我国上市公司融资啄序的实证分析

鉴于融资啄序理论主张的在信息不对称条件下的"留存收益-债权-股权"的企业最优融资啄序,以我国A股上市公司1994～2007年的融资数据为样本,根据上市公司的规模、成长性和杠杆水平对其进行分类,运用面板数据模型分析不同规模、成长性和杠杆水平的上市公司融资行为的啄序特征.实证结果表明:我国上市公司均存在不同程度的股权融资偏好,但这种偏好会受到诸如规模、成长能力和负债水平等内部条件以及外部融资政策的制约.     

优序融资理论对上市公司融资行为的解释力

本文以当前国内外公司财务学界流行的理论学说“优序融资理论”为基础,分析了其对上市公司融资行为的解释力。文章在对优序融资理论的简单论述之上,回顾了优序融资理论的研究文献和相关模型修改。由此出发论述优序融资理论的检验模型,最终论述了优序融资理论在我国上市公司中对其融资偏好的影响和启示。     

信息披露、市场关注与融资约束

本文运用中国证券市场的实证数据,研究了信息披露水平、市场关注程度对企业融资约束的影响。本文的理论分析表明,主动信息披露是解决信息不对称的有效方式,并且,市场关注程度对企业的融资约束也有影响,市场对企业越关注,越有利于企业私有信息的挖掘和公开信息的传播,进一步会减轻企业与市场的信息不对称问题。实证结果支持了上述理论:信息披露水平和以分析师为代表的市场关注程度提高能显著降低企业的融资约束。     

资本市场错误定价、融资约束与公司融资方式选择

本文运用2000-2013年中国A股上市公司年数据,研究了资本市场错误定价对不同融资约束水平公司融资方式选择的影响。研究发现,对于股权融资,无论融资约束水平高低,错误定价对公司股权融资均具有显著的正向影响;对于债务融资,股价高估会显著促进高融资约束公司的债务融资,包括长期债务融资和短期债务融资,而对低融资约束公司则不存在显著影响。同时还发现,错误定价对高融资约束公司短期债务融资的正向影响要远高于长期债务融资。这表明,在中国资本市场,资本市场错误定价对不同融资约束水平公司融资方式选择的影响存在显著差异,对高融资约束公司的影响表现为股权融资、短期债务融资、长期债务融资的融资优序现象,而对低融资约束公司则不存在这一现象。     

融资约束、支付方式与并购绩效的关系研究

本文利用中国A股上市公司2008～2010年在国内并购的数据,实证检验融资约束是否影响并购支付方式以及公司并购绩效。研究结果发现,融资约束程度的提高增加了公司采用现金支付对价的可能性;收购公司规模和交易规模对支付方式选择也具有显著影响;融资约束公司并购绩效好于无融资约束公司并购绩效;现金支付引起公司并购绩效降低,但是,这种作用在不同融资约束程度公司中存在差异。本文研究意味着融资约束公司遵循融资优序理论;自由现金流假说对于融资约束公司可能不成立。     

上市公司融资行为分析

<正>企业的融资行为决定着企业的资本结构,并最终影响到企业的价值。如何规范上市公司的融资行为,完善公司的资本结构乃至治理结构,一直是值得社会关注的重要课题。而长期以来,一个不争的事实是我国上市公司融资行为并不规范,以至于公司资本效率、公司治理、公司成长以及投资者利益等方面都未能取得良好的成效。本文从西方经典的融资优序理论     

市场景气、融资约束与制造业投资 ——基于带有预期效应的新古典投资理论的再检验

本文在新古典投资理论基础上,将市场景气状态、预期偏差、融资约束纳入投资行为的理论分析框架,并利用我国31个省(自治区、直辖市)制造业上市企业微观数据进行了实证检验.研究表明:企业合意投资水平与市场景气水平密切相关,当市场处于扩张期时,企业合意投资规模提高,反之合意投资规模下降.受预期偏差和融资约束的影响,企业实际投资规模偏离合意投资水平,形成非效率投资.融资约束不是越低越好,当市场处于扩张期,企业对未来预期过于乐观时,适度的融资约束有助于企业合理控制投资规模,避免投资过度;当市场处于收缩期,且企业对未来预期过于悲观时,降低融资约束有利于提高企业投资规模;国有企业和民营企业由于融资能力和投资动力不同,其投资水平也有所不同,相对于民营企业,国有企业更容易产生过度投资问题.     

