Networks,Knowledge and Power: Decision Making,Politics and the Process of Innovation

This paper examines the highly political nature of innovation appropriation processes. The central focus is on the role of networks, networking, and knowledge in these processes. The data presented is drawn from two case study companies, both of which were implementing Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. While formal, hierarchical authority was found to be an important contextual factor, shaping the appropriation processes examined, it was found that such authority was not automatically translatable into actual power. In terms of knowledge and networks, the paper concludes that they were inextricably inter-related, largely because the typically tacit nature of much relevant knowledge required the development of networks to access and utilize it. The paper further concluded that the use of both networks, and knowledge in the innovation appropriation processes examined had a dual character. They could not only provide access to relevant knowledge and artefacts, but could also be used as political tools in support of particular interests.     

Networks, Knowledge and Power: Decision Making, Politics and the Process of Innovation

This paper examines the highly political nature of innovation appropriation processes. The central focus is on the role of networks, networking, and knowledge in these processes. The data presented is drawn from two case study companies, both of which were implementing Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems. While formal, hierarchical authority was found to be an important contextual factor, shaping the appropriation processes examined, it was found that such authority was not automatically translatable into actual power. In terms of knowledge and networks, the paper concludes that they were inextricably inter-related, largely because the typically tacit nature of much relevant knowledge required the development of networks to access and utilize it. The paper further concluded that the use of both networks, and knowledge in the innovation appropriation processes examined had a dual character. They could not only provide access to relevant knowledge and artefacts, but could also be used as political tools in support of particular interests.     

Environmental versus Human-Induced Scarcity in the Commons: Do They Trigger the Same Response?

We study appropriation strategies in common pool resources where extinction is a credible threat. Here we present an experimental study of the appropriation of common pool resources in a dynamic setting where resource availability depends on the initial environmental characteristics of the common resource and on human-induced resource depletion due to users’ appropriation patterns. Our results show that initial resource scarcity limits appropriation by inducing an initial caution among users that persists throughout of the game. Additionally, we find that subjects restrain their appropriation strategies when scarcity increases. However, this concern for resource scarcity is not enough to prevent resource depletion. Agents do not counteract the previous rounds’ appropriation strategies but follow the appropriation trend. High appropriation levels are followed by higher appropriation strategies, thus promoting the well known tragedy of the commons. Often concern for resource preservation is not great enough to limit appropriation.      

The appropriation of endogenously provided common-pool resources

Because game theory suggests that the origin of a common-pool resource should not affect appropriation behavior, experimental studies of appropriation from common-pool resources generally presume resources are exogenously provided. However, behavioral economic research indicates that the origin of a resource may affect the use of that resource. We investigate the potential role of resource origin by considering the appropriation of a common-pool resource after users have determined its productive capacity through contributions. Results indicate that resource origin does not significantly influence aggregate appropriation levels but that endogenous resource provision leads to individual strategic behavior.     

Aggregate comparative statics

In aggregative games, each playerʼs payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of the actions of all the players. Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. This paper provides a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games. We focus on two classes of games: (1) aggregative games with strategic substitutes and (2) nice aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which positive shocks to individual players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. The results are illustrated with applications to public good provision, contests, Cournot competition and technology choices in oligopoly.     

Piracy of digital products: A critical review of the theoretical literature

Digital products can be copied at almost no cost and are subject to non-commercial copying by final consumers. Because the copy of a copy typically does not deteriorate in quality, copies can become available on a large scale basis – this can be illustrated by the surge of file-sharing networks. In this paper we provide a critical overview of the theoretical literature that addresses the economic consequences of end-user copying. We analyze basic models of piracy, models with indirect appropriation, models with network effects, and models with asymmetric information. We discuss the applicability of the different modeling strategies to a number of industries such as software, video and computer games, music, and movies.     

Agriculture in recent development theory

This paper is a critical review of recent contributions to the literature on agriculture in development theory. It considers and compares the main lines of advance made within neoclassical, neo-Marxian and structuralist approaches. Recent neo-Marxian and structuralist studies of agrarian development reveal that traditional agriculture is neither stationary nor efficient, that resource allocation cannot be separated from wealth distribution or production organization, that forms of surplus appropriation do not necessarily follow the dictates of efficiency, that the social relations of production may inhibit accumulation and determine the forms of technological change, that the state's role in primitive accumulation is more economic than explicitly coercive/political, and that political and macroeconomic constraints preclude a simple ‘get the prices right’ view of the intersectoral terms of trade. The thrust of these developments is to challenge both neoclassical and some orthodox Marxian formulations of agrarian development issues and add to the insights to be gleaned from a political economy of development.     

The sustainability of the commons: giving and receiving

This paper analyzes the use of a cost-free reward mechanism in the exploitation of a common property resource. We implement an experimental study involving a two-stages game where agents first decide resource appropriation and then have the opportunity to distribute cost-free bestowals. We observe that subjects link the two activities in such a way that appropriation determines the distribution of bestowals which in turn contributes maintaining low appropriation levels, thus avoiding the destruction of the common resource. Not all the potential bestowals are distributed, however.     

Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory

We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated competitive equilibrium of the underlying economy. Motivated by these findings, we provide a theoretical argument for why evolutionary forces can lead to competitive outcomes in market games.     

