Biased managers with network externalities

In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition.     

企业、银行和政府三方还贷博弈研究

预算软约束已成为国有企业改革的阻碍因素,并影响经济转型期的政企、银企关系,而政府对于债务的软预算约束是企业信贷违约的原因之一,根据企业还贷过程中相关利益者的相互博弈,建立一个企业、银行、政府之间三方博弈模型来分析它们之间的行为及其目标差异对企业信贷违约的影响。模型分析表明：政府出于政治和经济利益的考虑,通过补贴银行和企业来实施对企业还贷的软预算约束,而银行在衡量了政府补贴和清算得失之后有可能对企业再贷款。解决预算软约束和企业信贷违约的关键在于＂政府、银行、企业＂之间的关系处理,企业完全按市场化运作,建立科学的法人治理结构,让政府从企业中逐步退出,硬化企业的预算约束环境,从而降低企业的信贷违约的概率。     

Bank loan supply shocks and leverage adjustment

We investigate the effect of bank loan supply shocks on firms’ leverage adjustment. We show that the impact of bank shocks is larger for firms with greater dependence on financially troubled banks. We measure firms’ pre-crisis loan dependence on troubled banks by using matched firm–bank loan data. Using the boom-bust cycle from 1987 to 2014 in Japan as a quasi-experiment, we find that financially constrained firms adjust their leverage slower during credit-crunch periods than during other periods. During credit-crunch periods following banking crisis, firms associated with failing banks or with banks that have a limited capacity to supply loans show a slower adjustment than other firms. Bank shocks have significant effects on small firms’ adjustment but not on that of large firms. These results are robust when we consider demand-side effects and perform other robustness tests. Our results imply that bank shocks have a persistent effect on borrowers’ leverage.     

INVESTMENT BEHAVIOUR,CORPORATE CONTROL,AND PRIVATE BENEFITS OF CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM A SURVEY OF UKRAINIAN FIRMS

We analyse the impact of ownership and corporate control on firms’ investment using the 2001 survey of Yacoub et al. on Ukrainian firms. The model explains investment by output, financial and soft budget constraints, and corporate control (and ownership) categories potentially enjoying private benefits of control. We find that the corporate control model fits better than the ownership model, a negative relationship between state and employee control and firms’ investment, and evidence for the presence of soft budget constraints. A negative relationship between firms’ investment and the relative size of non‐monetary transactions strengthens the conclusion of private benefits of control impacting investment.     

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

本文在一个动态博弈的框架下 ,考察了政策性负担与转轨经济中企业的预算软约束问题。在信息不对称情况下 ,政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险 ,从而导致国有企业的低效率 ;当市场竞争达到一定程度时 ,政策性负担必然带来国有企业的预算软约束。而且 ,预算软约束同企业的公有制性质无关 ,在同样承担政策性负担的条件下 ,私有企业比国有企业更容易产生预算软约束 ,并且要求政府提供更多的补贴。当国有企业承担政策性负担时 ,政府剥夺企业的生产自主权往往是一种次优的制度安排     

Investment and the soft budget constraint in China

This paper examines the incentive effects of the soft budget constraint on the investment behavior of firms in general and on the investment-cash flow sensitivity in particular. To this end, we develop a simple model of moral hazard that takes the soft budget constraint into account. Within this moral hazard environment, we show that investment is positively related to the amount of internal funds. We further show that the presence of the soft budget constraint deteriorates the moral hazard problem, thereby making the investment level less sensitive to the amount of internal funds. This is the case irrespective of whether the soft budget constraint renders the firm more or less liquidity constrained. To test the model's empirical implications, we employ data of China's listed companies for the period from 1997 to 2003. We use the share of state ownership as a proxy for the severity of the soft budget constraint. We find strong evidence that firms with larger shares of state ownership exhibit lower investment-cash flow sensitivities than firms with smaller shares of state ownership.     

Mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets: value relevance and impact on analysts’ forecasts

Drawing on a large sample of European firms, we examine whether variant compliance levels with mandated disclosures under IAS 36 Impairment of Assets and IAS 38 Intangible Assets are value relevant and affect analysts’ forecasts. Our results indicate a mean (median) compliance level of about 84% (86%) but high variation among firms and disclosure levels regarding IAS 36 being much lower than those regarding IAS 38. In depth, analysis reveals that non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgment and expectations. Furthermore, we find a positive (negative) relationship between average disclosure levels and market values (analysts’ forecast dispersion). Results, however, hold more specifically for disclosures related to IAS 36, and these also improve analysts’ forecast accuracy. Our findings add knowledge regarding the economic consequences of mandatory disclosures, have an appeal to regulators and financial statement preparers and reflect on the IASB’s concerns to increase the guidance and principles on presentation and disclosure.     

Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market

This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the effect of soft budget constraints on economies in transition from centralization to capitalism; it also reviews our understanding of soft budget constraints in general. It focuses on the conception of the soft budget constraint syndrome as a commitment problem. We show that the two features of soft budget constraints in centralized economies – ex post renegotiation of firms' financial plans and a close administrative relationship between firms and the centre – are intrinsically related. We examine a series of theories (based on the commitment-problem approach) that explain shortage, lack of innovation in centralized economies, devolution, and banking reform in transition economies. Moreover, we argue that soft budget constraints also have an influence on major issues in economics, such as the determination of the boundaries and capital structure of a firm. Finally, we show that soft budget constraints theory sheds light on financial crises and economic growth.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

违约风险与贷款定价:一个基于期权方法和软预算约束的新模型

由于忽视了软预算约束导致的"优先原则"不成立以及由此产生的还贷道德风险等现实问题,贷款定价传统期权方法在中国的适用性受到了影响。通过引入信贷合同效率,本文构造了二维违约风险,并据此建立了贷款定价的新模型。新模型解决了上述问题,得到以下结论:第一类与第二类违约风险的联动对贷款定价的影响是不确定的,第一类与第二类违约风险相关度越高则贷款定价越低,贷款期限与贷款定价之间的关系受违约风险构成的影响等。     

THE IMPACTS OF “SHOCK THERAPY” UNDER A BANKING CRISIS: EXPERIENCES FROM THREE LARGE BANK FAILURES IN JAPAN*

A bank failure can have various adverse consequences for clients; these adverse impacts differ depending on which bank takes over the failed banks’ operations. In this paper, we show how the new banks’ management strategies are important in mitigating the short‐ and long‐run consequences. We focus on the clients of three large failed Japanese banks and examine their responses in terms of increased bankruptcies and changes in market valuation after the banks’ operations were taken over. The results imply that the choice of “shock therapy” or “soft budget constraints” had dramatically different consequences in resolving the bad loan problems in Japan.     

Investment decisions and the soft budget constraint

This paper investigates the investment behaviour of a large panel of Hungarian firms in the period 1989–99, in order to assess the impact of institutional and regulatory changes on the efficiency of credit allocation. We find that the role of financial factors for investment decisions has changed significantly after the introduction of major financial reforms, and that firms were affected differently depending on their ownership type. Reforms have hardened the budget constraint of private domestic firms, particularly small ones, and reduced informational problems for foreign‐owned firms. State‐owned firms remained subject to a soft budget constraint. In particular, small state firms became more sensitive to financial conditions, whereas large state firms were unaffected and kept operating under a soft budget constraint.     

Soft or hard information? A trade-off selection of environmental disclosures by way of peer imitation and geographical distance

With the public pressure increasing, increasingly more number of studies explore how managers respond to outer pressures by using the environmental disclosure tool. However, previous studies ignore systematic research on the condition, duplicity and consequences of environmental disclosures. This article studies how geographical distance and peer imitation influence managers’ selection of soft and hard environmental disclosures and their economic consequences based on cost-benefit trade-off models and empirical data. The results indicate that when public pressure increases sharply, geographical distance has a negative influence on hard environmental disclosures, and peer imitation has a positive influence on soft environmental disclosures. Under the joint effect of two factors, managers tend to disclose soft environmental information more than hard environmental information, which cannot only mitigate potential risks but also ensure good economic consequences. To restrict managers’ opportunistic disclosure behaviour and improve the disclosing level and quality of environmental information, detailed standard norms and heavy punishment measures should be established, and regulating departments should regulate the disclosure behaviour of distanced firms and check the redundancy of soft environmental information to ensure whether the same information is repeatedly disclosed in the annual reports.     