融资约束与中国企业的进口行为

本文采用贸易四元边际的分析框架,实证分析了融资约束对企业进口行为的影响,并对比了非金融危机、金融危机背景下融资约束对企业进口行为影响的差异性。主要发现:(1)融资约束对企业进口决策存在显著的抑制作用,融资约束会显著抑制企业的进口行为,包括进口规模、进口来源国数量、进口产品种类。(2)相对于外资企业,内资企业的进口行为更容易受融资约束的影响;相对于一般贸易,企业的加工贸易进口更容易受融资约束的影响;相对于只进口的企业,同时具有进口和出口行为的企业更容易受到融资约束的影响。另外,不同行业的企业、不同地区的企业受融资约束的影响也具有较大的差异。(3)不同的外部金融环境导致融资约束对企业进口行为的影响存在显著差异。金融危机导致企业的进口行为对融资约束表现出更强的敏感性,高融资约束企业与低融资约束企业在进口四元边际上的差距被进一步拉大。     

市场约束、银行风险与批发融资成本

本文基于2006～2018年我国32家上市银行的面板数据,实证检验了批发融资市场的市场约束问题。结果表明:第一,我国批发融资市场存在市场约束,银行偿付风险对批发融资成本存在正向影响;第二,不同规模的银行所面临的市场约束程度不同,相较于大型国有银行而言,中小银行面临更为严苛的市场约束;第三,宽松的货币政策显著降低机构投资者对商业银行的市场约束,紧缩的货币政策显著提高机构投资者对商业银行的市场约束。本文结论对于商业银行成本管理,以及银保监会对批发融资市场风险的监管,均具有重要的启示意义。     

融资约束与内部资本市场、盈余管理的关系探析——基于保险集团视角的研究

通过调整赔款准备金的方式进行盈余管理是非寿险公司常用的缓解融资约束的方式.在保险集团化经营模式下,保险公司还可以通过内部资本市场缓解融资约束.本文探析保险集团内部资本市场、盈余管理和融资约束的关系,基于2009～2019年我国非寿险公司数据,分析非寿险公司利用保险集团内部资本市场及盈余管理缓解融资约束的效果,以及这两种行为在缓解融资约束时的相互关系.研究发现,保险集团内部资本市场和盈余管理行为均能显著地缓解非寿险公司面临的融资约束,且两者在缓解融资约束时存在替代效应,即不处于保险集团中的非寿险公司倾向于通过盈余管理缓解融资约束,保险集团中的非寿险公司倾向于利用内部资本市场缓解融资约束.     

IPO Market Timing

I develop a model of information spillovers in initial publicofferings (IPOs). The outcomes of pioneers’ IPOs reflectparticipating investors’ private information on commonvaluation factors. This makes the pricing of subsequent issuesrelatively easier and attracts more firms to the IPO market.I show that IPO market timing by the followers emerges as anequilibrium clustering pattern. High offer price realizationsfor pioneers’ IPOs better reflect investors’ privateinformation and trigger a larger number of subsequent IPOs thanlow offer price realizations do. This asymmetry in the spillovereffect is more pronounced early on in a hot market. The modelprovides an explanation for recent empirical findings that illustratethe high sensitivity of going public decision to IPO marketconditions.     

Market Timing and Capital Structure

It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence, current capital structure is strongly related to historical market values. The results suggest the theory that capital structure is the cumulative outcome of past attempts to time the equity market.     

Conglomerate Structure and Capital Market Timing

We examine the effects of keiretsu structure on capital market-timing. Keiretsu groups offer a hybrid structure between fully integrated conglomerates and stand-alone firms. We find that past market conditions affect the capital structure of keiretsu firms more than they affect the capital structure of unaffiliated firms. The decision to issue equity is more correlated with market conditions for keiretsu members than it is for unaffiliated firms. The stock returns of keiretsu firms following the issuance of equity decrease with the size of the issuance. These results suggest that keiretsu members time the issuance of equity more so than stand-alone firms.     

