New Measures for Inflation Uncertainty and Disagreement from Treasury Auctions: Alternative to Surveys

In this article, we propose a novel methodology to construct new uncertainty and disagreement measures for the long-term inflation rate with the use of micro data of Treasury auctions. We employ individual bids submitted in Treasury auctions for nominal and inflation indexed bonds. We argue that these newly formed indicators do not have the problems associated with the survey and market-based uncertainty and disagreement measures. We also focus on the interactions of our proposed measures for inflation rate by comparing the measures commonly used in the literature. The findings of this article are believed to enhance the effectiveness of policy-making by introducing new proxies for crucial economic variables and also by providing the opportunity for other emerging economies with inadequate surveys to construct historical uncertainty and disagreement measures for inflation rates.     

Property and Inflation: The Hedging Characteristics of U.K. Commercial Property, 1967–1994

This paper examines the statistical similarities between U.K. commercial property capital and rental values and the price level. Our aim is to determine whether commercial property is an inflation hedge and, if so, what type of inflation it hedges against. To answer these questions, we use both a multivariate unobserved components model and structural vector autoregressions. We find that commercial property is an inflation hedge but only a weak one. More specifically, we find that property offers some form of partial hedge against changes in the underlying inflation rate but not to either temporary or permanent changes to the price level. We also find that capital values offer a stronger hedge than rental values and that industrial and retail property account for most of this hedging capacity. We find no evidence that property responds differently to high or low inflation but we do find capital and rental values respond more to unexpected inflation than anticipated price changes.     

The Impact of Inflation Measures on the Real Returns and Risk of U.S. Stocks

Using different inflation measures produces economically significant differences in both the inflation record and inflation‐adjusted stock returns. We introduce a more consistent measure of the monthly Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate to better measure real returns over 1913–2004, for which the official CPI exists. We also extend the series backward to 1871 on a monthly basis, an important addition to the data series. We analyze the impact of inflation on the real standard deviation of stock returns and find that, in contrast to the results for geometric mean returns, inflation adjustments have little impact on estimates of return variability.     

Measuring Inflation Expectations Uncertainty Using High‐Frequency Data

Inflation expectations play a key role in determining future economic outcomes. The associated uncertainty provides a direct gauge of how well‐anchored the inflation expectations are. We construct a model‐based measure of inflation expectations uncertainty by augmenting a standard unobserved components model of inflation with information from noisy and possibly biased measures of inflation expectations obtained from financial markets. This new model‐based measure of inflation expectations uncertainty is more accurately estimated and can provide valuable information for policymakers. Using U.S. data, we find significant changes in inflation expectations uncertainty during the Great Recession.     

Inflation illusion and the dividend yield: evidence from the UK

We report evidence that the UK dividend yield and expected inflation are positively correlated from 1962 to 1997, but negatively correlated subsequently. Using a commonly used VAR (vector auto-regression)-based procedure we find strong evidence that the positive correlation is caused both by inflation illusion and the effect of inflation on required rates of return. We also find some evidence that it is caused by inflation rationally reducing expected real dividend growth. We find that Chen and Zhao's (2009. “Return Decomposition.” Review of Financial Studies 22 (12): 5213–5249) criticism of the VAR-based procedure has little empirical relevance but that the procedure can be highly sensitive to the choice of data period.     

Inflation Expectations and Risk Premiums in an Arbitrage‐Free Model of Nominal and Real Bond Yields

Differences between yields on comparable‐maturity U.S. Treasury nominal and real debt, the so‐called breakeven inflation (BEI) rates, are widely used indicators of inflation expectations. However, better measures of inflation expectations could be obtained by subtracting inflation risk premiums (IRP) from the BEI rates. We provide such decompositions using an affine arbitrage‐free model of the term structure that captures the pricing of both nominal and real Treasury securities. Our empirical results suggest that long‐term inflation expectations have been well anchored over the past few years, and IRP, although volatile, have been close to zero on average.     

Inflation and monetary regimes

Correlations of inflation with the growth rate of money increase when data are averaged over longer time periods. Correlations of inflation with the growth of money also are higher when high inflation as well as low-inflation countries are included in the analysis. We show that serial correlation in the underlying inflation rate ties these two observations together and explains them. We present evidence that averaging increases the correlation of inflation and money growth in more when the underlying inflation rate has higher serial correlation.     

