Labor market reforms, job instability, and the flexibility of the employment relationship

We endogenize separation in a search model of the labor market and allow for bargaining over the continuation of employment relationships following productivity shocks to take place under asymmetric information. In such a setting separation may occur even if continuation of the employment relationship is privately efficient for workers and firms. We show that reductions in the cost of separation, owing for example to a reduction in firing taxes, lead to an increase in job instability and, when separation costs are initially high, may be welfare decreasing for workers and firms. We furthermore show that, in response to an exogenous reduction in firing taxes, workers and firms may switch from rigid to flexible employment contracts, which further amplifies the increase in job instability caused by policy reform.     

Taxation In The Two‐Sector Neoclassical Growth Model With Sector‐Specific Externalities And Endogenous Labour Supply*

This paper examines the long‐run impacts of selective (or sector‐specific) commodity, payroll, and profit taxes in a two‐sector endogenous growth model with sector‐specific production externalities, in which one sector produces consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. The novelty of the model is that it allows not only for endogenous labour supply but also for the intersectoral allocation of resources, which may together lead to indeterminacy. We analytically show that the stability properties of the long‐run equilibrium critically affect the long‐run effects of these selective taxes, which may reverse the standard results of the growth effects of distortionary taxes.     

Influence Of Over‐ And Underconfidence On A Marriage Market*

This paper examines misconfidence (over‐ or underconfidence) and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with non‐transferable utility. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous—there exists a ranking of marital charm (types). It is shown that there are two externalities to over‐ or underconfident behaviour: someone's over‐ or underconfidence affects: (i) the duration of search for others who directly meet over‐ or underconfident agents; and (ii) the marriage decision of others who directly or indirectly meet over‐ or underconfident agents. Furthermore, these externalities prevent the lowest‐type agents from marrying in an equilibrium.     

α‐SERIAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROVISION OF AN EXCLUDABLE PUBLIC GOOD

We present a new class of “α‐serial mechanisms” for the provision of an excludable public good. Those mechanisms have a similar structure to the serial mechanism, but may let the non‐consumers pay a positive cost. They inherit desirable properties such as anonymity, envy‐freeness, Maskin monotonicity, and population monotonicity from the serial mechanism. We calculate the “maximal efficiency loss” and “maximal manipulation” of α‐serial mechanisms and point out a trade‐off between these two properties.     

A general equilibrium model of statistical discrimination

We study a general equilibrium model with endogenous human capital formation in which ex ante identical groups may be treated asymmetrically in equilibrium. The interaction between an informational externality and general equilibrium effects creates incentives for groups to specialize. Discrimination may arise even if the corresponding model with a single group has a unique equilibrium. The dominant group gains from discrimination, rationalizing why a majority may be reluctant to eliminate discrimination. The model is also consistent with “reverse discrimination” as a remedy against discrimination since it may be necessary to decrease the welfare of the dominant group to achieve parity.     

The evolving nature of the college wage premium

Focusing on the signaling aspect of education, we show that the college wage premium can be U-shaped in the share of the population with a college degree. This prediction is consistent with empirical evidence from a range of countries. Moreover, the equilibrium in our model is unique, which means that we are able to generate empirically-testable predictions linking income inequality and the premium enjoyed by the college educated. Consequently, our model provides a framework for future empirical studies.     

After you—endogenous sequencing in voluntary contribution games

We examine contributions to a public good when some donors do not know the true value of the good. If donors in such an environment determine the sequence of moves, two contribution orders may arise as equilibria. Either the uninformed and informed donors contribute simultaneously or the informed contribute prior to the uninformed. Sequential moves result in a larger provision of the public good, because the follower mimics the action of the leader, and in accounting for this response the leader chooses to contribute when it is efficient to do so. An experimental investigation of the game shows that the donors predominantly choose to contribute sequentially, and that the resulting contributions are larger than those of the simultaneous-move game. Although the gain from sequential moves is smaller when the sequence is set exogenously, our results suggest that the involved parties would benefit from having sequential moves imposed upon them.     

The role of boundary solutions in principal-agent problems of the Holmström-Milgrom type

The paper extends the Holmström-Milgrom [B. Holmström, P. Milgrom, Aggregation and linearity in the provision of intertemporal incentives, Econometrica 55 (1987) 303-328] analysis of intertemporal incentive provision to allow for the implementation of actions on the boundary of the feasible set. Boundary actions provide the principal with some freedom in choosing incentive schemes. This can be used to reduce premia. The paper characterizes optimal incentive schemes for the continuous-time Brownian-motion model and its discrete-time approximations. Linearity of incentive schemes in “accounts” is confirmed. However, for models with effort costs depending only on mean returns, the availability of boundary actions destroys the linearity of optimal incentive schemes in profits.     

Population ageing,time allocation and human capital: A general equilibrium analysis for Canada

This study explores the long-term impact of population ageing on labour supply and human capital investment in Canada, as well as the induced effects on productive capacity. The analysis is conducted with a dynamic computable overlapping generations model where in the spirit of Becker [Becker, Gary (1965), A theory of the allocation of time, The Economic Journal, Vol. 75, pp. 493–517.] and Heckman [Heckman, James (1976), A life-cycle model of earnings, learning and consumption, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, pp. 511–544], leisure has a quality-time feature and labour supply and human capital investment decisions are endogenous. The role of human capital in the growth process is based on the framework used by Mankiw et al. [Mankiw, N. Gregory, Romer, David and Weil, David N. (1992), A contribution to the empirics of economic growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, no. 2, pp. 407–437]. The paper indicates that population ageing creates more opportunities for young individuals to invest in human capital and supply more skilled labour at middle age. Consequently, the reduction in labour supply of young adults initially lowers productive capacity and exacerbates the economic costs of population ageing. However, current and future middle-age cohorts are more skilled and work more, which eventually raises productive capacity and significantly lowers the cost of population ageing. Finally, these results suggest that the recent increase in the participation rate of older workers might be the beginning of a new trend that will amplify over the next decades.     

