On the time-consistency of optimal capital taxes

This paper studies the time-inconsistency problem of optimal capital taxes. In the absence of full-commitment, it is well known that debt restructuring cannot solve the time-inconsistency problem for economies with a private stock of capital. We re-examine this result by exploring the role of institutional delays in government policies. We show that, when the implementation of government policy requires time, debt restructuring can enforce commitment to the optimal capital taxes. We conclude that, since institutional delays characterize democratic decision making, the time-inconsistency problem of capital taxes is not so severe.     

Optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria

We study optimal fiscal policy in an economy where (i) search frictions create a coordination problem and generate multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria and (ii) the government finances the provision of a public good by taxing market activity. The government must choose the tax rate before it knows which equilibrium will obtain, and therefore an important part of the problem is determining how the policy will affect the equilibrium selection process. We show that when the equilibrium selection rule is based on the concept of risk dominance, higher tax rates make coordination on the Pareto-superior outcome less likely. As a result, taking equilibrium-selection effects into account leads to a lower optimal tax rate.     

On the optimal timing of capital taxes

For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge in production in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lower (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzes the implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path of future tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.     

Nonseparable Preferences, Fiscal Policy Puzzles, and Inferior Goods

Nonseparable preferences over consumption and leisure can generate an increase in private consumption in response to government spending, as found in the data, in a frictionless business cycle model. However, the conditions on preferences required for these result to obtain hold if and only if the consumption good is inferior. Similarly, positive co-movement of consumption and hours worked occurs if and only if either consumption or leisure is inferior.     

Fiscal policy and financial market movements

This paper estimates fiscal policy reaction function in order to investigate the links between financial market movements and fiscal policy outcomes. An increase in asset prices affects in a positive and significant manner primary balances, with the response reflecting both an increase in government revenues and a fall in government spending. The most important impact on fiscal balances is due to changes in residential property prices. Changes in equity and commercial property prices are also important determinants of fiscal balances. Our findings suggest that the steepening of the slope of the yield curve contributes to expenditure based fiscal discipline.     

Simple versus optimal rules as guides to policy

This paper compares the performance of different policy rules. Our comparisons focus on simple feedback rules versus rules which are optimal, given knowledge of the correct economic structure and the appropriate loss function for the policymaker. First, we compare rule performance when the correct model is not known. Second, we compare rule performance with respect to the frequency-specific behavior for variables of interest. Taken as a whole, our results indicate how the case for a model-specific optimal rule can break down when one relaxes the assumption that the true model is known as well as the assumption that the appropriate loss function is known. Links are made to the literature on monetary policy.     

Durables, nondurables, down payments and consumption excesses

We examine a model that generalizes the standard buffer-stock model of saving to accommodate durables, nondurables, down payment requirements, and adjustment costs in the durables market. We find that nondurable consumption becomes more volatile relative to income as down payments decrease at the individual and at the aggregate level. Moreover, for plausible parameter values, the model can explain the excess smoothness and excess sensitivity observed in U.S. aggregate data. The result follows from a gradual adjustment of consumption to permanent income shocks when agents attempt to spread out the burden of down payments over time, compounded by slow adjustment due to transaction costs.     

The Spirit of Capitalism, Precautionary Savings, and Consumption

Recent research has shown that the "spirit of capitalism"—a preference for wealth itself, in addition to consumption—has important implications for growth and asset pricing. This paper explores how the spirit of capitalism affects saving and consumption behavior. We demonstrate that the spirit of capitalism may reduce the importance of precautionary savings. It can also explain the excess sensitivity puzzle: the spirit of capitalism causes dramatic deviations from a random walk. It may also offer a partial explanation of the excess smoothness puzzle.     

Benefits from U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation in the Days of Samuelson and Solow and Lucas

A policy maker knows two models. One implies an exploitable inflation-unemployment trade-off, the other does not. The policy maker's prior probability over the two models is part of his state vector. Bayes' law converts the prior probability into a posterior probability and gives the policy maker an incentive to experiment. For models calibrated to U.S. data through the early 1960s, we compare the outcomes from two Bellman equations. The first tells the policy maker to "experiment and learn." The second tells him to "learn but don't experiment." In this way, we isolate a component of government policy that is due to experimentation and estimate the benefits from intentional experimentation. We interpret the Bellman equation that learns but does not intentionally experiment as an "anticipated utility" model and study how well its outcomes approximate those from the "experiment and learn" Bellman equation. The approximation is good. For our calibrations, the benefits from purposeful experimentation are small because random shocks are big enough to provide ample unintentional experimentation.     

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Customer Markets

We present a model in which some goods trade in “customer markets” and advertising facilitates long‐lived relationships. We estimate the model on U.S. data and find a large congestion externality in the pricing of customer market goods. This motivates the analysis of optimal policy. Under a complete set of taxes, fiscal policy eliminates the externalities with large adjustments in tax rates on customer markets goods, while labor tax volatility remains low. Constraining the instruments to the interest rate and labor tax, the optimal labor tax displays large and procyclical fluctuations, but monetary policy is little changed compared to a model with no customer markets.     

