Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

Does Risk Management Add Value? A Survey of the Evidence

The fact that 92% of the world's 500 largest companies recently reported using derivatives suggests that corporate managers believe financial risk management can increase shareholder value. Surveys of finance academics indicate that they too believe that corporate risk management is, on the whole, a valueadding activity. This article provides an overview of almost 30 years of broadbased, stock‐market‐oriented academic studies that address one or more of the following questions:

• ? Are interest rate, exchange rate, and commodity price risks reflected in stock price movements?
• ? Is volatility in corporate earnings and cash flows related in a systematic way to corporate market values?
• ? Is the corporate use of derivatives associated with reduced risk and higher market values?

The answer to the first question, at least in the case of financial institutions and interest rate risk, is a definite yes; all studies with this focus find that the stock returns of financial firms are clearly sensitive to interest rate changes. The stock returns of industrial companies exhibit no pronounced interest rate exposure (at least as a group), but industrial firms with significant cross‐border revenues and costs show considerable sensitivity to exchange rates (although such sensitivity actually appears to be reduced by the size and geographical diversity of the largest multinationals). What's more, the corporate use of derivatives to hedge interest rate and currency exposures appears to be associated with lower sensitivity of stock returns to interest rate and FX changes. But does the resulting reduction in price sensitivity affect value—and, if so, how? Consistent with a widely cited theory that risk management increases value by limiting the corporate “underinvestment problem,” a number of studies show a correlation between lower cash flow volatility and higher corporate investment and market values. The article also cites a small but growing group of studies that show a strong positive association between derivatives use and stock price performance (typically measured using price‐to‐book ratios). But perhaps the nearest the research comes to establishing causality are two studies—one of companies that hedge FX exposures and another of airlines' hedging of fuel costs—that show that, in industries where hedging with derivatives is common, companies that hedge outperform companies that don't.     

Model-free hedge ratios and scale-invariant models

A price process is scale-invariant if and only if the returns distribution is independent of the price measurement scale. We show that most stochastic processes used for pricing options on financial assets have this property and that many models not previously recognised as scale-invariant are indeed so. We also prove that price hedge ratios for a wide class of contingent claims under a wide class of pricing models are model-free. In particular, previous results on model-free price hedge ratios of vanilla options based on scale-invariant models are extended to any contingent claim with homogeneous pay-off, including complex, path-dependent options. However, model-free hedge ratios only have the minimum variance property in scale-invariant stochastic volatility models when price–volatility correlation is zero. In other stochastic volatility models and in scale-invariant local volatility models, model-free hedge ratios are not minimum variance ratios and our empirical results demonstrate that they are less efficient than minimum variance hedge ratios.     

ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATES: BACK TO BASICS

Public accountants have had a hard time deciding how to account for derivatives that are used to hedge risks, which in turn has given derivatives users and others a hard time. For about six years, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has struggled with several, often diametrically opposed procedures, ranging from showing all derivatives at “fair” values to deferring realized losses or gains on derivatives until related gains or losses on the hedged transactions have been realized (a practice known as “hedge accounting”). What is behind the FASB's inability to come up with a decisive and authoritative ruling? Although the politics of self-interest has fueled much of the debate, there is more to the problem than politics. The author argues that the underlying cause of the FASB's inability to reach a satisfactory and acceptable solution is not politics, but rather a flawed basic concept of how financial accounting should be done. In this article, the author recommends a procedure for derivatives accounting that was endorsed by the Financial Economists Roundtable in its 1995 “Statement on Accounting Disclosure about Financial Derivative Instruments.” The proposal, in brief, is this: Provided a company can satisfy its auditors that it is using derivatives primarily to hedge an offsetting price exposure, the firm should be given the option to use hedge accounting for that part of its derivatives position that is functioning as a hedge. All other investment or speculative uses of derivatives should be treated like other financial instruments and marked to market or fair value. Such a procedure, the author argues, is far more consistent than the FASB's recent proposals with fundamental principles of accounting that have been developed by accounting practitioners and scholars over several centuries.     

