论经济学中的价值理论

价值理论在经济学中占有核心地位.本文简要回顾了经济思想史上价值理论的发展过程,梳理了几种主要价值理论——劳动价值论、生产要素价值论、边际效用价值论、均衡价格理论一之间的对立和传承关系,逐一分析了这几种价值理论的基本内容,重点关注每种理论的前提假设是否合理,逻辑推演过程是否正确,尽力避免意识形态角度的评断.主要结论是:马...     

Sentiments and Motivations in Adam Smith and Vernon Smith

Vernon Smith (VS) discovered Adam Smith (AS) late in his professional career, and has adopted ideas from The Theory of Moral Sentiments to explain findings in experimental economics. Most important is the theorized link between moral sentiments and the evolution of property rights and law as foundations for commerce. VS's encounter with AS, while not new, provides a compelling look at the modern laboratory of social science through the lens of the Enlightenment, and cannot easily be encapsulated within a utilitarian framework. This paper provides an overview and commentary on VS's approach.     

The modern foundations of Marx's monetary economics

The first chapters of Capital are still often ‘tlerated’, Mirowski (1986: 222) reminds us, as a ‘regrettable metaphysical residuum of [Max's] Hegelian [past]’. Such ‘tolerance’ has unfortunate consequences, howeve, not the least of which is Marx's reputation for ‘theoretical metallism’, simple and derivative. This paper builds on the recent efforts of de Brunhoff (1981), Lavoie (1983) and others to deconstruct, with support from Grundrisse and related texts, the important thrid chapter of Capital, Marx's account of the universal equivalent's four functions. As it is identified here, the chapter's core includes ‘pody-Keynesian’ elements– a reversal of the Ricardian view of the quantity equation, an effective demand principle in which capitalists’ dcisions about the recommitment of hoards assume a prominent role, and the deermination of interest rates, in the short term, on the basis of liquidity preference-– but does not include, in the conventional sense, a commodity theory of money.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

从价值论出发比较《资本论》与西方经济学

马克思的《资本论》与西方经济学,由于价值论上的本质区别,因而演绎出不同的理论体系。在论述工资、利润、地租及历史观时,二者既存在对象上的关联性,又得出了对立的结论。在我国社会主义市场经济改革进程中,一方面要坚持《资本论》的指导地位,不断丰富和发展马克思主义理论;另一方面又要借鉴和利用西方经济学中的合理成分,为改革实践拓宽道路。     

Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games

This article investigates the use of standard econometric models for quantal choice to study equilibria of extensive form games. Players make choices based on a quantal-choice model and assume other players do so as well. We define an agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE), which applies QRE to the agent normal form of an extensive form game and imposes a statistical version of sequential rationality. We also define a parametric specification, called logit-AQRE, in which quantal-choice probabilities are given by logit response functions. AQRE makes predictions that contradict the invariance principle in systematic ways. We show that these predictions match up with some experimental findings by Schotter et al. (1994) about the play of games that differ only with respect to inessential transformations of the extensive form. The logit-AQRE also implies a unique selection from the set of sequential equilibria in generic extensive form games. We examine data from signaling game experiments by Banks et al. (1994) and Brandts and Holt (1993). We find that the logit-AQRE selection applied to these games succeeds in predicting patterns of behavior observed in these experiments, even when our prediction conflicts with more standard equilibrium refinements, such as the intuitive criterion. We also reexamine data from the McKelvey and Palfrey (1992) centipede experiment and find that the AQRE model can account for behavior that had previously been explained in terms of altruistic behavior. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Towards a History of American Institutional Economics

This paper focuses on a number of issues that have arisen in my efforts to deal with the history of American institutional economics in the interwar period. The specific issues addressed here are (1) the choice of time frame; (2) the definition of institutionalism in terms of its commonly held ideas; (3) the treatment of the network of personal contacts that make up the institutional movement; (4) the treatment of certain institutional and cross-disciplinary connections and supports; and (5) the variety of reasons lying behind the relative decline in the position of institutional economics after World War II. Each of these issues is discussed in light of historical material and examples and with a view to detailing the specific challenges and possible solutions involved.     

Rethinking the Foundation of the Original Institutional Economics Policy and Reform Program: Reactions to Thomas C. Leonard’s “Illiberal Reformers”

John R. Commons, among other original institutional economists, argued for the interests of the common people against the power of vested interests in politics and business. Against this backdrop, a new book by Thomas C. Leonard contends that, in fact, these same economists were actually “illiberal” and only promoted the interests of certain groups, such as Anglo-Saxon men, and were against the progression of minority populations, women, or the disabled. But Leonard’s argument that these economists were “illiberal,” and that their entire reform program related to the role of government in the economy and the creation of the administrative state, is essentially defunct. As Leonard (2016 Leonard, Thomas C. Illiberal Reformers: Race, Eugenics and American Economics in the Progressive Era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. [Google Scholar], xiv) writes in the prologue, “expertise in the service of the administrative state, what progressives call social control, has survived the discredited notions once used to uphold it.” We respond to Leonard’s book by offering a direct critique of the arguments he makes. We argue that Leonard — at least partially — takes the founders’ view on these issues out of context, and that even where some of their views would be refused by today’s institutional economists, it does not mean that the entire reform project is rejected.