A theory of rent seeking with informational foundations

I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock’s (1980) classic model where the influence activities are “black-boxed.” Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be studied. In particular, I show that competition among rent seekers can be socially beneficial, since the additional information that the decision maker gets access to makes the increase in rent-seeking expenditures worthwhile. However, the analysis also highlights a logic that, under natural parameter assumptions, makes the rent seekers spend more resources on rent seeking than is in society’s interest, which is consistent with the spirit of the rent-seeking literature.      

The PC as electronic nag

While often well-meant and sometimes unintended, nagging is an irritation we can easily do without. Whether personal or electronic, low-tech or high, it matters not. With PC proliferation, problem potential increases—even at home. Resisting the urge to telecommute unless anticipated gains can be “proved” in advance, and self-discipline if and when the PC becomes a “family member,” are urged.     

To dissent or not to dissent? Informative dissent and parliamentary governance

Legislative dissent has detrimental effects for both party and legislator, i.e., legislators depend on their party label for re-election, which value in turn depends in part on the party’s reputation of cohesiveness. Commonly dissent has been attributed to “extreme” preferences. I provide an informational rationale for dissent. Costly dissent allows the legislator to credibly signal information about his constituency’s preferences to the Cabinet. As a result the Cabinet can better calibrate its policies with the electorate’s preferences. Dissent is shown to depend on policy preferences as well a the legislators’ electoral strength, electoral volatility, and the cost of dissent. Finally, the results suggests that parties may sometimes benefit from tolerating some level of dissent. I am grateful to Christopher Kam, Randall Calvert, John Duggan, Mark Fey, Eduardo Leoni, Sona Golder, and the anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program at Michigan State University for its support. All remaining errors are mine.     

On a heuristic analysis of highly fractionated 2 n factorial experiments

The paper deals with a method for the analysis of highly fractionated factorial designs proposed by Raghavarao and Altan in Metrika 58:185–191 (2003). We show that the method will find “active” factors with almost any set of random numbers. Once that an alias set is found active, Raghavarao and Altan claim that their method can resolve the alias structure of the design and identify which of several confounded effects is active. We show that their method cannot do that. The error in Raghavarao and Altan’s arguments lies in the fact that they treat a set of highly dependent (sometimes even identical) F-statistics as if they were independent.     

Contingent payments in selection contests

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free. This paper is part of the project “The Knowledge-Based Society” sponsored by the Research Council of Norway (project 172603/V10).     

Delegation and strategic incentives for managers in contests

Owners usually want their managers to maximize profits. As the literature on strategic delegation has shown it may be beneficial to owners to put a positive weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for managers to make them behave more aggressively in the market. This paper shows that if the competition between the managers can be characterized as a contest, owners may induce their managers to maximize sales. Moreover, there is a first‐mover advantage for owners when choosing their incentive schemes. If delegation is endogenous the type of contest will determine whether all owners delegate their decisions to managers or not. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Causality in qualitative and quantitative research

We are flooded with a wave of writings on causality in the social sciences during the last decades. The same holds for the relationship between quantitative and qualitative research in the social sciences. An enormous amount of texts appears on (causality in) qualitative research, mostly in a controversy with quantitative research. These writings induced us to develop the thesis of “unity in diversity”, i.e., that there is no difference “in principle” between causality in qualitative and quantitative research, because both are supported by what I will call an “experimental logic”. In developing this thesis a plea is being made for going back to the sources. A historical overview of theories of causality is presented, which develops into two prominent views: INUS-causation and causal realism. A historical framework is also outlined for the opposition between quantitative and qualitative research, in which French positivism and British empiricism are opposed to German neo-kantianism and neo-hegelianism. After having developed the thesis of “unity in diversity” for this historical framework, the same is being done for the recent literature: “mixed methods research”, the book DSI of KKV, the reactions of David Collier and “QCA” of Charles Ragin. At the end the question of small-n research and the case n = 1 is examined.     

Bilateral Delegation in Duopoly Wage and Employment Bargaining

We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does government ideology influence budget composition? Empirical evidence from OECD countries

This paper examines whether government ideology has influenced the allocation of public expenditures in OECD countries. I analyze two datasets that report different expenditure categories and cover the time periods 1970–1997 and 1990–2006, respectively. The results suggest that government ideology has had a rather weak influence on the composition of governments’ budgets. Leftist governments, however, increased spending on “Public Services” in the period 1970–1997 and on “Education” in the period 1990–2006. These findings imply, first, that government ideology hardly influenced budgetary affairs in the last decades, and thus, if ideology plays a role at all, it influences non-budgetary affairs. Second, education has become an important expenditure category for leftist parties to signal their political visions to voters belonging to all societal groups.     

