加强我国商业银行次级债风险约束作用的思考——基于“相互持有”视角的理论分析

本文基于我国银行间相互持有次级债的现实背景,以数理模型和数值计算方式研究了银行间相互持有次级债可能引致的潜在后果,发现银行间相互持有次级债尽管能提高其资本充足比率,但在某种程度上削弱了次级债的市场约束功能,有可能加剧银行业的系统性风险。进一步研究表明持债银行资产之间的相关性、持债银行自身的风险承担、以及相互持有规模是导致次级债市场约束功能弱化的重要诱因,建议减少银行间相互持有次级债的数量.减弱银行资产相关性并促进次级债投资主体的多元化。     

次级债能发挥对银行风险承担行为的市场约束作用吗

关于次级债的既有文献基本都在实证研究其市场约束的存在性,而没有揭示次级债作为一种市场约束激励机制的有效程度或内在机理。本文则基于或有权估值理论,研究了次级债对银行风险承担行为的市场约束机理。我们的研究发现:当银行的资产负债水平处于一定的安全边界之内时,随着银行风险承担行为的提高,次级债债权人会在某种程度上补偿高级债债权人。在银行的负债结构中引入次级债,不一定能起到约束银行风险承担行为的目的,它取决于银行既有的资本充足水平。监管当局在允许或强制商业银行发行次级债时,应考虑到次级债市场约束与银行风险承担行为之间的内在关系。为增强市场对银行风险承担行为的约束作用,监管当局应强制资本相对充足的银行发行一定规模的次级债,但这种强制性要求不应覆盖到资本不足的银行。     

谈银行的次级债务与市场约束

我国银监会近日已决定将符合规定条件的次级债务计入银行附属资本，来缓解我国商业银行资本先天不足、资本补充渠道单一的状况。但是我们不能仅关注次级债弥补银行资本的作用，还应重视并发挥次级债对银行的市场约束作用。     

次级债对我国商业银行市场约束功能的研究

主要讨论次级债对我国商业银行市场约束的效用。首先,简述了市场约束及次级债的含义和作用;简单介绍了次级债发挥市场约束作用的有效性;引出了我国商业银行次级债的发展历程。其次,通过对我国次级债发行的现状分析,总结出了我国商业银行发行次级债的问题及其相关原因——尤其是在发挥市场约束方面。最后,根据得出的问题和原因,提出了几项解决我国商业银行次级债的市场约束功能的建议,旨在进一步促进我国商业银行次级债的市场约束作用的发挥。     

国内商业银行“次债”发行升温

今年年初以来,伴随着监管部门对资本充足率监管的升级,我国商业银行业开始掀起一浪高过一浪的次级债发行热潮,如何看待本轮次级债发行热以及由此引发的影响也越来越受到业内和市场的关注。次级债作为附属资本,其本身抵御风险的能力有限,特别是银行同业间的过度交叉持有次级债和混合债券,使商业银行的资本充足率虽然达到了形式上的要求,而实际上并没有从根本上增加整体的稳健性。基于我国债券市场的现状和对银行风险管理的要求,商业银行不能也不应过分“依赖”次级债补充资本充足率,应该以增加利润、提升业务量的方式来彻底解决资本金不足的困局。     

商业银行次级债新规：资本约束和市场约束双重功效

中国银监会于2009年10月21日向各大商业银行下发《关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知》,对次级债券的发行做了比较大的调整和修改。次级债券具有资本约束和市场约束双重功能,此次次级债改革不仅有利于次级债资本约束能力提高,同时也加强了其市场约束。如何进一步提高次级债券对商业银行的约束功能,可以从继续坚持次级债为资本金补充重要手段、大力发展次级债发行和交易市场、减轻政府对商业银行的隐性担保和扩大次级债的投资群体四个方面着手。     

商业银行次级债新规:资本约束和市场约束双重功效

中国银监会于2009年10月21日向各大商业银行下发《关于完善商业银行资本补充机制的通知》,对次级债券的发行做了比较大的调整和修改。次级债券具有资本约束和市场约束双重功能,此次次级债改革不仅有利于次级债资本约束能力提高,同时也加强了其市场约束。如何进一步提高次级债券对商业银行的约束功能,可以从继续坚持次级债为资本金补充重要手段、大力发展次级债发行和交易市场、减轻政府对商业银行的隐性担保和扩大次级债的投资群体四个方面着手。     

