The pricing of deposit insurance in the presence of systematic risk

Based on the Merton (1977) put option framework, we develop a deposit insurance pricing model that incorporates asset correlations, a measurement for the systematic risk of a bank, to account for the risk of joint bank failures. Estimates from our model suggest that actuarially fair risk-based deposit insurance that considers only individual bank failure risk is underpriced, leaving insurance providers exposed to net losses. Our estimates also capture the size premium where big banks are priced with higher deposit insurance than small banks. This result is particularly relevant to the current regulatory concerns on big banks that are too-big-to-fail. Above all, our approach provides a unifying framework for integrating risk-based deposit insurance with risk-based Basel capital requirements.     

Market discipline and deposit insurance reform in Japan

On April 1, 2002, the Japanese government lifted a blanket guarantee of all deposits and began limiting the coverage of time deposits. This paper uses this deposit insurance reform as a natural experiment to investigate the relationship between deposit insurance coverage and market discipline. I find that the reform raised the sensitivity of interest rates on deposits, and that of deposit quantity to default risk. In addition, the interest rate differentials between partially insured large time deposits and fully insured ordinary deposits increased for risky banks. These results suggest that the deposit insurance reform enhanced market discipline in Japan. I also find, however, that too-big-to-fail (TBTF) policy became a more important determinant of interest rates and deposit allocation after the reform, thereby partially offsetting the positive effects of the deposit insurance reform on overall market discipline.     

Risk management of deposit insurance corporations with risk-based premiums and credit default swaps

In this paper, we propose a risk-based model for deposit insurance premiums and provide the closed-form formula for premiums, including early closure, capital forbearance, interest rate risk, and moral hazard. Our numerical analysis confirms the proposed pricing formula and the relative impact of the provisions for deposit insurance premiums. We illustrate how to use credit default swaps (CDSs) to manage the bank’s asset risk corresponding to the deposit insurance model. A failed bank, Washington Mutual, is used to demonstrate how to calibrate the model’s parameters and calculate fair premiums that are consistent with market risks on the basis of our proposed model and credit derivatives. Finally, a numerical experiment is designed to determine the optimal hedge ratio, which can minimise the variance of cash-flow of the deposit insurance corporations.     

A positive analysis of deposit insurance provision: Regulatory competition among European Union countries

We consider the provision of deposit insurance as the outcome of a non-cooperative policy game between nations. Nations compete for deposits in order to protect their banking systems from the destabilizing impact of potential capital flight. Policies are chosen to attract depositors who optimally respond to the expected return to deposits, which depends on deposit insurance levels, systemic risk and transaction costs. We identify both defensive and beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The model sheds light on the European banking crisis of 2008 in which individual nations ratcheted up their deposit insurance levels.     

Premium setting and bank behavior in a voluntary deposit insurance scheme

This study analyzes the effect of premium rates on banks’ incentives to join a deposit insurance scheme and their incentives to invest in risky projects under a voluntary deposit insurance scheme. We find that in order to maximize social welfare, the insurance agency must either set the premium rate to be low so as to attract all banks to join the insurance scheme, or not to have the deposit insurance at all. However, the low premium rate in the voluntary scheme does not balance the budget of the deposit insurance. We also show that in the compulsory deposit insurance scheme, however, it is possible to impose an optimal premium rate that can balance the insurance agency’s budget and achieve the highest social welfare. The results also present the dominance of the compulsory scheme over the voluntary scheme in terms of maximizing social welfare and balancing the budget.

Simultaneous borrowing of information across space and time for pricing insurance contracts: An application to rating crop insurance policies

Changing climate and technology can often lead to nonstationary losses across both time and space for a variety of insurance lines including property, catastrophe, health, and life. As a result, naive estimation of premium rates using past losses will tend to be biased. We present three successively flexible data‐driven methodologies to nonparametrically smooth across both space and time simultaneously, thereby appropriately incorporating possibly nonidentically distributed data into the rating process. We apply these methodologies in estimating U.S. crop insurance premium rates. Crop insurance, with global premiums totaling $4.1 trillion in 2018, is an interesting application as losses exhibit both temporal and spatial nonstationarity. We find significant borrowing of information across both time and space. We also find all three methodologies improve both the stability and accuracy of crop insurance premium rates. The proposed methods may be of relevance for other lines of insurance characterized by spatial and/or temporal nonstationary losses.     

