Political competition,tax salience and accountability. Theory and evidence from Italy

This paper argues that electoral competition may hinder rather than foster political accountability, especially when elected officers can choose among a number of tax instruments. We develop a political agency model showing that politicians in more competitive jurisdictions use less salient tax instruments more intensely. Defining salience as visibility or, analogously, as voters' awareness of the costs associated with specific government revenue sources, we argue that voters are less likely to hold politicians to account for the associated tax burden of a less salient instrument. This in turn implies that strategic politicians will more heavily rely on less salient revenue sources when electoral competition is stronger. Using data on Italian municipal elections and taxes over a 10-year period, we determine the degree of salience of various tax instruments, including property taxes (high salience) and government fees for official documents (low salience). We then show that mayors facing stronger competition for re-election use less salient tax instruments more intensely.     

Geographic labour mobility and the cost of housing: evidence from Italy

In recent years, internal migration in Italy has declined markedly, notwithstanding the widening of the North-South gap in terms of unemployment rates and real income. Here, the extent to which the housing market has contributed to the decline is examined. Preliminary to this analysis, differentials in the cost of housing between the macro-areas of the country are estimated using data on the market price of houses located in 96 provincial capitals. Econometric evidence is provided supporting the view that the North-South housing price differential is a notable factor in explaining the falling pattern of mobility. The positive impact on migration from the South to the North of a wider gap in the two areas in terms of income and employment prospects has been offset by the housing price differential, which has steadily risen at least from the mid-1980s onwards. Yet, a considerable share of the decrease in mobility remains unexplained, possibly owing to the heterogeneity in the composition of migration flows across different cohorts.     

The effect of death tax on the labour supply of donors: evidence from TRA97

Exploiting estate tax cuts from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA97), this paper estimates the effect of death tax on the labour supply of living potential donors. To this end, difference-in-difference with multiple imputation approach is applied to micro-level panel data. This paper finds that the estate tax cuts makes no difference in labour force participation or working hours of potential donors in a statistically meaningful way, although the TRA97 reduces marginal estate tax rates by 37.51% on average. This finding suggests that the death tax causes no meaningful distortion of living potential-donors’ labour supplies at either extensive or intensive margin.     

Sectoral shifts, diversification and regional unemployment: evidence from local labour systems in Italy

Using Local Labour Systems (LLSs) data, this work aims at assessing the effects of sectoral shifts and industry specialization patterns on regional unemployment in Italy over the years 2004–2008. Italy represents an interesting case study because of the high degree of spatial heterogeneity in local labour market performance and the well-known North–South divide. Furthermore, the presence of strongly specialized LLSs (Industrial Districts, IDs) allows us to test whether IDs perform better than highly diversified urban areas thanks to the effect of agglomeration economies, or viceversa. Building on a semiparametric spatial auto-regressive framework, our empirical investigation documents that sectoral shifts and the degree of specialization exert a negative role on unemployment dynamics. By contrast, highly diversified areas turn out to be characterized by better labour market performances.     

Tax evasion and tax morale: A social network analysis

We study the effects of tax morale and social norms on tax evasion when individuals interact in a network. We present a model that incorporates incentives for tax compliance in the form of punishment and fines, tax morale, and reputation for social behaviour. We assume that individuals adjust their tax morale by observing the neighbours' tax morale. We simulate the model for different values of the parameters and show that the steady-state share of taxpayers as opposed to tax-evaders is affected by the probability of finding like-minded peers in the reference group (network integration), the weight that individuals attribute to reputation, and the share of individuals who update their tax morale. Last, we consider the possibility of a fiscal authority using the knowledge of the network structure and targeting ‘central’ individuals. We show that by positively affecting the tax morale of individuals whose influence within the network is high, a fiscal authority can increase tax compliance.     

