STOCK MARKET REACTION TO ANTICIPATED VERSUS SURPRISE RATING CHANGES

I examine whether bond rating changes can be anticipated by investors and test whether the stock price reaction to the eventual change varies as a result. All else equal, the market reaction to changes that could have been easily predicted should be significantly smaller than the reaction to changes that are largely a surprise. Although rating upgrades prove difficult to predict, approximately 20% of downgrades can be correctly predicted using a relatively small number of publicly available variables. There is no significant difference between the stock price reaction to anticipated versus unanticipated rating changes.     

MACROECONOMIC NEWS AND STOCK MARKET CALENDAR AND WEATHER ANOMALIES

An analysis of six stock market calendar and weather anomalies from 1980 to 2003 shows that (1) returns on trading days in which macroeconomic announcements were made generate the anomalies and (2) five of the six anomalies are not present at all on the trading days in which such announcements were not made (more than 60% of the sample). The results suggest that the market response to macroeconomic news, not psychological or institutional factors, is the main source of calendar and weather anomalies.     

SENSITIVITY OF INVESTOR REACTION TO MARKET DIRECTION AND VOLATILITY: DIVIDEND CHANGE ANNOUNCEMENTS

We examine whether investor reactions are sensitive to the recent direction or volatility of underlying market movements. We find that dividend change announcements elicit a greater change in stock price when the nature of the news (good or bad) goes against the grain of the recent market direction during volatile times. For example, announcements to lower dividends elicit a significantly greater decrease in stock price when market returns have been up and more volatile. Similarly, announcements to raise dividends tends to elicit a greater increase in stock price when market returns have been normal or down and more volatile, although this latter tendency lacks statistical significance. We suggest an explanation for these results that combines the implications of a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model with behavioral considerations that link the responsiveness of investors to market direction and volatility.     

MODELS OF STOCK MARKET PREDICTABILITY

I briefly review the success of past studies purporting to explain equity valuations and predict future equity returns. The Campbell‐Shiller mean reversion models are contrasted with an expanded version of the so‐called Federal Reserve model. At least from 1970 to 2003, Federal Reserve–type models did somewhat better at predicting long‐horizon returns than did a mean reversion model based on dividend yields and price‐earnings multiples. However, timing investment strategies based on any of these prediction models do no better than a buy‐and‐hold strategy. Although some predictability of returns exists, there is no evidence of any systematic inefficiency that would enable investors to earn excess returns.     

MACROECONOMIC NEWS,STOCK TURNOVER,AND VOLATILITY CLUSTERING IN DAILY STOCK RETURNS

We study volatility clustering in daily stock returns at both the index and firm levels from 1985 to 2000. We find that the relation between today's index return shock and the next period's volatility decreases when important macroeconomic news is released today and increases with the shock in today's stock market turnover. Collectively, our results suggest that volatility clustering tends to be stronger when there is more uncertainty and disperse beliefs about the market's information signal. Our findings also contribute to a better understanding of the joint dynamics of stock returns and trading volume.     

STATE DEPENDENCY OF BANK STOCK REACTION TO FEDERAL FUNDS RATE TARGET CHANGES

We investigate the effects of changes in the federal funds target rate on bank stock returns through an event‐study analysis. We examine the state dependency of such effects and focus on the surprise elements of policy changes derived from the federal funds futures market. Although we confirm an inverse relation between bank stock returns and changes in the federal funds target rate previously supported in the literature, we find that bank stock returns only respond to surprise or unexpected changes in the federal funds target rate. We also find that such responses are conditional on the context in which policy changes take place.     

DEBT FORGIVENESS AND STOCK PRICE REACTION OF LENDING BANKS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM JAPAN

We provide a simple model for analyzing how debt forgiveness affects the stock price of a lending bank. Our model shows that although debt forgiveness increases shareholder wealth of a bank in healthy financial condition, it decreases shareholder wealth of a bank in unhealthy financial condition. We empirically investigate the announcement effect of debt forgiveness on bank stock prices in Japanese markets. On average, lending banks experience a significant negative announcement effect with respect to debt forgiveness. Consistent with the prediction of the model, we find a negative relation between the announcement effect and the net bad loan ratio as a proxy of the unhealthiness of the financial condition of the bank.     

DAYLIGHT AND INVESTOR SENTIMENT: A SECOND LOOK AT TWO STOCK MARKET BEHAVIORAL ANOMALIES

Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000, 2003) describe two stock market behavioral anomalies associated with changes in investor sentiment caused by daylight saving time (DST) changes and seasonal affective disorder (SAD). According to the hypothesized effects, DST changes and SAD affect asset prices by changing investors’ risk aversion. Although changes in the timing or amount of daylight are correlated with unusual stock market returns, I present evidence they do not cause those unusual returns. Instead, seasonal patterns in market‐related information during the sample period are the likely cause of the correlation between stock market returns and DST changes or SAD.     

