Management Ownership and Audit Firm Size*

The finance literature identifies two agency problems between managers and outside shareholders. First, there is a divergence‐of‐interests problem as management ownership falls. Second, there is an offsetting entrenchment problem when management ownership increases within intermediate regions of ownership. Agency problems are mitigated through contracting, but contracts are often based on accounting numbers prepared by management. Because accounting numbers must be reliable for contracts to be enforced, agency theory predicts a demand for higher‐quality auditors when agency problems are more severe. However, extant studies find no significant or robust relation between management ownership and audit firm size. In contrast to extant research, this study samples unlisted companies rather than listed companies for two reasons. First, the monitoring value of auditing may be higher in unlisted companies because they are less vulnerable to takeover and they are required to disclose much less nonaccounting information to shareholders. Second, unlisted companies have greater variation in management ownership, which permits more powerful tests of the demand for auditing as ownership varies between 0 percent and 100 percent. Consistent with a divergence‐of‐interests effect, the association between management ownership and audit firm size is found to be significantly negative within low and high regions of management ownership. The association is flatter and slightly positive within intermediate regions of management ownership, suggesting the existence of an opposite entrenchment effect. The negative association and the nonlinearity is consistent with the finance literature and with the predictions of agency theory.     

Control–ownership Disparity and Business Performance: A Study of Korean Firms

In Korea, there is a large disparity between voting and cash flow rights (control–ownership disparity). Using firm‐level data from Korea for the 2004–2009 period, the present study examines whether control–ownership disparity influenced firm performance. Specifically, the study analyzes whether the effects of control–ownership disparity on firm performance vary according to the type of firm (publicly traded vs private firms) and to the major shareholder's ownership stake (greater than 50 percent vs less than or equal to 50 percent). According to the results, the negative effect of control–ownership disparity on firm performance was weaker for publicly traded firms, and control–ownership disparity had a negative effect on firm performance when the major shareholder's ownership stake exceeded 50 percent.     

Ownership, performance and executive turnover in China

To better understand the relationship between different types of firm ownership and management turnover, this study classifies ownership along two dimensions: the type of owner and the concentration of ownership. Within this framework, a unique data set is used to study the impact of management turnover on a company's performance. This study, in addition to confirming some of the results from previous studies, includes interesting and important new results. Most importantly, it finds evidence that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is weaker in state-controlled firms than in non-state firms, and varies according to different subtypes of private ownership. We also demonstrate that the turnover–performance relationship is curvilinear in ownership concentration, but that this relationship moves in opposite directions under state and private ownership. Important policy implications of these findings are discussed.     

Foreign Takeovers and Wages in Hungary

This study investigates the wage premium that foreign takeover firms pay for a type of worker on top of the wage before takeover. We apply Hungarian employee-employer matched data from 1992 until 2001, and find a nonlinear wage premium profile before and after a foreign takeover. Takeover targets do not pursue a different wage policy before ownership change compared to other indigenous firms. Then, there is a hike in the wage premium during the takeover year. Moreover, there is gradually building up a wage premium over the following years after the takeover. The later stylized fact helps discriminating bargaining theories of the foreign-investor wage premium from technology spillover theories. JEL no. E24, F16, F23     

成长企业面临并购威胁的动态模型

以Shleifer与Vishny股市推动型并购理论为基础,本文提出了成长企业面临随机并购威胁的动态新模型．具体分析了在随机的股票市场产生定价错误和收购者预期有协同效应收益的情况下,利润最大化企业面对并购威胁所采取的防御性红利支付策略。本模型运用可靠性理论的“风险率”概念。不但解释了并购活动和观察到的成长型企业的红利支付行为,还导出了关于反并购成本影响目标企业价值的可验证性推论。     

股权性质、股权集中度、股权制衡与公司绩效——以新疆上市公司为例

新疆上市公司股权集中度高、国有股比例高。对2003～2007年新疆上市公司股权结构与公司绩效进行的实证研究表明,法人股股东、股权集中度、股权制衡度都未对公司绩效产生显著影响,但国有股对公司绩效产生了显著为负的影响,意味着新疆上市公司存在明显的代理问题及行政干预;而法人股股东未能发挥其应有的作用,也与其多为国有法人股东有关。对新疆上市公司而言,当前重要的是继续减持国有股,而非考虑股权的分散性以及是否机构法人持股。     

Foreign bank lending and information asymmetries in China: Empirical evidence from the syndicated loan market

This paper considers whether information asymmetries affect the willingness of foreign banks to participate in syndicated loans to corporate borrowers in China. We analyze how ownership concentration, which influences information asymmetries in the relationship between the borrower and the lender, exerts an impact on the participation of foreign banks in syndicated loans granted to Chinese borrowers in the period 2004–2009. We observe that greater ownership concentration of the borrowing firm does not positively influence participation of foreign banks in the loan syndicate. We conclude that information asymmetries are not exacerbated for foreign banks relative to local banks in China.     