Inflationary Effects of Oil Prices in Turkey: A Regime-Switching Approach

This paper investigates the existence of oil pass-through to inflation for Turkey covering the period February 1996-May 2007. Oil price-augmented Phillips curves are estimated with linear and Markov regime-switching models. Markov regime-switching models reveal the asymmetric structure of oil pass-through and indicate the existence of two different regimes characterized as the high- and the low-inflation periods. We find evidence for asymmetric oil pass-through in the high-inflation regime for headline and food- and energy-excluded inflation measures. Our results suggest that Jarque-Bera core inflation is not affected by oil price variations under either inflationary environment. Hence, we suggest the Jarque-Bera indicator as an intermediate target in the analysis of the future trend of inflation.     

A Phillips Curve with Anchored Expectations and Short‐Term Unemployment

This paper examines the behavior of U.S. core inflation, as measured by the weighted median of industry price changes. We find that core inflation since 1985 is well‐explained by an expectations‐augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is measured with professional forecasts and labor‐market slack is captured by the short‐term unemployment rate. We also find that expected inflation was backward‐looking until the late 1990s, but then became strongly anchored at the Federal Reserve's target. This shift in expectations changed the relationship between inflation and unemployment from an accelerationist Phillips curve to a level‐level Phillips curve. Our specification explains why high unemployment during the Great Recession did not reduce inflation greatly: partly because inflation expectations were anchored, and partly because short‐term unemployment rose less sharply than total unemployment.     

A New Model of Inflation,Trend Inflation,and Long‐Run Inflation Expectations

This paper develops a bivariate model of inflation and a survey‐based long‐run forecast of inflation that allows for the estimation of the link between trend inflation and the long‐run forecast. Thus, our model allows for the possibilities that long‐run forecasts taken from surveys can be equated with trend inflation, that the two are completely unrelated, or anything in between. Using a variety of inflation measures and survey‐based forecasts for several countries, we find that long‐run forecasts can provide substantial help in refining estimates and fitting and forecasting inflation. It is less helpful to simply equate trend inflation with the long‐run forecasts.     

High-Frequency Changes in Shopping Behaviours,Promotions and the Measurement of Inflation: Evidence from the Great Lockdown*

We use real-time scanner data in Great Britain during the COVID-19 pandemic to investigate the drivers of the inflationary spike at the beginning of lockdown and to quantify the impact of high-frequency changes in shopping behaviours and promotions on inflation measurement. Although changes in product-level expenditure shares were unusually high during lockdown, we find that the induced bias in price indices that do not account for expenditure switching is not larger than in prior years. We also document substantial consumer switching towards online shopping and across retailers, but show this was not a key driver of the inflationary spike. In contrast, a reduction in price and quantity promotions was key to driving higher inflation, and lower use of promotions by low-income consumers explains why they experienced moderately lower inflation. Overall, changes in shopping behaviours played only a minor role in driving higher inflation during lockdown; higher prices were the main cause, in particular through a reduced frequency of promotions.     

Inflation Targeting Around the World

This paper examines the inflation record of twenty-nine inflation- and noninflation-targeting economies. Both industrial and emerging market economies are considered. Empirical evidence is based on a comparison of actual and forecasted inflation, an econometric analysis that estimates changes in inflation persistence, and an estimate of the probability of a breach in the inflation target as a proxy for the fragility of the targeting regime. I find that inflation persistence has fallen in only a handful of emerging market economies. However, the inflationtargeting regime is not especially fragile in emerging market economies. As these economies gain experience with inflation targets and respond appropriately to forecast errors generated by the private sector, the likelihood of breaches in the target ranges tends to fall.     

Out of Bounds: Do SPF Respondents Have Anchored Inflation Expectations?

Since the Federal Open Market Committee announced a 2% inflation target in 2012, the median long-run inflation forecast of professional forecasters has been near target. We show, however, that most individual forecasters' long-run inflation expectations fluctuate substantially, with sizeable departures from target. We propose a new “bounds anchoring” indicator based on deviations of individuals' long-run forecasts from target. This indicator sheds new light on gradual changes in expectations since the 2012 announcement. We find that bounds anchoring gradually strengthened in the years following the target announcement, but that this trend has recently started to reverse.     

