Book–to–Market Equity, Distress Risk, and Stock Returns

This paper examines the relationship between book–to–market equity, distress risk, and stock returns. Among firms with the highest distress risk as proxied by Ohlson's (1980) O–score, the difference in returns between high and low book–to–market securities is more than twice as large as that in other firms. This large return differential cannot be explained by the three–factor model or by differences in economic fundamentals. Consistent with mispricing arguments, firms with high distress risk exhibit the largest return reversals around earnings announcements, and the book–to–market effect is largest in small firms with low analyst coverage.     

R&D investments,capital expenditures,and earnings thresholds

Prior studies find that firms cut research and development (R&D) expense in response to earnings considerations. We extend this stream of research by documenting that firms narrowly achieving an earnings threshold also report unusually high capital expenditures. In addition, these firms’ total investments (R&D expense plus capital expenditures) do not vary in response to earnings thresholds, which suggests that, on average, reductions in R&D expense are offset by concurrent increases in capital expenditures. Lastly, our research design allows us to infer that the increased capital expenditures are largely R&D investments that are capitalized instead of non-R&D capital expenditures, suggesting that overall investments in R&D are relatively unchanged.     

Fixed‐ and Variable‐Rate Mortgages,Business Cycles,and Monetary Policy

This paper studies how the proportion of fixed‐ and variable‐rate mortgages affects business cycles and welfare. I develop and solve a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with a housing market and a group of constrained individuals who need housing collateral to obtain loans. The model predicts that with mostly variable‐rate mortgages, an exogenous interest rate shock has larger effects on borrowers than in a fixed‐rate economy. For plausible parameterizations, aggregate differences are muted by wealth effects on labor supply and by the presence of savers. For given monetary policy, a high proportion of fixed‐rate mortgages is welfare enhancing.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.     

Bank Competition: Measurement,Decision‐Making,and Risk‐Taking

This paper investigates whether greater competition increases or decreases individual bank and banking system risk. Using a new text‐based measure of competition, and an instrumental variables analysis that exploits exogenous variation in bank deregulation, we provide robust evidence that greater competition increases both individual bank risk and a bank's contribution to system‐wide risk. Specifically, we find that higher competition is associated with lower underwriting standards, less timely loan loss recognition, and a shift toward noninterest revenue. Further, we find that higher competition is associated with higher stand‐alone risk of individual banks, greater sensitivity of a bank's downside equity risk to system‐wide distress, and a greater contribution by individual banks to downside risk of the banking sector.     

Local Trends in Price‐to‐Dividend Ratios—Assessment,Predictive Value,and Determinants

Persistent variations of the log price‐to‐dividend ratio (PD) and their economic determinants have attracted a lively discussion in the literature. We suggest a gradually time‐varying state process to govern the persistence of the PD. The adopted state‐space approach offers favorable model diagnostics and finds particular support in out‐of‐sample stock return prediction. We show that this slowly evolving mean process is jointly shaped by the consumption risk, the demographic structure, and the proportion of firms with traditional dividend payout policy during the past 60 years. In particular, the volatility of consumption growth plays the dominant role.     

Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains

Although researchers have documented gains from insider trading, the sources of private information leading to information asymmetry and insider gains have not been comprehensively investigated. We focus on research and development (R&D)—an increasingly important yet poorly disclosed productive input—as a potential source of insider gains. Our findings, for the period from 1985 to 1997 indicate that insider gains in R&D-intensive firms are substantially larger than insider gains in firms without R&D. Insiders also take advantage of information on planned changes in R&D budgets. R&D is thus a major contributor to information asymmetry and insider gains, raising issues concerning management compensation, incentives, and disclosure policies.     

Providers’ affiliation,insurance and collusion

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the benefits for an insurance company to develop its own network of service providers when insurance fraud is characterized by collusion between policyholders and providers. In a static framework without collusion, exclusive affiliation of providers allows insurance companies to recover some market power and to lessen competition on the insurance market. This entails a decrease in the insured’s welfare. However, exclusive affiliation of providers may entail a positive effect on customers’ surplus when insurers and providers are engaged in a repeated relationship. In particular, while insurers must cooperate to retaliate against a fraudulent provider under non-exclusive affiliation, no cooperation is needed under exclusive affiliation. In that case, an insurer is indeed able to reduce the profit of a malevolent provider by moving to collusion-proof contracts when collusion is detected, and this threat may act as a deterrent for fraudulent activities. This possibility may supplement an inefficient judicial system: it is thus a second-best optimal anti-fraud policy.     

ESG preferences,risk and return

There are two primary factors that affect expected returns for companies with high ESG (environmental, social and governance) ratings—investor preferences and risk. Although investor preferences for highly rated ESG companies can lower the cost of capital, the flip side of the coin is lower expected returns for investors. Regarding risk, the jury remains out on whether there is an ESG-related risk factor. However, to the extent, ESG is a risk factor it also points towards lower expected returns for investments in highly rated companies. Though ESG investing may have social benefits, higher expected returns for investors are not among them.