策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

气候政策的时间不一致性问题研究

经验证据表明,很多国家都很难严格执行既定的气候政策。从理论上证明追求社会福利最大化的政府在经济剩余、政府税收收入和碳排放的负外部性等多重目标约束条件下,实施碳税政策时会产生时间不一致现象。结果表明,即使考虑到公共资金的边际成本,由于企业投资的不可逆转性和沉淀性,相对社会最优而言政府也会在事后降低碳税率,导致更多的能源消费和更多的碳排放。为克服时间不一致问题带来的效率损失,建议政府应建立独立的碳排放管制机构,对碳税政策做出可置信的承诺,改变电源结构,鼓励减排技术的投资,完善碳交易市场。     

Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with External Effects

This paper investigates an environmental policy designed to reduce the emission of pollutants under uncertainty, with the agent problem as an optimal stopping problem. We first analyze the two cases in which there are one agent and two competing agents by following Ohyama and Tsujimura (2005). When we consider a model of strategic agents, we need to analyze the external economic effect that is peculiar to an agent’s environmental policy implementation. Then, to improve and resolve these external effects, we examine three alternative political measures, comprising an environmental subsidy, an environmental tax and an emission trading system. The results of the analysis indicate that the environmental subsidy and environmental tax promote environmental policy. However, they do not create an incentive to be the leader. On the other hand, an emissions trading system not only promotes environmental policy but also creates an incentive for leadership.This paper was previously circulated under the title “Political Measures for Strategic Environmental Policy with Induced Effects”. The authors would like to thank Masaaki Kijima for helpful comments. The authors would also like to thank Alistair Munro and two anonymous referees providing detailed comments and suggestions. This research was partially supported by Daiwa Securities Group Inc. The second-named author was partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B) (2), 16310118.     

欧盟关于气候变化政策的新进展

本文分析了欧盟理事会2008年3月批准了欧盟气候与能源的一揽子行动计划的背景,提出：欧盟高度重视气候变化,除了因为气候变化已经日益影响人类的生活外,主要是基于自身能源、经济增长和就业的考虑。分析了欧盟实现减排的方式,更新的排放交易机制将是主要手段,还有发展可再生能源、提高能效、利用清洁发展机制,以及应用碳捕捉与储存技术等,指出：欧盟气候变化关键目标是“两个20％”,即：到2020年,温室气体排放至少减少20％,能源消费中可再生能源的份额占20％。     

Climate Change Taxes and Energy Efficiency in Japan

In 2003 Japan proposed a Climate Change Tax to reduce its CO₂ emissions to the level required by the Kyoto Protocol. If implemented, the tax would be levied on fossil fuel use and the revenue distributed to encourage the purchase of energy efficient equipment. Analysis using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model shows that this policy is unlikely to bring Japan into compliance with its Kyoto target unless the subsidy encourages improvement in energy intensity well beyond Japan’s recent historical experience. Similar demand-management programs in the US, where there has been extensive experience, have not been nearly as effective as they would need to be to achieve energy efficiency goals of the proposal. The Tax proposal also calls for limits on international emission trading. We find that this limit substantially affects costs of compliance. The welfare loss with full emissions trading is 1/6 that when Japan meets its target though domestic actions only, the carbon price is lower, and there is a smaller loss of energy-intensive exports. Japan can achieve substantial savings from emissions trading even under cases where, for example, the full amount of the Russian allowance is not available in international markets.     

组合政策下双寡头企业绿色创新博弈分析

为研究政府组合政策对于绿色创新能力不同的寡头企业生产策略的影响,构建演化博弈模型,在环境税税率和创新补贴额度不同的情境下,通过数值仿真模拟企业生产决策的动态选择过程。研究表明:高强度环境税制和高额的创新补贴极大地激励了两寡头企业绿色创新。环境税一定时,补贴值到一定额度,创新能力强的企业率先选择生产绿色产品,进一步提高时,创新能力弱的企业也将选择绿色生产。当环境税税率和补贴都比较低时,两类企业均选择生产普通产品,政府的宽松管控,低额补贴无法激起企业的绿色创新积极性。生产绿色产品的单位成本增额越高,或者消费者对于绿色产品的消费意愿不足时,需要政府的补贴力度越大。     

基于CGE模型的环境税优惠政策的环保效应分析

通过建立一个CGE模型,并对该模型在存在和不存在环境税优惠政策两种场景下的社会产出、产品供应和社会福利状况进行模拟分析,考察环境税优惠政策的环保效应。结果表明,环境税的税收减免在长期内对社会福利的影响不大,但是,它却会对环境税的环境保护效果产生较大的负面影响。在使用税收减免工具时,政府要从社会福利和环境保护、能源使用等方面加以考虑,避免社会总福利的净损失。     

