响。     

Privatisation in Russia Has Led to Criminalisation

Abstract
Russia has recently embarked on a dramatic program of privatisation as part of the process of shock therapy which aims to convert the command economy to a market economy. This program has been undertaken in the absence of a well-developed set of institutions needed for the proper functioning of a market economy. These institutions include a legal system, a related system of property rights, a credit system, a system of commercial banks, classified advertising, an accounting system and others including a sound currency and a social safety net. In the absence of these institutions the incentives facing agents in economic transactions have been perverted. This has led to criminalisation of the economy, dramatic falls in production, loss of confidence in all aspects of commerce, and political instability. The recent Russian experience of privatisation has important lessons for other economies in transition, for developing economies and for economic theory.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case

This paper presents a model of the conditions that may lead a small open economy towards a middle income trap. This situation has shown to be pervasive in Latin America. As Argentina is a salient instance of this phenomenon, we develop a stylized model of its economy at the first decades of the XXth century. It consists of a general equilibrium model of an open emerging economy, which is a price-taking primary goods exporter. A growth process is triggered by an increase of commodity prices, due to an upward jump of the world demand of these goods. The economy goes through several phases of growth, starting from a subsistence stage. Once decreasing returns set in, the economy reaches a steady state. Only a sustained high demand of its export products allows the economy to thrive. Otherwise, the economy gets entrapped in a middle income level.     

Opinion convergence in location: A spatial version of the Delphi method

This paper proposes a modified version of the Delphi method, starting from the assumption that in many situations the convergence of opinions can be considered in a spatial context. The Spatial Delphi we suggest is based, like the classical Delphi, on the judgments of experts, and it is useful in the consultations for decision and/or forecast purposes, provided that they concern matters of spatial location. The basis for the questionnaire is a map, on which each expert provides, as answer(s), one or more opinion-points, i.e., locations that, according to their opinion, are best for a specific purpose. We propose a method for narrowing the area of convergence along a multi-step procedure so that the final result of the consultation is a small portion of the initial territory with respect to the initial area considered. Besides a simulation study, we report also a prototype application with a panel of twelve experts.     

Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms

This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.     

Bank competition and optimal monetary policies under alternative reserve accounting schemes

The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the implications of increased competition among depository financial institutions for the optimal conduct of monetary policy with respect to the ultimate goals of price and output stability. In the context of a general equilibrium model which includes rational expectations and a market for bank deposits, it is shown that a rise in bank rivalry for deposits produces a more steeply sloped LM schedule. Under a system of lagged required reserve accounting, this fact has no effect on the optimal conduct of monetary policy, which requires an operating procesure designed to target a market interest rate. However, under a system of contemporaneous reserve accounting, this fact implies that less emphasis should be placed on a market interest rate as a variable upon which the Fed's setting of reserves should be conditioned.     

Junk-food,home cooking,physical activity and obesity: The effect of the fat tax and the thin subsidy

In an effort to reduce the growing prevalence of obesity, a tax on junk-foods, known as ‘fat tax’, has been proposed, the revenue from which could be used to finance a ‘thin subsidy’ for healthy foods or exercising equipment. The present paper addresses the fat tax and thin subsidy within a food-intake rational-choice model. Assuming that healthy meals are cooked at home with purchased ingredients and time input, the paper examines the effects on obesity of a tax on junk-food meals and a subsidy to cooking ingredients, distinguishing between a weight-conscious and a non-weight conscious individual, and between a weight-conscious individual who is physically active and physically inactive. The results show that for a non-weight conscious individual a fat tax will unambiguously reduce obesity, whereas a thin subsidy may increase obesity. However, for a weight-conscious individual, particularly one who is physically active, even a fat tax may increase obesity, as it may reduce not just the consumption of junk-food, but also the time devoted to physical activity. The paper explores conditions under which obesity will rise, fall, or remain intact following the introduction of a fat tax or a thin subsidy.     