“次债”发行热还需冷思考

今年年初以来,伴随着监管部门对资本充足率监管的升级,我国商业银行业开始掀起一浪高过一浪的次级债发行热湖,如何看待本轮次级债发行热以及由此引发的影响也越来越受到业内和市场的关注。次级债作为附属资本,其本身抵御风险的能力有限,特别是银行同业间的过度交叉持有次级债和混合债券,使商业银行的资本充足率虽然达到了形式上的要求,而实际上并没有从根本上增加整体的稳健性。基于我国债券市场的现状和对银行风险管理的要求,商业银行不能也不应过分“依赖”次级债补充资本充足率,应该以增加利润、提升业务量的方式来彻底解决资本金不足的困局。     

银行永续债发展的国际经验借鉴

随着金融监管形势趋严趋紧,商业银行资本充足性面临的监管压力加大。银行永续债是当下商业银行补充一级资本的最优选择,在未来也终将成为商业银行补充资本金的重要手段。永续债在国际金融市场上大行其道的最近10年,其主体以银行为主,而我国引进永续债之初其发行主体则主要是企业,银行永续债才刚刚起步。本文介绍银行永续债的概念及其特征,分析我国银行永续债发展现状及障碍,梳理和阐释银行永续债的国外发展经验对我国发展银行永续债的启示。     

银行信用评级的信息质量及其次级债事前约束北大核心CSSCISSCI

本文研究了银行信用评级的信息内容和信息质量及其在次级债风险定价或事前约束中的反映情况。研究表明信用评级不仅在次级债风险定价中得到了显著反映,还非充分内嵌了政府隐性救助预期和银行风险特征等丰富信息;较之主体信用评级,上市银行风险的市场测度指标能更显著地解释次级债的发行溢价,然而,投资者在政府隐性救助预期下进行了"扭曲"的风险定价,它们不仅未对上市银行的风险承担给予应有的市场约束,反而还可能鼓励其未来更大的风险承担倾向。研究表明,将次级债事前约束的缺失归咎于外部评级失当以及非效率市场不能提供有价值的风险信号有失偏颇。     

Does Subordinated Debt Play a Role for Market Discipline?

This paper examines the link between the issuance of subordinated debt by commercial banks and market discipline. Using cross-sectional and time-series data from 2002 to 2007, we empirically examine the relationship between banks' risk level and their decisions to issue subordinated debts in Taiwan. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the commercial banks with low risk levels prefer to issue subordinated debts more than high-risk banks do, and we reject the hypothesis. We conclude that the application of subordinated debt is not a mature channel for providing market discipline for commercial banks in Taiwan. We offer potential reasons for this finding and discuss the policy implications of our findings.     

Bank Contingent Capital: Valuation and the Role of Market Discipline

This paper develops a structural model to evaluate contingent capital notes (CCN) of Basel III under alternative regulatory closure rules. Our dynamic model has a fixed default barrier and at specific discrete time points an additional higher default barrier depending on the closure threshold. The closed-form expressions of CCN and subordinated debts (SD) in the simple Merton model are presented to understand the convex relationship between the price and capital ratio trigger of CCN and to examine the effects of closure rules on CCN and SD through their derivatives’ properties. Our numerical results in the more general model show that a lax closure rule increases the price of SD and distorts the risk information of issuing banks, but not so for CCN. The policy implications are that CCN are more effective than SD in terms of enhancing market discipline because the price/yield information of CCN is more sensitive to the issuing bank’s risk than SD and will not be distorted by regulatory closure rules.     

The New Basel Capital Accord: Making it Effective with Stronger Market Discipline

In January 2001 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision proposed a new capital adequacy framework to respond to deficiencies in the 1988 Capital Accord on credit risk. The main elements or 'pillars' of the proposal are capital requirements based on the internal risk-ratings of individual banks, expanded and active supervision, and information disclosure requirements to enhance market discipline. We discuss the incentive effects of the proposed regulation. In particular, we argue that it provides incentives for banks to develop new ways to evade the intended consequences of the proposed regulation. Supervision alone cannot prevent banks from 'gaming and manipulation' of risk-weights based on internal ratings. Furthermore, the proposed third pillar to enhance market discipline of banks' risk-taking is too weak to achieve its objective. Market discipline can be strengthened by a requirement that banks issue subordinated debt. We propose a first phase for introducing a requirement for large banks to issue subordinated debt as part of the capital requirement.     

