Psychology at work

We compare three wage–effort psychological games. In the first game, the agent’s motivation hinges on a degree of altruism influenced by the surprise generated by the principal’s wage offer. The agent works harder when the wage is greater than expected and vice versa when the wage is smaller than expected. Consistent equilibrium beliefs oblige the principal to randomize in order to surprise the agent, which results in the principal being worse off than if she were dealing with an unemotional agent. We then consider an intention-based reciprocity model and a model of guilt aversion. We find that guilt aversion may potentially yield the best outcome for the principal.     

Trade, product cycles, and inequality within and between countries

Abstract.  This paper incorporates Northern product innovation and product‐cycle‐driven technology transfer into the continuum‐of‐goods Heckscher‐Ohlin model. The creation of very skill‐intensive goods induces the North to transfer production of older, less skill‐intensive goods to the South. These relocated goods are the most skill intensive by Southern standards. Hence, product cycles raise the relative demand for skilled workers and thus wage inequality within both regions. This runs contrary to the Stolper‐Samuelson theorem, but accords well with the fact that wage inequality has risen in both Northern and Southern countries. Moreover, product cycles increase income inequality between countries. JEL classification: F1     

Gradual globalization and inequality between and within countries

Abstract.  This paper investigates the effects of gradual trade liberalization on intra‐country and inter‐country inequality. It assumes two countries, North and South, and two factors, skilled labour and unskilled labour. North is defined as the one that is relatively skilled‐labour abundant and larger. A marginal trade liberalization from autarky is shown to (a) increase (decrease) in skilled‐unskilled wage differential in the North (South) and (b) raise the inequality between North and South. As the global economy approaches free trade, a marginal trade liberalization has effects, which are the opposite of (a) and (b); that is, the relative wage falls in the North and rises in the South, and North‐South inequality decreases.     

The effect of ambiguity aversion on reward scheme choice

We test the implications of ambiguity aversion in a principal–agent problem with multiple agents. Models of ambiguity aversion suggest that, under ambiguity, comparative compensation schemes may become more attractive than independent wage contracts. We test this by presenting agents with a choice between comparative reward schemes and independent contracts, which are designed such that under uncertainty about output distributions (that is, under ambiguity), ambiguity averse agents should typically prefer comparative reward schemes, independent of their degree of risk aversion. We indeed find that the share of agents who choose the comparative scheme is higher under ambiguity.     

What drives the cross‐country growth and inequality correlation?

Abstract.  We present a neo‐classical model that explores the determinants of growth‐inequality correlation and attempts to reconcile the seemingly conflicting evidence on the nature of the growth‐inequality relationship. The initial distribution of human capital determines the long‐run income distribution and the growth rate by influencing the occupational choice of the agents. The steady‐state proportion of adults that innovates and updates human capital is path dependent. The output elasticity of skilled‐labour, barriers to knowledge spillovers, and the degree of redistribution determine the range of steady‐state equilibria. From a calibration experiment we report that a skill‐intensive technology, low barriers to knowledge spillovers, and high degrees of redistribution characterize the industrial countries with a positive growth‐inequality correlation. A negative correlation between growth and inequality arises for the group of non‐industrial countries with the opposite characteristics. JEL classification: E1, O4     

Goods market responses to trade shocks and trade and wages decompositions

Abstract.  Trade and wages literature asks whether trade or technology has been the major factor behind increases in wage inequality in OECD countries since the 1980s. In this literature, little attention has been paid to how goods market responses to trade shocks affect conclusions. Using an Armington heterogeneous goods trade model we capture demand side effects, and show how trade shocks affecting the price of unskilled‐intensive importable goods can be absorbed on the demand side of goods markets, with little or no impact on relative wage rates. No wage impact occurs if the elasticity of substitution in preferences between imports and import substitutes is one. As this elasticity increases, trade plays an ever larger role in explaining wage inequality changes, and as the elasticity goes below one the sign of the effect changes. We present some results of general equilibrium decompositions of total wage change into trade and technology components using UK data. We suggest that since many import demand elasticity estimates are in the neighbourhood of one, there is a prima facie case that goods market considerations further lower the significance of trade as an explanation of recent trends in OECD wage inequality beyond that claimed in the literature.     

