Vertical Foreclosure, Technological Choice, and Entry on the Intermediate Market

This paper analyzes the profitability of vertical integration for an upstream monopoly facing a potential competitor. We show that it depends on the technology used by the firm when it integrates. We distinguish two types of technologies: standard technologies, used by nonintegrated firms, and nonstandard technologies, reserved for integrated firms and implying the complete foreclosure of nonintegrated firms. Vertical integration with the adoption of a nonstandard technology dominates vertical integration with the adoption of a standard technology and is profitable, as long as the degree of competition in the downstream industry is sufficiently low.     

Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure

We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter-strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.     

Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration

This paper analyzes the effect of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to integrate vertically when firms in both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that as downstream competition becomes more intense, the upstream firm obtains a larger share of a smaller downstream industry profit. The upstream firm may encourage downstream competition (even excessively) in response to high downstream bargaining power. The option of vertical integration may be a barrier to entry downstream and may trigger strategic horizontal spinoffs or mergers. We extend the analysis to upstream competition.     

Option Contracts and Vertical Foreclosure

A model of vertical integration is studied. Upstream firms sell differentiated inputs; downstream firms bundle them to make final products. Downstream products are sold as option contracts, which allow consumers to choose from a set of commodities at predetermined prices. The model is illustrated by examples in telecommunication and health markets. Equilibria of the integration game must result in upstream input foreclosure and downstream monopolization. Consumers may or may not benefit from integration.     

Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, and profits in the Presence of Double Marginalization

Whether vertical integration between a downstream oligopolist and an upstream oligopolist is profitable for an integrated pair of firms is shown to depend on whether one means by this that profits increase no matter what other firms do, that all integrated firms are better off when all firms are integrated than when none are, or simply that no downstream-upstream pair of firms has an incentive to deviate from a situation where all firms are integrated. It is also shown to depend on the number of firms in each oligopoly and on the type of interaction that is assumed between firms that are integrated and firms that are not. In particular, it is shown that if no restriction is put on trade between integrated and nonintegrated firms, integrated firms may continue to purchase inputs from the nonintegrated upstream firms, with the goal of raising their downstream rivals' costs. Furthermore, even though firms are identical, asymmetric equilibria, where integrated and nonintegrated firms coexist, may actually arise as an outcome of the integration game.     

Market Entry,Capacity Choice,and Product Differentiation in Duopolistic Competition under Uncertainty

This paper examines the impact of pre‐emptive competition for a leader's position on the investment strategies for market entry, production capacities, and product differentiation. In the absence of pre‐emptive competition, the leader's production capacity exceeds the follower's, and the leader earns excess returns. In contrast, in its presence, the leader's production capacity decreases below the follower's, and the follower's investment value exceeds the leader's when the follower enters the market. These results suggest the new insight that pre‐emptive competition provides the opportunity for the follower to expedite investing and to enhance investment value by capitalizing on the leader's insufficient capacity. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Nonlinear Supply Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and Equilibrium Market Foreclosure

We examine how the feasibility of both nonlinear pricing and exclusive dealing arrangements affect incentives for market foreclosure when two manufacturers contract with a retail monopolist. Surprisingly, we find that although market foreclosure equilibria exist, they are Pareto-dominated (from each manufacturer's perspective) by all nonforeclosure equilibria. If one believes that Pareto-dominated equilibria are unlikely to arise, then the difference between our results and those of Mathewson and Winter (1987), who do not allow for nonlinear pricing, suggests an ironic twist on the notion that quantity discounts and other kinds of nonlinear pricing can provide an additional way for a manufacturer to foreclose a rival. By providing a manufacturer with increased flexibility (beyond linear pricing) to extract a retailer's surplus, nonlinear pricing may instead have the effect of reducing the incidence of observed market foreclosure.     

Foreclosure,vacancy and crime

This paper examines the impact of residential foreclosures and vacancies on violent and property crime. To overcome confounding factors, a difference-in-difference research design is applied to a unique data set containing geocoded foreclosure and crime data from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Results indicate that while foreclosure alone has no effect on crime, violent crime rates increase by roughly 19% once the foreclosed home becomes vacant – an effect that increases with length of vacancy. We find weak evidence suggesting a potential vacancy effect for property crime that is much lower in magnitude.     