A note on income tax evasion,labor supply,and nonlinear tax schedules

The existing literature on income tax evasion lays claim to two important implications: one is that higher tax rates induce greater income declarations and the other is that increases in gross income induce a fall in the fraction of income declared. The purpose of this paper is to examine the robustness of these results with respect to three modifications of the standard model. The first involves relaxing the assumption of linear income tax schedules. The second modification is to consider an alternative form for the penalty function. Thirdly, we consider the consequences of the tax payer making a joint hours of work-income declaration decision.     

Audit probabilities and tax evasion in a business simulation

This paper examines the role of individual differences and audit probabilities in tax evasion and argues that more elaborate experimental studies of evasion are needed.     

Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence

Although a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals optimize fully with respect to the introduction of a tax, a growing body of research is proving that several heuristics are in place when people take decisions. We re‐examine the well known liability side equivalence principle in the light of the concept of salience. While these two topics have been extensively investigated in isolation, this paper innovates on the previous literature in that it focuses on their joint effects. Is tax incidence dependent on whether the subjects face a salient rather than a nonsalient tax? Does the salience of a tax exert a different effect depending on who is legally committed to bear the tax burden? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is being traded through a double‐auction market institution. Based on a panel data analysis, our contribution shows that point of collection matters and determines the economic incidence of tax. Additionally, we find that the joint effect of salience and statutory incidence does not alter the informative efficiency, but has a positive effect on buyers’ allocational efficiency when the tax is levied on sellers.     

A note on progression,penalty schemes and tax evasion

This note deals with the question of whether shifting the tax base towards more progression will stimulate or discourage tax evasion, when the tax base is shifted so that either the expected tax revenues of government or the expected utility of taxpayer will remain unchanged. The answer turns out to depend sensitively on the nature of penalty schemes if caught in tax evasion. If the penalty rate is charged on the undeclared income, tax evasion will increase, while if the penalty rate is charged on the evaded tax, tax evasion will decrease when the tax base is shifted towards progression.     

The learning path of the hidden economy: the tax burden and tax evasion in New Zealand

This paper considers the ‘learning curve’ relationship between the aggregate tax rate and the relative size of the hidden economy in New Zealand. Some simple non-linear models are estimated so that the effects of changes in the effective tax rate on the underground economy can be simulated. This study finds that about half of the hidden activity in New Zealand is a learned response to changing opportunities and constraints in fiscal policy, but this amount varies over the business cycle. Simulating a zero tax rate permits us to discover the ‘natural rate’ of underground and criminal activity. Some partial lessons are drawn for taxation policy in that country.     

The pedagogy of tax evasion: Its extent and its determinants

This pedagogical note develops a model of individual choice and a comprehensible and functionally realistic framework that explains how the size of the underground economy or the extent of aggregate income tax evasion can be estimated. It also describes three models for estimating the size of the underground economy for the U.S. and provides a formal but easily understood analytical model of determinants of the extent of aggregate income tax evasion. The latter model is useful in serving as the basis for empirical estimates of determinants of income tax evasion and is useful in enhancing student understanding economic behavior through student projects.     

Controling tax evasion under direct and indirect taxation: Some notes

The purpose of the paper is to use a simple model of the firm having monopoly power in the goods market as the framework to study the relative effectiveness of unit, ad valorem and profit taxes under two alternative criteria when the taxes are changeds so as to keep either the expected utility of the monopoly firm or the expected tax revenues for government constant. Under the former policy the profit tax turns out to be best and the unit tax worst in all respects; for instance, the profit tax will give rise to higher production, lower prices, lower tax evasion and higher tax revenues for government than other taxes. The dominance of the profit tax and the inferiority of the unit tax still holds under the policy of keeping the expected tax revenues constant in terms of production, prices and the expected utility of the monopoly firm. But strikingly, in terms of effectiveness of tax evasion control the ranking of taxes is now exactly the reverse from the one obtained under the expected utility criterium; now the unit tax is best and the profit tax worst.     

