国际税收竞争效应分析及对策

国际税收竞争是主权国家或地区通过减税、免税等各种税收优惠政策,乃至提供避税港等制度性或政策性行为来吸引别国或地区税基的一种行为。从表面上看是税收竞争,但其实质确为经济竞争。本文从国际税收竞争认识入手,从正反两方面分析国际税收竞争所产生的效应,并据此提出我国应对国际税收竞争的实施对策。     

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调之辩证观

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调是经济全球化下国际税收关系主要矛盾的外在表现形式,二者之间存在着辩证统一的关系。国际税收协调既可以缓解恶性国际税收竞争,又会产生新一轮的国际税收竞争。各国对待国际税收竞争与协调的立场会因各自利益的不同需要而发生改变,但总体而言,走“税收竞争——税收协调”之路是处理国际税收关系的必然趋势,这一趋势的发展对我国税收政策的调整也有重要启示。     

从国际税收竞争走向国际税收合作

经济全球化向深层发展,给我们带来了全新的经济环境。日益增长的电子商务和新通信技术将处于世界贸易的支配地位;跨国企业将不再把自己看成是某国的跨国企业,全球管理的理念将日益盛行;不只是资本更具流动性,高技术专业人员也将具有很大的流动性;地区经济集团的地位将越发重要。在这种新的环境下,政治压力将会促使各国在税收政策方面有更大程度的协调,各国税务当局之间需要有新的合作形式。但纵观世界税收,当今处于主导地位的仍然是以本国利益为出发点的国际税收竞争,并且税收竞争有愈演愈烈的趋势。本文从国际税收竞争开始分析,逐步得出在经济全球化的推动下税收竞争必将走向税收协调的结论。     

国际税收竞争与国际税收协调

随着经济全球化的进一步加深，经济交往的日益复杂，国际税收也遇到了越来越多的问题。由于税收已构成了跨国经济活动的一项重要成本因素，为了吸引更多的资本流入，国际税收竞争日益加剧。在经济全球化的前提下，一国税收政策变动的影响常常会超出国界的范围，引起另一国采取相应行动，从而引起国家之间的税收分配关系发生变化，并有可能对其他国家造成有害的外部影响。因此，税收竞争逐渐成为国际税收的重要内容之一，有害税收竞争也随之成为人们关注的焦点。基于此，本文试图对税收竞争和有害税收竞争谈些个人的看法。     

试析国际税收竞争及其协调

随着经济全球化的不断深入,阻碍生产要素跨国界流动的障碍逐渐消除,资本等要素的流动性大大增强,各国纷纷采用税收手段来增强本国对生产要素的吸引力,全球范围内的降税浪潮所导致的激烈的国际税收竞争,引发了国际社会对此现象的深入思考。国际税收竞争实质上反映了正在变化中演进的国家间的税收关系,这种变化的背后体现的是国家主权和经济全球化之间的矛盾。     

国际税收竞争的实质及应对

国际税收竞争实质上是市场竞争规律在政府行政领域的体现形式。良性税收竞争有助于降低总体税负、减少经济扭曲、提升公共产品生产效率,但对此类竞争的国际协调难以取得实质成效。恶性税收竞争则会掠夺性地侵占他国税基,对此类竞争的遏制具备理论的必要性和可行性。政府可通过改革现行税制、精简规范收费、优化公共服务以及加强国际合作来应对国际税收竞争。     

国际税收竞争、资本管制与企业所得税负担调整

在经济全球化的背景下,为争夺国际资本,各国都实行了相当优惠的公司所得税政策。但是,减税等国际税收竞争措施的作用是不确定的,一国应采取的国际税收竞争战略与其国家规模、资本管制政策等因素密切相关。面对近年来引进外国直接投资(FDI)增速放缓和逐步放松资本管制的大背景,我国必须抓住内外资企业所得税制度合并的有利时机,合理调整我国企业所得税负担。     

论国际税收竞争的法律调节

国际税收竞争正在成为经济全球化时代各国最大化本国经济利益的重要方式,它具有广泛的域外负外部效应,需要国际法规范予以调节.随着经济全球化的推进,wTO将成为调节国际税收政策的主要机构.我们必须降低现行企业所得税税率,以应对外国的税收竞争政策,同时,应成立专门工作小组,就国际税收竞争对我国的影响进行理论分析与实证研究,为我国参与wTO关于国际税收竞争问题的谈判提供政策建议.     

国际视角下中国环境税研究

目前,环境税体系在欧盟国家已经相对成熟,中国的环境税的开征方案也正在制定过程中。本文厘清了国际上不同口径的环境税定义,并分析了环境税的经济效应,最后,阐述了中国开征环境税的必要性及改革思路。     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties

This paper examines bilateral double taxation treaties, with an emphasis on information exchange among tax authorities. A major objective is to understand which countries are more likely to sign a tax-relief treaty and when information-exchange clauses will be added to a treaty. A simple model with two asymmetric countries and repeated interactions among governments is used. The paper shows that no information exchange clause may be added to a tax treaty when there is a reciprocity requirement, when there is a high cost of negotiation, when there is a cost of providing information, or with one-way capital flows. It is also shown that an information clause increases the gains from a tax relief treaty, but may make it less sustainable.     

Some Equity and Efficiency Considerations of International Tax Competition

The paper uses a dynamic 2-country equilibrium model with imperfections in the labour market calibrated for the US and EU economy to investigate dynamic efficiency and equity aspects of international tax competition. We focus on tax policy where governments can only decide on the levels of corporate and labour taxes, given a constant share of government consumption and transfers in GDP and a constant VAT rate. We find that the welfare effect of a tax shift from capital to labour depends heavily on the distortionary nature of labour taxes. In contrast to existing results we find substantial positive international spillover effects of corporate tax reduction in one country, with long term gains outweighing short term losses. Results are very different, however, if one goes beyond the representative agent framework. According to our results, a tax switch is most likely not Pareto improving since net wages tend to decline in both regions even in the long run.     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

Tax Competition and Tax Coordination in the European Union

This paper examines the tax competition literature and attempts to draw out its implications for the debate on corporate tax coordination within the EU. It begins with the early basic tax competition model, which derives conditions under which underprovision of public services occurs and tax harmonization unambiguously improves welfare for all states in the union. The paper then turns to a wide variety of extensions of this model, some of which reinforce its results and others that yield rather different conclusions. The analysis concludes by considering the implications of the tax competition literature for the debate on EU corporate tax coordination, drawing on some recent efforts to synthesize this vast literature by estimating the efficiency costs of tax competition and simulating the efficiency gains from various tax coordination palns.     

税收竞争、税收负担与经济发展的关系及政策选择

税收负担与经济增长的相关理论证明,适度的低税负有利于经济增长,但因税收负担不公平而形成的税收竞争格局在刺激我国经济快速发展的同时也拉大了内部差距,进一步强化了不公平竞争。随着经济全球化浪潮的加速,国际税收竞争也越来越激烈。因而,针对我国国内经济差距扩大的现实国情,改革相应的财政税收制度,采取灵活的税收竞争政策已成为保持我国经济持续快速发展的迫切要求。