On the optimality of privacy in sequential contracting

This paper studies the exchange of information between two principals who contract sequentially with the same agent, as in the case of a buyer who purchases from multiple sellers. We show that when (a) the upstream principal is not personally interested in the downstream level of trade, (b) the agent's valuations are positively correlated, and (c) preferences in the downstream relationship are separable, then it is optimal for the upstream principal to offer the agent full privacy. On the contrary, when any of these conditions is violated, there exist preferences for which disclosure is strictly optimal, even if the downstream principal does not pay for the information. We also examine the effects of disclosure on welfare and show that it does not necessarily reduce the agent's surplus in the two relationships and in some cases may even yield a Pareto improvement.     

REPUTATIONAL BIDDING

We consider auctions where bidders care about the reputational effects of their bidding and argue that the amount of information disclosed at the end of the auction will influence bidding. We focus on bid disclosure rules that capture all of the realistic cases. We show that bidders distort their bidding in a way that conforms to stylized facts about takeovers/licence auctions. We rank the disclosure rules in terms of their expected revenues and find that, under certain conditions, full disclosure will not be optimal. First‐price and second‐price auctions with price disclosure are not revenue equivalent and we rank them.     

Long‐Term Impact of Minimum Wages on Workers’ Careers: Evidence from Two Decades of Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

We analyze the impact of high youth minimum wages, relying on two decades of linked employer–employee data and a major law change. Alternative treatment/control groups follow from two strands of the literature, one tracking low‐skilled workers employed before the law change, who are eligible for a large wage increase, and one tracking the employment of full cohorts, whether working or in school when the law changed. High minimum wages led to a short‐term wage gain, which faded over time. They did not jeopardize employment prospects. Changes in the hours worked by part‐time workers point to increased job attachment.     

Earnings, Education, and Fixed-Term Contracts

We explore the relationship between earnings, education, and fixed‐term contracts using data from the 1997 British Social Attitudes Survey. We find that the log hourly wage of workers employed under such contracts is approximately 13% lower than that of their ‘permanent’ counterparts, even after controlling for a plethora of personal and job characteristics. Standard decompositions indicate that the vast majority of this differential (more than 70%) is attributable to price effects, which may reflect discrimination on the part of the employer. Such findings may, therefore, suggest that employment protection is appropriate for individuals employed under fixed‐term contracts.     

Information Disclosure Policies: When Do They Bring Environmental Improvements?

There has been a growing interest among policy makers on the use of information disclosure policies for pollution control. This paper theoretically assesses the consequences of information disclosure policies and identifies the conditions under which such policies are likely to bring environmental improvements. Based on a dynamic game framework, the paper shows that both eco-labeling and more general full information disclosure policies may not always result in pollution reduction. Full information disclosure policies are likely to be effective if the product is not heavily polluting and if the minimum quality standard is set quite low. The paper also identifies the conditions under which all consumers are strictly better off with information disclosure policies.

Do Immigrants Affect Firm‐Specific Wages?*

We propose and test a novel effect of immigration on wages. Existing studies have focused on the wage effects that result from changes in the aggregate labour supply in a competitive labour market. We argue that if labour markets are not fully competitive, immigrants might also affect wage formation at the most disaggregate level – the workplace. Using linked employer?employee data, we find that an increased use of low‐skilled immigrant workers has a significantly negative effect on the wages of native workers at the workplace – also when controlling for potential endogeneity of the immigrant share using both fixed effects and instrumental variables.     

The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity*

In this paper, we investigate how social comparison information about referent others (i.e., learning what similar others do, and how they are treated) affects reciprocal relationships. Using three‐person gift‐exchange games, we study how employees’ reciprocity towards an employer is affected by pay comparison information (what co‐workers earn) and effort comparison information (how co‐workers perform). We find strong evidence of the effects of effort comparison: employees are more willing to reciprocate by choosing high effort in response to a high wage if they observe others doing so. In our setting, we find somewhat weaker evidence of the effects of pay comparison.     

LABOUR‐MARKET ATTACHMENT AND TRAINING PARTICIPATION*

This paper examines how expected attachment to the labour market and expected tenure at a specific firm affect training participation. The results, based on cross‐sectional data from Japan, indicate that expected attachment to the labour market affects participation in both employer‐ and worker‐initiated training, while expected tenure at a specific firm mainly explains participation in employer‐initiated training. These two attachment indices explain more than two‐thirds of the sex gap in training participation. Employers in less‐competitive labour markets are more likely to offer employer‐initiated training to their workers.     

Eliciting information from a committee

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.     

INTERNATIONAL ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURING AND ORIGINAL DESIGN MANUFACTURING CONTRACTS WITH QUALITY‐DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS

We build a model of international subcontracting in quality‐differentiated goods. Assuming no entry in an original equipment manufacturing (OEM) market, we show that the foreign outsourcer will choose an original design manufacturing (ODM) contract only if the subcontractor is good enough at product design. However, the product quality with the ODM contract is not necessarily higher than that with the OEM contract. When the subcontracting market becomes perfectly competitive, the outsourcer will always choose an OEM contract. In a two‐period model with learning and entry effects, the foreign outsourcer chooses between different modes of manufacturing contracts. We demonstrate that a laissez‐faire policy on research and development (R&D) activity may be optimal even if the subcontracting firm can only obtain an OEM contract. In the case where the OEM market becomes perfectly competitive in the second period, we predict that a positive R&D subsidy in the first period can help the domestic subcontractor obtain OEM–ODM contracts and, as a result, national welfare rises.     