WHY REWARDS ARE BETTER THAN SANCTIONS

Sanctions are said to fail because of the “rally‐round‐the‐flag effect”. This is the main reason why many advocate the use of positive incentives as a viable alternative. Not only do rewards provoke no defensive reaction, but they may elicit a rally in support of compliance – a “fifth‐column effect.” Yet, positive incentives are vulnerable to extortion – doing wrong in the hope of obtaining larger rewards. As a result, many conjecture that sanction threats and promises of reward are most efficient when used simultaneously. We put this conjecture to a test, staging a formal confrontation of the two forms of incentives. Our model pits a sanctioner and a target in a game allowing for the possibility of rally‐round‐the‐flag, fifth‐column, and extortion effects. The game yields unambiguous results: under no circumstances should a sanctioner prefer sanction threats to reward promises. This result holds despite the risk of extortion, a risk that proves to be less of a drawback than the rally round the flag.     

Targeting the biotechnology clusters in North Carolina and Israel: lessons from successful and unsuccessful policy making

This paper analyses the development of biotechnology clusters in North Carolina (NC) and Israel. In both NC and Israel, when the biotechnology was identified as a potential strategic priority, the framework conditions were suitable for successful policy-targeting. NC presents a case of a successful transition from a traditional manufacturing economy to a knowledge economy. The most successful part of this transition was a policy-led development of a biotechnology cluster in the Research Triangle. While Israel also presents a case of a successful transition from a low-tech economy to a knowledge-intensive economy, Israel failed to develop a successful biotechnology cluster. We suggest that this failure is mostly due to a failure to implement policy to encourage such development. We argue that the elements, which separate NC's success from Israel's failure, are: a clear vision and strategic planning; timely response, long-term commitment; strong leadership; cooperation between the government, private sector and academia, and an adjustable policy-making process.     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

Consumer surplus and the reform of network industries: a primer

Starting from an industry where production is provided by a public monopolist, we observe the effects of a sequence of reforms within the network industry on consumer surplus. Using a simple comparative statics framework, we find the indifference conditions for the consumer surplus under the following regimes: a public monopoly, an unregulated private monopoly, a regulated private monopoly, a vertically disintegrated monopoly, a duopoly and a liberalized market. The results are determined by the relative size of the x-inefficiencies of the public monopolist, allocative inefficiencies of the private monopoly, the cost of unbundling and the costs related to establishing a competitive market.     

A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis

In this paper, we examine which auction format, first-price or second-price, a seller will choose when he can profitably cheat in a second price auction by observing all bids by possible buyers and submitting a shill bid as pretending to be a buyer. We model this choice of auction format in seller cheating as a signaling game in which the buyers may regard the selection of a second price auction by the seller as a signal that he is a shill bidder. By introducing trembling-hand perfectness as a refinement of signaling equilibrium, we find two possible strictly perfect signaling equilibria. One is a separating equilibrium in which a noncheating honest seller selects a first price auction and a cheating seller does a second price auction. In another pooling equilibrium, however, both cheating and non-cheating sellers select a second price auction. The conclusion that a seller chooses a second price auction even if he cannot cheat is in contrast to the previous literature, which focused on the case of independent values. We thank an anonymous referee for useful comments that have improved the paper. This research was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) 15310023 and (C) 18530139.     

The stability of decision making in committees: The one-core

We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, it is in spite of the committee member who introduced it, who does not cooperate in any effort to defeat it. Shenoy (1980) proposes the one-core as a solution concept for this game, and shows that this solution may be empty. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable policy under the majority rule. This result highlights a trade-off between the size of a committee, the number of competing policy options, and the existence of a stable outcome. Our findings imply a tension between political stability and the existence of a large number of competing interests in democracies.     

Knowledge Games

The subject of epistemic logic is firmly entrenched in game theory, including the analysis of common knowledge and of public announcements, such as in 'hat problems'. How to analyse communications to sub groups of the public, and the effects of such common knowledge of a subgroup on the information state of a larger group, has only recently come into fruition. Knowledge games are introduced to provide a comfortably concrete vehicle for the study of such interactions. This paper introduces the concepts of knowledge game, deal of cards, knowledge game state, game action, and action execution. A deal of cards is a function from cards to players. A knowledge game state is represented by a pointed multiagent S5 model on the set of card deals where all players hold the same number of cards as in the actual deal. A game action combines a question with an answer, and is represented by a pointed multiagent S5 frame on the set of possible answers. The execution of a game action in a knowledge game state corresponds to the computation of a pointed multiagent S5 model that is a restriction of the direct product of the corresponding action frame and game model.