Foreign direct investment and bilateral investment treaties: An international political perspective

This paper investigates the effect of the implementation of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) on the bilateral stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI). We argue that the understanding of how BITs affect FDI requires recognizing that multinational enterprises (MNEs) are not Stateless and that their investment return may well depend on the quality of political relations between the home and host countries. Using bilateral FDI data and event data to measure political interactions between countries, we show that the effect of the entry into force of a BIT crucially depends on the quality of political relations between the signatory countries; it increases FDI more between countries with tense relationships than between friendly countries. We also find evidence that BITs and good domestic institutions are complementary. BITs should therefore be understood as a mechanism for host governments to credibly commit not to expropriate investors in the future.     

Does Preferential Trade Benefit Poor Countries? A General Equilibrium Assessment with Nonhomothetic Preferences

We develop a Ricardian model of trade with nonhomothetic preferences to analyze preferential trade agreements (PTAs) among countries of different stages of economic development. The richer a country is, the more likely will PTAs improve its terms of trade, also when it is a non‐member. Rich non‐member countries are also less likely to incur welfare losses from PTAs. PTA membership only guarantees welfare gains for countries that are too poor to import the goods rich countries produce. For all other countries, the welfare effects of joining PTAs depend on the world income distribution and on the strength of comparative advantages.     

Free-Trade Areas and Welfare: An Equilibrium Analysis

This paper examines the welfare effects of the formation of a free-trade area. When a country is constrained to charge lower tariffs on imports from some countries, it is in its interest to reduce external tariffs as well. In alinear-quadratic model of intraindustry trade, the reduction in external tariffs induced by free-trade agreements is sufficiently large to make nonmember countries better off. Since only privately beneficial free-trade agreements are signed voluntarily, the formation of a free-trade area is a Pareto improvement. Owing to free-riding problems, however, the global free-trade area may not be a stable outcome.     

Foreign direct investment and international trade in a continuum Ricardian trade model

We develop a continuum Ricardian trade model to capture both North–South trade and technology transfer via foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational enterprises (MNEs). We show that there is a unique range of products produced in the South by MNEs. In the case of an infinitely elastic supply of expatriates, if the ability of Southern workers in absorbing Northern technology increases, then (a) the range of MNE production increases, (b) Northern workers's welfare and Southern workers' welfare change in opposite directions, and (c) the world aggregate welfare increases under certain conditions. We explore issues such as North–South wage gaps, FDI policies and the product cycle. We also derive results under a general supply of expatriates.     

Tax Policies,Regional Trade Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment: A Welfare Analysis

In this paper, we develop a partial equilibrium three‐country model to examine the relationship between regional trade agreements (RTAs) and foreign direct investment (FDI) in an environment with double taxation. Our analysis shows that FDI is welfare‐improving for at least one or both of the two regional countries if wage asymmetry is significantly large. FDI and an RTA are also welfare‐improving for the high‐wage country and the region if the wage differential is not small. We also examine the role of repatriation taxes in affecting the determination of firm location under an RTA. Our results suggest that the signing of an RTA may induce relocation from the high‐wage country to the low‐wage country unless an increase in the repatriation tax rate also occurs.     

Tariff,Growth, and Welfare

We develop a two‐country (Home and Foreign) by two‐good (consumption good and investment good) by one factor (capital) endogenous growth model with international knowledge spillover to study the relationship between an import tariff and economic growth and welfare. First, unlike the past literature, we do not need to make an assumption such that the growth rates between countries are identical in a balanced growth path (BGP). Second, we show that there exists a unique and saddle‐point BGP with both countries being incompletely specialized. Third, a higher import tariff on the consumption good in the domestic country may boost (reduce) the rate of economic growth when the foreign (domestic) country has an absolute advantage in the investment good. Finally, a rise in the tariff rate by one country may improve world welfare under some parameter spaces.     

A Public Choice Approach to Strategic and Nonstrategic Environmental Policy

In this paper we take a public choice perspective on strategic environmental policy and international environmental agreements. We examine cooperative and noncooperative environmental policies under governments that are either welfare maximizers (“good dictators”) or tax revenue maximizers (“Leviathans”). We show that Leviathans can perform better in terms of welfare and that good dictators can set higher taxes. We then analyze international environmental agreements and show that the breakdown of environmental cooperation can indeed lead to a welfare gain for all signatory countries. Considering a delegation game between governments, we find that a Pareto‐superior Leviathan outcome can be the unique Nash equilibrium.     

