A NEW DIRECTION IN WORLD BANK URBAN LENDING TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES*

The urban development loans of the World Bank are acquiring a regional rather than a city-specific orientation in several countries, especially in Latin America. These broader operations often dovetail national trends of decentralization in the political, administrative and fiscal structures. Given the current constraints of the central governments in meeting the growing demands of urbanization through incremental top-down grants, these operations aim at a gradual substitution of unrequited transfers with long-term loans to regional and local governments. The paper reviews the implications of this approach in terms of distribution and efficiency and suggests that it may be more suitable in countries undergoing economic adjustment. The objective is to sustain motivation in fiscal effort and resource mobilization at the city level, and possibly establish a different rationale for external credit supporting local infrastructure and service improvements.     

Impact of Currency Boards on Fiscal Policy in Central and Eastern European Countries

The paper focuses on the impact of currency boards on fiscal policy in transition economies. Starting with an overview of theoretical and empirical studies in the related area, it tests for the interaction between monetary policy regimes and fiscal policy in Central and Eastern European countries who aim for the membership in the European Union. The theoretical background of this study lies in the model of Tornell and Velasco (1998). They demonstrate that fiscal transfers do not ultimately depend on the chosen exchange rate and monetary policy, but only on the worlds real rate of interest and the rate of time preference of the fiscal authority. A sample of 10 accession candidates constitutes a group of countries which go through similar macroeconomic stabilisation processes but have chosen different nominal anchors. The paper investigates whether there are any systematic differences between those countries with a currency board arrangement and those without. The empirical evidence suggests that currency boards enhance fiscal discipline in Central and Eastern European countries.     

The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints

The government may delegate two sequential tasks (e.g., building and operating an infrastructure) to the same or different agents (i.e., partnership vs. sequential contracts). Agents are risk-neutral but face financial constraints, whereas the government's contractual capacity may be limited by the renegotiation-proofness and fiscal constraints. By relying on history-dependent incentives, the partnership contract corrects moral hazard more effectively than sequential contracts. Thus, it is socially preferred unless bundling different tasks deteriorates the agent's financial conditions. Our results shed new light on the role of firms' financial and government's fiscal conditions in driving the cost–benefit analysis of public–private partnerships.     

Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria,Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

Using survey data for 220 traditional manufacturing firms over 7 years of transition and 4 Central Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, we find firms that produced for the EU market under planning consistently outperform those that produced for the CMEA market. Within the previously CMEA market, the best firms were selected to outside privatisation and outperformed insider/state owned firms. Outside privatisation was resisted in EU oriented firms and ownership was found to have no effect on performance. Path dependent demand shocks and political constraints on the sequencing of state firms to private ownership determine the relationship between firm performance and ownership structure during transition.     

Short‐term monitoring of fiscal policy discipline

Under the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), European Union (EU) Member States commit themselves to avoid excessive deficits over 3% of GDP and to pursue the medium‐term objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus. The SGP also provides regulation for the surveillance of budgetary positions. An analysis of tools for the surveillance of budgetary positions is the focus of this paper. In particular, it addresses two open issues in the empirical public finance literature which are crucial for monitoring fiscal policy discipline in the EU. First, the estimation of the structural component of the fiscal balance ratio. Second, the computation, when only annual fiscal data are available, of quarterly budget balance ratios, using relevant information from quarterly measured macroeconomic series. An econometric model that addresses both issues is presented and estimated. Additionally, this modelling framework allows us to answer questions such as: what is the safety margin that will prevent a particular country from reaching, with certain probability, a budget deficit that breaches the 3% upper bound? Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The determinants of austerity in the European Union 2010–16

This paper aims at decteting what drove the adoption of austerity policies over the period 2010–16 in a panel of 28 European countries. Austerity is identified by year increases in the ratio between the structural primary balance and potential GDP. By means of principal component factor analysis we select the aggregate factors that might affect austerity, namely (i) fiscal consolidation (correction of high deficits and debts), (ii) market discipline (high sovereign spreads, low ratings), (iii) rule-based fiscal discipline (compliance with the Eurozone rules), and macroeconomic stabilisation (consideration for the cyclical position of the economy). Then we estimate a dynamic panel model with the system-GMM method. Results show that the most important contributions to austerity are provided by the market discipline and fiscal consolidation factors together with Excessive Deficit Procedures, with no significant role played by concomitant macroeconomic conditions. Overall, governments complied with orthodox fiscal principles and rules.     