Privatization and efficiency wages

The impact of privatization is investigated in a shirking model of efficiency wages. Without trade unions, privatization — modeled as a stricter control of employees — lowers wages and raises employment, output, and profits, while effort and productivity effects depend on the employees' risk aversion. However, for a utilitarian monopoly union, facing a company characterized by a constant-elasticity labor-demand schedule, privatization raises efficiency wages. If privatization is modeled as a stronger profit orientation, wages, effort, and labor productivity will rise, while employment will shrink in a wage-setting firm. Again, wage and employment effects can be reversed in the case of wage negotiations.     

Wage inequality and overeducation in a model with efficiency wages

Abstract.  This paper shows that the existence and persistence of 'overeducation' can be explained by an extension of the efficiency wage model. When calibrated to fit the amounts of overeducation found in most empirical studies, the model implies that both the relative wage and the relative employment of high‐skill workers depend inversely on aggregate economic activity. Keeping aggregate employment constant, furthermore, low‐skill unemployment rises, following an increase in the relative supply of high‐skill labour, and relative wages may be insensitive to changes in relative labour supplies. The model may help to explain rising wage inequality in some countries since the early 1970s. JEL classification: J31     

Strategic union delegation and strike activity

Abstract.  We develop a model of wage determination with private information, in which the union has the option to delegate the wage bargaining to either surplus‐maximizing delegates or to wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members). We show that the wage outcome in case of surplus‐maximizing delegates is not necessarily smaller than the wage outcome in case of wage‐maximizing delegates, even when the wage bargaining with private information is close to one with complete information. However, if it is commonly known that the union is stronger than the firm and the demand is sufficiently elastic, then delegating to wage‐maximizing delegates definitely increases the wage at equilibrium. The maximum delay in reaching an agreement is greater whenever the union chooses wage‐maximizing delegates instead of surplus‐maximizing delegates and remains finite even when the period length shrinks to zero. JEL classification: C70, C71, C72, C78     

Policy Influences on Unemployment: the European Experience

This paper considers the implications of four kinds of labour market policies for the 1980s rise in European unemployment: unemployment compensation, active labour market policies, employment protection legislation and taxation. It finds evidence that all have played a role in the determination of unemployment and discusses the mechanisms involved, the extent of the influence of each and the lessons learned from this experience. One of the main findings is that there is a trade‐off between wage inequality and unemployment. Policy has played a role in determining how a country responded to the negative macroeconomic shocks of the 1980s but policy alone cannot explain the full rise in European unemployment and North American wage inequality.     

On the first-order approach in principal-agent models with hidden borrowing and lending

We provide sufficient conditions for the validity of the first-order approach for two-period dynamic moral hazard problems where the agent can save and borrow secretly. The first-order approach is valid if the following conditions hold: (i) the agent has non-increasing absolute risk aversion utility (NIARA), (ii) the output technology has monotone likelihood ratios (MLR), and (iii) the distribution function of output is log-convex in effort (LCDF). Moreover, under these three conditions, the optimal contract is monotone in output. We also investigate a few possibilities of relaxing these requirements.     

The effect of wage dispersion on team outcome and the way team outcome is produced

The impact of intra-team pay dispersion on team productivity is a highly discussed issue. On the one hand, wage differentials provide incentives for higher employee effort. On the other hand, pay inequality may reduce team cohesiveness and increase feelings of relative deprivation leading to lower performance. Analysing nonlinear effects of wage dispersion in professional soccer, we find empirical evidence that team performance is strongest when there is either very high or very low wage inequality. Medium levels produce the weakest team performance. In addition, we show that the pay structure affects the team's playing style even after controlling for team and coach heterogeneity. We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications as well as the limits of generalization.     

Inequality and trade

Abstract.  We incorporate demand‐side considerations in trade in a systematic but straightforward way. We do so by focusing on the role of inequality in the determination of trade flows and patterns. With non‐homothetic preferences, when countries are similar in all respects but asset inequality, we find that trade is driven by specialization in consumption , not production. Besides, these assumptions allow us to generate some interesting international spillover effects of redistributive policies. Finally, we study a model of monopolistic competition and find a novel V‐shaped relationship between the ratio of inter‐industry to intra‐industry trade and a country's inequality. JEL classification: F11, F12     

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MEETS ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY: GLOBALIZATION, INEQUALITY, AND INNOVATION STRATEGIES

I perform a Schumpeterian analysis of a world economy in which heterogenous individuals and firms endogenously respond to stronger global competition by undertaking more education and by spending more in research and development (R&D). A more globalized economy is predicted to exacerbate wage inequality, but to spur human capital accumulation within each country. However, despite its positive level effects on consumption and output, globalization can reduce each country's per-capita output growth rate. R&D specialization allows each country to positively invest in manufacturing, variety proliferation R&D, and product quality upgrading R&D. The existence of such an R&D specialization – jointly with domestic size – allows us to explain some different economic performance about inequality and R&D effort of developed regions, such as the US and the EU countries.     

