Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation

Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all.     

Multistage Contracting with Applications to R&D and Insurance Policies

An agent undertakes a nonobservable first‐stage effort. The principal observes whether the effort results in a successful project or not. If the project succeeds, only the firm observes its interim quality, and can further improve it with a nonobservable second‐stage effort. If the agent accepts penalties when the first‐stage fails, moral hazard and asymmetric information do not prevent the principal from implementing her first‐best outcome. However, if the agent is bounded by the maximum loss he can bear when the first‐stage fails (limited liability), the principal induces the agent to exert a first‐stage effort below the first‐best level and a second‐stage effort above the first‐best level when the interim quality of his project is low. This distortion in efforts implies that the ex post rent left to the agent with a project of high interim quality is above the first‐best level. This provides a rationale for the optimality of expanding the use of the “carrot” (second‐stage rent) when the use of the “stick” (first‐stage penalty) is restricted. Implications of the theory for R&D, bank, job, and insurance contracts are discussed.     

Economic Performance, Trade Restrictiveness, and Efficiency

The paper addresses the question of whether trade restrictiveness impacts economic performance, via a trade restrictiveness index that is decomposable into a trade distortion and a domestic distortion component. The paper builds on the Anderson and Neary price index measure of trade distortion, in evaluating trade restrictiveness via a distance function approach. This is accomplished by adding a “dual” version to their trade restrictiveness price index, based on distance functions that scale output quantities. The authors compute the trade restrictiveness quantity index (TRQI) using a parametric frontier approach to model the production side of the economy, and a panel of information on the agricultural sector of a set of European Community countries. The results suggest that the use of TRQI makes a considerable difference to interpretations of the efficiency impact of agricultural trade policies in EC countries, as compared to policy‐oriented aggregates or result‐oriented measures of trade restrictiveness.     

PROTECTION,INVOLUNTARY SELF‐EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE

A small open economy operates with a unionized import‐competing sector and an informal “self‐employed” sector. Productivity varies across people in the informal sector. The full‐employment structure accommodates “underemployment or involuntary self‐employment” in the flexible‐wage informal sector. Protection increases the cost of capital and may increase the set of people who are involuntarily employed in the informal sector. Even if one ignores the consumption distortion effect of a tariff, the tariff may fail to be second‐best because it may raise underemployment. Our results on tariff‐reform are consistent with some recent empirical evidence.     

Rent Seeking with Politically Contestable Rights to Tariff‐rate Import Quotas**

This paper analyzes rent seeking for agricultural import quotas and the associated waste of resources when politically contestable licenses are allocated to either or both importers and exporters. In a two‐stage simultaneous contest where firms seek rent for licenses and then bargain over the import/export price, it is shown that (1) rents are not dissipated completely because of uncertainty in allocation of “rights,” (2) the dissipation ratio increases if the country with a more competitive contest increases the probability of establishing licenses, (3) rent seeking may cause the market structure to change, (4) less rent is dissipated in the case of pre‐existing market power, and (5) allocation of multiple licenses decreases rent‐seeking outlays.     

Vertically Integrated North–South Trade and the Redux Model

The paper uses the framework of Obstfeld and Rogoff's Redux model to study the impact of monetary shocks on exchange rate, terms of trade, and welfare in the context of a North–South trade. The authors show that a relative Northern monetary expansion can depreciate or appreciate its currency depending on whether the consumption elasticity of money demand and the degree of monopolistic distortion are low or high enough. This shock has asymmetric effects on welfare in such a way that “beggar‐thyself” or “beggar‐thy‐neighbor” effects always occur.     

On the informational size of message spaces

In a recent paper, Mount and Reiter established that, in a certain sense, the competitive mechanism is an “informationally most efficient” procedure for allocating resources. This result, of course, depends upon the way in which we characterize the notion of informational efficiency. Several alternative characterizations, and the relationships among them, are given here, and it is shown under which characterizations the above result is true, and under which it is false. It is shown that there is an intuitively appealing “best” characterization for which it is true.     

“Love of wealth” and economic growth

In a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth framework it is shown that for an optimum a benevolent social planner cannot have an excessive “love of wealth”. With a “right” “love of wealth” an optimum exists and implies higher long‐run per‐capita capital, income, and consumption relative to the standard model. This has important implications for comparative development trajectories. The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility of getting arbitrarily close to the golden rule where long‐run per‐capita consumption is maximal. It is shown that the optimal path attains its steady state more slowly. Thus, the beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model. Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private ownership economy. One can then identify “love of wealth” with the “spirit of capitalism.” The paper thus implies that one needs a “right” level of the “spirit of capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.     

OPTIMAL CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES IN THE PRESENCE OF INCOME TAXATION*

A substantial literature examines how the Pigouvian directive that marginal taxes should equal marginal external harms needs to be modified in light of the preexisting distortion due to labor income taxation. Additional literature considers distributive concerns. It is demonstrated, however, that simple first‐best rules—unmodified for labor supply distortion or distribution—are correct in the model examined. Specifically, setting all commodity taxes equal to marginal harms (and subsidies equal to marginal benefits) can generate a Pareto improvement, as can a marginal reform toward the first‐best. Qualifications and explanations for differences from previous work are also presented.     

Inter‐regional competition,comparative advantage and environmental federalism

In this paper, we compare endogenous environmental policy setting with centralized and decentralized governments when regions have comparative advantages in different polluting goods. We develop a two‐region, two‐good model with inter‐regional environmental damages and perfect competition in product markets, where both regions produce both goods. Despite positive spillovers of pollution across regions, the model predicts that decentralization may lead to weaker or stricter environmental standards or taxes, depending on the degree of regional comparative advantage and the extent of transboundary pollution. This suggests that federalism can lead to either a “race to the bottom” or a “race to the top,” without relying on inefficient lobbying efforts or capital competition.     