Fine‐Tuning a Corporate Hedging Portfolio: The Case of an Airline

Industrial companies typically face a multitude of risks that could cause significant fluctuations in their cash flow. This is a case study of the hedging strategy adopted by an international air carrier to manage its jet‐fuel price exposure. The airline's hedging approach uses “strips” of monthly collars constructed with Asian options whose payoffs are based on average of “within‐prompt‐month” oil prices. Using the carrier's own implicit objective function based on an annual granularity, the authors show how the air carrier could fine‐tune its current hedge portfolio by adding tailored exotic options. The article describes annual average‐price options, provides an explicit valuation of them, and considers how such instruments may affect corporate liquidity. Consistent with its annual objective function, the airline made this exotic derivative the central tool to hedge across all potential realized values of annual jet‐fuel spot prices. The authors believe this modified portfolio is better suited to address the firm's hedging cost and its overall exposure to jet‐fuel price fluctuations.     

Can Companies Use Hedging Programs to Profit from the Market? Evidence from Gold Producers*

In this article, the authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the hedging activities of 92 North American gold mining companies during the period 1989‐1999. The aim of the study was to answer two questions: (1) Did such hedging activities increase corporate cash flows? (2) And if yes, were such increases the result of management's ability to anticipate price movements when adjusting their hedge ratios? Although the author's answer to the first question is “yes,” their answer to the second is “no.” More specifically, the authors concluded that:

• ? During the 1989‐1999 period, the gold derivatives market was characterized by a persistent positive risk premium— that is, a positive spread between the forward price and the realized future spot price—that caused short forward positions to generate positive cash flows. The gold mining companies that hedged their future gold production realized an average total cash flow gain of $11 million, or $24 per ounce of gold hedged, per year, as compared to average annual net income of only $3.5 million. Because of the positive risk premium, short derivatives positions did not generate significant losses even during those subperiods of the study when the gold price increased.
• ? There was considerable volatility in corporate hedge ratios during the period of the study, which is consistent with managers incorporating market views into their hedging programs and attempting to time the market by hedging selectively. But after attempting to distinguish between derivatives activities designed to hedge and those designed to profit from a view, the authors conclude that corporate efforts to time the market through selective hedging were largely if not completely futile. In fact, the companies' adjustments of hedge ratios appeared to consistently lag instead of leading the market.

     

Periodic Stochastic Volatility and Fat Tails

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the size andstatistical significance of the day of the week, month of theyear, and holiday effects in daily stock index returns and volatility.We employ data from the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA),the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P SmallCap600 in order to test whether the seasonal patterns of mediumand small firms are similar to those of large firms. Using formalhypothesis tests based on bootstrapping, we demonstrate thatthere are more significant calendar effects in volatility thanin expected returns, especially for the two large cap indices.More importantly, we introduce the periodic stochastic volatility(PSV) model for characterizing the observed seasonal patternsof daily financial market volatility. We analyze the interactionbetween seasonal heteroskedasticity and fat tails by comparingthe performance of Gaussian PSV and fat-tailed PSVt specificationsto the plain vanilla SV and SVt benchmarks. Consistent withour model-free results, we find strong evidence of seasonalperiodicity in volatility, which essentially eliminates theneed for a fat-tailed conditional distribution, and is robustto the exclusion of the crash of 1987 outliers.     

Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?

Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) alpha explains hedge fund flows better than alphas from more sophisticated models. This suggests that investors pool together sophisticated model alpha with returns from exposures to traditional (except for the market) and exotic risks. We decompose performance into traditional and exotic risk components and find that while investors chase both components, they place greater relative emphasis on returns associated with exotic risk exposures that can only be obtained through hedge funds. However, we find little evidence of persistence in performance from traditional or exotic risks, which cautions against investors’ practice of seeking out risk exposures following periods of recent success.     

The impact of hedging on the market value of equity

We examine the annual stock performance of firms that disclose the use of derivatives to hedge over the period 1995 to 1999. We find that only 21.6% of publicly traded U.S. corporations in our sample hedged with derivative instruments over this period and their use is concentrated in the larger companies. Similar to other studies we find that when derivatives are used, interest rate and currency securities are used much more frequently than commodity products. Our sample of 1308 companies that hedge outperforms other securities by 4.3% per year on average over our sample period. This result is robust to several alternative methods of estimating abnormal returns. When we segment performance by the type of hedge used, however, we find that the over-performance is due entirely to larger firms that hedge currency. We find no abnormal returns for firms hedging either interest rates or commodities. The abnormal returns in firms hedging currency is robust to alternative models that seek to control for exchange rate fluctuations and global equity returns; however, we find no significant abnormal returns to currency hedgers when using an augmented model that controls for the role of intangible assets.     