BEHAVIOR IN GROUP CONTESTS: A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH

Group contests are ubiquitous. Some examples include warfare between countries, competition between political parties, team‐incentives within firms, and rent‐seeking. In order to succeed, members of the same group have incentives to cooperate with each other by expending effort. However, since effort is costly, each member also has an incentive to abstain from expending any effort and instead free ride on the efforts of other members. Contest theory predicts that the intensity of competition between groups and the amount of free riding within groups depend on the group size, sharing rule, group impact function, contest success function, and heterogeneity of players. We review experimental studies testing these theoretical predictions. Most studies find significant over‐expenditure of effort relative to the theory and significant heterogeneity of behavior within and between groups. Also, most studies find support for the comparative statics predictions of the theory (with the exception of the “group size paradox”). Finally, studies show that there are effective mechanisms that can promote within‐group cooperation and conflict resolution mechanisms that can de‐escalate and potentially eliminate between‐group conflict.     

Determining of threat perceptions affecting direction of the US defense expenditures by using ordinal regression models

The article examines whether the US threat perceptions defined in terms of federal government national defense outlays in billions of constant (FY 2000) dollars change along with periodical changes in international politics between 1945 and 2007. Three different models affecting direction of the US defense expenditures are developed. The first model are estimated by using five link functions even though results of only two of them, complementary log–log and cauchit, are presented. As complementary log–log produced the best results, others models are predicted by using only this function. The parameter estimates of complementary log–log function for the first model indicate that four of these variables (Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush Sr.) out of eleven are significant in the category of presidents. “Truman Docrtrine/Cominform”, “Korean War”, “Vietnam War”, and “Invasion of Iraq” also seem to be the important independent variables on empirical grounds for the first model. While “Party”, “Invasion of Iraq”, “Vietnam War”, “Korean War”, and “Cuban Missile Crisis” constitute the important independent variables on empirical grounds for the second model, “Korean War”, “Vietnam War”, “Invasion of Iraq”, “Truman Docrtrine/Cominform”, “The Cold War and New World Order”, and “Cuban Missile Crisis” are important independent variables on empirical grounds for the third model. Estimations based on these three models therefore suggest that aforementioned independent variables do indeed have effect on the US defense expenditures.     

Verbesserung des nicht-randomisierten exakten Testes von R.A. Fisher

Summary The so-called Exact Test of R. A. Fisher for comparing two probabilitiesp ₁ andp ₂ in a Fourfold-Table with small cell frequencies is known as a UMPU-Test. But in practice the test is used in a nonrandomized, often tabulated version. Given a certain level of significanceα it is shown: the critical region of this nonrandomized test, referred to as “Fisher 1”, can be enlarged considerably. For instance for all sample-size-sums up to 20 andα=0.01 the total number of points in the critical regions of “Fisher 1” is 552 whereas the analogous number of the new version “Fisher 2” is 788. The size of tables for “Fisher 2” can be reduced considerably because the main parts of the critical regions can be described by the aid of some Chi-square-test versions. In particular Yates’ continuity-correction turns out to be always conservative in the above mentioned region relative to “Fisher 2” whereas this is not strictly true relative to “Fisher 1”.      

Variance estimation in the change analysis of a linear regression model

We study a “direct test” of Chu and White (1992) proposed for detecting changes in the trend of a linear regression model. The power of this test strongly depends on a suitable estimation of the variance of the error variables involved. We discuss various types of variance estimators and derive their asymptotic properties under the null-hypothesis of “no change” as well as under the alternative of “a change in linear trend”. A small simulation study illustrates the estimators' finite sample behaviour.     