INTANGIBLE ASSETS,BOOK‐TO‐MARKET,AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS

I examine two anomalies where the Fama and French three‐factor model fails to adequately explain monthly industry and index returns. Both anomalies are consistent with a bad model problem where the book‐to‐market factor introduces a negative bias in the intercepts. I propose the intangibles model as an alternative where the three‐factor model is known to have difficulty. This alternative model, which replaces the book‐to‐market factor with zero investment portfolio returns based on prior investments in intangible assets, is well specified in random samples, has comparable power, and fully explains both anomalies.     

ARE COMMON STOCKS A HEDGE AGAINST INFLATION?

We test whether U.K. common stocks hedge against inflation using a framework of the tax‐augmented Fisher hypothesis. Aggregate and disaggregate (seven industry groups) monthly data covering 48 years are used. All pairs of stock and retail price indexes are cointegrated. Tests in most cases reveal significant shifts in the cointegrating vectors, and accounting for these shifts improves the precision of the estimates. The point estimates of goods price elasticity are significantly above unity in all but two cases. These findings, though in sharp contrast to most existing findings that report price elasticity of below unity, appear theoretically more plausible because nominal stock returns must exceed the inflation rate to insulate tax‐paying investors.     

THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADING VOLUME REACTION TO FINANCIAL INFORMATION: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

Prior empirical research indicates that trading volume reaction to new information increases with the heterogeneity of investors’ prior beliefs. We examine three potential factors that theoretical models of financial economists show determine trading volume reaction to new information: heterogeneous prior beliefs, differential interpretation, and the consensus effect—the extent to which the information causes their beliefs to converge or diverge. We find that these three factors have a distinct and significant incremental effect on trading volume, thereby suggesting that empirical trading volume models that exclude or fail to control for any of these determinants are misspecified with biased estimated coefficients.     

GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS, VOLUME, AND THE MONDAY EFFECT

New evidence is presented on the nature of the Monday effect in stock market returns. Using stock returns for the years 1962-1986, the Monday effect is found to be confined to periods of negative market returns. Monday's returns are no different from other weekday returns in periods of positive returns. In addition, trading volume and the Monday effect are related. Monday's volume is lower than the other weekdays. When returns are compared controlling for trading volume, we find that the Monday effect is confined to negative return periods with above normal volume, which represent only two per cent of the sample period.     

STOCK MARKET REACTION TO ETHICAL INITIATIVES OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper offers an Investor Decision Framework (IDF) to describe and measure investor behavior toward social responsibility information. This framework seeks to explain how investors perceive the effects of social responsibility information on firm value. The formation in 1986 by 32 major defense contractors of the Defense Industries Initiative (DII) provides an ideal example to assess stock market reaction to an ethical initiative. The performance of the DII firms was compared with that of a control group of non-DII defense firms, which did not sign the agreement, in order to measure and determine the extent to which the market placed substance on the DII as a public commitment to ethics. We initially posited that the DII firms stock price would move in a significantly positive direction. However, when our analysis revealed a significant negative impact not only on DII, but also on non-DII defense stock prices, we were forced to reject thisa priorihypothesis. The market interpreted this ethical initiative as (i) a precursor of future sanctions towards firms engaged in defense contracting or (ii) as a penalty for social irresponsibility imposed by socially conscious investors. Either way, it would have a negative impact upon future cash flows.     

MARKET TIMING IN REGRESSIONS AND REALITY

We compare price‐to‐earnings ratios and dividend yields, which are indirect measures of sentiment, with the bullish sentiment index, which is a direct measure. We find that the sentiment index does better as a market‐timing tool than do P/E ratios and dividend yields, but none is very reliable. We do not argue that market timing is impossible. Rather, we observe that stock prices reflect both sentiment and value, both of which are difficult to measure and neither of which is perfectly known in foresight. Successful market timing requires insights into future sentiment and value, insights beyond those that are reflected in widely available measures.     

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION UNCERTAINTY AND COMMON STOCK RETURNS IN THE UNITED STATES

There is substantial evidence on the influence of political outcomes on the business cycle and stock market. We further hypothesize that uncertainty about the outcome of a U.S. presidential election should be reflected in pre‐election common stock returns. Prior research pools returns based on the party of the winning candidate, assuming that the outcome of the election is known a priori. We use candidate preference (i.e., polling) data to construct a measure of election uncertainty. We find that if the election does not have a candidate with a dominant lead, stock market volatility (risk) and average returns rise.     

ANALYST REPUTATION,DEALER AFFILIATION,AND MARKET MAKING

We investigate the effects of analysts' affiliation and reputation on dealers' market making activities. We find that for a given stock, dealers who have affiliated analysts covering the stock quote and trade more aggressively than those who do not have any affiliated analysts. More important, the reputation of affiliated analysts plays an additional role in the affiliated dealer's quote and trade behavior. Dealers with affiliated star analysts post more aggressive quotes and have larger market shares than dealers with affiliated nonstar analysts. Although dealers who post more aggressive quotes also induce affiliated star analysts to cover the stocks, the positive effect of analyst reputation on the affiliated dealers' quote aggressiveness remains significant and robust after controlling for potential endogenous and simultaneous problems.