Nondisclosure and adverse disclosure as signals of firm value

We present a model in which some of the firm's information ('news')can be disclosed verifiably and some information ('type') cannot,to show that some firms may voluntarily withhold good news anddisclose bad news. We describe an equilibrium in which high-typefirms withhold good news and disclose bad news, whereas low-typefirms disclose good news and withhold bad news. Under some parametervalues, this equilibrium exists when other more traditionalequilibria are ruled out by standard equilibrium refinements.The model explains some otherwise anomalous empirical evidenceconcerning stock price reactions to disclosure, provides somenew empirical predictions, and suggests that mandatory disclosurerequirements may have the undesirable consequence of makingit more difficult for firms to reveal information that cannotbe disclosed credibly.     

Large UK Companies and Derivatives

Derivative securities have transformed the way treasurers view financial price risk and have been used to hedge risks that were previously left open. In this paper, we present the results of surveys of treasurers of large UK companies to questions about their derivative use. We examine the extent of derivative use, the reasons for their use, the perceived risks associated with derivatives, what sort of controls are in place to monitor the use of derivatives, and, finally, reporting practices which govern the disclosure of derivative practices. Results of the surveys indicate widespread use of derivatives like swaps, forwards and options. The primary reasons for their use are to manage interest rate and currency risk. There is a rather limited, but growing, use of derivatives to manage commodity and equity risk. Treasurers report that they are somewhat cautious about more exotic types of derivatives, primarily because of concern over the illiquidity of the underlying market for these derivatives. Interestingly, treasurers revealed that they view control and the nature of their counterparty as the main risks in using derivatives. Finally, the use of derivatives is accompanied by significant control mechanisms inside companies, and treasurers are using sophisticated procedures to quantify their derivative exposures before they are reported at board level.     

Property Derivatives and Index-Linked Mortgages

Economists have forcefully argued for the introduction and use of property derivatives as a hedge against house price risk (e.g. Shiller and Weiss, J. Real Estate Finance Econ., 19(1):21–47, 1999). The rationale for these financial instruments seems clear, as many households are heavily invested in housing and standard financial instruments offer a poor hedge. In practice, however, most of the property derivatives available have been targeted to meet the needs of institutional investors, not those of owner-occupiers. Building on the recent launch of the first Swiss property derivative, we here propose index-linked mortgages tailored to retail consumers. The payments of these mortgages depend on the corresponding housing market performance. We further price the instruments, discuss the stabilization of the homeowner’s net wealth, and quantify the expected decrease in the mortgage default risk achieved by this immunization effect.

How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?

Before the credit crisis that started in mid-2007, it was generally believed by top regulators that credit derivatives make banks sounder. In this paper, we investigate the validity of this view. We examine the use of credit derivatives by US bank holding companies with assets in excess of one billion dollars from 1999 to 2005. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Bank Holding Company Database, we find that in 2005 the gross notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks exceeds the amount of loans on their books. Only 23 large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held for dealer activities rather than for hedging of loans. The net notional amount of credit derivatives used for hedging of loans in 2005 represents less than 2% of the total notional amount of credit derivatives held by banks and less than 2% of their loans. We conclude that the use of credit derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited because of adverse selection and moral hazard problems and because of the inability of banks to use hedge accounting when hedging with credit derivatives. Our evidence raises important questions about the extent to which the use of credit derivatives makes banks sounder.

Liquidity risk and maturity management over the credit cycle

We show that firm demand-side factors are strong drivers of procyclical refinancing behavior over the credit cycle using novel data from the Shared National Credit program. Firms are more likely to refinance early when credit conditions are good to keep the effective maturity of their loans long and hedge against having to refinance in tight credit conditions. High credit quality firms are better able to hedge, making their refinancing propensity more sensitive to credit cycles than less creditworthy firms. There is a strong relationship between refinancing a loan, and subsequent growth in capital expenditure, especially when a loan is refinanced early.     

