Do bank loans still convey information to investors? Evidence from the split share structure reform in China

Bank loans can convey information about the borrowing firms that have proper corporate governance systems. Using a sample of bank loan announcements in China, we find that the market reaction is positive after the split share structure reform in 2005, which aligns the interests of large shareholders and minority shareholders, government and public investors, and alleviates their tunneling incentives. We also find that this effect is more pronounced for private firms as the reform mainly enhances corporate governance for private firms. The signaling role of bank loans is less pronounced for firms with less severe information asymmetry after the reform, e.g. higher shareholdings of mutual funds and higher proportion of independent directors. Related party transactions decrease when they obtain bank loans after the reform, which reflects the alleviation of tunneling after the reform.     

Bank Loan Announcements and Borrower Stock Returns: Does Bank Origin Matter?

Banks play a special role as providers of informative signals about the quality and value of their borrowers. Such signals, however, may have a quality of their own as the banks' selection and monitoring abilities may differ. Using an event study methodology, we study the importance of the geographical origin and organization of the banks for the investors' assessments of firms' credit quality and economic worth following loan announcements. Our sample comprises 986 announcements of bank loans to US firms over the period of 1980–2003. We find that investors react positively to such announcements if the loans are made by foreign or local banks, but not if the loans are made by banks that are located outside the firm's headquarters state. Investor reaction is, in fact, the largest when the bank is foreign. Our evidence suggest that investors value relationships with more competitive and skilled banks rather than banks that have easier access to private information about the firms. These results are applicable also to the European markets where regulatory and economic borders do not coincide and bank identities and reputation seem to matter a great deal.     

商业银行公司治理结构与经营绩效研究

选取九家银行为研究样本,使用面板数据的时间固定效应模型,本文分析了商业银行的股权结构、董事会特征、监事会特征、高管激励制度、境外战略投资者的引进,对银行盈利能力和风险控制能力的影响,认为我国商业银行的内部治理结构并不能对银行盈利能力造成显著影响,但是却能显著地影响银行的信贷风险控制能力;股权集中度较高、独立董事所占比例较高,高管激励制度较健全、境外战略投资者所持股份比例较高的银行,信贷风险控制能力较强,银行的不良贷款率较低。     

Foreign institutional investors and dividend policy: Evidence from China

This study examines whether foreign institutional investment influences firms’ dividend policies. Using data from all domestically listed nonfinancial firms in China during the period of 2003–2013, we find that foreign shareholding influences dividend decisions and vice versa.Furthermore, changes in dividend payments over time positively affect subsequent changes in foreign shareholding, but the opposite is not true. Our study indicates that foreign institutional investors do not change firms’ future dividend payments once they have made their investment choices in China. Moreover, they self-select into Chinese firms that pay high dividends. Our evidence suggests that in an institutional setting where foreign investors have tightly restricted access to local securities markets and a relatively high risk of expropriation by controlling shareholders exists, firms can use dividends to signal good investment opportunities to foreign investors.     

Effects of Foreign Institutional Ownership on Foreign Bank Lending: Some Evidence for Emerging Markets

Despite the large literature on developed countries, little is known about the interactions between corporate governance, foreign ownership, and foreign bank lending in developing countries. Using data from five Latin American countries from 2001 to 2008, we provide one of the first pieces of evidence of how foreign ownership affects the loan cost of borrowers in emerging markets. We find that in terms of foreign bank lending, the cost of debt financing is significantly higher for firms whose largest shareholder is a foreign institutional one. The results support the hypothesis that because of potential agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors, having block institutional shareholders tend to increase the borrowers’ debt burden. There is further evidence supporting this agency conflict hypothesis as we find that the effects of large institutional shareholders on borrowing costs become larger (smaller) when the conflicts are aggravated (mitigated).     

城市商业银行贷款集中度对资产质量影响的研究

文章利用我国27个省市的46家城市商业银行2007-2016年度数据,从客户集中度和行业集中度两个维度考察其对资产质量的影响。分析了城市商业银行授信策略的时滞性,比较了东部、中部、西部及东北地区城市商业银行贷款集中现象的差异,探讨了引进境外战略投资者对城市商业银行资产质量的影响。研究结论如下：城市商业银行的贷款集中度对资产质量具有负面影响,其中客户集中度的影响比较显著,行业集中度仅在东部地区存在显著性影响;贷款集中度对银行资产质量的影响存在滞后效应和累积效应;不同地区的城市商业银行其贷款集中度对资产质量的影响程度不一致,西部地区城市商业银行的行业集中度对资产质量具有强烈的负面影响;引进境外战略投资者的城市商业银行风险偏好较激进,贷款集中度对银行资产质量的影响较大。基于上述结论,文章最后提出了一些参考性建议。     

Revisiting the Bright and Dark Sides of Capital Flows in Business Groups

Prior studies report that the business group structure and the associated intra-group capital flows are prone to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority investors. Yet business group is a prevalent and stable structure around the globe, particularly where capital markets are underdeveloped. Using data from China, this paper empirically studies the trade-off between the negative and positive roles played by intra-group capital flows and tests the efficiency implications of such trade-off. We find that from the perspective of the whole group, intra-group capital flows are most efficient when the groups are least subject to conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders and when they face strong external financing constraints.     