Optimal taxes on wealth and consumption in the presence of tax evasion

This article incorporates tax evasion into an optimum taxation framework with individuals differing in earning abilities and initial wealth. We find that despite the possibility of its evasion a tax on initial wealth should supplement the optimal nonlinear income tax, given a positive correlation between initial wealth and earning abilities. Further, even if income and initial wealth are taxed optimally, it is still desirable to levy a tax on commodities, though it can be evaded as well. Thus, our result provides a rationale for a comprehensive tax system. Optimal tax rates on commodities differ in general, however for the special case of a uniform evasion technology equal rates are optimal if preferences are homothetic and weakly separable.     

Fiscal policy uncertainty and the business cycle: Time series evidence from Italy

Economic uncertainty is an important factor behind macroeconomic fluctuations: in an uncertain environment, firms reduce hiring and investment; financial intermediaries are more reluctant to lend; households increase their propensity to save. In the present paper, we study the effects of the uncertainty which arises from fiscal policy decisions and propose a new measure of fiscal policy uncertainty (FPU). In particular, we estimate a fiscal reaction function, allowing the volatility of the shocks to be time-varying. The time series of this volatility is our proxy for FPU. Looking at Italian data over the period 1981–2014, we find that an unexpected increase in our measure of FPU has a negative impact on the economy. One implication of this result is that the same change in the government budget can have different effects depending on whether it is associated with a reduction or an increase in FPU. Therefore, the neglect of FPU may partly explain why the size (and sign) of fiscal multipliers differs so much across existing empirical studies.     

Quasi-experimental evidence on the effectiveness of heart attack treatment in Germany

ABSTRACT

Medical technological progress has been shown to be the main driver of health care costs. A key policy question is whether new treatment options are worth the additional costs. In this analysis we assess the causal effect of percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), a major new heart attack treatment, on mortality. We use a full sample of administrative hospital data from Germany for the years 2005 to 2007. To account for non-random treatment assignment of PTCA, instrumental variable approaches are implemented that aim to randomize patients into getting PTCA independent of heart attack severity. Instruments include differential distances to PTCA hospitals and regional PTCA rates. Our results suggest a 4.5 absolute percentage point mortality reduction for patients who have access to PTCA compared to patients receiving only conservative treatment. We relate mortality reduction to the additional costs for this treatment and conclude that PTCA treatment is cost-effective in lowering mortality for AMI patients at reasonable cost-effectiveness thresholds.     

Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion

This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields.We wish to thank Johann K. Brunner and two anonymous referees for many helpful comments.     

A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.     

Business culture and tax evasion: Why corruption and the unofficial economy can persist

This paper shows that business and tax inspection culture can create multiple equilibria. In bad equilibria (high cheating and corruption), increases in penalties or auditing can have perverse impacts and increase cheating. The source of the multiple equilibria is the externalities created by business and tax inspection cultures. As tax evasion and corruption become more common, they become more acceptable and their cost is lowered. A third externality – that between firms and inspectors – is the source of the perverse effect; more cheating by firms is good for bribe-taking inspectors and more bribe-taking inspectors are good for cheating firms.     

The evasion of fiscal and labor regulations: Firm behavior and optimal tax policy

Firms face many fiscal and labor regulations, but they may evade these legal requirements in several different ways. We develop a model that captures these two types of evasion decisions and unlike existing literature assume firms can evade labor regulations independently from income tax responsibilities. We characterize firms’ entry and evasion behavior and find that the design of the tax system can generate both positive and negative correlations between evasion decisions consistent with what is observed empirically. We then characterize optimal government policies given the firms’ decisions. We obtain intuitive optimal tax rules that highlight the trade‐offs the government faces when firms have multiple margins on which to evade.     

Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion

This paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma-based model of tax compliance. The paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria, and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge. Precisely, multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous, because the ‘social coordination effect’ dominates the ‘individual characteristics effect’. Numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two-step audit policies on the part of the tax agency, under the presumption that the best (or good) equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria. As a byproduct, the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two-step audit policy, the equilibrium compliance, and fiscal revenue is analyzed.