Toward an institutional ecology of establishment of foreign firms in the Chinese construction industry

In the current study, an integration of insights from institutional theory and organization ecology is used to explain the relationship between industry-level ownership structure and the establishment of foreign invested firms in the Chinese construction industry. It is argued that in a stated-owned enterprises dominated environment, where the market forces are weak, legitimation is the major driving force harming the proliferation of foreign firms, whereas in a private-enterprise dominated environment, where the market forces are strong, competition is the major driving force inhibiting the viability of foreign firms. Thus, concentration of either state ownership, implying lower legitimation of the foreign firm form, or concentration of private ownership, triggering tough competition from domestic private firms, is hypothesized to have a negative impact on the number of foreign firms. Using a regional data set from 1994 to 2007, estimation of a cross-section–time series model largely confirms our theoretical claims.     

Rise and Fall of Multinational Enterprises in Vietnam: Survival Analysis Using Census Data during 2000–2011*

This study examined the survival of multinational enterprises (MNE) in Vietnam during 2000–2011 using Cox hazard models. The characteristics and ownership structure of firms and the nationality of foreign partners are found to be associated with the probability of firm exit, with a firm having greater capital share of foreign partners surviving longer. An efficient local government requiring less time for bureaucratic procedures and inspections is found to be associated with a lower probability of MNE exiting. Meanwhile, transparency in business regulations and predictability in implementing central government policies accelerate the survival of highly competitive MNE.     

股权的家族化、家族高管与家族企业业绩

文章利用2004-2015年中国A股家族控股上市公司的相关年度数据,从家族企业股权家族化视角出发,实证检验了股权家族化对家族企业业绩以及对企业是否聘任家族成员担任公司高管的经验影响关系。结果发现：（1）同等条件下,控股家族股权分配的家族化水平越高,其经营业绩表现越差;（2）家族成员担任CEO或董事长等关键高管会加剧股权家族化对家族企业业绩的负向影响关系;（3）同等条件下,公司股权的家族化更可能促使家族企业聘请家族成员担任CEO或董事长。此外,文章进一步分析发现,非核心家族成员参股企业会降低股权家族化与聘请家族成员担任公司CEO之间的正向影响关系。     

经营杠杆、企业创新投入和高管持股

针对现有经营杠杆对于企业创新行为的研究存在的空缺,以2016—2019年中国A股共1350家上市制造业公司为研究样本,实证检验经营杠杆对企业创新投入的影响以及高管持股的调节作用.结果表明,经营杠杆对企业创新投入正相关,高管持股在经营杠杆与企业创新投入关系中起正向调节作用.研究结果补充了企业创新投入的影响因素,并实证检验了高管持股可以有效解决由委托代理关系而造成的风险偏好较低的问题.     

资源还是负担？国有资本参股对跨境并购的影响分析

跨境并购是中国企业获取海外市场与战略性资产的重要方式,已有研究表明国有资本直接参与跨境并购过程中遭遇了不少阻碍,但少有学者关注国有资本发挥的资源作用。文章则探讨了非国有制企业引入国有股东在跨境并购中获得的资源优势。以2009-2018年中国非国有上市公司跨境并购交易作为样本,研究发现：非国有制企业中国有资本持股的比例更高会带来更多的资源,有助于跨境并购的完成。而当被并购目标是上市企业、属于高科技行业以及位于制度完善度较好的东道国时,东道国合法性门槛提高,导致国有资本参股的非国有制企业仍然会遭遇到来自东道国的歧视与制度压力,削弱国有资本的资源优势。在进一步分析中验证了主效应的机制,发现国有资本能够帮助解决非国有制企业的融资困难问题,进而促进跨境并购的完成。除此之外,文章也利用工具变量法解决了潜在的内生性问题。     

The takeover and selection effects of foreign-owned establishments: an analysis using linked employer–employee data

We provide the first estimates of the effect of foreign ownership on wages in Germany, controlling for the observed and unobserved characteristics of workers and plants. We also test whether the wage gains from joining a foreign-owned firm are subsequently lost when leaving that firm, and we examine whether wage gains vary across the sample. We find large selection effects in terms of worker and plant components of wages. Once the selection effect is taken into account, the takeover effect is small and in some cases insignificantly different from zero.