Third-degree price discrimination in a short-stay accommodation industry

This article analyses the pricing in the short-stay accommodation industry in Tasmania. It utilizes a novel 2008 survey of Tasmanian short-stay accommodation firms in which business managers were asked about their perception of the elasticity of their firm’s demand in each of the market segments that their firm supplied. This direct observation of elasticity allows us to demonstrate that firms’ price across market segments act in a manner consistent with the Lerner index and the theory of third-degree price discrimination. Further we show, in line with expectations based on the literature, that increased quality of the accommodation lowers the elasticity of demand, while the elasticity of demand is higher in winter. Surprisingly, Internet sales channels do not exhibit a different elasticity of demand to other sales channels.     

Do mispricing and financial constraints matter for investment decisions?

This study investigates how mispricing and financing constraints affect ?rms’ future capital investments. We find that when the financing constraints are high, overpriced (underpriced) firms invest more (less) subsequently under previous non-optimal investments. The overpriced (underpriced) firms with precautionary motives invest significantly less subsequently when they are financially constrained. The overall evidence suggests that share mispricing, financial constraints and precautionary motives play a critical role that enables investors to less effectively monitor managers’ real decisions, thus limiting firms’ capital investments.     

Firm growth and productivity in Belarus: New empirical evidence from the machine building industry

Using a unique dataset comprising information for (up to) 153 firms in the machine building sector in Belarus, we investigate the determinants of firm growth for an economy where state ownership of enterprises is widespread. We use panel data models based on generalizations of Gibrat’s law, total factor productivity estimates and matching methods to assess the differences in firm growth between private and state-controlled firms. Our results indicate that labor hoarding and soft budget constraints play a particularly important role in explaining differences in performance between these two groups of firms.     

NATURAL DISASTERS,DAMAGE TO BANKS,AND FIRM INVESTMENT

This article investigates the effect of banks’ lending capacity on firms’ investment. To identify exogenous shocks to loan supply, we utilize the natural experiment provided by Japan's Great Hanshin‐Awaji earthquake in 1995. Using a unique data set that allows us to identify firms and banks in the earthquake‐affected areas, we find that the investment ratio of firms located outside the earthquake‐affected areas but having a main bank inside the areas was significantly smaller than that of firms located outside the areas and having a main bank outside the areas. Our findings suggest that loan supply shocks affect firm investment.     

基于政府门户网站视角的中美预算公开信息比较与评价

互联网是政府信息公开的一种主要途径。基于政府门户网站这一公开渠道及网络信息传播特点,可以从专门性、全面性、详细性、动态性、便利性等不同角度,对美国和中国的201 1年度中央(联邦)预算公开信息进行比较。虽然近几年中国在预算公开方面取得了一定进展,但仍处在起步阶段,预算公开信息呈现典型的"碎片化"特征,缺乏制度性保障,与社会期望仍有较大的差距。因此,应以政府门户网站为主要公开渠道,提高中国政府预算公开信息的质量。     

The effect of lender and loan type on a borrowing firm’s equity return

Past empirical studies appear to support the idea that banks and finance companies do not differ in their ability to resolve adverse selection problems associated with issuing new debt. In this article, we find there is a difference. More specifically, using an event study we find larger abnormal returns for secured loan disclosures to lower quality borrowers when the lender is a finance company versus a bank. This suggests the market views finance companies as more effective than banks in evaluating/monitoring lower quality borrowers obtaining secured loans. We posit this is due to finance companies’ greater expertise in this type of lending, resulting from specialization. Our findings extend the literature on how lender identity can influence signals about firm value from loan disclosures. Our results also support recent findings that positive abnormal returns to borrowing firms may not be a general feature across the loan population, but may be restricted to smaller, lower quality borrowers. Finally, we are the first to provide evidence that the market takes loan type into account, not just lender and borrower type, when considering the information embedded in loan disclosures.     

银行竞争与僵尸企业去杠杆

本文将银监会公布的金融许可证信息与中国工业企业数据库相匹配,考察了银行竞争对僵尸企业资本结构动态调整的影响机理。研究发现,银行竞争通过提高僵尸企业的融资成本显著加快了其资本结构调整速度,尤其是降杠杆的幅度。进一步研究表明,在货币政策宽松期,银行竞争对僵尸企业降杠杆的促进效果会更明显。此外,预算软约束小、外部融资依赖程度高、规模小的僵尸企业去杠杆的速度更快。本文立足于中国金融体系深化开放的现实情境,聚焦于僵尸企业这一特定主体的资本结构决策,为金融市场的竞争机制如何助力僵尸企业去杠杆提供了一定经验证据。