Preparing for higher inflation: Portfolio solutions using U.S. equities

Investors have always been interested in reducing inflation risk in their portfolios. However, investors face different types of inflation than those measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Moreover, different asset classes can be used to hedge portfolio inflation. In this paper, we show how individual equities can be used to construct equity portfolios sensitive to customized inflation targets. We illustrate portfolios for three types of inflation: US headline CPI, Forbes Cost of Living Extremely Well Index, and the US Medical Care Price Index. We also show how alternative weighting schemes, such as minimum volatility and maximum inflation beta, can be used to construct inflation‐hedged portfolios.     

Are REITs inflation hedges?

This study investigates the relationship between returns on Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and anticipated inflation. It was motivated by the contradictory findings in the literature concerning the inflation-hedging characteristics of financial and real assets. We employ the methodology developed by Fama and Schwert, which represents a generalization of the Fisher equation. Two different measures of anticipated inflation were used to estimate the regression equations. The results show that REITs generally tend to behave like equities with respect to their hedging characteristics, regardless of how inflation expectations are measured. When we used a survey measure of anticipated inflation, however, we found some evidence that REITs are partial hedges against anticipated inflation.     

News on Inflation and the Epidemiology of Inflation Expectations

This paper examines the nexus between news coverage on inflation and households’ inflation expectations. In doing so, we test the epidemiological foundations of the sticky information model (Carroll 2003, 2006 ). We use both aggregate and household‐level data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan. We highlight a fundamental disconnection among news on inflation, consumers’ frequency of expectation updating, and the accuracy of their expectations. Our evidence provides at best weak support to the epidemiological framework, as most of the consumers who update their expectations do not revise them toward professional forecasters’ mean forecast.     

Why Don’t Oil Shocks Cause Inflation? Evidence from Disaggregate Inflation Data

This paper uses disaggregate U.S. inflation data to evaluate explanations for the breakdown of the relationship between oil price shocks and consumer price inflation. A data set with measures of inflation, energy intensity, labor intensity, and sensitivity to monetary policy is constructed for 97 sectors that make up core CPI inflation. A comparison of the 1973–85 and 1986–2006 time periods reveals that substitution away from energy use in production and monetary policy were both important, with approximately two‐thirds of the change in response of inflation to oil shocks being due to reduced energy usage, and one‐third to monetary policy. We find no evidence that other factors, such as changes in wage rigidities or changes in the persistence of oil shocks, played a role.     

The Formation of Inflation Expectations: Microdata Evidence from Japan

We propose a novel approach for measuring inflation expectations, which can alleviate the rounding number problem. Furthermore, we examine how consumers form inflation expectations. We find that consumers heterogeneously update their information sets on prices; 46% of the consumers collect information about the consumer price index at least once a quarter, while the remaining consumers less frequently or never obtain this information. We also find that forecast revisions are sensitive to a change in food prices. More than half of consumers are attentive only to a change in food prices and may form their inflation expectations using food price changes as a signal of fluctuations in the overall inflation rates. The existence of consumers who are inattentive to aggregate inflation casts doubt on the transmission of monetary policy through the management of expectations.     

Asset Returns and Inflation in Response to Supply,Monetary, and Fiscal Disturbances

This paper identifies sources of asset returns (stock returns and interest rates) and inflation relations. We find that the relation between asset returns and inflation is driven by three types of disturbances to the economy. We interpret them as due to supply disturbances and two types of demand—monetary and fiscal—disturbances. In post-war U.S. data, supply and fiscal disturbances drive a negative stock return-inflation relation, whereas monetary disturbances generate a positive stock return-inflation relation. However, all three types of disturbances generate a negative interest rate-inflation relation. Depending on the interaction of the three types of shocks, we observe different correlations between asset returns and inflation in post- and pre-World War II U.S. data.     

Globalization and Changing Inflation Dynamics in China

This article investigates the changing impact of economic globalization on inflation in China over the post-reform era. We construct an inflation dynamics model with globalization factors from microeconomic foundations. Empirical results with quarterly data spanning from 1984 to 2012 show that in 1994 there was a significant structural change in the inflation dynamics model, after which China’s inflation responded more significantly to foreign economic slack while the slope of the inflation-domestic slack relation reduced substantively.