东道国腐败对跨国公司进入模式的影响研究

作为东道国投资环境中的重要组成部分,腐败不但会对FDI流入总量产生影响,还会对跨国公司的战略产生影响,而首先受到影响的就是跨国公司的进入模式战略。本研究以19个新兴市场国家的745家跨国公司子公司作为样本,运用MANOVA分析、判别分析、Logistic分析等研究方法得到以下结论:第一,东道国国家层面感知腐败、产业层面感知腐败会使跨国公司采用持股比例较低的合资(控股或非控股)进入模式;第二,东道国腐败程度对跨国公司进入模式战略的影响会受到跨国公司进入东道国战略动机的调节。     

Information and crowding externalities

Summary. We analyze a model in which agents have to make a binary choice under incomplete information about the state of the world, but also care about coordination with other agents who have the same problem. In some of these situations, the larger the share choosing the same alternative, the better off are agents. In others, if too many people choose the same alternative, agents could be worse off, due to crowding externalities. Agents receive public and private information about the state of the world. We determine whether agents rely more on private or public information, and whether or not their choice behavior is socially efficient. We characterize existence conditions for equilibria in which either all available information, or only the public information is used for decisions, compare the two equilibria in terms of welfare, and analyze the effects of better information. Surprisingly, increasing signal accuracy may be welfare decreasing.Received: 24 March 2004, Revised: 19 November 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D82. Correspondence to: C. Robert ClarkWe would like to thank Ig Horstmann, Gilbert Laporte, Andrew Leach, Matthias Messner, Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, Howard Thomas, Nicholas Yannelis, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The first author wishes to acknowledge the Strategic Research Grant he received from HEC Montreal for this project.     

Regional Blocs and Foreign Direct Investment

The paper examines the impact of the emergence of regional blocs on the patterns of interbloc and intrabloc trade when firms have the option to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). For exogenously given external tariffs, when firms have the option to engage in FDI, all interbloc trade may cease—complete trade diversion that is replaced by interbloc FDI investment creation. In such an event the volume of world trade declines but this is more than offset by the increase in world output due to direct investment. The paper also investigates the optimal tariff that a trading bloc levies on imports from nonmember countries. The tariffs are restricted by the option to engage in two‐way direct investment; hence, the regional blocs are hampered from mutually harming one another through an escalation in the tariff war. Finally, the formation of two regional blocs enhances the welfare of all countries.     

Partial Free Trade Agreements and Economic Welfare: Reconsidering GATT Article 24

This paper generalizes the Kemp–Wan theorem on the customs union to cover partial and incomplete free trade agreements emerging all over the world and elucidates the conditions which ensure that they are potentially conducive to the economic welfare of member countries without harming the rest of the world. In the light of this generalization, it also reconsiders two well‐known conditions stipulated in Article 24 of the GATT required for the formation of FTAs.     

Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements

This paper examines various implications of preferential trade agreements, namely customs unions and free trade areas, in the context of a multicountry general equilibrium model. The model is calibrated to represent countries with symmetric endowments, and aggregate and disaggregate welfare change measures are used to quantify the welfare effects of preferential trade agreements. It is found that free trade areas are better than customs unions on welfare grounds for the world as a whole. Welfare decompositions suggest that a significant fraction of the welfare changes is explained by the volume-of-trade effect for both types of preferential trade agreements.     

On the genesis of multinational foreign affiliate networks

Multinational enterprises (MNEs) develop their networks of foreign affiliates gradually over time. Instead of exploring all profitable opportunities immediately, they first establish themselves in their home countries and then enter new markets stepwise. We argue that this behavior is driven by uncertainty concerning a firm's success in new markets. After entry, the firm collects information which is used to update its beliefs about its performance in a market. As conditions in different markets are correlated, the information gathered in one of them can also be used to update beliefs elsewhere – with the degree of correlation depending on issues such as the geographical or cultural distance between markets. This correlated learning may render it optimal to enter markets sequentially – investment in market A is only followed by entry in market B if the firm was sufficiently successful in A. The prediction that firms start their expansion in markets that are closer to their home base and then proceed step by step is supported by our empirical analysis, which features the universe of foreign affiliates held by German multinationals. Based on a rich set of benchmark estimates and sensitivity checks, we identify correlated learning across markets beyond alternative explanations as a key driver of gradualism in the genesis of MNEs' foreign affiliate networks.     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