气候政策的经济环境效应及其缓解措施的研究综述——兼谈对我国的启示

气候政策对一国经济和环境产生一定的效应,开放经济条件下还将对一国产业的国际竞争力产生影响。碳泄漏等问题使得气候政策的实际减排效果受到了质疑。气候政策实施过程中产生的这些问题都将严重影响气候政策的有效性。为使气候政策的有效性达到最优,很多学者研究了缓解气候政策负面效应的措施。本文对一些重要的气候政策的经济环境效应进行了理论总结,从竞争力效应、经济效应、环境效应和研究方法这四个方面综述了相关实证研究成果,分析了气候政策负面效应的缓解措施,以期为制定适合我国的气候政策提供借鉴。     

技术政策需求分析模型及其在应对气候变化领域的应用

针对目前在技术政策的制定与实施方面我国与发达国家有较大差距的现状,引入技术生命周期理论,建立技术政策需求分析模型;并应用于应对气候变化领域:在综述国内外应对气候变化的技术政策实施现状的基础上,通过列表对比分析,最终得出我国应对气候变化的技术政策需求,以期为政策制定者提供决策参考,为我国应对气候变化目标顺利实现提供政策支持。     

环境管制政策的比较分析

命令控制型的环境管制政策能较快地控制污染排放,但缺乏效率,且不利于技术创新,激励型的环境管制政策具有成本低、技术创新激励性强的特点.基于此,近年来世界各国对激励型的环境管制政策日益重视.我国未来环境管制政策的设计应更多地引入市场机制,强化环境政策对技术进步的激励作用,并适度结合命令控制型的环境管制工具.     

Climate Policy with Multiple Sources and Sinks of Greenhouse Gases

This paper studies how inclusion of many sources, sinks and reservoirs -- a comprehensive approach -- affects climate policy, compared with a control merely of CO₂. Two questions of particular importance arise in such an analysis. One is how to aggregate the emissions of different climate gases, and the other is how to include all relevant measures in the analysis. To aggregate gases properly, an intertemporal analysis should be carried out. To assure that all relevant measures are included, we suggest that certain measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases are specified explicitly and evaluated together with indirect measures, such as carbon charges. A numerical analysis based on an optimal control model indicates that direct measures may play an important role in the design of climate policy, especially for the control of the emissions of greenhouse gases other than CO₂. Similar to other studies of the time-path for abatement efforts, the bulk of abatement should be taken by the end of the planning period. This result is significantly strengthened if gases with short life-times in the atmosphere, such as methane, are subject to control.     

Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public Investment in Education

This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. Fiscal policy affects growth in two respects: first, work time reacts to variations of prospective tax rates and modifies knowledge formation; second, public spending enhances labour efficiency but also stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on adults are always growth-improving due to crowding-in effects: the welfare of all generations is unambiguously higher with respect to a private system, and there generally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

Economic Impacts of the 1997 EU Energy Tax: Simulations with Three EU-Wide Models

In March 1997 the European Commission adopted aproposal that increases existing minimum levels oftaxation on mineral oils by around 10 to 25% andintroduces excises for other energy products. Thispaper analyses the macroeconomic impacts of theproposal. It employs three models: HERMES, GEM-E3, andE3ME. All models confirm that the proposal will havepositive macroeconomic impacts when the tax revenuesare used to reduce social security contributions paidby employers. For the EU as a whole, both GDP andemployment are expected to be higher and CO₂emissions are 0.9 to 1.6 percent lower. The positiveEU-wide effects can be observed in practically allmember states. The sector impacts are modest, with theenergy sector expected to face the most negativeimpacts. Differences between model results are due tothe model type (general equilibrium ormacro-econometric), the EU countries covered and theway tax exemptions were handled. Crucial assumptionsto obtain the ``double dividend' are the modelling ofthe labour market and the impacts on EU externaltrade. The sensitivity of the results for the use oftax revenues, tax exemptions and tax rate increases isassessed.     

Climate Policy without Tears CGE-Based Ancillary Benefits Estimates for Chile

This study examines a hithertoneglected set of benefits from climate policy,viz., the reduction in emissions of localair pollutants and the associated healthbenefits, in this case for residents ofSantiago de Chile. By using an economy-widemodel, we are able to compare these monetisedbenefits to the direct costs of carbonabatement, thereby determining the scope for no regrets CO₂ reductions. Sensitivityanalysis is performed in recognition of theuncertainty surrounding certain key parameterand exogenous variable values – notably,households' willingness to pay (WTP) forreduced mortality and morbidity risk, and thesubstitution elasticities among energy sourcesand between energy and other inputs. Ourresults suggest that, even with the mostconservative assumptions (low WTP, lowelasticities), Chile could reduce CO₂emissions by almost 20% from the 2010 baselinewith no net welfare loss, though a 10%reduction is closer to optimal. If insteadChile were to target a 20% reduction inparticulate concentrations, a particulate taxwould incur slightly lower costs than anequivalent carbon tax to achieve the samehealth benefits. While the latter is asecond-best method of addressing localpollution, the welfare loss of choosing thisinstrument could be fully compensated by carboncredit sales at a world market price of$20/tC.