ON THE “PRO‐POORNESS” OF GROWTH IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL CONTEXT

This paper represents a first attempt to bring together the issues of multidimensional poverty and growth “pro‐poorness” assessments. More specifically, we suggest the use of sequential dominance procedures to test the “pro‐poorness” of observed growth spells when poverty is measured on the basis of income and another discrete well‐being attribute. Sequential procedures are also used to obtain graphical tools that are consistent with the spirit of Ravallion and Chen's growth incidence curve and Son's poverty growth curve. Contrary to traditional unidimensional tests, our method makes it possible to take into account the importance of deprivation correlations at the individual level and thus may reverse results observed with the traditional tools used to check the “pro‐poorness” of growth. An illustration of our approach is given using Turkish data for the period 2003–05.     

Corporate social responsibility and market entry

Is the decision of firms to pursue social interest and promote social progress philanthropic or motivated by strategic reasons? Using a simple Spence–Dixit entry model game with homogeneous goods, this paper studies the possible anticompetitive effect of the adoption of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the form of “consumer friendliness” (i.e., firms’ attention to the welfare of consumers). It is shown that, when the market becomes contestable, the incumbent can select to adopt CSR to hamper to a greater extent the potential entrant, regardless of its choice to engage in CSR activities. In other words, CSR can become a strategic barrier to entry.     

Environmental Standards in a Large Open Economy

The small‐country price‐taking assumption of Oates and Schwab is relaxed to consider a large open economy that can influence its net capital return. This creates an incentive for the country to distort its policies. The key question asked is whether this induces inefficient outcomes. The result is that if the country has a dedicated tax on capital and uses this tax optimally, the Oates and Schwab first‐best result still holds. However, efficiency in a large open economy requires that the tax on capital be nonzero, unlike Oates and Schwab where the capital tax must be zero for first‐best efficiency.     

Japan's Post‐Fukushima Energy Policy Challenges

The Great East Japan Earthquake and the successive accidents at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station are stark reminders of the importance of energy, which is the basis of economic activity and national governance. Urgent responses have been conducted since March 11, 2011, including controlling the consequences of the nuclear accident, dealing with the short‐term power shortages, and a comprehensive review of Japan's long‐term national energy policy. Nationwide discussions and reviews of these issues are still continuing. Even today, more than 2 years after March 11, many problems remain unsolved and Japanese society has to face uncertainty and challenges about its energy future. In the current difficult situation, Japan needs to achieve “3Es (e nergy security, environmental protection, and economic efficiency)” plus “S” (safety) and “M” (macro economy protection) simultaneously, taking account of the new realities following the Fukushima accident. This paper tries to identify the energy‐related challenges that Japan has to face and tries to recommend the concept of the “energy best mix policy” for Japan, by describing the present status of energy issues in Japan and the national debate on energy policy.     

Market Entry Regulation and International Competition*

We analyze a non‐cooperative two‐country game where each government decides whether to allow free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We show that a Pareto‐efficient allocation may result in equilibrium. In particular, if the cost difference between home and foreign production is “significant,” production will be located in the cost‐efficient country exclusively; and if this cost difference is even “substantial,” the induced allocation is also Pareto efficient. Only if the cost difference is “insignificant,” production may take place in both countries and the allocation is inefficient.     

Relation-based versus Rule-based Governance: an Explanation of the East Asian Miracle and Asian Crisis

The paper aims to establish a theory of relation‐based governance to explain both the “East Asian miracle” and the Asian crisis. The author first defines “relation” and “relation‐based governance” in terms of information and enforcement, and then analyzes the nature and dynamics of relation‐based governance, comparing its benefits and costs with that of “rule‐based governance” in terms of observability/verifiability, commitment, and transaction costs. The theory is applied to examine a particular relation‐based governance system—the Japanese model—to explain both the East Asian miracle and the Asian crisis. The framework provides foundations for studies of East Asian catching‐up and economic development in general.     

Optimal Monetary Policy in OLG Models with Long‐Lived Agents: A Note

This note reexamines Crettez, Michel, and Wigniolle ( 2002 ), who studied a two‐period overlapping generations model with cash‐in‐advance constraints and showed that a combination of saving tax and monetary policy involving positive nominal interest rates could achieve the first‐best allocation. The note shows that their result does not hold if agents live for three periods. The implementation of the first best requires the Friedman rule. If agents are long‐lived, saving tax cannot offset a distortion caused by the positive nominal interest rate.     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

Long‐term care policy with lazy rotten kids

This paper studies the determination of informal long‐term care (LTC) provided by children in a scenario which is somewhere in between perfect altruism and selfish exchanges. Parents are altruistic but children are purely selfish, and neither side can make credible commitments. The model is based on Becker's “rotten kid” specification except that it explicitly accounts for the sequence of decisions. In Becker's world, with a single good efficiency is achieved. We show that when family aid is introduced the outcome is likely to be inefficient. Still, the rotten kid mechanism is at work and ensures that a positive level of LTC is provided as long as the bequest motive is operative. We identify the inefficiencies by comparing the laissez‐faire (subgame perfect) equilibrium to the first‐best allocation. We first assume that families are identical ex ante and then consider the case where dynasties differ in wealth. We study how the provision of LTC can be improved by public policies. Interestingly, crowding out of private aid by public LTC is not a problem in this setting. With an operative bequest motive, public LTC will have no impact on private aid. More amazingly still, when the bequest motive is (initially) not operative, public insurance may even enhance the provision of informal aid.