Domestic Banks As Lightning Rods? Home Bias and Information during the Eurozone Crisis

European banks have been criticized for holding excessive domestic government debt during the recent Eurozone crisis, which may have intensified the diabolic loop between sovereign and bank credit risks. By using a novel bank-level data set covering the entire timeline of the Eurozone crisis, I first reconfirm that the crisis led to the reallocation of sovereign debt from foreign to domestic banks. In contrast to the recent literature focusing only on sovereign debt, I show that the banks' private-sector exposures were (at least) equally affected by the rise in home bias. Consistent with this pattern, I propose a new debt reallocation channel based on informational frictions and show that the informationally closer foreign banks increase their relative exposures when the sovereign risk rises. The effect of informational closeness is economically meaningful and robust to the use of different information measures and controls for alternative channels of sovereign debt reallocation.     

Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view

We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Bank use of sovereign CDS in the Eurozone crisis: Hedging and risk incentives

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.     

Sovereign collateral as a Trojan Horse: Why do we need an LCR+

Sovereign bonds are widely used as collateral in banks’ funding and trading operations. If a sovereign becomes distressed, the collateral mechanism impairs and banks are suddenly facing significant liquidity calls. Basel III's Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) protects banks against unexpected liquidity calls, but currently excludes sovereign distress. Thus, all banks fulfilling the LCR are still exposed to a liquidity risk stemming from distressed sovereign debt and materializing through the collateral channel. Our paper shows that this unaddressed risk can translate into a system-wide liquidity shock. To gauge the potential damage caused by such a shock, we develop a model based on banks’ home sovereign exposures and a bundle of simplifying assumptions in which sovereign distress triggers bank distress. Our model describes how deteriorating sovereign collateral can lead to an overall liquidity squeeze and non-compliance with Basel III liquidity standards. As this risk is too material to be neglected, we propose an alternative version of the LCR, LCR+, which includes the liquidity impact of sovereign distress.     

Collateral Framework: Liquidity Premia and Multiple Equilibria

Central banks normally accept debt of their own governments as collateral in liquidity operations without reservations. This gives rise to a valuable liquidity premium that reduces the cost of government finance. The ECB is an interesting exception in this respect. It relies on external assessments of the creditworthiness of its member states, such as credit ratings, to determine eligibility and the haircut it imposes on such debt. We show how such features in a central bank's collateral framework can give rise to cliff effects and multiple equilibria in bond yields and increase the vulnerability of governments to external shocks. This policy can potentially induce sovereign debt crises and defaults that would not otherwise occur. The success of the ECB's temporary suspension of these features of its collateral framework during the pandemic illustrates the practical relevance of this mechanism.     

A comprehensive approach to measuring the relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt

Using an integrated model to control for simultaneity, as well as new risk measurement techniques such as Adapted Exposure CoVaR and Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), we show that the aggregate systemic risk exposure of financial institutions is positively related to sovereign debt yields in European countries in an episodic manner, varying positively with the intensity of the financial crisis facing a particular nation. We find evidence of a simultaneous relation between systemic risk exposure and sovereign debt yields. This suggests that models of sovereign debt yields should also include the systemic risk of a country's financial system in order to avoid potentially important mis-specification errors. We find evidence that systemic risk of a country's financial institutions and the risk of sovereign governments are inter-related and shocks to these domestic linkages are stronger and longer lasting than international risk spillovers. Thus, the channel in which domestic sovereign debt yields can be affected by another nation's sovereign debt is mostly an indirect one in that shocks to a foreign country's government finances are transmitted to that country's financial system which, in turn, can spill over to the domestic financial system and, ultimately, have a destabilizing effect on the domestic sovereign debt market.     

A Pyrrhic Victory? Bank Bailouts and Sovereign Credit Risk

We model a loop between sovereign and bank credit risk. A distressed financial sector induces government bailouts, whose cost increases sovereign credit risk. Increased sovereign credit risk in turn weakens the financial sector by eroding the value of its government guarantees and bond holdings. Using credit default swap (CDS) rates on European sovereigns and banks, we show that bailouts triggered the rise of sovereign credit risk in 2008. We document that post‐bailout changes in sovereign CDS explain changes in bank CDS even after controlling for aggregate and bank‐level determinants of credit spreads, confirming the sovereign‐bank loop.     

Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

欧洲主权债务危机演进及对中资银行的启示

受全球金融危机的持续影响和欧元区制度问题的激化,欧洲主权债务危机呈愈演愈烈之势,逐步从边缘国家扩散至核心国家,并从主权债务危机向银行业危机演化。目前,欧元区重债国采取的财务整顿政策难以在短期发挥缩减赤字的作用,反而加大复苏风险;对重债国援助资金总量有限,其发放门槛徒增短期违约风险;欧洲央行购买国债虽有利于缓解危机恶化,但量化宽松的政策与其控制通胀的设立宗旨存在矛盾。在此背景下,中资银行应调整涉欧资产配置,进一步加强国别风险研究和管理,积极稳健地推进国际化经营,打造资产、业务和经营地域多元化的国际化银行。     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

Sovereign tail risk

We provide a new measure of sovereign country risk exposure (SCRE) to global sovereign tail risk based on information incorporated in 5-year sovereign CDS spreads. Our panel regressions with quarterly data from 53 countries show that macro risks have strong explanatory power for SCRE. Results show that SCRE increases for countries with less fiscal space, higher interest rates, and financial stability concerns. Exposure sensitivity to public sector leverage is shown to increase non-linearly with public debt and to decrease with central banks’ sovereign debt programs. Our results imply that good forward-looking macro-finance fundamentals, such as high expected GDP growth and low credit-to-GDP ratios protect countries against sovereign risk especially in times of global distress.     

