管理层风险偏好异质性、股权结构与股权激励模式组合

近年来,越来越多上市公司在推出的同一期股权激励计划中同时包含两种以上股权激励模式.以2006-2020 年实施股权激励模式组合计划的沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,实证研究管理层风险偏好异质性对上市公司股权激励模式组合选择行为的影响,并探究股权结构对两者关系的调节作用.研究发现:管理层风险偏好异质性越大,公司越有可能选择股权激励模式组合,以匹配管理层异质性的风险偏好,从而实现管理层风险承担总水平最优;股权结构对管理层风险偏好异质性与股权激励模式组合选择之间关系具有显著的调节效应,国有控股和股权集中度增大能够弱化管理层风险偏好异质性对股权激励模式组合选择的正向影响;股权激励模式组合能够匹配管理层风险偏好异质性,使得管理层风险承担总水平实现最优,进而提升公司价值.     

Nearly exact sample size calculation for powerful non‐randomized tests for differences between binomial proportions

In the case of two independent samples, it turns out that among the procedures taken in consideration, BOSCHLOO'S technique of raising the nominal level in the standard conditional test as far as admissible performs best in terms of power against almost all alternatives. The computational burden entailed in exact sample size calculation is comparatively modest for both the uniformly most powerful unbiased randomized and the conservative non‐randomized version of the exact Fisher‐type test. Computing these values yields a pair of bounds enclosing the exact sample size required for the Boschloo test, and it seems reasonable to replace the exact value with the middle of the corresponding interval. Comparisons between these mid‐N estimates and the fully exact sample sizes lead to the conclusion that the extra computational effort required for obtaining the latter is mostly dispensable. This holds also true in the case of paired binary data (McNemar setting). In the latter, the level‐corrected score test turns out to be almost as powerful as the randomized uniformly most powerful unbiased test and should be preferred to the McNemar–Boschloo test. The mid‐N rule provides a fairly tight upper bound to the exact sample size for the score test for paired proportions.     

What You Should Know About Megaprojects and Why: An Overview

This paper takes stock of megaproject management, an emerging and hugely costly field of study, by first answering the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units of mega, giga, and tera, and concluding with how we are presently entering a new “tera era” of trillion‐dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at US$6 to US$9 trillion annually, or 8% of the total global gross domestic product (GDP), which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four “sublimes”—political, technological, economic, and aesthetic—are identified and used to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the “iron law of megaprojects” is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again. Moreover, the “break–fix model” of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschman's theory of the “Hiding Hand” is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to “survival of the unfittest,” which explains why the worst projects get built rather than the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a “tension point,” in which tradition is being challenged and reform is emerging.     

Why Does the Negotiable Certificate of Deposit Matter for Chinese Banking?

The Negotiable Certificate of Deposit (NCD) is a major financial instrument in China; the value of outstanding Chinese NCDs was approximately RMB8 trillion (equivalent to USD1.2 trillion) in mid‐2017. This article reviews the most recent developments in the Chinese NCD, including its effect on interest rate pass‐through and money creation. Empirical results show that the introduction of the NCD in 2014 influenced the relationship between the policy rate and the lending rate of Chinese commercial banks, and the interest rate pass‐through from the policy rate to the lending rate of commercial banks improved subsequently. However, this process has also been accompanied by maturity mismatch, increasing leverage, and decreasing credit ratings for the assets of banks and other financial institutions. Consequently, systemic risk in the Chinese banking system has increased.