Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders

A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting we show: (1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; (2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementarities; (3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and (4) budget constraints arise endogenously.     

STRATEGY PROOF AND PRIVACY PRESERVING FAIR ALLOCATION MECHANISM*

We study a fair division problem with indivisible objects such as jobs, houses and one divisible good like money. It is required that each agent be assigned with exactly one object and a certain amount of money. Agents are assumed to have quasi‐linear utilities in money but their reservation values over the objects are private information. A dynamic mechanism is proposed that induces all agents to act honestly rather than strategically and assigns the objects with money to agents efficiently and fairly; at the same time it achieves privacy protection for the agents.     

Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects

Summary. Auctioneers often face the decision of whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction (or any other revenue equivalent auction form) there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that critical number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. The results have been proved using a mathematical technique of quantiles that can be extremely useful for similar analysis. Received: November 5, 1996; revised version: January 21, 1998     

Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization

This paper presents a rational theory of categorization and similarity-based reasoning. I study a model of sequential learning in which the decision maker infers unknown properties of an object from information about other objects. The decision maker may use the following heuristics: divide objects into categories with similar properties and predict that a member of a category has a property if some other member of this category has this property. The environment is symmetric: the decision maker has no reason to believe that the objects and properties are a priori different. In symmetric environments, categorization is an optimal solution to an inductive inference problem. Any optimal solution looks as if the decision maker categorizes. Various experimental observations about similarity-based reasoning coincide with the optimal behavior in my model.     

论中国的货币政策目标

货币政策目标是货币政策的核心 ,货币政策效果如何 ,表现为货币政策目标是否实现。本文回顾了中国两种不同货币政策目标的形成原因 ,认为近期内中国货币政策目标不会发生变化 ,从长期来看有可能变为四大目标。尽管把金融市场的稳定作为货币政策目标存在着操作上的困难 ,但中国的货币政策应该关注金融市场的稳定。     

Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games

Majority auction games are simultaneous sealed-bid auctions of identical objects among identical bidders who each want to win a specified fraction (more than a half) of the objects. Each bidder receives no benefit from winning less than the specified fraction and no additional benefit from winning more than it. Symmetric equilibria having simple, intuitive forms are shown to exist in first-price, second-price and all-pay versions of such games when the number of bidders is sufficiently large. This contrasts with earlier results for the two-bidder “pure chopstick” majority auction games where the only known equilibria are more complicated.     

Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions

We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k₁ objects are sold in the first round and k₂ in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a lowballing effect that reduces the first-round price. Total revenue is greater in a single-round, uniform auction for k=k₁+k₂ objects than in a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also identify a positive informational effect on the second-round price. Total expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement may be greater or smaller than in a single-round uniform auction, depending on the model's parameters.     

Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints

We study simultaneous ascending auctions of two identical objects when bidders are financially constrained and their valuations exhibit complementarities. We assume the budget constraints are known but the values for individual objects are private information, and characterize noncollusive equilibria. Equilibrium behavior is affected by the exposure problem. Bidders with higher budgets are more reluctant to bid, because opponents with lower budgets may end up pursuing a single object, thus preventing the realization of complementarities. Therefore poor bidders may win both objects when they do not have the highest valuation. We gratefully acknowledge comments by Marco Battaglini, Benny Moldovanu and participants at seminars held at Montreal, Yale, Texas A&M, Washington St. Louis and at the Workshop on Mechanism Design with Budget Constraints held at SUNY - Stony Brook. Sandro Brusco acknowledges financial support from the Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencias D.G.E.S., proyecto SEC2001-0445.     

On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems

We consider the priority-based allocation problem: there is a set of indivisible objects with multiple supplies (e.g., schools with seats) and a set of agents (e.g., students) with priorities over objects (e.g., proximity of residence area). We study two well-known and competing mechanisms. The agent-optimal stable mechanism (AOSM) allots objects via the deferred acceptance algorithm. The top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) allots objects via Gale's top trading cycles algorithm. We show that the two mechanisms are equivalent, or TTCM is fair (i.e., respects agents’ priorities), or resource monotonic, or population monotonic, if and only if the priority structure is acyclic. Furthermore, if AOSM fails to be efficient (consistent) for a problem, TTCM also fails to be fair (consistent) for it. However, the converse is not necessarily true.     

