Negative externalities on property values resulting from water impairment: The case of the Pigeon River Watershed

The objective of this research was to determine whether willingness to bear the negative externality from water quality impairment differs between those who do and those who do not receive economic benefit from the impairment source. Differences were tested using a hedonic analysis of ambient water quality in two discrete housing markets in the Pigeon River Watershed, which have been polluted by the operation of a paper mill. The results suggest that North Carolina residents residing in subwatersheds with impaired portions of the Pigeon River, who experience economic benefit from the paper mill in addition to its harmful effects on water quality, do perceive the pollution as a negative externality. In contrast, the effects of both the degraded river and its contributing streams on property values are perceived as negative externalities by watershed residents in Tennessee who experience only harmful effects from the pollution. Differences in willingness to bear the water-impairment externality were not indicated by variables representing view of and proximity to impaired water bodies. The results suggest that the perception of water quality to which property owners implicitly apply value should be considered when establishing water-quality regulations.     

Can privatization be a catalyst for environmental R&D and result in a cleaner environment?

In this paper we explore whether privatization helps to catalyze a firm's environmental research and development (ER&D) and improve environmental quality. By defining ER&D as the effort undertaken by a firm to reduce its pollution per unit of output, we find in a duopoly framework that privatization cannot catalyze both public and private firms’ ER&D efforts simultaneously; it can increase one but decrease the other firm's investment, or it may even lower both firms’ ER&D investments. Moreover, when production causes severe environmental damage, or the imposition of environmental taxes poorly internalize the pollution externality, privatization may result in a poorer environment. For the sake of having a cleaner environment, policy-makers can impose higher environmental taxes on a highly polluting industry when it is being privatized.     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.     

Tax Competition in Vertically Differentiated Markets with Environmentally Conscious Consumers

This paper analyses the effects of tax competition on environmental product quality, pollution and welfare in a two-country, vertically differentiated, international duopoly, in which consumers are environmentally conscious. The firm in each country chooses first the environmental quality of its product (which reflects the emissions generated in the production process) and then the price. In equilibrium one country will be more polluted than the other because firms choose different levels of environmental quality of their products. We find that a country’s optimal commodity tax is higher if the domestic firm is the more polluting supplier. Furthermore, non-cooperative commodity tax rates are inefficiently high in equilibrium. This is because, in this framework with environmentally aware consumers, commodity taxes affect the choice of firms regarding their emissions. Therefore, a domestic tax reduction not only raises the profits of the foreign firm but also lowers its emission levels, resulting in higher welfare for the other country. We also analyse the optimal cooperative and non-cooperative commodity and emission taxes with border tax adjustments. With these two policy instruments available, commodity taxes are higher.     

Longevity and environmental quality in an OLG model

Whereas existing OLG models with endogenous longevity neglect the impact of environmental quality on mortality, this paper studies the design of the optimal public policy in a two-period OLG model where longevity is influenced positively by health expenditures, but negatively by pollution due to production. It is shown that if agents, when choosing how much to spend on health, do not internalize the impact of their decision on environmental quality (i.e. the space available for each person), the decentralization of the social optimum requires a tax not only on capital income (to internalize the pollution externality), but, also, on health spending (to internalize the congestion externality). We also examine the second-best policy under a limited set of taxation instruments, and explore its sensitivity to the pollution process and to individual preferences.     

Does trade stimulate product quality upgrading?

This paper investigates whether increased import competition leads firms to engage in incremental innovation reflected in product quality upgrading using Chilean manufacturing firm‐product data and measuring product quality with unit values (prices). We identify causal effects of import competition using an effective trade barrier measure – transport costs – as instruments for import penetration ratios across industries. Transport costs have a negative and significant effect on product quality. The evidence suggests that estimated unit value increases capture product quality upgrading, imports’ competition effects drive quality upgrading, and benefits depend on firms’ industrial specialization. Easier access to intermediate inputs also fosters quality upgrading.     

Bargaining externalities in a privatization programme

In privatization programmes, the state commonly keeps a minority ownership stake in firms. We provide an explanation based on the externality that privatization of one firm has on the profitability of others. If this externality is negative, as with oligopolistic firms, the government can gain a strategic advantage in bargaining over the sale of one firm if it keeps an ownership share in another. We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential sale of firms. The results apply to the period in which privatization takes place, and are consistent with the delayed sale of minority ownership often observed in practice.     

On Pollution Permit Banking and Market Power

We consider a pollution permit market with a large firm and fringe of competitive firms. To smooth compliance towards a long-run emissions goal, firms are initially allocated a stock (i.e., bank) of permits that can be gradually consumed. We first show how the large firm can credibly manipulate the spot market in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Motivated by features observed in the US market for sulfur dioxide emissions, we then show that the introduction of stock transactions has no effects on market power, but that forward trading and incomplete observability of stock holdings do have pro-competitive effects. Both authors are also Research Associates at the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research.     

A NOTE ON ENDOGENOUS TIMING WITH STRATEGIC DELEGATION: UNILATERAL EXTERNALITY CASE

We investigate the endogenous choice of roles by managerial firms in the presence of unilateral externality. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by owners. It is shown that: (i) the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would have achieved by specifying the timing in the delegation contract; and (ii) firms move simultaneously if the degree of unilateral externality is small, while sequentially if the degree of unilateral externality is large, with the firm generating unilateral externality as a follower; the owner of the follower firm delegates to restrict output, while his/her counterpart does not delegate it.     