Modelling correlation dynamics of EMU sovereign debt markets during the recent turmoil

The purpose of the present study is to explicitly model the correlation dynamics of Eurozone sovereign debt markets. Our analysis runs from 2000 through 2014. Time varying correlations are derived from a dynamic conditional correlation GARCH model (t-cDCC model). We document substantial variability in correlations that is time and region-dependent. Evidence suggests that the Lehman collapse coupled with the German banks’ bailout programme and the events that followed have undermined sovereign debt integration. Moreover, sensitivity analysis provides useful insights that global and regional risk factors play pivotal role in explaining correlation structure both before and after the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. We believe that our results entail important implications for market authorities, international fixed income portfolio diversification and asset allocation.     

The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises

European banks became a source of risk to global financial markets during the financial crisis and attention to the European banking sector increased during the sovereign debt crisis. To measure the systemic risk of European banks, we calculate a distress insurance premium (DIP), which integrates the characteristics of bank size, probability of default, and correlation. Based on this measure, the systemic risk of European banks reached its height in late 2011 around €500 billion. We find that this was largely due to sovereign default risk. The DIP methodology is also used to measure the systemic contribution of individual banks. This approach identifies the large systemically important European banks, but Italian and Spanish banks as a group notably increased in systemic importance during the sample period. Bank-specific fundamentals like capital-asset ratios predict the one-year-ahead systemic risk contributions.     

Does the European Financial Stability Facility Bail Out Sovereigns or Banks? An Event Study

On May 9, 2010 euro zone countries announced the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility. This paper investigates the impact of this announcement on bank share prices, bank credit default swap (CDS) spreads, and sovereign CDS spreads. The main private beneficiaries were bank creditors. Furthermore, countries with banking systems heavily exposed to southern Europe and Ireland benefited, as evidenced by lower sovereign CDS spreads. The combined gains of bank debt holders and shareholders exceed the increase in the value of their banks’ sovereign debt exposures, suggesting that banks saw their contingent claim on the financial safety net increase in value.     

主权债务风险跨国溢出研究——来自频域的新证据

本文从国家间主权债务风险溢出的持续期角度出发,采用基于广义方差分解谱表示的BK溢出指数方法,首次从频域视角对短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应进行研究。研究发现:第一,短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应均较为显著,并且时域下的总溢出主要由短期的风险溢出主导。第二,14个国家的短期和长期风险输出水平呈线性关系,但对于风险输入,不同类型国家出现分化并形成两个聚类,新兴市场国家的短期风险输入水平远高于长期,其具有较强的“短期脆弱性”。第三,风险输出国的自身风险越大,对他国的长期溢出水平越高,风险输入国的自身风险越大,接收他国的短期溢出水平越高,并且两两国家间的进出口规模、金融市场一体化水平和经济周期协同性与其长期风险溢出水平呈正相关关系,而与其短期风险溢出水平的关系并不显著。第四,短期和长期的主权债务风险溢出网络都呈现明显的区域聚集特征,并且各国在短期溢出网络中主要与同区域以及经济金融环境相似的国家连接,在长期溢出网络中则通过经贸关系将连接范围扩大至不同区域甚至经济金融环境差异较大的国家。     

Mandatory Disclosure,Voluntary Disclosure,and Stock Market Liquidity: Evidence from the EU Bank Stress Tests

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks’ sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one‐time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following periods and, through the shift in the voluntary disclosure equilibrium, increases the liquidity of banks’ shares. First, we find that the timing and content of different mandatory disclosure events helps explain the levels of stress‐test banks’ voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk. Second, although the bid‐ask spreads of stress test participants generally increased after the mandatory stress test in 2011, our results suggest that the decrease in market liquidity is entirely attributable to those stress‐test participants that did not commit to voluntarily maintaining the disclosures of sovereign risk exposure.     

主权债务风险跨国溢出研究——来自频域的新证据

本文从国家间主权债务风险溢出的持续期角度出发,采用基于广义方差分解谱表示的BK溢出指数方法,首次从频域视角对短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应进行研究。研究发现:第一,短期和长期下的主权债务风险跨国溢出效应均较为显著,并且时域下的总溢出主要由短期的风险溢出主导。第二,14个国家的短期和长期风险输出水平呈线性关系,但对于风险输入,不同类型国家出现分化并形成两个聚类,新兴市场国家的短期风险输入水平远高于长期,其具有较强的“短期脆弱性”。第三,风险输出国的自身风险越大,对他国的长期溢出水平越高,风险输入国的自身风险越大,接收他国的短期溢出水平越高,并且两两国家间的进出口规模、金融市场一体化水平和经济周期协同性与其长期风险溢出水平呈正相关关系,而与其短期风险溢出水平的关系并不显著。第四,短期和长期的主权债务风险溢出网络都呈现明显的区域聚集特征,并且各国在短期溢出网络中主要与同区域以及经济金融环境相似的国家连接,在长期溢出网络中则通过经贸关系将连接范围扩大至不同区域甚至经济金融环境差异较大的国家。     

Bank/sovereign risk spillovers in the European debt crisis

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.