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1.
Consider trade liberalization between two countries, each of which produces two private goods and provides on a voluntary basis one public good (the common). In these circumstances, what are the consequences of trade liberalization on the production of the public good and on welfare in both countries? Using a Ricardian framework, we first show that the opening of trade increases the opportunity cost of producing the public good in both countries and will therefore reduce the aggregate supply of the public good. On the other hand, at the autarky equilibrium, only one country supplies the public good, the other “free rides”. The analysis of the welfare incidence of the opening of trade then reveals that the country which provides the public good under autarky always enjoys a welfare gain from trade while the free rider under autarky does not unless the terms of trade are sufficiently in its favour to compensate for the reduction in the supply of the common. Finally, if all countries involved in trade liberalization can without cost coordinate their supplies of the common, then the implementation of the first-best outcome is shown to be possible with a conditional Paretian transfer scheme.  相似文献   

2.
In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms. In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits.  相似文献   

3.
This paper develops a two‐country dynamic game model of tariff protection to reconsider optimal trade policies and their implications for welfare. The authors show that an import subsidy is optimal in the feedback Nash equilibria, which results in a curious possibility that the domestic market is monopolized by the foreign firrm. However, welfare comparisons among Nash equilibria, free trade, and autarky reveal that feedback Nash equilibria involve higher welfare than both autarky and free trade, i.e. dynamic noncooperative choices of policy serve as tacit policy coordination and ensure larger trade gains relative to free trade.  相似文献   

4.
Gains from trade with overlapping generations   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
Summary This paper examines the welfare effects of international trade in a context of overlapping generations. It shows that, for a single trading country, uncompensated free trade may be Pareto inferior to autarky. However, for each government there are compensation schemes which guarantee welfare improvements for all local individuals when free trade is allowed, or when for a small open economy the terms of trade improve or the number of tradable goods increases, or when a customs union is formed.We acknowledge with gratitude the probing comments of Henry Y. Wan, Jr. and two anonymous referees.  相似文献   

5.
In a two‐country segmented markets model with homogeneous product Cournot oligopoly we show that production efficiency improves in the free‐trade regime compared to autarky, if autarky price in each country is lower than both the post‐trade prices—which holds, for example, when preferences are identical. The result holds irrespective of the demand structure, number, and cost distribution of firms in the two countries. The improvement in production efficiency lowers average cost of production which, for some parameterizations, gives rise to higher aggregate profits for all countries in the free‐trade regime (compared to autarky). Though free trade (zero tariffs) improves production efficiency from autarky (prohibitive tariffs), freer trade is not always associated with greater production efficiency.  相似文献   

6.
In April 2000, India eliminated the quantitative import restriction of apples and instituted a trade barrier in the form of lower ad valorem tariffs. This study examines the impacts of Indian trade policies on the apple market by reviewing the government policies, discussing mathematical and graphical analyses of trade policies, presenting estimated equations of demand, supply, and excess supply, and providing solutions of prices, quantities, and welfare impacts under autarky, free trade, and tariff regimes. Given the total population of more than one billion and a vast middle income population, and economic reforms and resulting income growth, India has a considerable potential to increase its apple consumption. Our study shows that under free trade, India will consume 3008 thousand metric tonnes (TMT) of apples of which 2237 TMT will be imported. Also, free trade will increase the total welfare by Rs 29?512 million. These large gains suggest that India should liberalize apple import barriers and move toward free trade.  相似文献   

7.
This paper considers foreign direct investment which produces a manufactured good entirely for the market of the host country. It analyzes the welfare implications of an expansion of this activity, and compares the results with ones obtained from the model of export processing zones. It is shown that, contrary to the case of EPZs, an expansion of market-oriented direct investment improves welfare under free trade, and if there is an import tariff, the expansion may improve welfare under certain conditions.  相似文献   