Loafing or learning?—the demand for informal education

Using detailed time use data for Germany a positive correlation is found between the level of schooling and time investments in informal education. Two hypotheses explain this observation: (1) highly educated people have higher opportunity costs of their leisure time and thus prefer leisure activities which add to their market productivity (wage effect) and (2) highly educated people have a preference for ‘high quality’ leisure (taste effect). The demand for informal education is derived in a household production model accounting for both explanations. An empirical investigation finds evidence for both effects with the taste effect being more important.     

IT‐Based Technical Change and Job Instability

We investigate the impact of IT diffusion on the stability of employment. We document the evolution of different components of job instability over a panel of 348 cities in France, from the mid‐1970s to the early 2000s. The evidence goes against the view that the diffusion of IT has spurred job instability. Yet, analysing long‐term differences in the occupational structure, we find that IT diffusion has increased the share of high‐skill occupations at the expense of low‐skill occupations. This is consistent with French firms' reliance on their internal labour market to meet the new skill requirements associated with IT diffusion.     

IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS

Some labour contract negotiations involve strikes while most conclude with immediate settlement. This article offers a model of union‐firm negotiation with private information to show that either strikes or immediate settlement will take place in the equilibrium. Different from most signalling literature where the signals are exogenously given, this article endogenizes the choice of signals. We compare two signals, the employment level and the strategic delay. We show that the low‐revenue firm will choose the signal which gives it higher payoff while separating itself from the high‐revenue firm.     

A fault confessed is half redressed—Confessions and punishment

Confessions after failures are socially desirable. However, confessions also bear the risk of punishment. In a laboratory experiment I examine how confessions work. I analyze whether the willingness to punish harmful failures depends on how the harmed party has learned about the outcome. The harmed party can learn about the outcome via random detection or self-report by the performer. There are two major findings: first, confessions are a powerful instrument: punishment for confessed failures is less likely than for randomly detected failures. Second, confessions are much more likely to occur if there is no punishment.     

PRICE SETTING PRACTICES IN GREECE: EVIDENCE FROM A SMALL‐SCALE FIRM‐LEVEL SURVEY

The paper documents the price setting practices followed by some 400 or so firms operating in Greece. Survey replies reveal a low percentage of firms changing prices with frequency higher than annual and staggering of price changes during the year. As to firms’ reactions to unexpected shocks, prices appear to adjust sluggishly to cost shocks with asymmetries in price adjustment across positive and negative shocks. Adjustments to increases in costs appear speedier than those to reductions in demand. The data confirm a result found for other countries: the existence of cross‐sectional variations in price setting strategies and in the extent to which prices are adjusted in reaction to unexpected shocks. The results suggest a positive association between, on the one hand, product market competition and, on the other hand, state‐dependent pricing, frequent price changes and the likelihood of a price adjustment following an adverse demand shock.     

Subjective Performance Evaluations and Reciprocity in Principal–Agent Relations

We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on, and principals benefiting from, a real effort task in which the agents' performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give subjective performance feedback to agents, and agents have an opportunity to sanction principals. In contrast to existing models of reciprocity, we find that agents tend to sanction whenever the feedback of principals is below their subjective self‐evaluations even if agents' pay‐offs are independent of it. In turn, principals provide more positive feedback (relative to their actual performance assessment of the agent) if this does not affect their pay‐off.     

A NOTE ON “A ONE‐SECTOR NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS RETIREMENT”: EXISTENCE OF MULTIPLE STEADY STATES*

This note extends Matsuyama's 0–1 endogenous retirement choice model to the framework with continuous endogenous retirement choice to study the consumption‐saving decision and capital accumulation in an overlapping generation model. The conditions for the existence of multiple steady states have been derived. In contrast to the 0 or 1 labour choice, the partial retirement may be a stable steady state under the continuous endogenous retirement choice in the second period. And this implies that partial retirement may be a stable optimal choice. Also, we find that the retirement choice depends on the initial capital stock when there are multiple steady states.     

Corporate Restructuring in Japan Part I: Can M‐Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?

The purpose of this paper is to examine the recent organizational restructuring in Japan in the framework of organizational economics, assuming that the product/market portfolio of the firm is fixed. How does a firm set about organizing its internal divisions? I first summarize some stylized facts on corporate diversification strategy and multi‐divisional (M‐form) organization in large Japanese firms from different perspectives. I then analyse the problem of choosing an organizational form. In particular, I argue that, precisely because of its related diversification, the multi‐business Japanese firm adopting the M‐form finds it difficult to differentiate its diverse businesses internally.     

Pure rent taxation and allocation of capital in a two-sector open economy: A long-run analysis

In this paper, the long-run incidence of a tax on pure rent is analyzed in an OLG two-sector small open economy, in which one sector produces a capital good and one sector a consumer good. Contrary to what is obtained in a one-sector closed economy, a land rent tax does not necessarily foster nonhumam wealth accumulation and capital formation. The accommodating scheme for the government budget plays a crucial role for the effects of pure rent taxation. A rent tax stimulates nonhuman wealth if distortionary taxes on wealth or on income from nonland inputs are alleviated. The mechanism spurring capital formation is brought into action, instead, only when the rent tax is matched by a fall in capital taxation or, if the capital sector is capital intensive, by an increase in government spending on the capital good.