Market Timing and Managerial Portfolio Decisions

This paper provides evidence that top managers have contrarian views on firm value. Managers' perceptions of fundamental value diverge systematically from market valuations, and perceived mispricing seems an important determinant of managers' decision making. Insider trading patterns shows that low valuation firms are regarded as undervalued by their own managers relative to high valuation firms. This finding is robust to controlling for noninformation motivated trading. Further evidence links managers' private portfolio decisions to changes in corporate capital structures, suggesting that managers try to actively time the market both in their private trades and in firm‐level decisions.     

高管持股、择时披露与市场反应

基于2001至2008年间A股公司业绩预告的样本,本文研究了高管持股对择时信息披露策略的影响,以及市场对择时披露信息的反应。研究发现,A股公司在业绩预告时存在择时披露的行为:好消息①更倾向于在交易日披露,坏消息更倾向于在休息日披露。高管持股比例会显著影响择时披露策略:高管持股比例越高的公司,进行择时披露的可能性也越高。从市场反应角度看,休息日披露的坏消息与交易日披露的坏消息没有显著差异,休息日披露的好消息反而会产生更加显著的正面市场反应。本文的研究意味着,高管持股比例会显著提高上市公司进行择时信息披露的可能性,但是市场在一定程度上能够识别择时披露策略,本文的研究结果支持了"信息消化"假说。     

市场时机与公司投资:研究述评

在资本市场非有效的情况下,管理者具有利用市场错误定价所带来的市场时机的动机,这种市场时机是否会对公司资本投资产生影响以及是否造成了社会资源的错误配置一直是学术界关注的焦点。本文对国外学者关于管理者利用市场时机的投资决策动机、市场时机影响公司投资支出的股权融资渠道和迎合渠道、市场时机衡量指标以及市场时机如何影响资源配置效率的相关研究进行了回顾和评析,并在此基础上提出了进一步开展该领域研究的几点启示。     

Calls of Warrants: Timing and Market Reaction

This paper examines the timing of, and reaction to, calls of callable warrants. Three main findings emerge. First, unlike convertible bonds or preferred stock, callable warrants are called almost as soon as possible. Second, there is a negative price reaction of about 3 percent when a call is announced. Finally, at the completion of a call, the stock price rebounds by an average of 7 percent. The total reaction from announcement through completion of the call is a positive excess return of about 4 percent.     

Pseudo Market Timing and the Long-Run Underperformance of IPOs

Numerous studies document long-run underperformance by firms following equity offerings. This paper shows that underperformance is very likely to be observed ex-post in an efficient market. The premise is that more firms issue equity at higher stock prices even though they cannot predict future returns. Ex-post , issuers seem to time the market because offerings cluster at market peaks. Simulations based on 1973 through 1997 data reveal that when ex-ante expected abnormal returns are zero, median ex-post underperformance for equity issuers will be significantly negative in event-time. Using calendar-time returns solves the problem.     

On the Timing and Execution of Open Market Repurchases

Little is known about the timing and execution of open marketrepurchases. U.S. firms are under no obligation to disclosewhen they are trading, and generally report only quarterly changesin shares outstanding. We use 64 firms' supplementally disclosedrepurchase trading data to provide the first examination ofrepurchase timing and execution. Across the days reported inour sample, firms adopted a variety of execution styles rangingfrom immediate intense repurchasing to delayed and smoothedrepurchasing. We find no clear evidence that repurchases aretimed to coincide with, precede, or follow, days on which informationis released. We benchmark the costs and value of a given repurchaseprogram against naive accumulation strategies achieving thesame terminal portfolio. While there is considerable variationacross the firms, NYSE firms on average beat their benchmarks,whereas NASDAQ firms do not. Finally, we document the liquidityimpact of open market repurchases. We find that repurchasingcontributes to market liquidity by narrowing bid-ask spreadsand attenuating the price impact of order imbalances on dayswhen repurchase trades are completed.