Minimum wages in an automating economy

We explore the suitability of the minimum wage as a policy instrument for reducing emerging income inequality created by new technologies. For this, we implement a binding minimum wage in a task-based framework, in which tasks are conducted by machines, low-skill, and high-skill workers. In this framework, an increasing minimum wage reduces the inequality between the low-skill wage and the other factor prices, whereas the share of income of low-skill workers in the national income is nonincreasing. Then, we analyze the impact of an automating economy along the extensive and intensive margins. In a setting with a minimum wage, it can be shown that automation at the extensive margin and the creation of new, labor-intensive tasks do not increase the aggregate output in general, as the displacement of low-skill workers counteracts the positive effects of cost-savings. Finally, we highlight a potential trade-off between less inequality of the factor prices and greater inequality of the income distribution when a minimum wage is introduced into an automating economy.     

Generalized measures of wage differentials

This paper considers measures of wage differentials not solely determined by mean comparisons but summarizing differences across complete wage distributions. The approach builds on considerations of risk or inequality aversion and on standard expected utility concepts. In an application to the gender pay gap in Luxembourg the disadvantage of women persists according to the proposed measures: lower mean wages for women are not compensated by differences in higher moments of wage distributions (e.g., by less dispersion) at least for realistic assumptions about women preferences toward risk and inequality. The paper also illustrates an original empirical model for wage distributions in the presence of covariates and under endogenous labour market participation.     

Decentralized Policymaking in a Long‐run Growth Model with Seigniorage and Taxes

The paper introduces decentralized policymaking into a game‐theoretic model with output growth through capital accumulation, and in which the determination of taxes, seigniorage and the long‐run growth rate of the economy reflects the strategic interactions between the government, the central bank and the private sector. The paper investigates, among other things, the impact on the long‐run growth rate of a higher degree of inflation aversion of the central bank and a higher degree of inefficiency in the tax system.     

Strategic Delegation of Multiple Tasks

This paper studies both the owner–manager relationship and the union–firm relationship in a model of unionised duopoly to analyse whether a firm's owner delegates the task of wage bargaining to a manager along with the task of output determination. We also analyse the profit and welfare effects of multiple‐task delegation. It has been shown in the literature that, when there is only one delegation task – output determination – delegation of output decisions to managers leads to lower profits for owners than non‐delegation as pure profit‐maximisation. However, when there are two delegation tasks as in our model – output determination and wage bargaining – we show that owners are better off delegating both tasks than delegating only the output decision or not delegating at all. This result provides a rationale and managerial insight for strategically delegating multiple tasks to managers. Moreover, we show that union utility, consumer surplus and social welfare are all higher when owners do not delegate the task of wage bargaining than when they do. This result suggests that governments implement union contracts that require owners, rather than managers, to negotiate wages with unions in order to benefit unions and consumers and to improve social welfare as well.     

Minimum wage impacts on youth employment transitions, 1993–1999

Abstract.  The longitudinal nature of the Master File of the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) for the period 1993–9, enables comparing transitions from employment to non‐employment for individuals affected by minimum wage changes with appropriate comparison groups not affected by minimum wages. This is based on the large number (24) of minimum wage changes that have occurred across the different provincial jurisdictions in Canada over the 1990s. The results indicate that the minimum wage increases have increased the transition from employment to non‐employment of employed low‐wage youths, who are at‐risk of being affected by a minimum wage increase, by around 6 percentage points (ranging from 4 to 8 percentage points). These disemployment effects in turn imply 'minimum wage' elasticities of about −0.4 (ranging from −0.3 to −0.5).     

Organized crime and wage inequality

This paper stresses the role of industrial organization of crime, and explores how organized crime affects wage inequality. We find that, when only unskilled workers (or both skilled and unskilled workers) engage in organized crime, an increase in the number of criminal groups will increase wage inequality if (1) the skilled sector is more capital intensive than the unskilled sector, and (2) the price elasticity of demand for the skilled product is large enough. However, when there are only skilled workers engaging in organized crime, condition (1) is sufficient to widen wage inequality, irrespective of the price elasticity.