UNIVERSAL BANKS ARE NOT THE ANSWER TO AMERICA'S CORPORATE GOVERNANCE "PROBLEM": A LOOK AT GERMANY, JAPAN, AND THE U.S.

This article objects to a recent tendency of legal and economic scholars to "romanticize" the corporate governance role of German universal banks and Japanese main banks. There are potential conflicts between banks' interests as lenders and as shareholders that are likely to make banks less-than-ideal monitors for outside shareholders. Citing evidence that Japanese corporate borrowers pay above-market interest rates for their bank financing, Macey and Miller interpret the high interest rates as "rents" earned by Japanese banks on their loan portfolios in exchange for (1) insulating incumbent management of borrower firms from hostile takeover and (2) accepting suboptimal returns on their equity holdings.
The main problems with the German and Japanese systems stem from their failure to produce well-developed capital markets. Concentrated and stable shareholdings reduce the order flow in the market, thereby depriving the market of liquidity. And the lack of capital market liquidity– combined with the intense loyalty of the banks towards incumbent management–removes the ability of outside shareholders to make a credible threat of takeover if managerial performance is substandard.
The problem with American corporate governance–if indeed there is one–is not that hostile takeovers are bad, but that there are not enough of them due to regulatory restrictions and misguided legal policies. While U.S. law should be amended to give banks and other debtholders more power over borrowers in the case of financial distress, encouraging U.S. banks to become large stockholders is not likely to improve corporate efficiency. Strengthening the "voice" of American equity holders by eliminating restrictions on the market for corporate control would be the most effective step in improving firm performance.     

CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN THE U.K., GERMANY, AND FRANCE

Like its U.S. counterpart, the U.K. corporate ownership and governance system can be characterized as an outsider system with a large number of public corporations, widely dispersed ownership (though with growing concentrations of institutional shareholdings), and well-developed takeover markets. By contrast, the much smaller number and proportion of publicly traded German and French corporations are governed by insider systems--those in which the founding families, banks, or other companies have controlling interests and in which outside shareholders are not able to exert much control.
The different patterns of ownership in the U.K. and in France and Germany give rise to different incentives and corporate control mechanisms. Concentrated ownership would seem to encourage longer-term relationships between the company and its investors. But, while perhaps better suited to some corporate activities with longer-term payoffs, concentrated ownership could also lead to costly delays in undertaking necessary corrective action, particularly if the owners receive "private" benefits from owning and running a business. And, although widely dispersed ownership may increase the likelihood that corrective action will be sought prematurely (as outsiders rush to sell their shares in response to a temporary downturn), the presence of well-diversified public owners may also be more appropriate for riskier ventures requiring large amounts of new capital investment.
Thus, concentrated ownership, while having the potential to reduce information costs and to strengthen incentives to maximize value, can also impose costs in two ways: (1) by forcing managers and other insiders to bear excessive company-specific risks that could be transferred to well-diversified outsiders; and (2) by allowing insiders to capture private benefits at the expense of outsiders.     

THE STATE OF U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: WHAT'S RIGHT AND WHAT'S WRONG?

Largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and other prominent American companies, U.S. corporate governance practices have come under attack. These much publicized failures and the resulting popular outcry have served as catalysts for legislative and regulatory changes that include the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ. But is the U.S. corporate governance system really as bad as critics suggest? And will the recent legislative and regulatory changes lead to a more effective system? The authors begin by noting that the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. governance system. During the past two decades, the U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries, even in the wake of the corporate scandals in 2001. Moreover, the most notable changes in U.S. corporate governance in the 1980s and 1990s‐including the institutionalization of U.S. share‐holders and the dramatic increase in equity‐based pay‐have served mainly (though not always) to strengthen the accountability of U.S. managers to their shareholders. The authors' message, then, is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system gave way under the exceptional strain created by the bull market of the 1990s, the overall system‐which includes corrective market forces as well as oversight by the public and government‐has reacted quickly and decisively to address its weaknesses. The net effect of the recent legislative and regulatory changes has been to make a good governance system an even better one. But, as the authors caution, perhaps the greatest risk now facing the U.S. financial market system (of which corporate governance is a critical part) is that of overregulation.     