To improve investors' valuation of accounting earnings in emerging markets: evidence from Taiwan

The valuation of accounting earnings is related to the level of earnings management used by the firm. In emerging markets where earnings management is typically pervasive, investors lose confidence in accounting earnings and thus tend to under‐value earnings. Using data from Taiwan, we show that better governance characteristics are associated with improved investor valuation of accounting earnings. Under weaker governance structures, such as excessive control on the part of majority shareholders, small board size, and chief executive officer/chairman of the board duality, the market tends to under‐value accounting earnings. Reducing controlling shareholders' ownership, increasing board size, and reinforcing the monitoring function of the board improves investors' ability to value accounting earnings. Copyright © 2010 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

现金股利与控股股东的利益输送行为研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

在存在控股股东的情况下,大股东的利益输送通常会造成对中小股东利益的侵犯,进而对资本市场的有效性造成影响。本文认为现金股利发放在中国上市公司中是作为控股股东利益输送的一种重要手段,对此的实证结果表明大股东的持股比例与公司发放现金股利的多少呈明显正相关关系;第二大股东和第三大股东不能对大股东利用现金股利转移现金进行监督;机构投资者的作用尚不明显。     

上市公司控制权溢价与中小投资者保护

上市公司中控股股东往往会利用控制权溢价为自己谋求私利,从而损害了中小股东的利益。在运用2002-2006年的样本数据,对中国上市公司控制权的隐性利益水平所进行的实证分析,结果表明中国上市公司的转让溢价与转让比例呈正相关,与转让溢价水平与净资产收益率、现金比率、流通股数和公司规模均呈负相关。同时,随着转让比例的上升,一开始溢价比例会增加,当转让比例增大达到一定程度时,溢价比就会随之下降。用法律或制度安排保护中小股东以及或者形成较为分散的股权结构对于保护中小投资者权益更为有利。     

Financial literacy and the cost of borrowing

This research investigates the relation between financial literacy and the cost of borrowing via credit cards and mortgage loans among US consumers. This is a departure from previous studies that have focused on levels of debt in relation to human capital, either financial knowledge or education. Data from the Consumer Finance Monthly (CFM) survey are used to specifically examine the effect of financial literacy on borrowing rates for credit cards and mortgages controlling for other human capital influences. The CFM is a national survey, rich in American consumer credit information, and includes a comprehensive instrument specifically designed to measure financial literacy. Results indicate that those who are financially literate are about twice as likely to have lower costs of borrowing for both credit cards and mortgage loans.     

中资银行引入战略投资者的潜在风险研究

当前,我国各大商业银行纷纷通过出让部分股权引入境外战略投资者。分析中国银行业引入战略投资者的潜在风险,认为对境外战略投资者抱以过高希望是不现实的,收益是潜在的,其实现与否取决于诸多条件,因而不能对境外战略投资者抱以过高的期望。     

The Changing Structure of Intercorporate Relations Among Britain's Largest Retail Firms, 1975-1997

Empirical studies of the structure of intercorporate relations among large firms in Britain and elsewhere have revealed extensive networks of interconections through interlocking directorships. Although the significance of such linkages has been much discussed, they are widely held to constitute important communication channels which may play a significant role in firms' strategic decision-making. However, these issues have not been examined previously in the case of Britain's retail sector. This paper explores the links, via shared directors, between Britain's twenty largest retail companies over the last two decades. The retailers' connections with other major financial and industrial concerns are also explored. The results indicate that intercorporate relations in the retail sector have been radically transformed as these firms have become progressively integrated into Britain's wider business network.     

Leverage made at home: Investors' margin loan usage and firm leverage

The “homemade leverage” conjecture by Modigliani and Miller (1958) implies that firm leverage and investors' leverage are substitutes. Using the data of margin loans by Chinese stock investors, we find that investors take significantly fewer margin loans on a stock when the company announces new bank loans. This effect is entirely driven by investors' margin loan repayment upon announcements, and is stronger for firms with higher institutional ownership or lower leverage. The findings suggest that investors undo the change in firm leverage by adjusting margin loans usage, supporting the “homemade leverage” conjecture.     

Large Shareholder Activism in Corporate Governance in Developing Countries: Evidence from India

Most of the existing evidence on the effectiveness of large shareholders in corporate governance has been restricted to a handful of developed countries, notably the UK, US, Germany and Japan. This paper provides evidence on the role of large shareholders in monitoring company value with respect to a developing and emerging economy, India, whose corporate governance system is a hybrid of the outsider‐dominated market‐based systems of the UK and the US, and the insider‐dominated bank‐based systems of Germany and Japan. The picture of large‐shareholder monitoring that emerges from our case study of Indian corporates is a mixed one. Like many of the existing studies, while we find blockholdings by directors to increase company value after a certain level of holdings, we find no evidence that institutional investors, typically mutual funds, are active in governance. We find support for the efficiency of the German/Japanese bank‐based model of governance; our results suggest that lending institutions start monitoring the company effectively once they have substantial equity holdings in the company and that this monitoring is reinforced by the extent of debt holdings by these institutions. Our analysis also highlights that foreign equity ownership has a beneficial effect on company value. In general, our analysis supports the view emerging from developed country studies that the identity of large shareholders matters in corporate governance.     

