Law and Preferences

Legal rules do more than provide incentives, they change people.When preferences and norms are endogenously determined via aprocess of imitation and learning, legal rules, by affectingthe market outcome, may affect the dynamics of preference formation.Analyzing the effect of different legal rules should thereforego beyond the analysis of the incentives they provide. It shouldalso include an analysis of their effect on the distributionof preferences and norms of behavior. We illustrate this claimby considering a simple market game in which individuals mayhave preferences that include fairness concerns. We show thatdifferent legal rules change not only the pattern of trade ina market game, but also individuals' fairness concerns. Thatis, different rules may eventually make individuals care more(or less) about a fair outcome. Specifically, our model suggeststhat enhanced remedies for breach of contract may reduce equilibriumpreferences for fairness.     

Racial Preferences in Dating

We examine racial preferences in dating. We employ a Speed Dating experiment that allows us to directly observe individual decisions and thus infer whose preferences lead to racial segregation in romantic relationships. Females exhibit stronger racial preferences than males. The richness of our data further allows us to identify many determinants of same-race preferences. Subjects' backgrounds, including the racial composition of the ZIP code where a subject grew up and the prevailing racial attitudes in a subject's state or country of origin, strongly influence same-race preferences. Older subjects and more physically attractive subjects exhibit weaker same-race preferences.     

Preferences in the Future

Environmental economics has been much occupied with the discount rate, which is the value of future costs and benefits relative to present costsor benefits. But at least as important is the question of whatshould be discounted, that is, what the value of those future environmentalbenefits is to future generations. This paper analyzes the role for futurepreferences and discusses the state of knowledge. I argue that theappropriate discount rate is the market one, and that the real problemis determining future willingness-to-pay. This approach makes clearerthe connection between discounting and the valuation debate.This paper focuses on two features that have been prominent in that debate:existence value and reference dependence. I argue that thereis a vital connection between the two constructs and that this link yieldsimportant implications for future willingness-to-pay.     

On Education and Democratic Preferences

We make the point that preferences for democracy are positively correlated with level of education. This correlation is robust even after controlling for a range of personal characteristics, including country of residence, income, age, or using different definitions of preferences for democracy or using instrumental variables. Interestingly, the results hold across countries with different level of democracy. We use data from World Values Surveys and show that our results are consistent with a simple theoretical model in which education makes political accountability easier.     

Nonhomothetic Preferences and International Trade

This study examines whether nonhomothetic preferences underlie the “missing trade” problem associated with factor content of trade models. We first find that per capita income goes a long way in explaining differences in goods consumption across countries. We then find a striking correlation between the factor content of consumption and per capita income, and show that accounting for this is a key part of resolving the case of the missing trade. However, nonhomothetic preferences over broad categories of expenditure play only a small role in this phenomenon. Rather, we find that as income grows, spending is directed towards the relatively capital‐intensive version of a given good. Since recent research shows that capital intensity is correlated with quality ( Schott, 2004 ), our results suggest that within‐product quality differences are likely important for explaining the factor content of trade, whereas nonhomothetic preferences over broad categories of expenditure are much less so.     

Public Policy with Endogenous Preferences

Public policy may influence norms and preferences. By altering the payoffs associated with different preferences, public policy may influence the distribution of these preferences in the population. Such interdependence between policy and preferences may limit (or enhance) the effectiveness of different policies. We demonstrate this idea with a simple model of subsidizing contributions to a public good. While the short‐run effect of such a subsidy will be an increase in the overall contribution, the subsidy triggers an endogenous preference change that results in a lower level of contribution to the public good, despite the explicit monetary incentives to raise that level.     

Mean-Variance Preferences and Investor Behaviour

We study the comparative statics implications of mean-variance preferences for optimal portfolios. Specifically, we show that all risk-averse mean-variance investors raise their investment in a risky asset in response to a change in that asset's return distribution if and only if the change lowers both the mean and standard deviation of the return by the same percentage. Besides being of interest in its own right, our results allow us to compare some comparative statics implications and the expected utility and mean-variance models systematically.     

Moral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences

The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal–agent relationships with theories of other-regarding preferences, in particular inequity aversion theory. The principal is in general worse off, as the agent cares more about the wellbeing of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's wellbeing, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations.     

Sustainability with Uncertain Future Preferences

A feature of the sustainability problem is that the preferences of future generations are uncertain. In this paper, we put forward a fairness-based definition of sustainability that takes this uncertainty into account. We analyze the implications of this definition in the context of a model of project evaluation. We show that our definition encompasses the concepts of non-declining welfare and of weak and strong sustainability. Furthermore, we show that preference uncertainty has a substantial influence on the implications of sustainability. We are indebted to two anonymous referees whose comments helped considerably to improve the paper. All remaining errors are ours.     

Endogenous Future Preferences and Conservation

A dynamic optimization model is developed in whichuncertainty about future preferences is endogenous,namely depending on the state of the environment atthe time the change in preferences occurs.Endogeneizing preferences not only provides economicintuition to previous results but also implies thatoptimal policies are less conservative.     

