工资合约、灰色收入和职业生涯考虑

该文用一个简单的两期动态模型分析年薪制下的显性激励和隐性激励.该文明确引入灰色收入作为企业经营者收入的一部分,定义广义的职业生涯考虑,同时,放弃了完全竞争市场的假设.通过对现行年薪制下经理考虑灰色收入时显性激励和隐性激励的共同作用的分析,该文解释了如下经济现象:虽然现行的年薪制引入了显性的工资合约,但并不一定使得经理的努力程度提高,而且也不能解决灰色收入问题.     

OPTIMAL CONTRACTS FOR CENTRAL BANKERS AND PUBLIC DEBT POLICY*

We consider how the second‐best allocation corresponding to an optimal rule under the policy commitment of a central bank and a fiscal authority with a consolidated government budget constraint can be achieved, even though these authorities are unable to commit themselves to their optimal policies and ignore the strategic interaction between their policies. Our results show that the best practical institutional arrangement is to have an instrument‐independent central bank that controls the money supply to determine the rate of inflation and commits itself to an inflation target that depends on fiscal variables.     

POLICY ANALYSIS IN A MATCHING MODEL WITH INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE MARGINS*

The large differences in hours of work across rich countries reflect large differences in both employment to population ratios and hours per worker. We imbed the canonical model of labor supply into a matching model to produce a model with operative intensive and extensive margins, and assess the implications of several policies for changes along the two margins. Tax and transfer policies lead to decreases along both margins, whereas regulations that increase the cost of creating or maintaining a job may lead to decreases in employment, but necessarily lead to increases in hours per worker.     

POSITIONAL CONCERNS IN AN OLG MODEL: OPTIMAL LABOR AND CAPITAL INCOME TAXATION*

This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two‐type OLG model when individuals’ relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low‐ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low‐ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within‐generation and upward comparisons.     

IDEAL AND REAL JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL POLICY MEASURES*

This paper discusses the successes and failures of Japanese monetary policy by evaluating policies from January 1980 to May 2003 in the light of optimal policy rules. First, we quantitatively conceptualize the Bank of Japan (BOJ)'s policy decisions by employing Bernanke and Mihov's (1998 ) econometric methodology for developing monetary policy measures and term the resulting policy measure the ‘actual policy measure’. Next, assuming that the BOJ is committed to optimal policy rules, we simulate optimal policy paths, which we term ‘optimal policy measures’. We evaluate Japanese monetary policy historically by comparing actual and optimal policy measures.     

EXTREME EVENTS AND OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY

This article studies the implication of extreme shocks for monetary policy. The analysis is based on a small‐scale New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages where shocks are drawn from asymmetric generalized extreme value distributions. A nonlinear perturbation solution of the model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. Under the Ramsey policy, the central bank responds nonlinearly and asymmetrically to shocks. The trade‐off between targeting a gross inflation rate above 1 as insurance against extreme shocks and targeting an average gross inflation at unity to avoid adjustment costs is unambiguously decided in favor of strict price stability.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE DON'T KNOW*

In this article, I examine the current state of knowledge about optimal monetary policy. I distinguish between two literatures, basic and applied. The basic literature is explicit about the frictions that generate a positive value for money and make it socially beneficial. The applied literature is not. I describe the recent lessons about monetary policy that we have learned from each literature and discuss how the two distinct approaches may be usefully combined.     

OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY AND ASSET PRICE MISALIGNMENTS

This paper analyses the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices in the context of optimal policy rules. The transmission mechanism is represented by a linearized rational expectations model augmented for the effect of asset prices on aggregate demand. Stabilization objectives are represented by a discounted quadratic loss function penalizing inflation and output gap volatility. Asset prices are allowed to deviate from their intrinsic value due to momentum trading. We find that in the presence of wealth effects and inefficient markets, asset price misalignments from their fundamentals should be included in the optimal interest rate reaction function.     

DOMESTIC COMPETITION POLICY AND TARIFF POLICY COMPARED*

M. Yano and F. Dei have demonstrated that, by controlling the degree of competition in a non‐tradables market (competition policy), a country can influence the terms of trade so as to increase its welfare, relative to free trade. Using their model, this study compares the extent of this effect with that of a tariff policy. It demonstrates that a competition policy can achieve a higher utility than a tariff policy if tariff rates are at levels currently tolerated in the real world. This demonstrates that domestic competition policy may play an important role as a substitute for tariff policy.     

INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY*

This paper discusses the issue of competition policy and innovation. First, a short review on the theoretical analysis of competition and innovation is provided, relying on the recent book by Aghion and Griffith (2005 ). Then, we examine how such innovation related issues as collaborative research, patent pool, merger in the technology intensive sector and bundling in the software industry are treated under Japan's Anti‐Monopoly Act. We contend that traditional competition policy framework is capable of dealing with innovation related issues but there are several points that should be kept in mind when competition policy deals with innovation related issues.     

SEARCH,LIMITED PARTICIPATION,AND MONETARY POLICY*

A model is developed that employs recent developments in the literature on search models of money to capture the distributional effects of monetary policy in a tractable way. Deterministic and stochastic versions of the model are studied. Money is not neutral, and these nonneutralities persist, whether or not the change in the money supply is anticipated or unanticipated. At the optimum, monetary policy is geared to correcting distortions in the search sector of the economy, while correcting for the persistent effects of past monetary policy actions.     

POLICY UNCERTAINTY,ELECTORAL SECURITIES,AND REDISTRIBUTION*

This article investigates how uncertainty about the adoption of a redistribution policy affects political support for redistribution when individuals can trade policy‐contingent securities in the stock market. In equilibrium the support for redistribution is smaller than where no “policy‐insurance market” is available. This implies that in economies with well‐developed financial markets redistribution decreases with the level of participation in these markets and with income inequality. Furthermore, the existence of a policy‐insurance market may lead to a less equal distribution of income than where no insurance is available even if a majority of individuals are redistributing resources through private transfers.     

LOCAL LABOR MARKETS,JOB MATCHING,AND URBAN LOCATION*

We present a new way of modeling local labor markets by linking the space of workers' skills and the physical space of cities. The key lesson of our analysis is that firms exploit workers in these two spaces by setting wages that are below the competitive level. The degree of monopsony power depends on the elasticity of the firm's labor pool, which is inversely related to the costs workers incur in commuting and acquiring skills. Our analysis thus shows how socioeconomic ghettos emerge as workers with poor skill matches are also those who incur the highest commuting costs.     

OPTIMAL FISCAL POLICY IN THE DESIGN OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORMS*

The quantitative literature has documented that a privatization of the social security system generates large long‐run welfare gains at the cost of welfare losses for transition generations. In this article, we maximize over the entire policy space, following the optimal fiscal policy approach. The resulting allocation, by construction, lies on the constrained Pareto frontier. We find that the optimal design of reforms exhibits sizeable welfare gains arising from a reduction in labor supply distortions. In contrast, the welfare gains coming from the reduction of savings distortions are relatively small.     

OPTIMAL IMMIGRATION POLICY: WHEN THE PUBLIC GOOD IS RIVAL*

In this model, we characterize optimal immigration and fiscal policies in the presence of a rival public good and heterogeneous discounting. Surprisingly, even if the government is benevolent towards natives only, it is optimal to keep borders open. Indeed, in the long run, patient natives hold the whole stock of capital, while impatient immigrants work. Moreover, since capital intensity is stationary, capital per native, consumption and the public good increase with the number of (immigrant) workers. This positive effect offsets the disutility deriving from the congestion of the public good. However, when we account for the costs associated with cultural heterogeneity, we find that it is optimal to regulate immigration inflows. We also analyze the long‐run sensitivity of the optimal policy mix with respect to the fundamentals.     

DEBT NONNEUTRALITY,POLICY INTERACTIONS,AND MACROECONOMIC STABILITY*

We study the consequences of nonneutrality of government debt for macroeconomic stabilization policy in a sticky‐price model. Ricardian equivalence fails because debt has a negative impact on its rate of return and on private savings, which is induced by assuming transaction services of bonds. Under aggressive monetary policy regimes, macroeconomic fluctuations tend to be stabilized if nominal budget deficits are low. A smooth debt path limits inflation expectations, such that inflation variances can be reduced. Under a balanced budget policy, the central bank's output gap–inflation volatility trade‐off is improved relative to an environment where debt is neutral.