跨国公司行业选择与地点选择战略的相关性

行业选择和地点选择分别是跨国公司进入战略的主要论题,但现有研究缺少对两者之间是否存在相关性的分析。本文以中国FDI的“引进来”部分（IFDI）和“走出去”部分（OFDI）为倒,分析中国作为东道国引进外资时和其作为母国对外投资时在行业选择上的差异;并考虑地点选择因素,研究“走出去”的中国企业在发达国家和发展中国家的行业选择上是否存在差异,以及在中国投资的发达国家和发展中国家在行业选择上是否存在区别。通过跟踪200家外商来华投资企业和40家中国对外投资企业（118个项目）的投资产业、母国和东道国信息,运用描述统计和卡方检验得出实证结论：外商来华投资和中国对外投资在行业选择和地点选择上都存在差别;发达国家和发展中国家在华投资行业的技术含量有显著不同,即跨国公司的行业选择与地点选择存在相关性;但中国企业在对外投资中受资源寻求动机的强烈影响,其到发达国家和发展中国家进行投资时在行业选择上没有体现出差异性。     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Welfare‐improving adverse selection in credit markets*

A model of simultaneous adverse selection and moral hazard in a competitive credit market is developed and used to show that aggregate borrower welfare may be higher in the combined case than in the moral‐hazard‐only case. Adverse selection can be welfare improving because in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model, high‐quality borrowers cross subsidize low‐quality borrowers. The cross subsidization reduces the overall moral hazard effort effects, and the resulting gain in welfare may more than offset the welfare loss stemming from distorted investment choices. The analysis focuses on pooling equilibria because model structure precludes separating equilibria.     

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

In this paper we develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. It is assumed that signatory countries will be able to punish non-signatories, at some cost to themselves. When countries decide on their pollution emissions, they account for the evolution of the stock of pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations characterized by partial cooperation within an IEA that is stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, and situations where no stable agreement is feasible. Where more than one possibility coexist, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial number of signatory countries and pollution level).     

A bargaining model in general equilibrium

The goal of the paper is to present a simple model of rational endogenous household formation in a general equilibrium framework in which Pareto optimality at the economy level is not necessarily obtained. The simplest example of household formation is the case in which pairs of individuals engage themselves in a bargaining process on the division of some wealth: if an agreement on the distribution is (not) reached, we can say that the household is (not) formed. The vast majority of existing bargaining models predicts agreements on an efficient outcome. A seminal paper by Crawford (Econometrica 50:607–637, 1982) describes a very simple game with incomplete information in which, even with rational agents, disagreement causes welfare losses. We embed that model in a general equilibrium framework and present some results on equilibria both in the bargaining game and the associated exchange economy. Crawford’s results support Schelling’s intuition on the reasons of disagreement: it may arise if players’ commitments are reversible. Crawford shows that high probabilities of reversibility tend to favor the bargaining impasse, in fact with low probability. We prove that even if those probabilities are arbitrarily close to zero, disagreement is an equilibrium outcome, with high probability. That conclusion seems to be an even stronger support to Schelling’s original viewpoint. In the exchange economy model with that noncooperative bargaining game as a first stage, we present significant examples of economies for which equilibria exist. Because of disagreement, Pareto suboptimal exchange economy equilibria exist for all elements in the utility function and endowment spaces and they may coexist with Pareto optimal equilibria even at the same competitive prices.     

Domestic Labor Markets and Foreign Direct Investment*

We study how the labor market and industry uncertainty affect the investment decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). In an uncertain business climate, MNEs must take account of the future in deciding where to locate a branch plant. When wages are endogenously determined, both the opportunity cost of labor and redundancy payments influence the MNE’s decision. When countries compete for foreign investment, different national characteristics determine the winners in different industries. Differences in risk may draw MNEs to different locations. Firm‐specific bargaining always offers an advantage, as the mix of current and future pay fully reflects the firm’s risk profile.