THE DYNAMICS OF NAMES: A MODEL OF REPUTATION*

The article studies reputation of names and its dynamics. First, the article shows that names backed by nothing intrinsic can bear reputation. Although the context is purely of adverse selection, a mechanism in the spirit of Kreps (1990) helps to sustain reputation. Second, it examines how the dynamics of the reputation affects the extent of sorting and the level of social efficiency and derives the dynamics in the equilibria with the highest efficiency. Finally, it empirically predicts that brand names can be fully established sooner in an industry where high‐end products have larger profit margins.     

DERIVATIVE IDEAS AND THE VALUE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS*

We build a general equilibrium model where growth is driven by two invention types: fundamental ideas that cause creative destruction, and derivative ideas that enhance the value of existing inventions. The model provides a new mapping from microeconomic, patent data to aggregate total factor productivity growth and the aggregate value of privately owned knowledge. We show how to measure the frequency of derivative ideas and the rate of creative destruction. We estimate that derivative ideas account for 70–80% of all patents and their presence more than doubles the value of knowledge capital relative to what the measured innovation rate might otherwise imply.     

PRODUCT QUALITY,REPUTATION, AND MARKET STRUCTURE*

In a repeated game in which firms simultaneously choose price and product quality, but quality is observed only after consumption takes place, equilibria exhibiting high quality may exist in oligopoly markets even when the low‐quality one is a unique equilibrium outcome in monopoly and competitive markets. Oligopolists can sustain high quality through the threat of both a loss of reputation and a breakdown in tacit collusion. While we abstract from other reasons that market structure might affect product quality, we show that the inverted‐U shaped relationship between feasible quality and market structure is robust to several generalizations of the model.     

STABILITY OF THE COURNOT SOLUTION AND FREE ENTRY: A NOTE*

Taking a traditional approach, I show that by using the discrete adjustment system, the Cournot solution in a free entry oligopoly with increasing returns to scale is stable only when the number of firms is very small. We must pay attention to stability when using the free entry Cournot oligopoly model.     

A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION*

We develop a positive theory of kleptocracy, in which the incumbent ruler's concern about his survival probability can induce him to pursue relatively benevolent policies. But, this effect can lower the equilibrium tax rate only until the time-consistency requirement becomes a binding constraint on the equilibrium tax rate. The minimum time-consistent tax rate in a reputational equilibrium is lower the more that the ruler values prospective future revenues, but the value of prospective future revenues itself depends on the ruler's survival probability. The analysis reveals that, if a relatively benevolent tax policy is both necessary and sufficient for a high survival probability, then equilibrium tax policy is relatively benevolent. Until two or three hundred years ago, it was characteristic almost     

COLLECTIVE REPUTATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF STATISTICAL DISCRIMINATION

Economists have developed theoretical models identifying self‐fulfilling expectations as an important source of statistical discrimination practices. The static models dominating the literature, however, may leave the false impression that a bad equilibrium is as fragile as a “bubble” and can burst at any moment when expectations flip. By developing a dynamic version of the model, we clarify the limits of expectations‐related fragility. Even if group members can coordinate their expectations about future employer behavior, a group with a poor initial collective reputation may still be unable to recover its reputation, implying that the once‐developed discriminatory outcomes can be long‐standing.     

声誉、搜寻成本与网上交易市场均衡

本文在搜寻理论的框架内分析了在卖家声誉存在差异的情况下,网上拍卖市场搜寻成本对价格水平和价格离差的影响,进而考察了搜寻成本对网上市场声誉机制的影响。本文的结论是:尽管搜索工具提高了网上交易市场的效率,但网上交易市场仍存在不可忽视的搜寻成本;较高的搜寻成本导致不同声誉水平的卖家同时存在于网上交易市场,高声誉卖家制定的价格较高,低声誉卖家制定的价格较低;搜寻效率的提高可以降低均衡价格水平,网站提供的推广服务也可以降低搜寻成本,降低均衡价格水平。模型很好地解释了网上拍卖市场中的一些现象,也与最近文献的经验事实有较好的吻合。     

BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND DEVELOPMENT*

We ask whether barriers to entry are a quantitatively important reason for the income gap between developing countries and the United States. We develop a tractable general equilibrium model that captures the effects of barriers to entry and the other main distortions typically considered in the development literature. We carry our model to the data and ask it to match the main development facts from the Penn World Table. We find that this requires large barriers to entry in developing countries, which account for about half of the income gap with the United States.     