Human capital costs,firm leverage,and unemployment rates

Because bankruptcy is costly for employees, theoretical studies argue that firms with higher leverage have to pay their employees higher wages. In this paper we empirically test this prediction. We find that firm leverage is positively related to the wages of employees, both in the United States and in the Netherlands. In the United States, the positive relation between wages and leverage is strongest in the 21st century, which is a period that also shows a positive relation between wages and unemployment rates. We conclude that the human capital costs of bankruptcy are an important disadvantage of debt.     

Capital regulation,deposit insurance and bank risk: International evidence from normal and crisis periods

In this paper, we examine the impact of capital regulation on bank risk and the moderating role of deposit insurance on the relationship between capital regulation and bank risk during both normal and crisis periods. Using an international sample of banks from 111 countries, our results show that stringent capital regulation reduces bank default risk, in general, during normal growth period, and this effect is not conditioned by the existence of explicit deposit insurance. Further, stringent capital regulation in place during the pre-crisis period reduces bank default risk during the crisis period, and this effect is stronger for countries with explicit deposit insurance during the pre-crisis period. These results have important policy implications to design the optimal bank regulations.     

寿险保单强制执行的法律问题研究

寿险保单属典型的财产权,在保险事故发生之前相关权利主要归属投保人,在法律上为民诉法相关司法解释所规定的债权,可被法院强制执行。法院在执行寿险保单时,不得直接要求保险公司解除寿险保单,而应要求投保人解除寿险保单并由保险公司协助扣划保单现金价值。企业为员工购买的寿险保单不得因企业负债而被执行,投保人为被执行人时应允许被保险人或受益人支付对价取得投保人地位。本文同时就保险公司如何应对协助执行寿险保单时可能面临的风险提出了对策。     

Anticipating bailouts: The incentive-conflict model and the collapse of the Ohio deposit guarantee fund

The collapse of the Ohio Deposit Guarantee Fund in March 1985 provides a laboratory for examining the financial market's belief in the incentive-conflict model proposed by Kane (1989). Research in this area has yet to examine the stock returns of federally insured institutions during that period in the context of this model. Thus, it has not addressed the question of whether financial market participants recognize the implications of the model; that is, whether they anticipate the bailouts it implies. This paper fills that void.We find that on average, stocks of firms insured by the poorly capitalized FSLIC do reasonably well during the 41-day event window centered on the ODGF's Bank Holiday, while stocks of firms insured by the relatively well-capitalized FDIC do not. More important, differences in abnormal returns of FDIC and FSLIC firms are consistent with a reaffirmation of the incentive-conflict model.     

对德国社会保险制度与政策的回顾和评析

基于德国社会保险发展史,本文着重探讨了保险机制作为社会保障制度核心的形成过程、作用机理和发展趋向。研究认为,历史上德国社会保险制度的两次飞跃凸显了社会保险兼具保险与社会的基本特征,也集中反映了制度选择对这两大特征之间内在矛盾的不断调和。德国社会保障制度体系中的双重内部结构和类型化发展的态势是对上述特征和矛盾的积极应对。结论认为,未来社会保障制度体系的发展演化仍会以保险机制的发展演化为根本核心,进一步明晰和协调现有制度体系下的内部结构,走向维护民生保障和提倡自我救助并重的新型保障制度,进而实现以群体为基本单位的普遍化的社会保障制度。     

Deposit insurance around the world: A comprehensive analysis and database

This paper provides a comprehensive, global database of deposit insurance arrangements as of 2013. We extend our earlier dataset by including recent adopters of deposit insurance and information on the use of government guarantees on banks’ assets and liabilities, including during the recent global financial crisis. We also create a Safety Net Index capturing the generosity of the deposit insurance scheme and government guarantees on banks’ balance sheets. The data show that deposit insurance has become more widespread and more extensive in coverage since the global financial crisis, which also triggered a temporary increase in the government protection of non-deposit liabilities and bank assets. In most cases, these guarantees have since been formally removed but coverage of deposit insurance remains above pre-crisis levels, raising concerns about implicit coverage and moral hazard going forward.     

