Evolutionary Economics,Rational Expectations,and Monetary Policy

Wealth disparity is a critical factor in the perpetuation of blackwhite disparity in the United States. Intergenerational wealth transfers are the major determinant of household wealth formation. A program of reparations would acknowledge past and continued injustice, redress such injustices, and provide closure. Radical institutional analysis benefits this policy discussion in at least three areas: explaining the re-creation of discrimination; indicating the role of wealth disparity; and identifying the funding source for reparations. For centuries the economic surplus has enhanced white wealth relative to black wealth. A program of reparations suggests directing the surplus toward funding black-white equality.     

Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection

This paper develops an approach to equilibrium selection in game theory based on studying the learning process through which equilibrium is achieved. The differential equations derived from models of interactive learning typically have stationary states that are not isolated. Instead, Nash equilibria that specify different out-of-equilibrium behaviour appear in connected components of stationary states. The stability properties of these components can depend critically on the perturbations to which the system is subjected. We argue that it is then important to incorporate such drift into the model. A sufficient condition is provided for drift to create stationary states, with strong stability properties, near a component of equilibria. Applications to questions of forward and backward induction are developed.     

Evolutionary Learning in Signalling Games

We study equilibrium selection by evolutionary learning in monotone two-type signalling games. The learning process we study extends that introduced by Young (1993, Econometrica61, 57–84) to deal with incomplete information and sequential moves; it thus involves stochastic trembles. For vanishing trembles the process gives rise to strong selection among sequential equilibria: if the game has separating equilibria, then in the long run only play according to the so-called Riley equilibrium will be observed frequently. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.     

Robust Volatility Estimation with and Without the Drift Parameter

We find the closed form solution for the joint probability of the running maximum and the drawdown of the Brownian motion with a non-zero drift parameter at a random time that is exponentially distributed and independent of the Brownian motion. This characterization leads us to come up with a robust method of estimating volatility using open, high, low and closing prices. We rigorously show the independence of robust volatility estimators based on extreme values of asset prices relative to the standard robust volatility estimator based on closing price alone. We further prove that the proposed robust volatility ratio is unbiased with no drift parameter. Moreover, we find that the robust volatility ratio with a non-zero drift parameter has only a second order effect. We have shown that our proposed extreme value robust volatility estimator is 2–3 times relatively more efficient when compared to the classical robust volatility estimator based on Monte Carlo simulation experiment. On the empirical side, we test the proposed robust volatility ratio based on high and low prices on different asset classes like stock indices, exchange rate and precious metals.

     

Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication

This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72,D82.     

Evolutionary Stability in Alternating-Offers Bargaining Games

This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (messes) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a mess causes agreement to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one period in order to achieve the other player's share of the surplus. Each player's share of the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game. As the probability of a break-down in negotiations becomes small (or discount factors become large), these bounds collapse on the subgame-perfect equilibrium.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers C70, C78.     

Evolutionary Economics and Cultural Hermeneutics: Veblen,Cultural Relativism,and Blind Drift

The aim of this paper is to quantify the importance of institutions in economic growth and to identify the factors that determine institutional quality. For this purpose, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations with an income equation and another one of institutional quality and use a broad sample of countries with very different levels of development. The analysis is also carried out for three sub-samples of different income levels. In addition, a test of the robustness of the results to econometric techniques is performed.     

Subgame Monotonicity in Extensive Form Evolutionary Games

A theory of subgame monotonicity is developed for finite extensive form games to model evolutionary processes that respect the subgame structure of the game. It is shown how these evolutionary processes can be decomposed into their evolution on smaller games and also recombined to simplify the analysis of the original game. When applied to the replicator dynamic, a generalization of the Wright manifold from population genetics is a natural consequence of monotonicity. Subgame monotonicity and the Wright manifold are also shown to arise naturally in imitation models based on the extensive form. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.     

International Environmental Agreements as Evolutionary Games

This paper applies evolutionary game theory to international environmental agreements (IEAs). Contrary to stage game models (Barrett in J Theor Politics 11:519–541, 1999, Eur Econ Rev 45:1835–1850, 2001), in an evolutionary equilibrium (EE) no signatory prefers to be outside the IEA and the EE is robust to trembles. With two populations, there is a unique interior EE when there is decreasing returns to abatement and small asymmetry in the externality differences across populations. At the interior EE, transfers from the poor to the rich can increase payoffs for all nations, but come at the expense of greater payoff inequality. Transfers can also eliminate the basin of attraction for the payoff inferior EE with decreasing returns to abatement and large asymmetry. Thus IEAs, such as the Kyoto Treaty, predicated on the polluter-pays and ability-to-pay principles may result in Pareto inferior outcomes.     

Evolutionary Stability of Pure-Strategy Equilibria in Finite Games

Sufficient conditions for pure-strategy Nash equilibria of finite games to be (Lyapunov) stable under a large class of evolutionary dynamics, the regular monotonic selection dynamics, are discussed. In particular, it is shown that in almost all finite extensive-form games, all the pure-strategy equilibria are stable. In such games, all mixed-strategy equilibria close to pure-strategy equilibria are also stable.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C70, C72.     

