An analysis of production cost inefficiency

This research empirically investigates the presence of production cost inefficiencies associated with non-optimal operating conditions. A model is developed which allows for the possibility that firms might be temporally constrained in their production decisions due to a quasi-fixed capital stock. The context of the study is the household goods motor carrier industry in the post-deregulatory period. The analysis employs a technique capable of quantifying excess per unit costs and decomposing this magnitude according to its determinants. Specifically, it identifies and measures three types of inefficiency at the firm level: short-run capital inefficiency, capital-induced variable input inefficiency, and X-inefficiency.     

DO OLIGOPOLISTS POLLUTE LESS? EVIDENCE FROM A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY MARKET*

Electricity restructuring has created the opportunity for producers to exercise market power. Oligopolists increase price by distorting output decisions, causing cross‐firm production inefficiencies. This study estimates the environmental implications of production inefficiencies attributed to market power in the Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland electricity market. Air pollution fell substantially during 1999, the year in which both electricity restructuring and new environmental regulation took effect. I find that strategic firms reduced their emissions by approximately 20% relative to other firms and their own historic emissions. Next, I compare observed behavior with estimates of production, and therefore emissions, in a competitive market. According to a model of competitive behavior, changing costs explain approximately two‐thirds of the observed pollution reductions. The remaining third can be attributed to firms exercising market power.     

Competitiveness and technical efficiency: Determinants in the groundnut oil sector of India

India imports about half of its domestic consumption needs of edible oils. Groundnuts are a major source of edible oils in India. One of the central problems of groundnut production and processing is huge inefficiencies due to an uncertain production environment owing to rainfed cultivation, the low resource base of smallholder farmers and processors, and the low adoption rates of improved technology. This paper addresses critical issues that impair the groundnut sector’s international competitiveness and efficiency. The paper uses primary data collected from Indian farmers and processors of groundnuts to measure efficiency, and it suggests policies for reducing yield gaps and increasing efficiency. Specific policies suggested from the study are (a) the harnessing of improved varieties with attributes like drought tolerance, high oil content, high productivity for large-scale seed multiplication and distribution by public and private agencies; (b) viable village seed banks and seed networks through cycles of post-rainy season seed multiplication to meet the seed requirements in the rainy season and vice versa; (c) adoption of low-cost technologies to increase profitability and reduce risk; (d) oilseed clusters to facilitate scale and scope economies in processing units; and (e) capital subsidies to accelerate technological upgrading to shed inefficiency in the processing sector. The expected gains in efficiency in the production and processing of oilseeds are expected to result in producer and consumer gains which would justify the proposed incentives for seeds and for technological upgrading in the processing sector.     

Auctions with bid credits and resale

Bid credits favoring subsets of bidders are routinely imposed on auctions and procurement auctions. These bid credits result in inefficient auction outcomes, which create pressure for post-auction resale or, in a procurement context, for subcontracting. We show that the presence of resale, in turn, affects bidding strategies in such a way that auction outcomes are more likely to be inefficient and less informative, making it harder for resale to correct inefficiencies. The negative effects of bid credits and resale can be mitigated through direct restrictions on resale, tight caps on credits, reserve prices, anonymous bidding, and enhanced competition.     

Time compression (dis)economies: An empirical analysis

Research Summary: To investigate time compression diseconomies (TCD), this study estimated time–cost elasticities using 459 oil and gas global investment projects (1997–2010). Results show that the average cost of accelerating investments is negative: a firm could cut $6.3 million in costs of a single project by accumulating asset stocks 1 month faster. About 88% of the projects exhibit negative time–cost elasticities with over 39% of unrealized economies of time compression. Only 12% of the projects are subject to TCD. These time inefficiencies or frictions do not negate the existence of TCD, but suggest they are less prevalent than assumed in the literature. Management experience, R&D investment, firm size, economic development, and political stability are shown to be associated with greater time compression efficiency. Managerial Summary: How fast should firms invest? The conventional view is that acceleration increases market revenues but also inflates costs. However, there is no recent empirical evidence of this tradeoff. Our article systematically investigates the costs of compressing time in investment projects. Results show that most firms in the oil and gas industry are significantly time inefficient in their operations. Specifically, by accelerating investments, firms would also substantially decrease costs. We estimate the magnitude of these time inefficiencies for specific oil and gas industries and firms and study which strategies might mitigate this problem. This fine‐grained analysis should help firms assess their financial incentives to accelerate projects and prove informative to stock market analysts’ valuations of firm investment timing.     

The Real Estate Brokerage Market: A Critical Reevaluation

This paper presents an analysis of the theories and evidence regarding the structure and performance of the market for real estate brokerage services. Some of the theoretical models found in the literature appear to suffer from logical inconsistencies, while others lack empirical support for their underlying assumptions and/or their predictions of market inefficiencies. Moreover, several important legal and institutional changes that have occurred recently have not been given sufficient attention in the existing literature.
Although some new evidence on this market is presented here, additional empirical research is warranted in at least two areas: the current pricing structure and the underlying production and cost functions of the real estate brokerage industry.     

A firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge—Antecedents and consequences

This paper proposes a conceptual model for a firm's capability to calibrate supply chain knowledge (CCK). Knowledge calibration is achieved when there is a match between managers’ ex ante confidence in the accuracy of held knowledge and the ex post accuracy of that knowledge. Knowledge calibration is closely related to knowledge utility or willingness to use the available ex ante knowledge: a manager uses the ex ante knowledge if he/she is confident in the accuracy of that knowledge, and does not use it or uses it with reservation, when the confidence is low. Thus, knowledge calibration attained through the firm's CCK enables managers to deal with incomplete and uncertain information and enhances quality of decisions. In the supply chain context, although demand- and supply-related knowledge is available, supply chain inefficiencies, such as the bullwhip effect, remain. These issues may be caused not by a lack of knowledge but by a firm's lack of capability to sense potential disagreement between knowledge accuracy and confidence. Therefore, this paper contributes to the understanding of supply chain knowledge utilization by defining CCK and identifying a set of antecedents and consequences of CCK in the supply chain context.     

Cost Efficiency and Product Mix Clusters across the Spanish Banking Industry

The competitive conditions under which Spanish bankingfirms operate have become much tighter. In these circumstances,inefficiencies should disappear, and if this does not occur,appropriate explanations should be explored. This paper doesexactly that, by estimating cost efficiency scores and assessingwhether they are biased by productive specialization. Thesequestions are not new, unlike the technique employed, whichenables us to evaluate firms' efficiencies by comparing them onlywith those focusing on similar specializations, without the needto specify separate frontiers for different output mixes. Resultsshow that firms' efficiency scores might be downward or upwardbiased when compared with all other firms in the industry, insteadof only with those focusing on similar activities.     

State estimation of a shop floor using improved resampling rules for particle filtering

Operational inefficiencies in supply chains cost industries millions of dollars every year. Much of these inefficiencies arise due to the lack of a coherent planning and control mechanism, which requires accurate yet timely state estimation of these large-scale dynamic systems given their massive datasets. While Bayesian inferencing procedures based on particle filtering paradigm may meet these requirements in state estimation, they may end up in a situation called degeneracy, where a single particle abruptly possesses significant amount of normalized weights. Resampling rules for importance sampling prevent the sampling procedure from generating degenerated weights for particles. In this work, we propose two new resampling rules concerning minimized variance (VRR) and minimized bias (BRR). The proposed rules are derived theoretically and their performances are benchmarked against that of the minimized variance and half-width based resampling rules existing in the literature using a simulation of a semiconductor die manufacturing shop floor in terms of their resampling qualities (mean and variance of root mean square errors) and computational efficiencies, where we identify the circumstances that the proposed resampling rules become particularly useful.     

Collective action for smallholder market access

The opportunity for smallholders to raise their incomes increasingly depends on their ability to compete in the market; yet there are many failures in rural markets in developing countries that make it difficult for them to do this. Understanding how collective action can help address the inefficiencies, coordination problems or barriers to market access is particularly important. This paper draws on the case studies in this special issue and on other literature to examine the conceptual issues and empirical evidence on the role of collective action institutions in improving market access for the rural poor. Applying insights from studies of collective action in natural resource management, the paper examines what conditions facilitate effective producer organizations for smallholders’ market access, with special attention to the characteristics of user groups, institutional arrangements, types of products (staples, perishables and other commodities), markets (local, domestic and international), and external environment. The paper also identifies policies and interventions that facilitate collective action for market access among smallholders, and examines whether the public sector, private sector and/or civil society is best positioned to provide such interventions.     

Airport deregulation: Effects on pricing and capacity

We use a model of vertical relations between two congestible airports and an airline oligopoly to examine, both analytically and numerically, how deregulation may affect airports prices and capacities. We find that: (i) unregulated profit-maximizing airports would overcharge for the congestion externality and, compared to the first-best, would induce large allocative inefficiencies and dead-weight losses. They would restrict capacity investments but, overall, would induce fewer delays; (ii) Welfare maximization subject to cost recovery performs quite well, achieving congestion levels similar to a private-unregulated airport but without inducing such large traffic contraction; this puts a question mark on the desirability of deregulation of private airports; (iii) Increased cooperation between airlines and airports provides some improvements, but the resulting airport pricing strategy leads to a downstream airline cartel; (iv) When schedule delay costs effects are strong and airline differentiation is weak, it may be optimal to have a single airline dominating the airports, but this happens only when airports' pricing schemes render the number of airlines irrelevant for competition.     

Strategic management of intangible assets and value drivers in R&D organizations

This paper takes a resource-based view of the R&D process. Based on the literature, we forward a theory that allows us to predict the dynamic interaction and transformation of five key resources, namely human, relational, organizational, monetary, and physical. Utilizing visualization tools allows us to test this theory on various levels in order to draw insights from the data. The output of the analysis improves the strategic understanding of an organization. In particular, it improves the understanding of how intangible resources drive the value creation in an R&D organization. Further analysis of the data allows us to identify resources that are either under utilized or over utilized, which might indicate inefficiencies in the organizational performance.     