Economic exposure and hysteresis: Evidence from German,Japanese, and U.S. stock returns

Real exchange rate changes reflect terms of trade changes and macroeconomic shocks in productivity, aggregate demand, and interest rates. We show that German, Japanese, and U.S. excess stock returns vary directly with changes in the real terms of trade as well as with exchange rate changes induced by the macroeconomic factors. These results suggest that economic exposure is a global phenomenon. Although German, Japanese, and U.S. firms appear to adjust costs and productivity in response to economic exposure, there are indications that firms in all three countries suffer from hysteresis, an effect persisting after the initial cause is removed.     

LARGE BANK STOCKHOLDERS IN GERMANY: SAVIORS OR SUBSTITUTES?

This article challenges Mark Roe's suggestion that the prevalence of the widely held public corporation in the U.S. may not have been inevitable because U.S. laws prevented financial institutions from playing the monitoring role assumed by large German banks. The differences between Germany and the U.S. in the importance of trading markets and the role of banks as monitors can be explained in large part by actions of German banks that blocked the development of German capital markets and provided big banks with informational advantages over other traders.
Markets are likely to be more effective monitors than large banks because of the banks' conflicts of interest as creditors as well as underwriters and market-makers for German firms. Moreover, there is more diversity in the ownership structure of U.S. corporations than the current governance debate would suggest. In the U.S. there are many publicly owned companies that are either closely held or have reverted to private ownership through LBOs. This in turn suggests that U.S. capital markets have devised means for bringing about concentrated stock ownership in those cases where large stockholder monitoring is likely to be more efficient.
Thus, to the question what is likely to happen to U.S. corporate ownership structure if remaining legal constraints on stock ownership by U.S. banks are relaxed, the answer this article offers is "not much." Indeed, if one considers increasing U.S. institutional ownership together with recent SEC attempts to liberalize shareholder communications, there appears to be a striking trend toward a new concentration of voting power–one that may ultimately rival that of the German banks.     

INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE DIFFERENCES: MARKETS OR LAW?

Current differences in international corporate ownership and governance systems reflect primarily differences in the efficiency of capital markets, not differences in corporate law. Law is an output of this process, not an input. In countries where financial markets are more efficient, there is both less law and greater investor protection. Unlike nations in Asia and most of Europe, the U.S. and the U.K. have large and efficient capital markets, with no restrictions on cross-border capital flows. It is thus notsurprising that when American and English banks, mutual funds, and insurers are allowed by law to increase the concentration of their holdings, they don't do so. With efficient markets, there is no money to be made by holding undiversified blocks in public corporations. If public markets were inefficient, entrepreneurs would arrange for large blocks of stock (or take companies private), just as they grant powers of control to venture capitalists. The effect of law on corporate governance and ownership is far less pronounced in America than in Europe and Japan. Restrictions on U.S. banks aside, corporate law in the United States is “enabling”–that is, it lets people do largely what they want in organizing, managing, and financing the firm. Corporate law in Europe and Japan is much more “directory.” And there is a straightforward explanation for this difference: When capital markets are efficient, the valuation process works better, which in turn provides investors with stronger assurances of fairness. When markets are less efficient, some substitute must be found–law, perhaps, or the valuation procedures of banks. Thus, banks play larger corporate governance roles in nations with less extensive capital markets–and corporate law, as the European Union's company directives show, is more restrictive. European corporate law is today about as meddlesome and directory as U.S. law in the late 19th century, before U.S. capital markets became efficient.     

GOLBALIZATION, CORPORATE FINANCE, AND THE COST OF CAPITAL

International financial markets are progressively becoming one huge, integrated, global capital market—a development that is contributing to higher stock prices in developed as well as developing economies. For companies that are large and visible enough to attract global investors, having a global shareholder base means having a lower cost of capital and hence a greater equity value for two main reasons: First, because the risks of equity are shared among more investors with different portfolio exposures and hence a different “appetite” for bearing certain risks, equity market risk premiums should fall for all companies in countries with access to global markets. Although the largest reductions in cost of capital resulting from globalization will be experienced by companies in liberalizing economies that are gaining access to the global markets for the first time, risk premiums can also be expected to fall for firms in long-integrated markets as well. Second, when firms in countries with less-developed capital markets raise capital in the public markets of countries (like the U.S.) with highly developed markets, they get more than lower-cost capital; they also import at least aspects of the corporate governance systems that prevail in those markets. For companies accustomed to less-developed markets, raising capital overseas is likely to mean that more sophisticated investors, armed with more advanced technologies, will participate in monitoring their performance and management. And, in a virtuous cycle, more effective monitoring increases investor confidence in the future performance of those companies and so improves the terms on which they raise capital. Besides reducing market risk premiums and improving corporate governance, globalization also affects the systematic risk, or “beta,” of individual companies. In global markets, the beta of a firm's equity depends on how the stock contributes to the volatility not of the home market portfolio, but of the world market portfolio. For companies with access to global capital markets whose profitability is tied more closely to the local than to the global economy, use of the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) will overstate the cost of capital because risks that are not diversifiable within a national economy can be diversified by holding a global portfolio. Thus, to reflect the new reality of a globally determined cost of capital, all companies with access to global markets should consider using a global CAPM that views a company as part of the global portfolio of stocks. In making this argument, the article reviews the growing body of academic studies that provide evidence of the predictive power of the global CAPM as well as the reduction in world risk premiums.     

CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS

There have been several cases in recent years—most notably, Chrysler—in which shareholders have objected to the level of companies' holdings of cash and other liquid assets. This paper describes the authors' study of the determinants of liquid asset holdings by publicly traded U.S. firms and how these holdings change over time. For those companies that appear to hold excess cash, the study also attempts to investigate whether such companies have a tendency to reduce value by "overinvesting"—a tendency described in the academic finance literature as the "free cash flow problem."
According to the study, the most important determinants of corporate cash holdings are size, risk, and the extent of the firm's investment opportunities, with smaller, riskier, and high-growth firms holding larger amounts of cash as a percentage of total (noncash) assets. These results are consistent with corporate decisions to hold liquid assets in order to preserve the firm's ability to make strategic investments when operating cash flow turns down and outside funds are expensive.
The authors also report that most companies with large amounts of excess cash tend to acquire it mainly by accumulating internally generated cash flows, and not by issuing securities. Perhaps surprising, the study also finds that spending on new projects and acquisitions is only slightly higher for firms with excess cash—and that such firms also tend to have higher payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. Thus, there is little evidence in this study of a free cash flow problem, as well as some indication that managers are aware of and attempt to address the problem.     

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Financial economists continue to point to Germany as a relatively successful model of a "bank-centered," as opposed to a market-based, economy. But few seem to recognize that, in the years leading up to World War I, German equity capital markets were among the most highly developed in the world. Although there are now only about 750 companies listed on German stock exchanges, in 1914 there were almost 1,200 (as compared to only about 600 stocks then listed on the New York Stock Exchange).
Since German reunification in 1990, there have been signs of a possible restoration of the country's equity markets to something like their former prominence. The last 10 years have seen important legal and institutional developments that can be seen as preparing the way for larger and more active German equity markets, together with a more "shareholder-friendly" corporate governance system. In particular, the 1994 Securities Act, the Corporation Control and Transparency Act passed in 1998, and the just released Takeover Act and Fourth Financial Market Promotion
Act all contain legal reforms that are essential conditions for well functioning equity markets. Such legal and regulatory changes have helped lay the groundwork for more visible and dramatic milestones, such as the Deutsche Telekom IPO in 1996, the opening of the Neuer Market in 1997, and, perhaps most important, the acquisition in 2000 of Mannesmann by Vodafone, the first successful hostile takeover of a German company.     

公司治理结构和会计控制观

研究公司治理结构 ,可识别会计信息的主要使用者 ,以确定会计观。美国公司股权分散型特征 ,决定了会计决策有用观导向 ;德日公司机构控制型特征 ,决定了会计受托责任观导向 ;我国公司治理结构 ,既有德日式的机构控制型 ,又有东亚式的拥有者管理型 ,我国以会计控制观导向建立会计规范体系 ,既现实 ,又必要、可行 ,体现了中国会计特色。为与国际会计协调 ,我国会计规范体系可实行“一国两制” :一般企业会计以会计控制观为导向 ,上市公司会计以决策有用观为导向 ;或所有企业会计均以会计控制观为导向 ,上市公司会计再实行以决策有用观为导向     

BANK OF AMERICA ROUNDTABLE ON BUSINESS UNIT EFFICIENCY VERSUS LEVERAGING CORPORATE COMPETENCIES

Corporate strategist C.K. Prahalad begins by observing that the efficiency achieved by U.S. companies in recent years, brought about in part by EVA and EVA-like systems, is a necessary condition for wealth creation in the new competitive environment. For this reason, the EVA movement is now spreading to Europe and Asia. But, as Prahalad goes to argue, efficiency is not a sufficient condition for wealth creation; equally important is the quest for profitable growth opportunities. And this raises a potential objection to EVA and indeed all divisional performance measurement systems: They could end up reducing long-term growth and value by discouraging managers from capturing synergies among business units and leveraging core competencies to the fullest extent possible.
Following Prahalad's discussion of the problem of capturing synergies and leveraging cross-unit capabilities in large, multi-business companies, moderator David Glassman explores potential solutions with top executives from a number of U.S. and Canadian companies. Among the most promising suggestions are significant managerial stock ownership (as exemplified by a plan used at Baxter International), a cross-unit auction system for evaluating large infrastructure investments pioneered by Stern Stewart, and, probably indispensable, strong encouragement of business unit collaboration by an active and accessible CEO.     

THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE

The distinctive ownership and governance structure of the large American corporation-with its distant shareholders, a board of directors that defers to the CEO, and a powerful, centralized management-is usually seen as a natural economic outcome of technological requirements for large-scale enterprises and substantial amounts of outside capital, most of which had to come from well-diversified shareholders. Roe argues that current U.S. corporate structures are the result not only of such economic factors, but of political forces that restricted the size and activities of U.S. commercial banks and other financial intermediaries. Populist fears of concentrated economic power, interest group maneuvering, and a federalist American political structure all had a role in pressuring Congress to fragment U.S. financial institutions and limit their ability to own stock and participate in corporate governance.
Had U.S. politics been different, the present ownership structure of some American public companies might have been different. Truly national U.S. financial institutions might have been able to participate as substantial owners in the wave of end-of-the-century mergers and then use their large blocks of stock to sit on the boards of the merged enterprises (much as Warren Buffett, venture capitalists, and LBO firms like KKR do today). Such a concentrated ownership and governance structure might have helped to address monitoring, information, and coordination problems that continue to reduce the value of some U.S. companies.
The recent increase in the activism of U.S. institutional investors also casts doubt on the standard explanation of American corporate ownership structure. The new activism of U.S. financial institutions-primarily pension funds and mutual funds-can be interpreted as the delayed outbreak of an impulse to participate in corporate ownership and governance that was historically suppressed by American politics.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN EMERGING MARKET: THE CASE OF ISRAEL

Despite significant capital-market reforms in the mid-1980s, the Israeli government and banks continue to play an unusually dominant role in Israeli financial markets. Israeli banks operate as merchant banks and, through pyramid structures of ownership, control large segments of manufacturing, construction, insurance, and services. In addition, the banks dominate all facets of the capital market, including underwriting, brokerage, investment advice, and the management of mutual and provident funds.
Because of this dominance by the banks, several important mechanisms of corporate governance are missing. There is no effective market for corporate control; institutional investors have little incentive to monitor corporate managers; and those managers in turn have little incentive to improve firm performance and increase shareholder value.
To be sure, there has been an impressive wave of IPOs on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (TASE) in the 1990s. But those firms' stocks have substantially underperformed the market since going public, and many "higher-quality" Israeli firms have chosen in recent years to list their securities on the NASDAQ and not at home. The main reason the most promising Israeli firms go public in the U.S. is because that is where U.S. and other foreign investors want to buy them; such investors want the assurances that come with the U.S. corporate governance system.     

STOCK BUYBACKS, CORPORATE PERFORMANCE, AND EVA

Most studies of corporate stock repurchase focus on the effect of stock buyback announcements on the stock price performance of companies announcing the programs, and on the corporate motives for undertaking stock buyback programs. The study described in this article examines the effects of actual stock buyback activities on corporate performance, addressing the question whether buybacks are associated with increases in economic value or EVA. In general, the study reports that the operating performance of buyback companies is better than that of non-buyback companies, and that performance improves in the year following the initiation of repurchasing activities. Although it is not the central focus of this study, the findings are consistent with both the free cash flow and the information signaling hypotheses as motives for engaging in stock buybacks.     