On the Use of Competition Policy to Enhance the Effectiveness of Industrial Policy

Motivated by the observation that many countries with an active industrial policy also have a lax competition policy, this paper argues that restricting firm numbers may be a means of rendering industrial policy more effective. A simple model is set up in which a subsidy is desirable to correct a general externality but may induce over-entry. Restricting the number of firms then renders the subsidy policy more effective in correcting the externality problem.     

Strategic manipulation of a pollution permit market and international trade

We consider a framework where firms which compete in an international product market are not all submitted to a pollution permit market. Using the Brander and Spencer’s framework (J Int Econ 18:83–100, 1985), we seek to determine the optimal strategies of both a dominant firm in the pollution permit market and the regulator in a such context. We first show that the dominant firm pursues a strategic manipulation to increase its profit. We also find that the regulator uses a sophisticated strategic policy to increase the domestic welfare by using two instruments: the initial allocation of pollution permits and the pollution cap.     

Pollution,public disclosure,and firm behavior

This paper looks at whether a government regulator should publicly announce the amounts of pollution emitted by individual firms and plants. Disclosure may be important if there is incomplete information about firm costs, since pollution levels may be used by the regulated firm as a signal of costs to rival firms. We compare the signaling games under public disclosure and no disclosure. Welfare is likely reduced by disclosure, but if the regulator can adjust the stringency of the relevant pollution regulations, then the loss in welfare can be smaller. The implications of these results for pollution permits markets are discussed.     

我国流域生态补偿标准实践:模式与评价

"十一五"期间,我国流域生态补偿实践探索加快。据统计,有15个省份开展了类型多样的流域生态补偿实践探索。补偿标准设计是流域生态补偿政策制定的核心。将我国流域生态补偿标准实践归结为三种模式:基于流域跨界监测断面水质目标考核的生态补偿标准模式,基于流域跨界监测断面超标污染物通量计量的生态补偿标准模式;基于提供生态环境服务效益的投入成本测算的生态补偿标准模式,并细致分析了三种不同模式的特征。在此基础上,对我国流域生态补偿标准实践总体状况进行了系统解析和评估,并提出了为将来推进我国流域生态补偿标准实践开展深入探索的政策建议。     

Measuring and Explaining Innovative Capability: Evidence from Southeast Asia

What causes firm‐level product innovation in developing economies? This paper answers this question by emphasizing the role of process improvements that are influential in product innovation. We construct a firm‐level innovative capability score using novel, broad‐based, but detailed data on various process improvement practices obtained from firms in Southeast Asia. We then investigate the factors that may affect innovative capability. We also estimate the effect of the innovative capability score on product innovation controlling for research and development intensity and other firm characteristics. Our empirical investigation identifies a chief executive officer (CEO)'s past experience at a foreign or large firm, and buyer pressure to adopt international standards as key determinants of innovative capability. Novel and unique findings from our examination include: (i) the impact of a CEO's past experience at a foreign or large firm on the innovative capability is larger for local enterprises and small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises; (ii) the impact of share of foreign workers in the upper managerial levels only appears to be significant in foreign firms and larger firms; and (iii) buyer pressure is a more likely contributor to innovative capability compared with capital tie‐ups with multinational enterprises or joint venture buyers that capture vertical technology transfers. Finally, our empirical results show that a firm in Southeast Asia is more likely to achieve product innovation if the firm has had a higher innovative capability.     

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.     

Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?

A three-stage game of production technology, signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco-labeling, in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. The production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non-observable by consumers. The only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it. However, a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost. By assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality, we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level. Finally and importantly, under restrictive conditions on labeling cost, ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy. However, ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point.      

Price and quantity regulation in general equilibrium

We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity shock by increasing input use. Thus price regulation generates higher average, but more variable, production. Therefore, we show that in general equilibrium the relative advantage of quantity versus price regulation depends not only on the slopes of marginal benefits and costs, but on general equilibrium effects such as risk aversion. The general equilibrium effects are often more important than the slopes of the marginal benefits and cost curves. In the simplest model, a reasonable risk aversion coefficient implies quantity regulation generates higher welfare regardless of the benefit function.     

Directors network centrality and earnings quality

This study examines whether firms with network central boards of directors behave differently from other firms in terms of financial reporting quality. We find that earnings quality among firms is low when board networks are channels of incorrect information transmission (including earnings management information) and for firms whose directors are awarded equity-based compensation have connections through boardroom networks, but earnings quality is better for firms with good performance in spite of their networks. These results are robust to controlling for firm information environment, growth, size, age, leverage, performance, volatility in firm operations, and corporate governance.     

EFFICIENCY OF WAGE BARGAINING WITH ON-THE-JOB SEARCH

This article studies efficiency in a general class of search models where both unemployed and employed workers search for better jobs and can meet multiple firms simultaneously. Employers can respond to outside offers and wages are a weighted average of the productivities of the current employer and a credible poaching firm. I derive a condition that balances firms' bargaining power and their meeting externality. This condition ensures efficiency of both worker turnover and firm entry. Finally, the efficiency condition unifies and extends many of the results on the efficiency of equilibrium search models.