Do subordinated debt holders discipline bank risk-taking? Evidence from risk management decisions

I test the market discipline of bank risk hypothesis by examining whether banks choose risk management policies that account for the risk preferences of subordinated debt holders. Using around 500,000 quarterly observations on the population of U.S. insured commercial banks over the 1995–2009 period, I document that the ratio of subordinated debt affects bank risk management decisions consistent with the market discipline hypothesis only when subordinated debt is held by the parent holding company. In particular, the subordinated debt ratio increases the likelihood and the extent of interest rate derivatives use for risk management purposes at bank holding company (BHC)-affiliated banks, where subordinated debt holders have a better access to information needed for monitoring and control rights provided by equity ownership. At non-affiliated banks, a higher subordinated debt ratio leads to risk management decisions consistent with moral hazard behavior. The analysis also shows that the too-big-to-fail protection prevents market discipline even at BHC-affiliated banks.     

Market discipline and the evaluation of Euro financial bonds—An empirical analysis

Within the context of the increasing discussion on a shift in financial regulatory philosophy from the currently prevailing rules-based approach to a more incentive-based supervisory procedure in which market discipline should play a decisive role in overcoming several moral hazard and efficiency problems of the financial system, the question regarding the evaluation of financial bonds has gained an important dimension. Such a disciplining market influence could namely be exercised if financial institutions were obliged to issue subordinated bonds on a regular basis (mandatory subordinated debt policy). However, the influence of market discipline will only be effective if the evaluation of different subordinated (and other) bonds occurs in a differentiated manner and dependent on the inherent risks. This study provides findings, on the basis of which this requirement for the Euro financial bond market can be regarded as fulfilled.     

Funding advantage and market discipline in the Canadian banking sector

We employ a comprehensive data set and a variety of methods to provide evidence on the magnitude of large banks’ funding advantage in Canada in addition to the extent to which market discipline exists across different securities issued by the Canadian banks. The banking sector in Canada provides a unique setting in which to examine market discipline along with the prospects of proposed reforms because Canada has no history of government bailouts, and an implicit government guarantee has been in effect consistently since the 1920s. We find that large banks have a funding advantage over small banks after controlling for bank-specific and market risk factors. Large banks on average pay 80 basis points and 70 basis points less, respectively, on their deposits and subordinated debt. Working with hand-collected market data on debt issues by large banks, we also find that market discipline exists for subordinated debt and not for senior debt.     

The emergence of market monitoring in Japanese banks: Evidence from the subordinated debt market

This paper uses a unique data set on the spreads of subordinated debts issued by Japanese banks to investigate the presence of market monitoring. The results show that subordinated debt investors punished weak banks by requiring higher interest rates. Moreover, I find that the spreads and the sensitivity of spreads to Moody’s bank ratings both increased dramatically after the Japanese government allowed a large city bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, to fail and passed the Financial Reform Act and the Rapid Revitalization Act in the late 1990s. These results suggest that the decline of conjectural guarantee led to the emergence of market monitoring. In addition, I find the relationship between spreads and accounting measures of bank risk to be quite fragile.     

Capital changes at large affiliated banks

The federal bank regulators imposed numerical capital guidelines in December 1981. If these guidelines are binding, then banking organizations may respond to the costs of regulation in various ways. If the regulations are not binding, then further reliance may be placed on market discipline. This study develops two models of changes in the equity capital to assets ratio of large banks affiliated with bank holding companies—a regulatory model in which capital regulations are a binding influence and a market model in which financial markets influence capital ratios. The two models are examined empirically through a disequilibrium framework and maximum likelihood estimation techniques. The results suggest that most banks are predominantly influenced by regulatory forces. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Florida State University     

短期融资券评级有用吗？

短期融资券是由非金融企业在银行间债券市场上发行并约定在一定期限内还本付息的有价证券。作为一种融资性的无担保商业本票，短期融资券的信用风险客观存在。本文讨论了我国短期融资券市场的发展，并通过对短期融资券级别与信用利差之间关系的分析，来为短期融资券评级的作用提供实证证据，研究结果发现，我国的主体长期信用级别与信用利差之间存在显著差别。