Deposit insurance and money market freezes

In the presence of deposit insurance, a rise in counterparty risk may cause a freeze in interbank money markets. We show this in a general equilibrium model with regionally segmented bank-based retail financial markets, in which money markets facilitate the reallocation of funds across banks from different regions. Counterparty risk creates an asymmetry between banks in savings-rich regions, which remain marginally financed by the abundant regional insured deposits, and in savings-poor regions, which have to pay large spreads in money markets. This asymmetry distorts the aggregate allocation of credit and, in the presence of demand externalities, can cause large output losses.     

Consumer durables and risky borrowing: The effects of bankruptcy protection

There exist substantial differences in the generosity of bankruptcy protection across U.S. states. This paper exploits cross-state variation in exemption levels to assess the dual role of durable goods as informal collateral for unsecured debt and self-insurance against bad shocks to earnings. The generosity of bankruptcy protection is found to change both the incentives and the ability of households to accumulate durable wealth. The gains from a high level of insurance are reduced by the effect of tighter credit constraints, so that the net effects of a change in exemption are very small. A more generous bankruptcy regulation reduces net durable wealth in the first half of the life cycle. In addition, the optimal level of exemption is positive but low.     

The pricing of equity-linked life insurance policies with an asset value guarantee

This paper considers the equilibrium pricing of equity-linked life insurance policies with an asset value guarantee; such policies provide for benefits which depend upon the performance of a reference portfolio subject to a minimum guaranteed benefit. The benefit is decomposed into a sure amount and an immediately exercisable call option on the reference portfolio. A numerical procedure for determining the value of the call option is presented and the risk minimizing investment strategy to be followed by the issuer of the policy is derived.     

中国农业保险制度的变迁与创新

本文通过对改革开放三十年我国农业保险发展历程的梳理,运用新制度经济学的经典理论,从历史的角度展开对我国农业保险制度变迁的全方位研究,从国家层面来研究和探讨我国农业保险制度发展变迁与创新。通过这种制度分析,形成对我国农业保险制度变迁的一个清晰认识和准确把握,探索我国农业保险发展及其制度创新的特定路径依赖和路径选择,并在此基础上提出我国农业保险制度创新的未来方向。     

Deposit insurance and credit union lending

We exploit an exogenous change in the coverage of insured deposits following the passage of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (2008) to investigate the impact of deposit insurance on the volume, composition and quality of credit union lending. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find changes in the volume, composition and riskiness of credit union lending. Specifically, we find that affected credit unions increase total and unsecured lending, leading to a decline in loan quality. Overall, our results suggest that an increase in the maximum coverage of insured deposits induces credit unions to lend more at the expense of loan quality.     

The minimum variance hedge and the bankruptcy risk of the firm

In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a “natural” hedge.     

The response of competitors to announcements of bankruptcy: An empirical examination of contagion and competitive effects

We find, like [Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1992. Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 45–60], that large firm bankruptcies generate a dominant contagion effect. A value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stocks experiences a significant loss of 0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement. This represents an average loss of $3.32 for all the competitors combined for every dollar lost by the bankrupt firm. In addition, we find that small firm bankruptcies also generate a dominant contagion effect among smaller sized competitors; an equally-weighted portfolio of all competitors has a significant 0.12% drop. In a new approach to separate the contagion and competitive effects, we compare the stock price reactions of competitors who themselves subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next three years (candidates for contagion effect) with those who do not do so (candidates for competitive effect). As expected, candidates for contagion effect experience a significant, negative three-day stock price reaction of −4.68%. However, contrary to expectations, candidates for competitive effect also have a significant, negative return (−0.49%), suggesting that the competitive effect is weak at best since it is dominated by the contagion effect even in this sample. Other procedures to identify candidates for competitive effect generally yield similar findings. Finally, we analyze competitors' stock price reactions based on selected characteristics (e.g., industry concentration, and leverage), with similar results as before. One explanation for the failure to detect a competitive effect is that the impact may already have been incorporated in stock prices prior to the filing for Chapter 11. Consistent with this explanation, we find significant positive stock price reactions by competitor stocks for the hundred days prior to the bankruptcy announcement.