Product quality selection: Contractual agreements and supplier competition in an assemble-to-order environment

We consider a multi-supplier, single-manufacturer supply chain where each supplier sells a different component at varying quality levels. The manufacturer has to decide on which quality level to choose for each component, trading-off the total cost and total quality. Each supplier decides on a price per unit quality level for its component. We characterize the strategic interaction among the suppliers and analyze the inefficiencies. We find that the inefficiencies due to such quality competition can be quite significant. We then propose and analyze several mechanisms, such as quality-price schedules and revenue sharing, that restore efficiency.     

An extended production/recycling model with stationary demand and return rates

A production–recycling system is investigated. A constant demand can be satisfied with production and recycling. The used items are bought back and then recycled. The non-recycled products are disposed of. Two types of models will be analyzed. The first model examines the EOQ-related costs and minimizes the relevant costs. The second model generalizes the first model with the introduction of the cost function with linear waste disposal, recycling, production and buyback costs. It is asked whether the pure (either production or recycling) or mixed strategies are optimal and it will be shown that under these circumstances the mixed strategies are dominated by the pure strategies. The paper generalizes a former model proposed by the authors for the case of one recycling and one production batch to the case of arbitrary batch numbers.     

Career Concerns,Inaction and Market Inefficiency: Evidence From Utility Regulation

We study how incentive conflicts known as ‘career concerns’ can generate inefficiencies not only within firms but also in market outcomes. Career concerns may lead agents to avoid actions that, while value‐increasing in expectation, could potentially be associated with a bad outcome. We apply this theory to natural gas procurement by regulated public utilities and show that career concerns may lead to a reduction in surplus‐increasing market transactions during periods when the benefits of trade are likely to be greatest. We show that data from natural gas markets are consistent with this prediction and difficult to explain using alternative theories.     

THE ROLE OF EXCLUSIVE CONTRACTS IN FACILITATING MARKET TRANSACTIONS*

We examine the relationship between market conditions and the adoption of exclusive contracts. In particular, we develop a matching model in which agents may decide to adopt exclusive contracts to reduce bilateral bargaining inefficiencies in the presence of private information. We show that it is optimal for agents to adopt exclusive contracts in thin markets but not in thick markets and that for intermediate levels of market thickness strategic complementarities lead to multiple equilibria. We study the welfare properties of market equilibria and discuss under what circumstances courts should enforce exclusive contracts.     

Institutions,resources, and entry strategies in emerging economies

We investigate the impact of market‐supporting institutions on business strategies by analyzing the entry strategies of foreign investors entering emerging economies. We apply and advance the institution‐based view of strategy by integrating it with resource‐based considerations. In particular, we show how resource‐seeking strategies are pursued using different entry modes in different institutional contexts. Alternative modes of entry—greenfield, acquisition, and joint venture (JV)—allow firms to overcome different kinds of market inefficiencies related to both characteristics of the resources and to the institutional context. In a weaker institutional framework, JVs are used to access many resources, but in a stronger institutional framework, JVs become less important while acquisitions can play a more important role in accessing resources that are intangible and organizationally embedded. Combining survey and archival data from four emerging economies, India, Vietnam, South Africa, and Egypt, we provide empirical support for our hypotheses. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Price caps with capacity precommitment

We examine the effectiveness of price caps to regulate imperfectly competitive markets in which the demand is uncertain. To that effect, we study a monopoly that makes irreversible capacity investments ex-ante, and then chooses its output up to capacity upon observing the realization of demand. We show that the optimal price cap must trade off the incentives for capacity investment and capacity withholding, and is above the unit cost of capacity. Moreover, while a price cap provides incentives for capacity investment and mitigates market power, it cannot eliminate inefficiencies. Capacity payments provide a useful complementary instrument.     

Stability of perishable goods in cold logistic chains

We consider that production and logistics facilities in the supply chain are positioned between the origin and the supply market or in a part of it. Any changes in time-distance or temperature in the chain could cause the net present value of the activities and their added value in the supply chain to be perturbed. In reality the perturbations can be robust. The natural question arises is to what are the effects of some perturbations in a supply chain, in its production or distribution part, on the stability of perishable goods in such systems and what is the appropriate control which keeps the product on the required level of quality and quantity at the final delivery. These analyses are especially important to assure the stability of cold chains in the cold chains management (CCM). What conditions should be fulfilled to assure that after such robust perturbations of parameters and especially time delays (lead times and some other delays) the behaviour of the logistics chain would still be within the prescribed limits. The formulation obtained in the time domain will be compared with the formulation in the frequency space introduced by Grubbström in his paper “On the Application of the Laplace Transform to Certain Economic Problems” (Manage. Sci. (7) (1967) 558) and with the later studies of his school. Their model was extended by the authors to the complete logistic chain, where location — and with it also the distance between the activity cells of logistic chain — play an important role.