Funding development infrastructure without leverage: A risk‐sharing alternative using innovative sukuk structures

Muslim countries of the developing world suffer indebtedness resulting mostly from funding development infrastructure. Faced with a dire need for development infrastructure but with inadequate resources to fund them domestically, these governments often resort to foreign borrowing. As neither foreign banks nor international debt markets would allow for the debt to be in home currency, the funding is invariably denominated in foreign currency. For the borrowing country, in addition to currency exposure such borrowing increases the country's leverage and economic vulnerability. As these countries typically have a narrow economic base with heavy reliance on commodity exports, they are susceptible to the vagaries of commodity price fluctuation. Leverage increases the amplitude of the economy's fluctuation, resulting if not in outright crisis, then, at least in financial distress and depreciating home currency. As a result, when the foreign currency funded project comes on stream, it is burdened with huge accumulated debt which in many cases makes the project unmanageable without further government help through subsidy of operating costs. This further stresses already stretched government budgets and perpetuates indebtedness. This cycle of borrowing, leverage and vulnerability can be broken by innovative use of sukuk. The problem with debt financing is that the servicing requirements are independent of the underlying project's risk or cash flows. This paper presents two sukuk structures based on the risk sharing principles of Islamic finance. Sukuk that have returns linked to the nation's gross domestic product growth if the funded project is non‐revenue generating and linked to earnings of the project if it is revenue generating can avoid the problems above. The pay‐off profile, estimated cost of funds and returns to investors of these sukuk are discussed. When designed in small denomination, such sukuk can enhance financial inclusion, help build domestic capital markets and enable the financing of development without stressing government budgets.     

中国可转债发行的股权价值效应

本文运用Merton(1990)的或有索取权分析方法,对中国上市公司发行可转债行为对非流通股东和流通股东股权价值的不同影响作了深入的分析,得出如下结论:(1)在中国目前股权分割的情况下,无论可转债是否按照合理价格发行,原有流通股的价值都会减少;(2)在非流通股东占控股地位的情况下,它会选择折价发行并向全体股东配售这一对其最为有利而对流通股东最为不利的可转债发行方案。并在此基础上提出政策建议:修改可转债发行法规,规定可转债只能向原有流通股股东配售,不能向社会公众和非流通股股东配售。     

Decentralized borrowing and centralized default

In the past, foreign borrowing by developing countries was comprised almost entirely of government borrowing. However, private firms and individuals in developing countries now borrow substantially from foreign lenders. It is often asserted that this surge in private sector borrowing generates excessive borrowing and frequent sovereign defaults in developing countries. This paper analyzes the impact of decentralized borrowing using a quantitative model in which private agents decide how much to borrow and the government decides whether to default. Relative to a model in which the government determines both the level of borrowing and whether to default, decentralized borrowing drives up aggregate credit costs and sovereign default risk, and reduces aggregate welfare. Interestingly, decentralized borrowing may lead to either too much or too little debt in equilibrium depending on the severity of default penalties.     

外资银行参股国有商业银行的价值分析——以建行IPO引进境外战略投资者为例

近年来,外资进入中国银行业的势头较猛,中行、建行、交行、工商银行目前都已引进了战略投资者。自从2005年建行在香港成功上市后,其IPO价格大大高于其转让给境外战略者股权的价格,引起了众多学者的关注。在引进战略投资者过程当中,银行股权如何定价、如何分析外资银行参股的价值以及引进之后所面临的问题,是一项重要的研究课题。     

Institutional investors and international investments in emerging economy firms: A behavioral risk perspective

While the extant literature has examined the influence of controlling and non-controlling principals on the internationalization decisions of emerging market firms, heterogeneity among non-controlling principals is largely ignored. The risk characteristics of different groups of owners, shaped by their institutional environments, could contribute to the differences in their preferences for firm internationalization. In this paper, we draw insights from institutional theory and behavioral risk perspective to examine the risk propensities and risk perceptions of various non-controlling principals, such as pressure-resistant (FIIs and mutual funds) and pressure-sensitive (banks, insurance companies and lending institutions) institutional investors. Empirical results from a sample of 2364 unique Indian firms during the 2005–2014 time-period show that, after controlling for firm-level resources and capabilities identified in prior literature, the ownership share of different types of institutional investors is associated with firms’ international investments differently. While pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such as banks and insurance companies, are not supportive of foreign investments by firms, pressure-resistant institutional investors, such as FIIs and mutual funds, are supportive of this strategic decision. Furthermore, our results show that the family ownership in a firm (measured in terms of family shareholding) further lowers the preference of pressure sensitive institutional investors for internationalization, whereas family ownership positively moderates the pressure resistant investors towards internationalization.