Technology interdependence and entry modes of the Taiwanese technological multinational companies: moderating effects of political instability,technological uncertainty,and Confucian dynamism

This study aims to examine how technology interdependence and three environmental variables, namely political instability, technological uncertainty and Confucian dynamism, in the host country collectively influence Taiwanese technological multinational company’s (MNC) entry mode choice between joint venture (JV) and wholly owned subsidiary (WOS). Grounded on theories of transaction cost economies and organisational design, this study hypothesises a positive technology interdependence–WOS relationship that can be explained by appropriation and coordination concerns. Moreover, the aforementioned relationship can be positively moderated by technological uncertainty while negatively moderated by political instability and Confucian dynamism. These hypotheses were examined and supported using logistic regressions in the analysis of 195 foreign entries undertaken by Taiwanese information and electronic MNCs.     

Computing open-loop noncooperative solution in discrete dynamic games

The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new algorithm for the approximation of non-quadratic, non-linear open-loop Nash Cournot equilibrium in a difference game of fixed duration (multiperiod) and initial state. The algorithm based on adaptive search procedure called genetic algorithm has been used to optimize strategies for N-person dynamic games. Since genetic algorithms require little knowledge of the problem itself, computations based on these algorithms are very attractive to complex dynamic optimization problems. The empirical evidences are also provided to show the success of the algorithm developed. A typical example in US macroeconomic policy selection for 1933-1936 yields evidence of political inference in the economy.     

Learning across games

This paper studies the learning process carried out by two agents who are involved in many games. As distinguishing all games can be too costly (require too much reasoning resources) agents might partition the set of all games into categories. Partitions of higher cardinality are more costly. A process of simultaneous learning of actions and partitions is presented and equilibrium partitions and action choices characterized. Learning across games can destabilize strict Nash equilibria even for arbitrarily small reasoning costs and even if players distinguish all the games at the stable point. The model is also able to explain experimental findings from the traveler?s dilemma and deviations from subgame perfection in bargaining games.     

中央政府与地方政府的政策博弈及其治理

本文描述了中央政府和地方政府政策博弈的凸现与加剧,认为这种政策博弈的制度性根源是市场取向的分权制以及以GDP为核心的政绩指标考核体系,制度性根源对政策博弈具有传导机制.这种政府博弈的积极影响促进了中央政府政策的更加合理、完善,而消极影响则是中央政府调控能力大打折扣、中央政府遭遇信任危机和扰乱市场秩序.治理途径则在于建立新型中央政府和地方政府关系,采取消除政策博弈的措施,即真正做到财权与事权的统一、建立居民的退出与呼吁机制、构建更加合理的政绩观与指标考评体系.     

An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining

There are many experimental studies of bargaining behavior, but suprisingly enough nearly no attempt has been made to investigate the so-called ultimatum bargaining behavior experimentally. The special property of ultimatum bargaining games is that on every stage of the bargaining process only one player has to decide and that before the last stage the set of outcomes is already restricted to only two results. To make the ultimatum aspect obvious we concentrated on situations with two players and two stages. In the ‘easy games’ a given amount c has to be distributed among the two players, whereas in the ‘complicated games’ the players have to allocate a bundle of black and white chips with different values for both players. We performed two main experiments for easy games as well as for complicated games. By a special experiment it was investigated how the demands of subjects as player 1 are related to their acceptance decisions as player 2.     

Where are we in the political economy of reform?

We review the experiences of developing countries with market-oriented reforms, using the tools of modern political economy. We impose intellectual discipline by requiring that actors behave rationally using available information and that basic economic relationships such as budget constraints be accounted for. We attempt to integrate two approaches, one based on dynamic games played by interest groups, with one that focus on limited information and the dynamics of learning.

We describe the “starting point” as the set of “old” policies and we attempt to explain the dynamics (political, economic and informational) that lead to reform (section II). We analyze strategies for reformers subject to political constraints (section Ш). We evaluate the aggregate and distributional costs of reforms, emphasizing the importance of looking at the right counterfactuals (section IV).

We conclude by pointing to the challenges ahead: the second-stage institutional reforms necessary to take off from underdevelopment.     

A theory of sequential reciprocity

Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept—sequential reciprocity equilibrium—for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence.     

Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games

This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction.     

Political Economy*

The term 'political economy' has a long and curious history, from its 17th-century meaning of statecraft to the classical economists' use of it for what later came to be called economics and its recent appropriation by neo-Marxists for social theory which, in contrast to 'orthodox' economics, goes into history, politics and sociology, focuses on power relationships and combines positive analysis with advocacy. This article points out that there are now at least two schools of political economy in this tatter sense, the neo-Marxist and the 'Chicago' school. The concluding section distinguishes sensible and not so sensible uses of the term.     

Appropriation,migration, and unemployment

This article builds general equilibrium models to explore the relationship among appropriation, rural–urban migration, the minimum wage and unemployment. We find that the proportion of appropriated capital plays a key role in the effects of appropriation on unemployment and rural–urban migration. When the proportion of appropriated capital is large, a stronger control on appropriation by the government results in a lower unemployment rate and more rural–urban migrants, and vice versa. In the extended models, the conclusion may be different when the plundered factor changes from capital to land. In the situation with the agricultural sector employing unskilled labour and capital, appropriation has no impact on unemployment, and the effect on migration remains the same. We also discuss the implications of the minimum wage, and find that under plausible conditions, the rise of the minimum wage can alleviate appropriation and reduce unemployment. The situation of migration is ambiguous due to the impacts of two opposite factors.