8.
International Duopoly, Tariff Policy and the Superiority of Free Trade   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper addresses the effectiveness of tariff policy in the long-run production framework in which decisions must be made about plant size and the level of output to be produced by foreign duopolists competing with each other in the importing country's market. We consider two types of tariff regime, discriminatory and uniform, and show that the importing country's welfare is unambiguously higher in the uniform tariff case. We consider free trade in the same production framework and show that, as the long-run capacity decision becomes increasingly relevant relative to the short-run quantity decision, free trade dominates tariffs in welfare rankings.
JEL Classification Number: F1.  相似文献   

9.
In an overlapping generations model, capital and labor produce two tradable goods. A kleptocratic government spends the tariff revenue. Trade liberalization benefits the retired generation if and only if the relative price of the capital-intensive good rises. Starting from autarky, a small liberalization benefits subsequent generations if and only if it hurts the retired one, a result reminiscent of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. However, the terms-of-trade effect means a large liberalization may simultaneously raise the welfare of all generations.  相似文献   

10.
This paper uses an applied general‐equilbrium model to decompose the effects of changes in trade‐ and technology‐related variables between 1982 and 1996 in the United States on the wages of skilled and unskilled labor. The results indicate that trade‐related variables (tariff cuts, improvement in the terms of trade, and the increase in the trade deficit) had little impact on the widening wage gap. The major factor behind the rise in the skilled wage relative to the unskilled wage was differential rates of growth in skill‐biased technical change across sectors. The paper also highlights the role that nontraded goods play in explaining the wage gap. Finally, the paper presents estimates of how wages would change if the economy moved to autarky. The results show that expanding trade could actually reduce wage inequality, rather than increase it.  相似文献   

11.
International trade and consumption network externalities   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of consumption network externalities. The framework is applicable to the choice of network products and sheds light on the debate on globalization and culture. In an extended Ricardian model of international trade the paper shows that: (i) trade is not Pareto inferior to autarky if the free trade equilibrium is unique; (ii) trade is not Pareto superior to autarky if both countries are diverse (network competition) under free trade, but can be if each country is homogenous (network monopoly); (iii) and when multiple free trade equilibria exist everybody in a country can lose from free trade if that country is homogenous under autarky. Consumers of imported network goods tend to gain, while consumers of exported network goods tend to lose from trade liberalization.  相似文献   

12.
For an oligopolistic industry, the effects of mergers on the domestic country's optimal trade policy are analyzed. If the domestic country pursues an optimal trade policy then it will always lose as a result of a foreign merger. The optimal domestic response to a foreign merger is to decrease (increase) the tariff if demand is concave (convex) and to increase the production subsidy. The foreign merger reduces foreign welfare when the domestic country pursues its optimal trade policy. The optimal domestic response to a domestic merger is to leave the tariff unchanged and to increase the production subsidy.  相似文献   

13.
This paper evaluates migration policies for an open economy in the presence of unemployment resulting from a minimum wage. Migration between countries is triggered by an expected wage differential which depends both on the market wage and the level of unemployment. Workers therefore can move in either direction. The paper shows that labor outflow raises employment and welfare. Distortion-ridden free trade with this out-migration is therefore better than distortion-ridden free trade with no migration. It might also be better than autarky. Under the scenario, free migration is an alternative to restricted trade often recommended to deal with this type of distortion. Labor inflow on the other hand generates unfavorable terms of trade, raises national and global unemployment, and reduces welfare. [F 2]  相似文献   

14.
M. Yano and F. Dei have demonstrated that, by controlling the degree of competition in a non‐tradables market (competition policy), a country can influence the terms of trade so as to increase its welfare, relative to free trade. Using their model, this study compares the extent of this effect with that of a tariff policy. It demonstrates that a competition policy can achieve a higher utility than a tariff policy if tariff rates are at levels currently tolerated in the real world. This demonstrates that domestic competition policy may play an important role as a substitute for tariff policy.  相似文献   

