Fiscal Stabilization in the EMU

This paper analyzes the effects of macroeconomic shocks in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) using a stylized two-country model. First, it is shown how asymmetries between countries might matter in terms of the resulting business cycle fluctuations. More specifically, country-specific shocks are allowed for as well as cross-national differences in wage behavior. Second, it is shown by means of numerical simulations how national and federal fiscal stabilization policies can be used to dampen business cycle fluctuations in various (a)symmetric settings. The main innovation of the paper is to illustrate how structural differences between countries help to determine the impact of macroeconomic shocks and the effectiveness of fiscal policy.     

MACROECONOMIC STABILIZATION POLICIES IN THE EMU: SPILLOVERS, ASYMMETRIES AND INSTITUTIONS

This paper studies the institutional design of the coordination of macroeconomic stabilization policies within a monetary union in the framework of linear quadratic differential games. A central role in the analysis plays the partitioned game approach of the endogenous coalition formation literature. The specific policy recommendations in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) context depend on the particular characteristics of the shocks and the economic structure. In the case of a common shock, fiscal coordination or full policy coordination is desirable. When anti‐symmetric shocks are considered, fiscal coordination improves the performance but full policy coordination does not produce further gains in policymakers' welfare.     

Measuring fiscal spillovers in EMU and beyond: A Global VAR approach

This paper identifies and measures fiscal spillovers in the EU countries empirically using a global vector autoregression (GVAR) model. Our aim was to look at the sign and the absolute values of fiscal spillovers in a countrywise perspective and at the time profile (impulse response) of the impacts of fiscal shocks. We find moderate spillover effects of fiscal policy shocks originating in Germany and France. However, there is significant variation regarding the magnitude of the spillovers on individual destination countries and country clusters. Furthermore, we find some evidence that German or French fiscal spillovers are stronger on EMU than on non‐EMU countries.     

In or out? The welfare costs of EMU membership

Sweden and the UK have repeatedly refused to join the European and Monetary Union (EMU). Surprisingly, there is very little work on the welfare consequences of the loss of monetary policy flexibility for these countries. This paper fills this void by providing a framework to evaluate quantitatively the economic costs of joining the EMU. Using a two-country dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices we investigate the economic implications of the loss of monetary policy flexibility associated with the EMU for each country. The main contribution of our general equilibrium approach is that we can evaluate the effects of monetary policy in terms of welfare. Our findings suggest that these economies may experience sizable welfare losses as a result of joining the EMU. Results show that the cost associated with the loss of the monetary policy flexibility is higher in the presence of persistent government consumption shocks and small trade shares with the EMU.     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules in the EMU

Abstract. This paper studies the design and effects of monetary and fiscal policy in the euro area. To do so, a stylized two‐region model of monetary and fiscal policy rules in the EMU is built. We analyse how monetary and fiscal rules affect the adjustment dynamics in the model. Both the effects on the individual countries and on the EMU aggregate economy are studied. Three aspects play an important role in the analysis: (i) the consequences of alternative monetary and fiscal policy rules, (ii) the consequences of asymmetries between EMU countries (asymmetries in macroeconomic shocks and macroeconomic structures), and (iii) the role of alternative degrees of backward‐ and forward‐looking behaviour in consumer decisions and inflation expectations.     

MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY EFFICIENCY AND COORDINATION IN A MULTI‐SECTOR OPEN‐ECONOMY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL

The paper analyzes monetary and fiscal stabilization and coordination in a multi‐sector stochastic new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM) model. It first aims to assess the capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to reduce or eliminate the negative welfare effects of an unanticipated productivity shock affecting some or all of the sectors in each country. Second, it evaluates the possible gains from international monetary cooperation as well as the impact of active fiscal policy on the welfare performance of monetary policy. The setup also allows for international asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks. The results show that monetary and fiscal policies are efficient tools of stabilization and under several conditions they can replicate the flexible‐price equilibrium. However, their welfare performance is not necessarily increased when both monetary and fiscal policies react to shocks at the national level. The existence of bilateral gains from monetary cooperation depends on the degree of asymmetry concerning the uncertainty over the shocks.     

Fiscal shocks and their consequences

This paper investigates the response of hours worked and real wages to fiscal policy shocks in the post-World-War II US. We identify these shocks with exogenous changes in military purchases and argue that they lead to a persistent increase in government purchases and tax rates on capital and labor income, and a persistent rise in aggregate hours worked as well as declines in real wages. The shocks are also associated with short lived rises in aggregate investment and small movements in private consumption. We describe and implement a methodology for assessing whether standard neoclassical models can account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock. Simple versions of the neoclassical model can account for the qualitative effects of a fiscal shock. Once we allow for habit formation and investment adjustment costs, the model can also account reasonably well for the quantitative effects of a fiscal shock.     