Residential Choice, Mobility, and the Labor Market

There is substantial evidence suggesting that the process of suburbanization creates new job opportunities that are not equally exploited by all workers. In order to explain this phenomenon, a simple model is developed which incorporates borrowing constraints as an important restriction on moving decisions, obstructing the necessary labor flows between jurisdictions required to equalize (net) wages. In essence, people who cannot borrow will be restricted in terms of their capability of changing residence location and therefore will have limited possibilities of working in distant labor markets, or they will be subject to excessive commuting. Furthermore, the labor allocation induced by households' behavior facing these constraints affects consumer welfare, production, and producers' profits. The outcomes with perfect credit markets and with borrowing restrictions are calculated and the economic welfare levels are compared. As wages are flexible, they adjust to reflect the relative scarcity of workers present in each jurisdiction. Consequently, some of the negative effects of the borrowing constraints are compensated, so the outcomes cannot be easily compared. Some numerical examples are constructed to have an idea of the possible outcomes under different conditions. Finally, it is found that allowing for moving cost deductions from taxable income may help to alleviate the problem.     

Real Options, International Entry Mode Choice and Performance

abstract    Recent scholarship suggests that combining insights from real option theory with transaction cost economics may improve decision-making models. In response to this suggestion we develop and test a model of international entry mode choice that draws from both perspectives. Examining samples of Dutch and Greek firms entering Central and Eastern European markets, we found that adding real option variables to a transaction cost model significantly improved its explanatory power. Additionally, firms that used the combined real option/transaction cost predicted choices had significantly higher levels of subsidiary performance satisfaction than firms that did not. Our results suggest that effective managerial decision-making may involve more than mere transaction cost minimization considerations; real option value creation insights also appear to influence the success of decision outcomes.     

Entry and Technological Performance in New Technology Domains: Technological Opportunities,Technology Competition and Technological Relatedness

Entry and success in new technology domains (NTDs) is essential for firms' long‐term performance. We argue that firms' choices to enter NTDs and their subsequent performance in these domains are not only governed by firm‐level factors but also by environmental characteristics. Entry is encouraged by the richness of opportunities for technology development, while technology competition by incumbent firms discourages entry and render entries that do take place less successful. Firms are expected to be positioned heterogeneously to recognize and capitalize on technological opportunities, depending on the presence of a related technology base. We find qualified support for these conjectures in a longitudinal analysis of entry and technological performance in NTDs by 176 R&D intensive firms. While opportunity rich technology environments attract entries by firms even if these NTDs are distal from firms' existing technologies, firms require related technological expertise in order to exploit technological opportunities post‐entry.     

经济规模、技术创新与垂直专业化分工

借鉴Hummels等(2001)的垂直专业化分析框架,本文比较了中国大陆等32个经济体1995年、2000年以及2005年制造业出口的垂直专业化水平。在此基础上,本文利用中国大陆等32个经济体18个制造业行业数据,进一步探讨了影响垂直专业化水平的主要因素。经验观察和计量分析结果发现,经济规模越大、技术创新能力越强的经济体,垂直专业化水平越低;技术复杂度越高的行业,垂直专业化水平也越高;技术越复杂的行业在经济规模越大、技术创新能力越强的经济体内,垂直专业化水平相对更低。本文的研究结论为我们评估中国当前的经济发展方式和国际竞争力提供了一个思路。     

我国的市场分析与政策选择

经济学的分析告诉我们,推动经济发展的动力有两类:一是需求拉动型;二是供给推进型.需求拉动型包括消费、投资、出口三个方面;供给推进型包括要素供给、结构供给、制度供给三个方面.投资、消费与外贸进出口,一直被专家学者称为拉动经济增长的三驾马车.     