Game Theory via Revealed Preferences

We investigate equilibrium notions in game theory from the revealed preference approach. For extensive game forms with complete information, we derive a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for the observed outcomes to be rationalized by subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92.     

Egalitarian division under Leontief Preferences

We consider the problem of fairly dividing $l$ divisible goods among $n$ agents with the generalized Leontief preferences. We propose and characterize the class of generalized egalitarian rules which satisfy efficiency, group strategy-proofness, anonymity, resource monotonicity, population monotonicity, envy-freeness and consistency. On the Leontief domain, our rules generalize the egalitarian-equivalent rules with reference bundles. We also extend our rules to agent-specific and endowment-specific egalitarian rules. The former is a larger class of rules satisfying all the previous properties except anonymity and envy-freeness. The latter is a class of efficient, group strategy-proof, anonymous and individually rational rules when the resources are assumed to be privately owned.     

The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences

This paper develops a general methodology for characterizing the dynamic evolution of preferences in a wide class of strategic interactions. We give simple conditions characterizing the limiting distribution of preferences in general games, and apply our results to study the evolutionary emergence of overconfidence and interdependent preferences. We also show that this methodology can be adapted to cases where preferences are only imperfectly observed. Earlier drafts of this paper were circulated under the title: “The Evolution of Perception Biases” and some of these results appeared in the earlier working paper Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2003). We thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Shannon thanks the NSF for research support under grant SES-0351346.     

Transparency of Central Bank Preferences

Abstract. In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important.     

Task Routineness and Trade Policy Preferences

Understanding the formation of individual trade policy preferences is a fundamental input into the modeling of trade policy outcomes. Surprisingly, past studies have found mixed evidence that various labor market and industry attributes of workers affect their trade policy preferences, even though recent studies have found that trade policy can have substantial impacts on workers' incomes. This paper provides the first analysis of the extent to which task routineness affects trade policy preferences using survey data from the American National Election Studies. We find significant evidence that greater task routineness leads workers to be much more supportive of import restrictions, consistent with recent evidence on how trade openness puts downward pressure on employment and wages for workers whose occupations involve routine tasks. In fact, other than education levels, task routineness is the only labor market attribute that displays a robust correlation with individuals' stated trade policy preferences. We also provide evidence that there are some interactions between the economic and non‐economic factors in our study. For example, women's trade policy views are much more invariant to their labor market attributes than men, suggesting that women's views on this issue are driven more by personal and ideological beliefs than men.     

Marriage Matching and Intercorrelation of Preferences

Men's and women's preferences are intercorrelated to the extent that men rank highly those women who rank them highly. Intercorrelation plays an important but overlooked role in determining outcomes of matching mechanisms. We employ simulation techniques to quantify the effects of intercorrelated preferences on men's and women's aggregate satisfaction with the outcome of the Gale–Shapley matching mechanism. Our results show that even a small amount of positive intercorrelation in a matching market means increased satisfaction for women and dramatically decreased potential for strategic manipulation. Negative intercorrelation has the opposite effects. Thus, matching markets characterized by positive intercorrelation are well suited for matching via Gale–Shapley, while markets characterized by negative intercorrelation may face opposition from the nonproposing side of the market. So that our results are immediately applicable, we also define and employ a general measure of intercorrelation that can be used for any matching market.     

Social Preferences and Price Cap Regulation

This paper analyzes the allocative properties of price cap regulation under very general hypotheses on the nature of society's preferences. We propose a generalized price cap that ensures the convergence to optimal (second best) prices in the long-run equilibrium for virtually any form of the welfare function. Hence, the result of the convergence to Ramsey prices of Laspeyres-type price cap regulation is a particular instance of our more general result. We also provide an explicit and relatively easy to calculate and implement generalized price cap formula for distributionally weighted utilitarian welfare functions, as suggested by Feldstein (1972a).     

Households' Preferences and Exchange Rate Overshooting

Abstract

This paper uses a ‘New-Open-Economy Macroeconomic’ model to study the effect of a shock to Households' preferences on exchange rate dynamics. The special features of the model are that Households' preferences exhibit a ‘catching-up with the Joneses’ effect and that international financial markets are imperfectly integrated. Results of numerical simulations of the model demonstrate that these features imply that, in an otherwise standard ‘New-Open-Economy Macroeconomic’ model, a shock to Households' preferences can give rise to an overshooting of the exchange rate.     

Preferences for environmental quality under uncertainty

Although the expected effects of environmental policies and interventions are rarely known with certainty, stated preference surveys rarely elicit preferences over uncertain environmental outcomes. This article presents empirical results challenging the view that ignoring such uncertainty during preference elicitation is of no consequence so long as people only care about final environmental states. We show that measured preferences for final environmental states, water quality in this case, depend on whether people choose between final states or between lotteries over final states. In contrast to the typical finding for monetary lotteries, we find significant under-weighting of low probability events related to water quality.