投资银行声誉、IPO质量分布与发行制度创新

本文通过构建投资银行声誉的静、动态分析模型,对投资银行、IPO质量与新股发行抑价之间的关系进行了探讨,并运用统计分析技术和方法,对有关推论进行了实证检验。结果表明:(1)对投资银行的声誉与其承销的IPO质量之间的关系来说,1999年是一个分水岭;(2)影响投资银行声誉的主要因素是其综合竞争力;(3)IPO上市五日抑价与公司业绩缺乏统计上的显著性,而主要受企业规模、发行比例、中签率、新股定价的管制程度、上市地点与时间等因素的影响。     

利益相关者治理与中国上市公司的企业信用

企业信用可以信号、抵押、担保的方式,部分消除内生性交易费用所抵消的交易创造。中国上市公司的企业信用与其治理状况密切相关,本文从406家调查样本中选取了249家中国上市公司的数据,对企业信用与其利益相关者的治理进行了实证研究,以期为中国上市公司的企业信用建设提供一些思路。     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DOWNSTREAM ENTRY BARRIERS*

We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive.     

RJV FORMATION AND STRATEGIC ENTRY ACCOMMODATION*

This article examines the relationship between cost reduction and public goods effect of research joint ventures (RJVs) and strategic entry deterrence. R&D is process innovation à la Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992 ) and R&D cost sharing between the incumbent and the entrant in a RJV can be asymmetric per Long and Soubeyran (2002 ). It is found that conforming with the conventional wisdom, the incumbents prefer to form RJV to deter entry when the entrant is very inefficient. However, if the entrant is moderately inefficient, it is a better choice for the incumbent to accommodate entry by forming a RJV with it. In contrast, if the entrant is very efficient, then the equilibrium RJV structure depends on the magnitude of spillover effect: it is better to deter entry in the case of high spillover effect.     

ESTIMATES OF THE VALUE OF HOUSEHOLD WORK CANADA, 1961 and 1971*

The paper presents some estimates of the imputed dollar value of household work (HW)for Canada in 1961 and 1971, finding this to be about $16 and $38 billion respectively, equal to 40 percent of GNP. From the results we derive some implications about five questions raised in the relevant literature. First, no clear evidence of a downward trend for the ratio HW/GNP is found, contrary to U.S. results. Second, addition of HW to GNP as a welfare measure does not affect the general pattern of past growth estimates. Third, a cost–by-function method of estimating HW is found superior in its theoretical support and the detail it provides, but the opportunity-cost method, despite doubts on its theoretical validity, gives a good approximation in the aggregate, and, being simpler, is likely to remain popular. Fourth, disaggregation does matter if detail by region or family type is required, in which case data by number and ages of children and market-employment status of females are needed; for the total, a reasonable estimate (6–7 percent error)is given by further aggregated data. Fifth, sensitivity of HW to accuracy in the data used is large only for female wages chosen, in particular for the function “cooking”. Finally, though available data must be manipulated to fit the needs of HW, especially for earlier years, the extent of this is not all that much more than is commonly found for GNP estimations.     

INTENSITY OF COMPETITION, ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS

In rent seeking contests agents compete over a given amount of resource a prize. To increase the likelihood of winning the prize, the agents expend efforts. This paper addresses the issue of entry to and entry deterrence from rent seeking contest. The main purpose of the analysis is to provide an explanation for the empirical fact that the number of participants in contests is usually small. I also obtain results on the relationship between the intensity of competition in a contest and the amount of the contenders'expenditures.