15.
We look at privatization in a general equilibrium model of a small, tariff‐distorted, open economy. There is a differentiated good produced by both private and public sector enterprises. A reduction in government production in order to cut losses from such production raises the returns to capital and increases the tariff revenue, which are welfare‐improving. However, privatization also leads to lower wages and possibly fewer private brands. This lowers workers’ welfare, which may make privatization politically infeasible. Privatization can improve workers’ welfare with complementary reforms, e.g., attracting foreign investment or trade liberalization.  相似文献   

16.
Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.  相似文献   

17.
Within models of traded and nontraded goods, that ignore international factor mobility, the literature on tariff reform has established sufficient conditions under which a policy that reduces (increases) the highest (lowest) tariff to the level of the second highest (lowest) rate, or a policy that moves proportionally all tariffs to a given number improves welfare. The present paper generalizes previous studies by introducing perfect international capital mobility. It demonstrates that if all goods are normal in consumption and the nontraded good markets are locally Walras stable, then a reform policy that reduces (increases) the highest (lowest) tariff to the level of the next highest (lowest) rate improves welfare if (i) the good with the highest (lowest) tariff rate is a net substitute to all other traded goods, and (ii) the nontraded goods are net substitutes to all other goods. Second, a policy reform that moves all tariffs to a given number is always welfare improving.  相似文献   

18.
This paper develops a partial-equilibrium model of a small open-economy trading an unsafe product. The model is used to analyze the welfare effects of trade with and without a country-of-origin labeling (COOL) program. The welfare gains from trade in the absence of COOL are ambiguous, may justify the imposition of a trade ban. Even if a full ban does not improve welfare and some restriction of trade is always welfare-enhancing. Under a tariff regime, more COOL trade is better than less trade. Independently of domestic market power, free trade coupled with a COOL program maximizes national welfare.  相似文献   

19.
The paper analyses complex interactions between intra-industry trade (IIT) and environment by extending Krugman's model of monopolistic competition and trade. It is found that an increase in exogenous environmental tax by a country leads to a fall in its output (the scale effect) and aggregate pollution, and an increase in its number of varieties (the selection effect). With IIT, if Home is a net exporter, an increase in its environmental stringency leads to a negative scale effect, which reduces its export demand and raises its import demand. In contrast, a positive selection effect reduces its import demand. However, the first-order scale effect on exports dominates the second-order effect on imports, implying a rise in Home's share of IIT with Foreign. The opposite holds true when Home is a net importer. Furthermore, the impact of a rise in environmental tax on aggregate welfare comprises the following counteracting effects: a negative scale effect, a positive selection effect, a lower level of aggregate pollution and a higher environmental tax revenue in autarky, and two additional effects, namely, changes in the level of exports and imports, under free trade. The overall change in aggregate welfare, in both autarky and free trade, is in general ambiguous.  相似文献   

20.
The paper examines the effect of freer North–South trade in goods on pollution, commodity terms-of-trade and national welfare, utilizing a factor endowment framework. North and South are distinguished in terms of the relative endowment of a pollution causing natural resource: South is relatively more resource abundant. Compared to the analysis of Copeland and Taylor (1994)—which is the central work so far on this subject—this paper internalizes the commodity terms-of-trade impact of individual environment policies. It is derived that if countries specialize completely in the free-trade equilibrium, both are induced to reduce their pollution as compared to autarky. It is interesting and paradoxical that the South also reduces its pollution, despite specializing in the pollution-intensive good. Again, contrary to common perception, free trade may entail an overall terms-of-trade loss for the North, while South will always have a positive change in the terms-of-trade. Finally, inspite of better environment, free trade may cause both the countries to gain or lose in terms of aggregate welfare. This research has benefitted from comments received at the conference on International Dimension of Environment Policy organized by the European Science Foundation and Tilburg University, October 7–12, 2000 Kerkrade, The Netherlands and the International Conference on Environment and Development organized by CITD, School of International Studies, JNU, April 7–8, 2005, New Delhi, India, as well as those received from two anonymous referees. A small section of this research was published in Mehra and Das (2002).  相似文献   

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