Corruption, inequality, and fairness

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.     

The scarring effect of recessions

According to the conventional view, recessions improve resource allocation by driving out less productive firms. This paper posits an additional scarring effect: recessions impede the developments of potentially superior firms by destroying them during their infancy. A model is developed to capture both the cleansing and the scarring effects. A key ingredient of the model is that idiosyncratic productivity is not directly observable, but can be learned over time. When calibrated with statistics on entry, exit and productivity differentials, the model suggests that the scarring effect dominates the cleansing effect, and gives rise to lower average productivity during recessions.     

The Role of Interbank Markets in Monetary Policy: A Model with Rationing

This paper analyzes the impact of asymmetric information in the interbank market and establishes its crucial role in the microfoundations of the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We show that interbank market imperfections induce an equilibrium with rationing in the credit market. This has two major implications: first, it reconciles the irresponsiveness of business investment to the user cost of capital with the large impact of monetary policy ( magnitude effect ), and second, it shows that banks' liquidity positions condition their reaction to monetary policy ( Kashyap and Stein liquidity effect ).     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

Unemployment insurance and capital accumulation

In this paper, I examine a model economy with production, search, and unemployment insurance. The introduction of capital into the economy of Wang and Williamson (J. Monetary Econom. 49(7)(2001)1337) generates the result that optimal replacement ratios are always zero. The result arises from the decline in aggregate activity caused by unemployment insurance: both capital and labor inputs to production fall when benefits rise. Unlike most of the literature, I compute explicitly the cost of the transition path; agents are made better off by switching to a steady state with no unemployment insurance, but the welfare gain is approximately cut in half. Only the very poor and unemployed suffer welfare losses along the transition path. I then briefly investigate the implications of negative replacement ratios.     

Asymmetric price adjustment in the small

Analyses of a large retail scanner price data set reveal a new and surprising regularity - small price increases occur more frequently than small price decreases for price changes of up to 10¢. That is, we find asymmetric price adjustment “in the small.” Furthermore, it turns out that inflation offers only a partial explanation for the finding. Indeed, substantial proportion of the asymmetry remains unexplained, even after accounting for the inflation. For example, the asymmetry holds also after excluding periods of inflation from the data, and even for products whose price had not increased. The findings hold for different aggregate and disaggregate measures of inflation and also after allowing for lagged price adjustments.     

Corruption in bank lending to firms: Cross-country micro evidence on the beneficial role of competition and information sharing

Building on the important study by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine [2006. Bank supervision and corruption in lending. Journal of Monetary Economics 53, 2131-2163], we examine the effects of both borrower and lender competition as well as information sharing via credit bureaus/registries on corruption in bank lending. Using the unique World Bank data set (WBES) covering more than 4,000 firms across 56 countries with information on credit bureaus/registries, assembled by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer [2007. Private credit in 129 countries. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299–329], and bank regulation data collected by Barth, Caprio, and Levine [2006. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, New York] to measure bank competition and information sharing, we find strong evidence that both banking competition and information sharing reduce lending corruption, and that information sharing also helps enhance the positive effect of competition in curtailing lending corruption. We also find that the ownership structure of firms and banks, legal environment, and firm competition all exert significant impacts on lending corruption.     

An investigation on the causal relationships between banking concentration and economic growth

This paper explores the causality between concentration in the banking industry and economic growth. Two empirical tests are performed for Italy over the period 1991-2001: the first one is a standard Granger-Sims causality test, the second one studies the direction of causality by taking into account the impact of changes in banks' internal and external factors on their own market shares. The results show that in the short-run economic growth is predominantly caused by banking consolidation, while in the long-run a reverse causation direction emerges, so that economic expansions tend to reduce market shares and thus favour a stronger competition in the industry.     

Why do people save in cash? Distrust,memories of banking crises,weak institutions and dollarization

The paper analyzes why households hold sizeable shares of their assets in cash at home rather than at banks – a phenomenon that is widespread in many economies but for which information is scarce. Using survey data from ten Central, Eastern and Southeastern European countries, I document the relevance of this behavior and show that cash preferences cannot be fully explained by whether people are banked or unbanked. The analysis reveals that a lack of trust in banks, memories of past banking crises and weak tax enforcement are important factors. Moreover, cash preferences are stronger in dollarized economies where a “safe” foreign currency serves as a store of value.     

A quantitative analysis of inflation as a tax on the underground economy

Inflation rates are more dispersed and are persistently higher in developing countries. This paper quantifies the importance of the public-finance motive for inflation in the presence of a tax-evading sector, the underground economy. The approach is motivated by the observation that the underground economy is especially large in poor countries. The analysis builds on a general equilibrium monetary model with two production sectors, where income in one of the sectors cannot be taxed. A benevolent government finances its budget using an optimal combination of the income tax rate and the inflation rate. The model is first calibrated to the U.S. economy and is then used for a cross-country simulation. The resulting relationships between the size of an underground economy, inflation rate, income tax rate and the share of seigniorage in the government revenue rationalize the cross-country data quantitatively well.