On the importance of boundary objects for virtual collaboration: a review of the literature

In this paper, we explore the phenomenon of boundary objects in the process of virtual collaboration. Virtual collaboration is an interactive act that interconnects jointly and voluntarily collaborating individuals that are electronically linked. We regard them as virtual communities (VCs). VCs are characterised by its aim to conduce to shared understanding through an effective use of boundary objects. Artefacts that serve two or more VC members to establish collaboration are seen as boundary objects. The study at hand uses the socio-technical systems theory as a framework to categorise extant research. It draws on the concept of Carlile’s three tiers of boundary objects (syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic) to further sub-categorise scholarly publications between 2004 and 2014. This leads to an in-depth analysis on the use of boundary objects, its effect on the collaboration process as well as a first research agenda for subsequent endeavours in the field of boundary objects and virtual collaboration.     

The Package Assignment Model

We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D44, D51.     

Auctions of Heterogeneous Objects

Simultaneous sealed bid auctions of heterogeneous objects are analyzed. Each bidder's reservation value for an object depends upon the other objects he obtains. Bidders' reservation values are common knowledge. In simultaneous first-price auctions, the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations contains the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium allocations which in turn contains the set of strict Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Hence, pure strategy Nash equilibria (when they exist) are efficient. Mixed strategy Nash equilibria may be inefficient. In simultaneous second-price auctions, any efficient allocation can be implemented as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if a Walrasian equilibrium exists.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D44, D51.     

Profiling science and innovation policy by object-based computing

Named entities, such as key initiatives, research programmes, scientific strategies and policies, are research objects or objects that are embedded in many web pages of science and innovation institutes. These objects provide important information that can be extracted intelligently from those pages. This paper brings forward an object-based computing method by using objects and their semantic information for profiling science and innovation policies. After extracting the objects and the relationships between them, we proposed an object grid to represent web pages. Objects were transferred into machine-readable knowledge units with rich semantic information. By using computational objects, we judged the intelligence value of web resources and classified policies into more detailed categories, such as strategic plan, research and development, and budget. To test the effectiveness of profiling science and innovation policies by using the object-based computing method, this paper conducted a research profiling experiment system.     

AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: AN OUTLINE

Reprinted from The Review of Income and Wealth 12: 179–189 (1966) This article deals in an axiomatic manner with problems of definition, classification, and measurement in the national accounts. It argues that the elementary units which must be classified in national accounting are economic objects (real and financial), rather than transactions. The article defines briefly a set of postulates, and shows that the structure of a simple system of national accounting can be derived from them. There are twenty postulates–certain of them establishing basic categories such as sector, time, economic object, value (price); others establishing relations between categories (for example the notion of ownership); and others describing operations in which economic objects can be involved, such as production, final consumption, change of ownership, and change of debtor and creditor (in the case of financial objects). It is shown that the system of postulates makes it possible to consider a large number of accounting concepts (flows or stocks) as classes (baskets) of real objects (e.g., exports, real capital) or financial objects (e.g., payments, total debt of a sector). These concepts can be defined without reference to prices, although prices are necessary to measure them. Other concepts cannot be defined in this way in this system of postulates, for example value added, foreign balance, saving, net worth. However, it is possible to define magnitudes of the latter type and measure them in terms of value: for example, value added can be defined as the difference between the value of receipts and the value of outlays of a sector. In this way it is possible to establish algebraic relations among the national accounting concepts. (This article is a summary of certain parts of the doctoral thesis of the author, published in Norwegian in 1955.)     