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Economic and monetary union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with weak domestic policies and institutions exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with weaker policies and institutions by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability.
— Marcel Fratzscher and Livio Stracca     

Monetary and Fiscal Stabilization of Demand Shocks Within Europe

This paper examines alternative macroeconomic stabilization rules for demand shocks, for a single open economy, and for an integrated European region. These questions are tackled in two ways. First a very simple macroeconomic model is used to focus on intercountry interconnections. Then the effects of shocks are simulated using the McKibbin Sachs MSG2 global economic model. The theoretical model analyzes just how much larger the disturbances caused by asymmetric shocks might be in a European Monetary Union, as compared with outcomes under floating exchange rates, especially (1) if rigid central monitoring and discipline of the fiscal policy prevents the full operation of the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers within individual European countries, and (2) if European monetary policy does not concern itself with fully European objectives. Simulations with the MSG2 model bear out the significance of these risks. They show that a demand shock like GEMU can have strongly negative effects on output in other European countries if either interest rates are raised to counter the demand shock in the originating country, or if, for some reason, fiscal stabilization is not allowed to be as strong as the inbuilt fiscal stabilizers.     

Commodity prices and fiscal policy in a commodity exporting economy

This paper analyzes the macroeconomic effects of commodity price shocks on a commodity exporting country. In doing so, we use a DSGE model developed to describe the business cycle in Chile, a copper exporting country. We compare the effects of commodity-price shocks under different fiscal rules. The results show that if the fiscal policy is conducted in a way such that the government saves most of the extra revenues from the higher commodity price, then the macroeconomic effects of a commodity price increase of 10% are an expansion of output below 0.2% and a real exchange appreciation of 0.5%. In contrast, when fiscal policy is highly expansive, the same commodity price increase implies an output expansion above 0.5% and a real exchange rate appreciation of 0.8%. With our model, we also analyze the effects of persistent reduction in the commodity price, the relevance of exchange rate flexibility and the role of imperfect credibility of the fiscal rule.     

Optimal Currency Areas Scottish Economic Society/Royal Bank of Scotland Annual Lecture, 1999

Microeconomic efficiency and market transparency argue in favour of UK membership in EMU and for Scotland’s membership in the UK monetary union and also in EMU. UK seigniorage (government revenues from money issuance) would be boosted by EMU membership. Lender of last resort arrangements would not be substantially affected by UK membership in EMU. The UK is too small and too open to be an optimal currency area. The same point applies even more emphatically to Scotland. The ‘one‐size‐fits‐all’, ‘asymmetric shocks’ and ‘cyclical divergence’ objections to UK membership are based on the misapprehension that independent national monetary policy, and the associated nominal exchange rate flexibility, can be used effectively to offset or even neutralise asymmetric shocks. This ‘fine tuning delusion’ is compounded by a failure to understand that, under a high degree of international financial integration, market‐determined exchange rates are primarily a source of shocks and instability. Instead, opponents of UK membership in EMU view exchange rate flexibility as an effective buffer for adjusting to asymmetric shocks originating elsewhere. I know of no evidence that supports such an optimistic reading of what exchange rate flexibility can deliver under conditions of very high international financial capital mobility. The economic arguments for immediate UK membership in EMU, at an appropriate entry rate, are overwhelming. Monetary union raises important constitutional and political issues. It involves a further surrender of national sovereignty to a supranational institution, the ECB/ESCB. It is essential that this transfer of national sovereignty be perceived as legitimate by those affected by it. In addition, the citizens of the UK have become accustomed to a high standard of openness and accountability of their central bank since it gained operational independence in 1997. The ECB/ESCB must be held to the same high standard, and, while there are grounds for optimism, there still is some way to go there.     

Swedish Postwar Business Cycles: Generated Abroad or at Home?

The relative importance of foreign and domestic shocks for the Swedish postwar business cycle is examined in a neoclassical stochastic growth model of a small open economy. Since recent research has shown that fiscal policy shocks may be important for business cycles, I extend previous work in the literature by allowing for stochastic fiscal policy. It is found that the introduction of fiscal policy improves the empirical fit of the model, although not significantly so when hours worked are detrended with the HP filter. The results suggest that domestic shocks are more important than foreign shocks for output fluctuations. Among the domestic shocks, innovations in fiscal policy seem to have been more important than technology shocks during this period. Foreign shocks are very important for fluctuations in the real exchange rate and the current account.     

Automatic stabilizers, fiscal rules and macroeconomic stability

This paper analyzes the effect of the fiscal structure upon the trade-off between inflation and output stabilization induced by technological shocks in a DGE model with nominal and real rigidities that also integrates a rich menu of fiscal variables as well as a target on the debt to output ratio. The channels through which fiscal policy affects macroeconomic stability include supply-side effects of distortionary taxes, the procyclical behavior of public spending induced by fiscal rules and the conventional effect of automatic stabilizers operating through disposable (permanent) income. The paper investigates these channels and concludes that, contrary to what has been found in RBC models, distortionary taxes tend to reduce output volatility relative to lump-sum taxes when significant rigidities are present. We also study the stabilization effect of alternative (distortionary) tax structures and find that these are only relevant if substantial rigidities are present.     