Optimal design of pension funds: a mission impossible?

Summary. Nowadays many employers offer their employees the possibility of an insurance against too large losses in income when retiring or becoming disabled. This paper models the optimization problem of the employer when setting up such a so-called pension fund. Not surprisingly, it turns out that the optimal solution depends on the premium the employees are willing to pay at most for such an insurance. Since this is private information for an employee and hence not known to the employer, he needs to collect information regarding these maximum premiums. It is shown that if employees' characteristics only differ in the maximum premium they are willing to pay, the employer is unable to perfectly inform himself on these maximum premiums, i.e. he cannot create the right incentives for his employees to reveal their maximum premiums truthfully. Received: March 20, 2000; revised version: March 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of an anonymous referee. The research of J. Suijs is made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). Correspondence to: J. Suijs     

The efficiency of monopolistically competitive equilibria in large economies: Commodity differentiation with gross substitutes

A general model of commodity differentiation is developed using two different approaches to the theory of demand. It is shown that a local version of Bertrand's argument holds under reasonable conditions. If all commodities are sustitutes and sunk costs are small, there is never too little commodity differentiation relative to the optimum. Under the same conditions, monopolistically competitive equilibria are approximately perfectly competitive if the optimal collection of commodities is sufficiently rich.     

SEARCH,ADVERSE SELECTION,AND MARKET CLEARING

We examine a dynamic decentralized trading model with infinitesimal sellers and buyers to investigate whether or not the market fails to clear in the limit of search friction vanishing. A seller, who has private information about product quality, and a buyer are matched to bargain over price. They form a long‐term relationship if they reach agreement. They return to the matching pool if they fail to agree or the existing relationship is dissolved. The market fails to clear if and only if the ratio of agents' patience over the dissolution rate exceeds a threshold.     

Public and Private Hospitals,Congestion, and Redistribution

This paper studies how congestion in the public health sector can be used as both an in‐kind and in‐cash redistributive tool. In our model, agents differ in productivity and they can obtain a health service either from a congested public hospital or from a noncongested private one at a higher price. With pure in‐kind redistribution, agents fail to internalize their impact on congestion, and the demand for the public hospital is higher than optimal. When productivities are not observable but the social planner can assign agents across hospitals, the optimal congestion is higher than in the full information case in order to relax incentive constraints and foster income redistribution. Finally, if agents can freely choose across hospitals, the optimal subsidy on the private hospital price may be negative or positive depending on the relative importance of redistribution and efficiency concerns. In this case, redistribution is limited if the quality of the public facility depends on the number of users.     

Pro‐Consumer Price Ceilings under Regulatory Uncertainty*

We examine optimal price ceilings when the regulator is uncertain about demand and maximizes expected consumer surplus. With perfect competition, if regulatory uncertainty is large enough, then softer intervention is called for, with the price ceiling set at a relatively high level compared with a full information scenario. In an imperfectly competitive setting where symmetric firms compete in supply functions, with large enough uncertainty, the optimal ceiling increases with the degree of competition, so greater competitive pressure justifies less restrictive regulation. Under perfect competition, we also determine a cut‐off level of rationing efficiency below which a price ceiling should not be used.     

When Redistribution Leads to Regressive Taxation

We introduce labor contracts in a framework of optimal redistribution: firms have some local market power and try to discriminate among heterogeneous workers. In this setting we show that if the firms have perfect information, i.e., they perfectly discriminate against workers and take all the surplus, the best tax function is flat. If firms have imperfect information, i.e., if they offer incentive contracts, then (under some assumptions) the best redistributive taxation is regressive.     

HEDGING AND THE COMPETITIVE FIRM UNDER AMBIGUOUS PRICE AND BACKGROUND RISK

This paper examines the optimal production and hedging decisions of the competitive firm that possesses smooth ambiguity preferences and faces ambiguous price and background risk. The separation theorem holds in that the firm's optimal output level depends neither on the firm's attitude towards ambiguity nor on the incident to the underlying ambiguity. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which the full‐hedging theorem holds and thus options are not used. When these conditions are violated, we show that the firm optimally uses options for hedging purposes if ambiguity is introduced to the price and background risk by means of mean‐preserving spreads. We as such show that options play a role as a hedging instrument over and above that of futures.     

The impact of hiring top workers on productivity: what is the role of absorptive capacity?

We examine the heterogeneous productivity impacts of hiring top workers on small and medium-sized enterprises, exploiting matched employer–employee panel data and employing within-firm as well as matching and difference-in-difference estimators. The results provide robust evidence that the productivity impact is stronger for firms with higher absorptive capacity. Technological laggards within an industry benefit more strongly from hiring top workers if their workforce is more well-educated.     

市场结构、环境税与福利效应分析

运用短期局部均衡分析方法研究完全竞争市场和垄断市场条件下环境税对社会福利的影响.结果显示:在完全竞争市场条件下,对企业征收环境税可以增进社会福利.而在垄断市场条件下,环境税的福利效应具有不确定性,这取决于垄断造成的扭曲程度.如果垄断造成的扭曲较小,环境税仍然可以提高社会福利.但无论是增进抑或降低社会福利,对垄断企业征收环境税都不可能实现最优化,因为环境税在矫正污染外部性的同时,垄断造成产量水平下降导致福利损失增加,所以只能追求一个次优的结果,次优环境税低于完全竞争条件下的标准环境税.