Dissertation Abstract: “Rationality, Minds, and Machines in the Laboratory: A Thematic History of Vernon Smith’s Experimental Economics”

This dissertation aims at elucidating the history of Vernon Smith’s experimental economics by focusing its attention upon the three themes of rationality, minds and machines that assumed significance at different (albeit overlapping) stages of the development of Smith’s experimental economics with the help of his published and unpublished papers.Chapter 1 is devoted to the scrutiny of the form of rationality incorporated into the portions of Smith’s laboratory experiments whose results have usually been taken as corroborations of his “Hayek Hypothesis.” By bringing into the foreground Smith’s definite position on demand theory and its concrete instantiations on many different occasions, we make the case that Smith has consistently imposed by means of the induced value theory certain narrowly defined preference structures that have definite implications for the form of rationality instantiated in the laboratory.     

Negative externalities and Sen’s liberalism theorem

Summary. Sen’s seminal, negative theorem about minimal liberalism has had a profound effect on economics, philosophy, and the social sciences. To address concerns raised by his result, we show how Sen’s assumptions must be modified to obtain positive conclusions; e.g., one resolution allows an agent to be decisive only if his choice does not impose “strong negative externalities” on others. We also uncover a significantly different interpretation of Sen’s societal cycles: rather than describing the rights of individuals to choose, the cycles identify when these choices impose difficulties on others. Other ways to address Sen’s difficulties come from game theory.Received: 14 October 2004, Revised: 7 March 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D71, C70, D62.Donald G. Saari: Correspondenc toThe research of D. Saari was supported by NSF grant DMI-0233798. Our thanks to P. Hammond for suggesting some useful references. Some of our joint results were reported in Brunel (now Petron) (1998).     

凯恩斯经济学方法的科学哲学评价

主流经济学在凯恩斯经济学形成之后,一直存在着争论,如何理解凯恩斯经济学理论的真谛,是当前研究现代经济学一个值得关注的问题,而在理解凯恩斯经济学理论中有关他的研究方法的哲学思想内涵是方法论的根本,也是构成其经济学理论的重要组成部分。本文以凯恩斯的《通论》为基础,分析凯恩斯经济学方法的哲学基础,并在方法论意义上进行了评价。分析结果表明,对于凯恩斯经济学的理解应当以全面发展的眼光看待,宏观经济学只是其理论起源的一个方面,追求经济思维的合理性和适应人类经济活动的需要是凯恩斯经济学方法论的根本。     

Japanese Consumption,External Disequilibrium and their Statistical Measurement

Georgescu-Roegen's work is usually divided into two categories, his earlier work on consumer and production theory and his later concern with entropy and bioeconomics beginning with his 1966 introductory essay to his collected theoretical papers published in the volume Analytical Economics. Most economists usually praise his earlier work on pure theory and ignore his later work which is highly critical of neoclassical economics. Those economists sympathetic to his later work usually take the position that he “saw the light” and gave up neoclassical theory some time in the 1960s to turn his attention to the issues of resource scarcity and social institutions. It is argued here that there is an unbroken path running from Georgescu's work in pure theory in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, through his writings on peasant economies in the 1960s, leading to his preoccupation with entropy and bioeconomics in the last 25 years of his life. That common thread is his preoccupation with “valuation.” The choices our species makes about resource use and the distribution of economic output depends upon our valuation framework. Georgescu-Roegen's work begins in the 1930s with a critical examination of the difficulties with the hedonistic valuation framework of neoclassical economics, moves in the 1960s to the conflict between social and hedonistic valuation, and culminates in the 1970s and 1980s with his examination of the conflict between individual, social, and environmental values. This paper traces the evolution of Georgescu-Roegen's thought about valuation and the environmental and social policy recommendations which arise out of his bioeconomic framework.     

The randomness of rational expectations: a perspective on Sargent's early incentives *

This paper searches for the story Thomas Sargent is likely to have told when he was trying to use rational expectations economics in the late-1960s and early 1970s. An argument will be made for his interest in achieving what he would regard as conceptual integrity of the determinism in neoclassical economic theory and the randomness in econometrics. This involves providing a narrative of how he came to the idea of rational expectations and what he had to relinquish to be able to put his initial interpretation of the concept to use.     