审计独立性:市场选择和政府选择

审计独立性首先是市场选择的结果；为弥补市场缺陷，政府选择审计独立性；市场选择与政府选择相互补充，强化选择机制；保证审计的独立性。     

Attainment Discrepancy and New Geographic Market Entry: The Moderating Roles of Vertical Pay Disparity and Horizontal Pay Dispersion

Studies in the behavioural strategy literature have examined the influence of attainment discrepancy on new geographic market entry with inconclusive results. We clarified the relationship between attainment discrepancy and new geographic market entry by considering the moderating effects of managerial pay gaps with concentration on vertical pay disparity and horizontal pay dispersion. The framework also contributes to our understanding of tournament theory and social comparison theory by identifying specified performance contexts under which types of pay gaps conform to or violate theoretical predictions. Empirical analyses based on a panel data of Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 firms from 1996 to 2006 showed that our hypotheses are largely supported.     

Market Power,Efficiencies, and Entry Evidence from an Airline Merger

We investigate the competitive effects of the merger between Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines (2009) in the domestic US airline industry. Applying fixed‐effects regression models, we find that the transaction led to short‐term price increases of about 11% on overlapping routes and about 10% on routes that experienced a merger‐induced switch of the operating carrier. Over a longer period, however, our estimation results are consistent with the hypothesis that both merger efficiencies and postmerger entry by competitors initiated a downward trend in price, leaving consumers with a small net price increase of about 3% on the affected routes. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Who,Where, What,How and When of Market Entry

This introductory, along with the eight articles contained within this Special Issue, highlights and brings greater clarity to entrant‐incumbent interactions and to firm movement – when entrants traverse market territories for the creation and/or delivery of offerings, where ‘markets’ include service or product categories, technology or resource spaces, industries, sectors and/or geographies. Collectively, this Special Issues explains that firm movement across market boundaries is highly consequential, influencing resource‐capability mixes inside firms, interfirm relations, market logic and industry value chains, and of course, people, communities and even nations. Specifically, we develop a field‐wide perspective of market entry by expanding on the framework of market entry that Zachary and his colleagues developed (Zachary et al., 2015) – i.e., the who (players such as incumbents, entrants, suppliers, etc.), when (the timing and sequence of entry), how (the strategy, resources, capabilities, etc.), where (the space of entry) and what (product, service, business model, etc.) – to include two additional categories: complements (networks, platforms, ecosystems) and non‐market elements (government, political, social and cultural arrangements). We also summarize the eight highly diverse and insightful articles that make this Special Issue, and conclude with a discussion to highlight foundational questions that point to new directions in future research in this field. In sum, we hope to inspire scholars to go beyond counting outcomes (e.g., entry/exit rates, or profiling successful versus unsuccessful entrants), to consider contexts, processes and contingencies (e.g., cost, time, collaboration, competition, interfirm relations, etc.) and to discover boundary conditions that inform a theory of market entry.     

CEO Experiences: Effects on the Choice of FDI Entry Mode*

abstract Drawing on the strategic management and international business literatures, this study examines the relationships between the experiences of newly selected CEOs and their choice of foreign direct investment (FDI) entry modes. Based on a sample
of 380 foreign market entry events involving acquisitions, greenfield investments, and joint ventures, our findings indicate that CEOs with less firm experience preferred acquisitions and greenfield investments to joint ventures and, older CEOs were more likely to opt for joint ventures over greenfield investments. In addition, CEOs with throughput functional experience favoured acquisitions over joint ventures and greenfield investments. Finally, CEO international experience was associated with a greater propensity to choose greenfield investments and acquisitions over joint ventures and also greenfield investments over acquisitions. The implications of the findings from the perspective of theory and managerial practice are discussed, along with possible directions for future research.     

Firm Productivity and the Foreign‐Market Entry Decision

We use Japanese firm‐level data to examine how a firm’s productivity affects its foreign‐market entry strategy. The firm faces a choice between exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI). In the case of FDI, the firm has two options: greenfield investment or acquisition of an existing plant (M&A). If it selects greenfield investment, it has two ownership choices: whole ownership or a joint venture with a local company. Controlling for industry‐ and country‐specific characteristics, we find that the more productive a firm is, the more likely it is to choose FDI rather than exporting and greenfield investment rather than M&A.     

走出去战略与跨文化管理

2006年3月28日——3月29日“全球商学院院长论坛”在上海交通大学圆满召开。全球100余位商学院院长济济一堂,共谋发展之计。本次论坛有一个重要议题便是“跨文化领导力”。这是经济全球化背景下的重要命题,对中国企业发展战略来说尤