Topics in macro-modelling of East European countries in the period of transition

Central and European former Centrally Planned Economies (CPEs) entered a period of transition towards market economies. The evolution is marked by a transition from shortage- to demand-determined economies, associated with the abandonment of price control and the introduction of tight wage control. Stabilization programmes (in Poland from 1990), implementing tough deflationary fiscal and monetary policies, brought about the suppression of hyperinflation. The high adjustment costs — deep recession, high rates of unemployment — are characteristics of the early '90s. The deregulation of the public sector and the building of the private one commenced, and will be a long-lasting process.To meet the changes in economic regimes and mechanisms, the existing models had to be adequately respecified and new models constructed. The large W-5 macromodel for Poland, which covers the final and intermediate demands, had to be extended to introduce the market adjustment mechanisms and, more broadly, the financial flows. To meet the needs of short-term financial policies, new quarterly models had to be built, as, for instance, the WK macromodel for the Polish economy. The paper discusses the major problems of the models' specification under the data constraints.     

New Nonlinear Approaches for the Adjustment and Updating of a SAM

Many structural relationships should be taken into account in any reasonable adjustment and updating process. These structural relationships are mainly represented by ratios of different types, such as technical coefficients or the proportion of the cell value in relation to its row or column total. We believe that in many cases (either because of lack of information or when the time elapsed for the estimation of a social accounting matrix is not long enough to allow for any significant structural change) the updating process should try to minimize the rela- tive deviation of the new coefficients from the initial ones in a homogeneous way. This homogeneity would mean that the magnitude of this relative deviation is similar among the elements of each row or column, therefore avoiding the concentration of the changes in particular cells of the SAM. In this work, we propose some new adjustment criteria in order to obtain a more homogeneous relative adjustment of the structural coefficients. These criteria combine the adjustment method proposed by Matuszewski et al. (1964) with other deviation functions. Each of the adjustment criteria proposed leads to a nonlinear optimization problem which is reformulated as a linear program. We test the usefulness of this proposal by comparing its results with the ones obtained by more standard approaches and we are able to show that these approaches tend to produce a less homogeneous pattern of coefficient adjustment, under certain circumstances, than the ones we put forward.     

Fiscal performance and elections in the context of a transition economy

It is widely accepted that, in democratic societies, incumbent governments may use various means, such as discretionary spending, to increase their chances of re-election. In the context of potential budget constraints (e.g., large debt), the incumbent might consider alternative means. Tax collection performance could be one such means that is prone to incumbents’ electoral manipulation, particularly in transition countries with a weak institutional framework. Investigating Albania, we show that fiscal performance, measured by monthly tax revenues, is poor before elections, especially in elections that result in political change. Before all elections, we observe a reduction in tax collection ranging from 3.2 percentage points in the twelve months before elections to 4.0 percentage points in the six months before elections. This implies a drop of more than half in fiscal performance compared with its long-term “natural” or average rate. Moreover, the deterioration in performance is considerably larger, by two- to threefold, before “change elections” (i.e. elections that result in a change of the governing party). After these elections, fiscal performance improves. The key to reducing deterioration in fiscal performance associated with elections is to establish rules and institutional oversight (independent or bipartisan) that reduce the discretion of tax authorities.     

Revenue trade-offs: Implications for state Government finance

Modifications in state level fiscal structures to address inequitable tax burdens or the issue of public sector growth have been accomplished by substituting one tax for another or by adjusting rates of existing taxes. This paper presents this fiscal adjustment process on the state level in terms of a policy in which complementary or competitive taxes are jointly determined as a tax mix in a process of revenue trade-offs.     

No direct influence of EU on domestic consolidation and reform: two fiscal ‘hardliners’, Netherlands and Estonia

ABSTRACT

In the Netherlands and Estonia, the European Union (EU) did not exert direct influence on domestic fiscal consolidation. They managed to resolve their fiscal crises and balance their budgets without external financial assistance, thanks to strict fiscal discipline. Yet, domestic consolidations in both countries were to some extent influenced by the EU. The Netherlands was subject to excessive deficit procedure. Estonia was indirectly influenced because of its top priority to join the Eurozone. This paper begins with a conceptual look at EU influencing. Then, fiscal discipline and consolidation in the Netherlands and Estonia are explored, especially their similarities and differences.     

Fiscal policy and asset markets: A semiparametric analysis

Using a flexible semiparametric varying coefficient model specification, this paper examines the role of fiscal policy on the US asset markets (stocks, corporate and treasury bonds). We consider two possible roles of fiscal deficits (or surpluses): as a separate direct information variable and as a (indirect) conditioning information variable indicating binding constraints on monetary policy actions. The results show that the impact of monetary policy on the stock market varies, depending on fiscal expansion or contraction. The impact of fiscal policy on corporate and treasury bond yields follow similar patterns as in the equity market. The results are consistent with the notion of strong interdependence between monetary and fiscal policies.     

The impact of adjustment and stabilization policies on infrastructure spending in Central America

During the 1980s and 1990s the countries of Central America experienced protracted fiscal crises and debt repayment problems which resulted in the implementation of structural adjustment agreements. Apart from attempting to reestablish fiscal balance and to control inflation, the proponents of adjustment policies sought to enhance growth by de-emphasizing the wasteful aspects of state spending while maintaining public expenditures on physical and human capital, which were believed to promote private sector productivity. By comparing a pre-debt crisis period with the period given by debt crisis and adjustment, the study reveals that the shares of government spending on human and, particularly, physical infrastructure dropped precipitously during the adjustment period. At the same time, the shares devoted to defense and subsidy categories—as well as interest payments on external debt—generally registered notable gains. The experience of adjustment policies in Central America indicated that substantial discrepancies existed between the idea and the reality.     