K. William Kapp's theory of social costs and environmental policy: Towards political ecological economics

The paper analyzes the contribution of K. William Kapp, widely considered one of the founders of Ecological Economics. This paper will demonstrate how K. William Kapp developed his theory of social costs into a framework for environmental policy development, i.e. the basis for Political Ecological Economics. The latter provides the most comprehensive and non-utilitarian alternative to the main neoclassical approaches provided by Arthur Pigou and Ronald Coase. Kapp determined basic human needs to be necessary values operational for policymaking via politically derived and scientifically determined social minima (criteria) and socio-ecological indicators. This “rational humanism” was inspired by Weber's concept of substantive rationality and informed by John Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalism. The paper concludes that Kapp's contribution is important enough to cement its place in the broader school of Ecological Economics.     

A probabilistic ghost in the experimental machine

This paper focuses on the opposition between two contemporary research programs in economics: behavioral economics (BE) and experimental market economics (EME). Our claim is that the arguments of this opposition can be clarified through the lens of another opposition in the philosophy of probability and in probability theory, between Bayesianism and frequentism. We show how this probabilistic opposition has indirectly shaped a controversy in psychology that opposes two research programs – Heuristics and Biases and Ecological Rationality – which play respective roles in the foundations of individual rationality in BE and EME. To understand these theoretical interrelationships, we investigate the 1996 controversy between Kahneman, Tversky, and Gigerenzer. Those psychologists held different views on how probabilistic representations influence the context-dependency of rationality. This provides a rationale to suggest that a probabilistic ghost may be haunting the experimental machine in economics, and explains how and why the oppositions between BE and EME are structured around the interplay between the norms of rationality and the context in which rationality is exercised.     

Lachmann and the wilderness: On Lachmann's radical subjectivism

Abstract

This paper deals with the question why in the 1940s and 1950s Ludwig Lachmann (1906–1990) failed to revive Austrian economics. Lake Keynes and Hayek, Lachmann pointed out that expectations, and hence knowledge, are important determinants of (cyclical fluctuations in) investment and economic activity. He thereby emphasized that the process of knowledge acquisition is indeterminate and open‐ended. This indeterminateness is difficult to reconcile with neoclassical attempts to provide economics with internally consistent microfoundations. This fundamental difference between his and the neoclassical research agenda explains Lachmann's failure to revive Austrian economics.     

What If There Are No Conventional Price Mechanisms?

Inspired by Frederic (“Fred”) S. Lee’s theoretical contribution to institutional-heterodox economics, I make the case that the neoclassical price mechanism is not only flawed, but also irrelevant for the study of actual coordination mechanisms, hence the price mechanism — as a theory as well as a way of thinking — should be discarded. While this position was addressed by early institutionalists, starting with Thorstein Veblen, later institutionalists have not completely rejected the price mechanism. The sympathy for the price mechanism has prevented institutionalists (and other heterodox economists) from fully developing an alternative theoretical framework concerning how actual economic activities are organized. I, therefore, provide an institutionalist-heterodox framework of the provisioning process focusing on business enterprise activities. This framework shows how institutional economics becomes more refined and useful when it is married to other traditions in heterodox economics, in particular, Marxian, social, and post-Keynesian economics. Such an integrative approach is what Fred Lee showed through his work toward producing a better theory and policy for the underlying population.     

马克思经济学发现经济危机的社会哲学观和研究方法论——兼论马克思经济学和现代主流经济学的认知差异

马克思经济学比现代主流经济学更容易发现经济危机,主要源于两个基本特征:一是在社会哲学观上坚持矛盾冲突论,从而发现个人理性与集体理性之间的不一致性;二是在研究方法论上采用平均主义分析,从而更适合使用统计材料和历史材料来考察宏观经济的周期性波动。正因如此,马克思经济学能够充分认识到自由市场经济内含的冲突性,并从收入分配角度揭示了经济危机的内在根源;相应地,解决经济危机的根本措施就是,改变不合理的收入分配制度。