Fiscal policy and national saving

This paper uses structural vector autoregressions along with structural measures of fiscal policy to measure the dynamic impact of fiscal policy shocks on the output gap and national saving. Positive shocks to government purchases and negative shocks to real net taxes are found to increase the output gap. Positive shocks to the government's structural surplus increases national saving although the effects are small. Positive shocks to government purchases are found to substantially reduce national saving. Negative shocks to real net tax revenues as a share of potential GDP have a small negative impact on national saving.     

Government solvency and financial markets: Dynamic panel estimates for the European Monetary Union

We assess government solvency in the European Monetary Union (EMU), controlling for the interaction of fiscal policy with financial markets. We find a positive interaction, reflecting market-based pressures for fiscal improvement, and significant debt stabilization efforts, weakened in the post-EMU era.     

Fiscal Policy to Stabilise the Domestic Economy in the EMU: What Can We Learn from Monetary Policy?

An important issue for the EMU countries is to what extent fiscalpolicy can be used to stabilise the domestic economy in thecase of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. The paper reviews possiblereforms of national fiscal policy institutions in order to promoteefficient fiscal stabilisation policy: (i) the introductionof a more transparent legal framework for the government's stabilisationdecisions; (ii) the establishment of an independent advisoryFiscal Policy Council; and (iii) the delegation of actual stabilisationdecisions to an independent Fiscal Policy Committee. The conclusionis that the Fiscal Policy Committee solution has much to speakfor itself. It seems possible to delegate fiscal stabilisationpolicy decisions, in much the same way as monetary policy hasbeen delegated to central banks, at the same time as fiscalpolicy decisions focusing on income distribution and socialefficiency are kept in the political sphere. Such delegationcan be made compatible with democratic accountability. (JELE61, E63, P16)     

Monetary and Fiscal Policy-Makers in the European Economic and Monetary Union: Allies or Adversaries?

Optimal monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are determined by simulating a global model under alternative assumptions about the objective function of the European Central Bank (ECB) and about cooperation vs. non-cooperation between monetary and fiscal policy-makers and among the latter. The results show the high effectiveness of fixed rules in the presence of supply-side shocks and the usefulness of cooperative discretionary measures against demand-side shocks. More generally, cooperation among fiscal policy-makers in the EMU is nearly always superior to non-cooperative equilibrium solutions, yielding a strong case for the coordination of fiscal policies.     

The effects of fiscal spending shocks on the performance of simple monetary policy rules

We examine the effects of fiscal shocks on the performance of alternative monetary policy rules in a small dynamic general equilibrium framework. We explicitly consider the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy rules which may be present in the real world. We use a simple specification for the fiscal policy rule and various specifications for the (simple) monetary policy rule. Our analysis suggests that some form of flexible inflation targeting regime would perform well in response to fiscal shocks compared to other forms of policy regimes.     

Interactions between Monetary and Fiscal Policy Rules

The Fiscal Stability Pact for EMU implies that constraints on fiscal policy facilitate inflation control. In this paper we identify two stable policy regimes. When monetary policy seeks to raise real interest rates in response to excess inflation, a self-stabilising fiscal policy is required to ensure model stability. A fiscal policy which does not, by itself, ensure fiscal solvency constrains monetary policy to be relatively 'passive'. However, in simulations we conclude that the central bank does not need to seek, on this account, the degree of debt stabilisation that appears to be implied by the fiscal stability pact.     

Multiple Wage Bargaining Systems in the Single European Currency Area

Little attention in the EMU literature has been paid to the interaction between centralbank monetary rules and systems of collective wage bargaining. Analytically andempirically, coordinated wage bargaining systems respond with real wage restraintto non-accommodating monetary policy. Since wage determination is dominated bycollective bargaining in all the EMU member states and wage coordination within themember states has grown since 1980, this is a topic of potential importance. In particular, the replacement of the Bundesbank, directly targeting German inflation, by an ECB targeting European inflation has removed a major institutional support of wage restraint in Germany. The consequences of this for EMU are worked out under two scenarios, that inflation expectations will be generated by ECB monetary policy and that they will reflect German inflation outcomes. Possible institutional developments are discussed including government-union bargains. The Bundesbank has also played a major role in maintaining fiscal rectitude by targeting excess fiscal deficits in Germany: again its replacement by the ECB – targeting (if at all) European rather than German fiscal policy – loosens fiscal constraints. For underlying structural reasons therefore, it is possible that Germany and other EMU countries will move to a period of fiscal activism with wage restraint and low inflation purchased through social contract negotiations.