分析师跟进、管理层持股与公司价值——基于联立方程组模型的实证检验

本文基于现有理论文献,使用联立方程组模型探索在具有转型和新兴特征的中国证券市场中,分析师跟进、管理层持股与公司价值三者的相关关系。研究发现,分析师跟进有助于投资者发现公司价值,管理层持股与公司价值存在U型非线性关系;管理层持股对分析师跟进的影响呈倒U型;分析师跟进与管理层持股在投资者发现公司价值、提升公司价值方面体现的是协同效应。同时,研究发现分析师跟进、管理层持股比例与公司价值之间是相互作用,相互影响的。     

Why more restricted stocks,less stock options?--An explanation based on the preference of regulators of China?

This paper provides an empirical explanation of the more frequent use of restricted stock plans for executives than stock option plans, to reveal the determinants of a restricted stock plan and understand its subsequent effects. We find that firms with higher growth opportunity, smaller size, higher executive ownership, smaller rent-seeking probably, and dividend payment prefer to grant restricted stock plans. Moreover, the preference of regulators drives the tendency of using restricted stock plans, designed to have higher pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and lower pay-risk sensitivity (vega). Under the intensive regulation, the restricted stock plans designed by firms with executive ownerships and large agency debt costs are more sensitive to risk. As a result, granting restricted stock plans rather than stock options helps improve firm performance and the preference of regulators on restricted stock plans can also enhance firm performance and decrease firm risks.     

Firm Productivity and Mode of Foreign Expansion: Evidence from Taiwanese Manufacturing Firms

This paper builds on the recent literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and aims to empirically examine how firm productivity affects a firm’s foreign market entry strategy beyond the simple binary choice between exporting and FDI. Utilizing the panel data of Taiwanese manufacturing firms during 2002–2012, we further classify FDI methods by whole ownership or a joint venture to investigate a firm’s foreign expansion decision. By performing Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) tests, we find that if a firm is more productive, it is more likely to choose FDI rather than exporting. However, productivity of firms choosing whole ownership is not so different from choosing a joint venture. Furthermore, a more productive firm is more likely to conduct both whole ownership of the foreign subsidiary and a joint venture formation in the case of FDI.     

Clan culture and family ownership concentration: Evidence from China

This study explores a cultural determinant of family ownership concentration of a corporate. Using hand-collected Chinese genealogy information and a panel of Chinese listed family firms, we find robust evidence that clan culture influences are associated with a significantly higher family ownership concentration. By taking advantage of firm owner birthplace information, we are able to separate the impact of inherited clan culture from that of external environmental factors. To further establish causality, we also employ an instrumental variable (IV) regression strategy and explore the underlying mechanisms.     

Differences in corporate saving rates in China: Ownership,monopoly, and financial development

Using the data of the listed non-financial companies from 2003 to 2012, this paper conducts a firm-level empirical analysis to reveal the determinants that lead to differences in saving rates of different enterprises in China. Particularly, we explore the discrepancies in the Chinese enterprises' saving rates from the new perspectives of ownership type, monopoly status, and financial development. We find that only some financial indicators of a firm, including the size and the long-term solvency ability, have direct impact on its saving rate. Besides, the difference in the saving rates between private firms and state-owned firms is insignificant while monopolies have higher saving rates than non-monopolies. Most importantly, financial development generally reduces a firm's saving rate and the impact is independent on its ownership type and monopoly status. Moreover, financial development decreases the influence of a firm's short-term solvency and profitability on its saving rate.     

The Empirical Study on Interaction between Corporate Ownership and Board Structure

Corporate ownership, board structure and leadership structure are important internal governance mechanisms. They have effect on firm performance, and also are affected by many internal factors of the firm. In this paper, by means of theory and empirical analysis, we discuss the relation between ownership and board structure and the determinants of them, find some significant results such as management ownership which is affected by firm performance, as well as relates to outside director ownership. These findings tell us that there exist some substitutions and complement relations in govemance mechanisms, which is important to the research on manner that corporate governance works.     

上市公司代理成本与资本结构实证分析:基于浙江省上市公司数据

文章在综述国外相关代理成本理论的基础上,利用2012年浙江省上市公司数据,实证分析了公司资本结构、公司规模、公司成长性、股权集中度和管理层持股比例与代理成本之间的关系,发现存在资本结构使得代理成本最小,且公司规模越大,成长性越高,代理成本越小。