ALIGNMENT EXPOSED: HOW CEOS ARE PAID, AND WHAT THEIR SHAREHOLDERS GET FOR IT

This article begins by arguing that, for many companies, there is a significant "disconnect" between how managers are paid and what is actually achieved for shareholders. This paper answers two questions of prime importance to investors: Is there a way to know beforehand whether managers' incentives are well aligned with those of its shareholders? And does such alignment actually make a difference in the returns one is likely to see?
In answering the first question, the author argues that cash bonuses and performance-based equity grants (i.e., grants based on managers' meeting accounting-based operating targets) are likely to provide stronger, more cost-effective incentives than grants of stock or options because the former are generally based on measures over which managers have significantly more control than the stock price. Using this insight, the author develops a method for evaluating compensation structures based on the variability of compensation, the number and type of compensation metrics purportedly driving that variability (including the award of performance shares or options), the stability of those metrics over time, and the apparent level of discretion in the use of those metrics to either fund or distribute bonuses (including equity). All these elements are disclosed to varying degrees in the proxy statements or annual reports of companies.
Using his compensation scores for 140 companies and their return history over the last eight years, the author concludes that "high alignment" companies outperform their "low alignment" peers by more than 5% per year in total shareholder returns. Furthermore, increases in alignment scores by individual companies over time tend to lead to higher total shareholder returns, and degradation of scores lead to lower returns. In short, observable improvements in compensation structure appear to pay off in the form of significant abnormal returns.     

Is Japanese management superior? Evidence from the performance of the USA targets in partial acquisitions

This paper examines the efficacy of Japanese management and corporate governance by comparing the long-term post-merger operating performance of the U.S. targets acquired by Japanese bidders compared to the performance of well-matched U.S. targets of U.S. bidders. Unlike prior studies that focus on short-term stock price reactions of target firms, it is possible to undertake this long-term analysis of performance by identifying targets that survive as independent entities because of partial acquisitions. The findings suggest that targets of Japanese bidders either perform no differently from targets of U.S. bidders, or possibly even underperform. Thus, the evidence does not support the oft-claimed superiority of Japanese management and corporate governance system.     

Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany

This article provides a comparative study of four major dimensions of corporate governance in the U.S. and Germany: (1) the laws affecting corporate governance, particularly those designed to protect minority shareholders; (2) the prescribed role and actual conduct of corporate boards; (3) the market for corporate control (including hostile takeovers); and (4) incentive compensation. The authors pose the question: If the primary purpose of the corporate governance system is to serve the interests of minority shareholders, how do the U.S. and German governance systems rank on each of these four dimensions ? Their conclusion is that although the U.S. system is more shareholder friendly in many respects than the German, both systems have major shortcomings, particularly in the market for corporate control. The authors conclude with a list of proposed changes to both systems that would amount to “taking shareholders seriously.”     

The exchange rate exposure of U.S. and Japanese banking institutions

In this paper, we examine the foreign exchange exposure of a sample of U.S. and Japanese banking firms. Using daily data, we construct estimates of the exchange rate sensitivity of the equity returns of the U.S. bank holding companies and compare them to those of the Japanese banks. We find that the stock returns of a significant fraction of the U.S. companies move with the exchange rate, while few of the Japanese returns that we observe do so. We next examine more closely the sensitivity of the U.S. firms by linking the U.S. estimates cross-sectionally to accounting-based measures of currency risk. We suggest that the sensitivity estimates can provide a benchmark for assessing the adequacy of existing accounting measures of currency risk. Benchmarked in this way, the reported measures that we examine appear to provide a significant, though only partial, picture of the exchange rate exposure of U.S. banking institutions. The cross-sectional evidence is also consistent with the use of foreign exchange contracts for the purpose of hedging.     

When the Japanese stock market meets COVID-19: Impact of ownership,China and US exposure,and ESG channels

We identify factors affecting the Japanese stock market during the COVID-19 pandemic period. First, we focus on the ownership structure. We find that indirect ownership through the exchange-traded fund purchasing program by the Bank of Japan has a positive impact on abnormal returns. Foreign ownership is negatively associated with abnormal returns, whereas ownership by traditional business groups is positively associated with abnormal returns. Second, we examine the impact of global value chains and find that stock returns are lower for companies with China and U.S. exposure. Third, in terms of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) engagement, there is no evidence that firms that have highly rated ESG scores have higher abnormal returns, but firms with ESG funds outperform those without.     

Explaining credit rating differences between Japanese and U.S. agencies

We compare credit ratings assigned to Japanese firms by the two leading U.S. rating agencies and the two leading Japanese agencies. Our goal is to investigate the complaint that the U.S. agencies Moody's and Standard and Poor's (S&P) ignore special corporate governance features of Japanese firms, i.e., keiretsu affiliation. We find that it is true that ratings of Japanese firms by the U.S. agencies are systematically lower than those assigned by Japanese raters. However, the reasons for the differences are not found to be related to keiretsu affiliation. Thus, we reject one of the prominent reasons for rating differences put forth by managers of Japanese firms. This leaves open the question of what drives the difference. The phenomenon is clearly consistent with more general home bias documented in previous work.