Fiscal restraints by advisors

This study investigates the role of fiscal advisors in maintaining government fiscal discipline when the advisor’s appointment is determined endogenously. Our theoretical model shows that an incumbent politician has an incentive to employ an external advisor as a commitment device for fiscal discipline before being aware of his own competence level. The advisor acts as a restraint on public expenditure, which works to control the incumbent politician’s ex post overspending to buy votes. Our empirical analysis supports this hypothesis in the Japanese case where governments with directors from the central government tend to spend less.     

Briefing Paper: The Interdependence of Fiscal and Monetary Policy under Economic and Monetary Union

This article explores the implications of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for the conduct of fiscal policy. Under EMU, where the European Central Bank is successful in controlling inflation, the loss of seigniorage revenues causes a potential problem for public sector deficits. To prevent the debt-income ratio from spiralling upwards, a primary budget surplus is ultimately required. EMU has usually been considered as a strong central monetary authority which forces fiscal discipline on lax national governments. But this is not the only possibility. Because the debt ratio can be reduced by surprise inflation, the price expectations of the private sector are important. Once these are taken into account, EMU can be examined in a 'game' framework in which the reputation of the authorities and the existence or otherwise of cooperation between the fiscal and monetary authorities becomes a critical factor.
The paper finds that where the authorities enjoy reputation and cooperate, a one-off reduction in public spending will lead to a permanent decline in the real interest rate and crowd in extra private spending (consumption and investment). Without reputation the cut in government spending has to be sustained. Where there is neither reputation nor cooperation, the outcome depends on the structure of the European economy and whether fiscal policy can effect the terms of trade between countries. If the terms of trade remain unchanged, the outturn is similar to the case of cooperation without reputation, but where the terms of trade can be improved in one country, there is no incentive to cut public spending. In this case the outturn is higher inflation with private spending crowded out.     

Structural Re-Adjustment in Nigeria: Diagnosis of a Severe Dutch Disease Syndrome

A bstract . Nigeria has adopted a program of structural adjustment economic reforms since 1986 in an effort to retrace steps toward economic stability. This Nigerian economic recovery effort based on structural adjustment is an attempt to cure a classic although extreme symptom of the "Dutch disease," but despite this determined effort, success may be threatened by two fundamental economic errors that contributed to the problem in the first place.     

Measuring the effects of fiscal policy

Measuring the effects of discretionary fiscal policy is both difficult and controversial, as some explicit or implicit identifying assumptions need to be made to isolate exogenous and unanticipated changes in taxes and government spending. Studies based on structural vector autoregressions typically achieve identification by restricting the contemporaneous interaction of fiscal and non-fiscal variables in a rather arbitrary way. In this paper, we relax those restrictions and identify fiscal policy shocks by exploiting the conditional heteroscedasticity of the structural disturbances. We use this methodology to evaluate the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy shocks in the U.S. before and after 1979. Our results show substantive differences in the economy׳s response to government spending and tax shocks across the two periods. Importantly, we find that increases in public spending are, in general, more effective than tax cuts in stimulating economic activity. A key contribution of this study is to provide a formal test of the identifying restrictions commonly used in the literature.     

Privatisation or Competition?

Market competition is essential for any economy to be efficient. In order to develop competition in a transition economy, it is conventionally thought that privatisation should take place first. This wisdom has been challenged by the Chinese reform experience of the last two decades, which modified the incentive structure of state enterprises and created markets and market competition in the absence of large scale privatisation. China's experience, however, raises the question of whether its chosen type of reform is sufficient to promote competition in a market dominated by public firms. To answer this, we need to know what kind of markets were created – regional markets closed to trade or unified markets with easy access – and whether or not improved incentives for state firms have led to competition. This paper investigates these questions on the basis of a survey of both theory and empirical evidence; and finds that the Chinese reform policies did succeed in stimulating competition among state firms.     

Central European EU accession and Latin American integration: Mutual lessons in macroeconomic policy design

Design options in exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies, are explored for economies in Central Europe and Latin America that aspire to engage in monetary unification. Recent experience in these regions suggests that, absent a model of institutional harmonization and a road map for policy convergence, Latin American economies would benefit from following internally consistent macroeconomic policies—possibly in the context of a rules-based framework—and from adopting widely accepted standards of best practice. Unilateral adoption of a hard currency (dollarization or euroization) tends to be counterproductive unless it is supported by fiscal discipline and wage flexibility. Empirical evidence is presented on the effect of expected monetary unification on sovereign risk.