Self-enforced collusion through comparative cheap talk in simultaneous auctions with entry

Campbell (J Econ Theory 82:425–450, 1998) develops a self-enforced collusion mechanism in simultaneous auctions based on complete comparative cheap talk and endogenous entry, with two bidders. His result is difficult to generalize to an arbitrary number of bidders, since the entry-decision stage of the game is characterized by strategic substitutes. This paper analyzes more-than-two-bidder, symmetric-prior cases. Two results are proved: (1) as the number of objects grows large, a full comparative cheap talk equilibrium exists and it yields asymptotically fully efficient collusion; and (2) there is always a partial comparative cheap talk equilibrium. All these results are supported by intuitive equilibria at the entry-decision stage (J Econ Theory 130:205–219, 2006; Math Soc Sci 2008, forthcoming). Numerical examples suggest that full comparative cheap talk equilibria are not uncommon even with few objects.     

AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO NATIONAL ACCOUNTING: AN OUTLINE

This article deals in an axiomatic manner with problems of definition, classification, and measurement in the national accounts. It argues that the elementary units which must be classified in national accounting are economic objects (real and financial), rather than transactions. The article defines briefly a set of postulates, and shows that the structure of a simple system of national accounting can be derived from them. There are twenty postulates—certain of them establishing basic categories such as sector, time, economic object, value (price); others establishing relations between categories (for example the notion of ownership); and others describing operations in which economic objects can be involved, such as production, final consumption, change of ownership, and change of debtor and creditor (in the case of financial objects). It is shown that the system of postulates makes it possible to consider a large number of accounting concepts (flows or stocks) as classes (baskets) of real objects (e.g., exports, real capital) or financial objects (e.g., payments, total debt of a sector). These concepts can be defined without reference to prices, although prices are necessary to measure them. Other concepts cannot be defined in this way in this system of postulates, for example value added, foreign balance, saving, net worth. However, it is possible to define magnitudes of the latter type and measure them in terms of value: for example, value added can be defined as the difference between the value of receipts and the value of outlays of a sector. In this way it is possible to establish algebraic relations among the national accounting concepts. (This article is a summary of certain parts of the doctoral thesis of the author, published in Norwegian in 1955.)     

The social construction of value: value theories and John Locke's framework of qualities

Value theory is central to economics. Whenever new economic theories appear on stage, their theory of value is different. I classify value theories along Locke's lines of primary and secondary qualities. When value is thought to inhere in objects, value is a primary quality. The marginalists perceive value as given to objects by autonomous individuals independent of their environment (much like monads) with given preferences. Value here is a secondary quality. Both are unsatisfactory; value is a social construct. The question arises why social value theory, which Clark and Anderson worked on around the turn of the nineteenth century, did not take root.     

Optimal bilateral trade of multiple objects

We study a private-values buyer–seller problem with multiple objects. Valuations are binary and i.i.d. We construct mechanisms that span the set of all Pareto-efficient outcomes. The induced trading rules for objects are linked in a simple way.     

Money as a Generic Particular: Marx and Simmel on the Structure of Monetary Denominations

ABSTRACT

This article is concerned with the structure of monetary denominations of economic value. Marx and Simmel analyze this structure by means of references to objects of mere catallactic validity. These objects are ontologically atypical insofar as they are particulars of the genus commodity. Understanding money through generic particulars elucidates the conceptual link between money as a unit of account and money as a means of payment. This initially perplexing idea captures a fundamental characteristic of money without committing to either a commodity theory or a claim theory of money. A modification of the notion ‘commodity’ allows for a conception of money as a generic particular that is consistent with contemporary accounts of money as abstract purchasing power residing in different forms of liabilities and claims denominated in a common quantitative scale.     

Mixed bundling auctions

We study multi-object auctions where agents have private and additive valuations for heterogeneous objects. We focus on the revenue properties of a class of dominant strategy mechanisms where a weight is assigned to each partition of objects. The weights influence the probability with which partitions are chosen in the mechanism. This class contains efficient auctions, pure bundling auctions, mixed bundling auctions, auctions with reserve prices and auctions with pre-packaged bundles. For any number of objects and bidders, both the pure bundling auction and separate, efficient auctions for the single objects are revenue-inferior to an auction that involves mixed bundling.