Volatility,growth and cycles

The paper investigates the factors affecting the equilibrium level of output in a panel of European countries. Output depends on factor inputs and on the technology and the efficiency with which those factors are used. Efficiency may be driven by international conditions and institutional changes such as the Single Market Programme in Europe. The technology indicators used in this study depend upon research and development and also include the level of labour efficiency which is indexed on skills data. The level of the capital stock depends upon the user cost of capital, which may depend upon risk and hence on the volatility of the economy. Recent literature suggests that real exchange rate volatility is important in determining investment and therefore has an impact on equilibrium output. A link of this form is uncovered for the European economies. If policy can reduce these volatilities then it can also raise equilibrium output.

Financial Integration,Growth and Volatility

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the welfare gains from financial integration for developing and emerging market economies. To do so, we build a stochastic endogenous growth model for a small open economy that can: (i) borrow from the rest of the world; (ii) invest in foreign assets; and (iii) receive foreign direct investment. The model is calibrated on 46 emerging market and developing economies for which we evaluate the upper bound for the welfare gain from financial integration. For plausible values of preference parameters and actual levels of financial integration, the mean welfare gain from financial integration is around 13.5% of initial wealth. Compared with financial autarky, actual levels of financial integration translate into higher annual growth rates.     

Expectations,substitution, and scrapping in a putty-clay model

The paper presents a framework for analyzing the effect of changing expectations about future prices on a firm's choice of technique, and on its anticipated scrapping of capital equipment. Assuming a putty-clay technology, particular attention is paid to the way in which the scrapping age depends on the degree of ex ante input substitution. Numerical illustrations — based on data for Norwegian manufacturing for the years 1964–1983, an ex ante technology represented by a Generalized Leontief cost function in materials, energy, labor, and capital, and an ARMA representation of the price expectation mechanism — are presented. The results indicate that the price changes in this period may have had a substantial impact on planned scrapping, and on the chosen production techniques.     

An Example of Dynamic (In)Consistency in Symmetric Extensive Form Evolutionary Games

An example is developed to show that equilibrium selection via dynamic stability, when applied to the normal form of extensive form games, is inconsistent with the subgame structure. Alternative dynamic approaches are proposed and discussed to circumvent this inconsistency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72.     

Aid, Volatility, and Growth Again: When Aid Volatility Matters and When it Does Not

In previous papers the authors have argued that aid is likely to mitigate the negative effects of external shocks on economic growth (i.e. that aid is more effective in countries which are more vulnerable to external shocks). Recently an important debate has emerged about the possible negative effects of aid volatility itself. However, the cushioning effect of aid may involve some volatility in aid flows, which then is not necessarily negative for growth. In this paper the authors examine to what extent the time profile of aid disbursements may contribute to an increase or a decrease of aid effectiveness. They first show that aid, even if volatile, is not clearly as pro-cyclical as is often argued, and, even if pro-cyclical, is not necessarily destabilizing. They measure aid volatility by several methods and assess pro-cyclicality of aid with respect to exports, thus departing from previous literature, which usually assess pro-cyclicality of aid with respect to national income or fiscal receipts. The stabilizing/destabilizing nature of aid is measured by the difference in the volatility of exports and the volatility of the aid plus export flows. Then, in order to take into account the diversity of shocks to which aid can respond, they consider the effect of aid on income volatility and again find that aid is making growth more stable, while its volatility reduces this effect. They finally show through growth regressions that the higher effectiveness of aid in vulnerable countries is to a large extent due to its stabilizing effect.     

Experience Goods, Expectations and Pricing*

This paper studies a peculiar problem involved in the pricing of an 'experience good' whose value is not known to consumers until it is actually consumed It shows that the producer faces an expectational problem that does not arise in the framework of a 'search good'. Noticing a link between markets in earlier and later periods due to the expectational problem, the present paper analyzes equilibrium price patterns when a producer can precommit to a certain future price path and when he cannot It also discusses social welfare implications.     

服务业顾客要求、顾客期望与顾客满意

本文对顾客要求、顾客期望和顾客满意的概念进行了阐述,并在此基础上提出了顾客要求、顾客期望和顾客满意在三个不同层次上相应的内容。最后,结合服务业给出了组织运作管理的启示。     

Monetary Policy,Expectations and Commitment*

Commitment in monetary policy leads to equilibria that are superior to those from optimal discretionary policies. A number of interest‐rate reaction functions and instrument rules have been proposed to implement or approximate commitment policy. We assess these rules in terms of whether they lead to a rational expectations equilibrium that is both locally determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. A reaction function that appropriately depends explicitly on private sector expectations performs particularly well on both counts.     

Globalization, Financial Volatility and Monetary Policy

Recently it has often been claimed that globalization eases the job of central banks as it helps to tame inflation. This is used to argue that central banks (particularly the ECB, referring to the objectives as laid down in the EU Treaty) could or should reduce their efforts in the fight against inflation in favor of supporting the general economic policies of the governments. This paper takes a critical look at this argument, pointing to the structural changes associated with globalization and to the corresponding increase in uncertainty by which the central banks are affected. As an example of this, the increase in financial volatility is analyzed and explained as the result of optimal portfolio allocation, and its implications for monetary policy are discussed.