Social Distance,Respondent Cooperation and Item Nonresponse in Sex Survey

This paper examines the ways in which the number of item nonresponses is determined by social distance and/or interview rapport, with a focus on responses of “refusal” and “don’t know”, implying the respondent’s lack of willingness and ability to provide substantive responses to sensitive questions. The data analyzed were from 39 self- administered questions concerning sexual attitudes and behaviors in the 2002 Taiwan Social Change Survey for module “Family and Changing Gender Role”. Poisson Regression in 2-level Hierarchical Linear Model was employed to enhance the accuracy of the analysis of the accumulation of “don’t know” and “refusal” responses. The results showed that respondent cooperation significantly decreased the number of both “don’t know” and “refusal” replies. The decrease was not conditioned by any kind of social distance. Age and education distances have respectively negative and positive effect on the number of “don’t know” and “refusal” answers. The married–married interview produced more “don’t know” and “refusal” than other paired interview types. The larger the ethnicity distance is, the more “refusal” appears. The substantial findings imply that the effects of social-distance and rapport (respondent cooperation) on the number of item nonresponses deserve more attention in research on survey methodology. The divergent findings on gender-distance effect and marital-status effect, however, call for replication studies in the future.     

Strategic managerial incentives under adverse selection

We extend the strategic contract model where the owner designs incentive schemes for her manager before the latter takes output decisions. Firstly, we introduce private knowledge regarding costs within each owner–manager pair. Under adverse selection, we show that delegation involves a trade‐off between strategic commitment and the cost of an extra informational rent linked to decentralization. Which policies will arise in equilibrium? We introduce in the game an initial stage where owners can simultaneously choose between control and delegation. We show that if decision variables are strategic substitutes, choosing output control through a quantity‐lump sum transfer contract is a dominating strategy. If decision variables are strategic complements, this policy is a dominated strategy. Further, two types of dominant‐strategies equilibrium may arise: in the first type, both principals use delegation; in the second one, both principals implement delegation for a low‐cost manager and output control for a high‐cost one. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining Turkey and member states of European Union in terms of health perspectives of millennium development goals

Development is related not only to production and increase in per capita income but also to social, cultural and political improvements. The purpose of development is that individuals would live long, healthy and happy lives thanks to economic development of society. From this perspective, it is obvious that the human factor is fundamental to the concept of development. This study examines the most important element in human development—health. As health indicators, it uses the health perspectives in the United Nations millennium development goals that are “reduce child mortality”, “improve maternal health” and “combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases”. In the study, European Union (EU) member states and candidate country Turkey are compared in terms of health related goals among millennium development goals by using Multidimensional scaling and Cluster analysis. Initially, countries with similar and dissimilar health indicators are mapped in multidimensional space by multidimensional scaling analysis. Further, the same method is used to reveal similar and dissimilar health indicators among countries. Then, the findings are compared using Cluster analysis and are identified to be similar.     

The equal pay act: Responsibilities and rights

The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) requires that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. Plaintiffs who claim discrimination on the basis of the EPA may settle out of court, or may bring legal action in the courts. Employers possess specific rights under the law, and can defend themselves against charges of discrimination through a number of “employer defenses.” These defenses involve providing that pay differences are based on seniority systems, merit systems, production systems, or “any other factor other than sex.” This article will also discuss the impact of court decisions that have further honed the responsibilities and rights of both employees and employers under the EPA.     

The impact of referendums on the centralisation of public goods provision: a political economy approach

The paper compares decision-making on the centralisation of public goods provision in the presence of regional externalities under representative and direct democratic institutions. A model with two regions, two public goods and regional spillovers is developed in which uncertainty over the true preferences of candidates makes strategic delegation impossible. The political economy argument against centralisation of Besley and Coate (J Public Econ 87:2611–2637, 2003) does therefore not apply. Instead, it is shown that the existence of rent extraction by delegates alone suffices to make cooperative centralisation more likely through representative democracy under reasonable assumptions. In the case of non-cooperative centralisation, the more extensive possibilities for institutional design under representative democracy increase the likelihood of centralisation. Direct democracy may thus be interpreted as a federalism-preserving institution.     

A family of measures of uncertainty involving utilities: Definition,properties, applications and statistical inferences

Consider an experiment involving the observation of a discrete random variable, or quantitative classification process. When, in addition to the probability of each value or class we know its “utility” (or, more precisely, we can quantify the “nature” of each value or class), the “uncertainty corresponding to the utilities” may be evaluated. In this paper, we are first going to introduce a family of Measures of Uncertainty involving Utilities and several properties of this family are studied. Then, some immediate applications are discussed: the definition of criteria for Comparing Experiments in Statistical Decision problems, and the quantification of the Inequality with respect to an economical attribute or the Industrial Concentration. Finally, we will analyze the asymptotic behaviour of the measures in simple random sampling, and some related problems. This work was partially supported by the Comisión Asesora de Investigación Científica Técnica (CAICYT) under the contract PB85-0401.