Lessons in Structuring Derivatives Exchanges

The global deregulation of financial markets has created newinvestment opportunities, which in turn require the developmentof new instruments to deal with the increased risks. Institutionalinvestors who are actively engaged in industrial and emergingmarkets need to hedge their risks from these cross border transactions.Agents in liberalized market economies who are exposed to volatilecommodity price and interest rate changes require appropriatehedging products to deal with them. And the economic expansionin emerging economies demands that corporations find betterways to manage financial and commodity risks. The instrumentsthat allow market participants to manage risk are known as derivativesbecause they represent contracts whose payoff at expirationis determined by the price of the underlying asset a currency,an interest rate, a commodity, or a stock. Derivatives are tradedin organized exchanges or over the counter by derivatives dealers.Since the mid-1980s the number of derivatives exchanges operatingin both industrial and emerging-market economies has increasedsubstantially. What benefits do these exchanges provide to investorsand to the home country? Are they a good idea? Emerging marketscan capture important benefits, including the ability to transferrisks, enhance public information, and lower transaction costs,but the success of a derivatives exchange depends on the soundnessof the foundations on which it is built, the structure thatis adopted, and the products that are traded.      

Static hedging and pricing American options

This paper utilizes the static hedge portfolio (SHP) approach of Derman et al. [Derman, E., Ergener, D., Kani, I., 1995. Static options replication. Journal of Derivatives 2, 78–95] and Carr et al. [Carr, P., Ellis, K., Gupta, V., 1998. Static hedging of exotic options. Journal of Finance 53, 1165–1190] to price and hedge American options under the Black-Scholes (1973) model and the constant elasticity of variance (CEV) model of Cox [Cox, J., 1975. Notes on option pricing I: Constant elasticity of variance diffusion. Working Paper, Stanford University]. The static hedge portfolio of an American option is formulated by applying the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions on the early exercise boundary. The results indicate that the numerical efficiency of our static hedge portfolio approach is comparable to some recent advanced numerical methods such as Broadie and Detemple [Broadie, M., Detemple, J., 1996. American option valuation: New bounds, approximations, and a comparison of existing methods. Review of Financial Studies 9, 1211–1250] binomial Black-Scholes method with Richardson extrapolation (BBSR). The accuracy of the SHP method for the calculation of deltas and gammas is especially notable. Moreover, when the stock price changes, the recalculation of the prices and hedge ratios of the American options under the SHP method is quick because there is no need to solve the static hedge portfolio again. Finally, our static hedging approach also provides an intuitive derivation of the early exercise boundary near expiration.     

Capital expenditures,financial constraints,and the use of options

This paper analyzes why gold mining firms use options instead of linear strategies to hedge their gold price risk. Consistent with financial constraints based theories, the largest and least financially constrained firms are the most likely to hedge with insurance strategies (put options), while more constrained firms finance the purchase of puts by selling calls (collars). The most financially constrained firms use strategies that involve selling calls. Firms with large investment programs are also more likely to use insurance rather than linear strategies. Firms’ hedging instrument choices are also correlated with current market conditions, suggesting that managers’ market views partially drive hedging instrument choices.     

A Theory of IPO Waves

In the IPO market, investors coordinate on acceptable IPO pricebased on the performance of past IPOs, and this generates anincentive for investment banks to produce information aboutIPO firms. In hot periods, the information produced by investmentbanks improves the quality of IPO firms, and this allows exante low quality firms to go public and increases the secondarymarket price, thus synchronizing high IPO volumes and high firstday returns. When investment banks behave asymmetrically ininformation production, the "reputations" of investment banksare interpreted as a form of market segmentation to economizeon the social cost of information production.     

Hedge fund networks,information dissemination,and stock price comovement: Evidence from China

We define a hedge fund network as consisting of weak ties based on common holdings. By creating a filtered dataset of stocks held by hedge funds in China from 2010 to 2019, we examine the effect of the network on stock return comovement and further test the incentive-compatible conditions for honest communication between competitors (Stein, 2008). First, we find that the weak ties in a social network affect the behaviour of hedge fund managers, when formal institutions are imperfect. Second, we find that listed firms held by hedge funds are exposed to an information network that is composed of hedge funds. The higher the hedge fund network density is, the more likely information dissemination is, and the weaker the stock price comovement is. Third, our results support Stein's (2008) two major conclusions: a network effect exists only within stable relationships, and the more central a stock is in the network, the stronger the network effect is. After controlling for various external factors that might influence the hedge fund network's information diffusion mechanism, all the results meet our theoretical expectations. Overall, we contribute to the literature by determining the role of the hedge fund network as an information transmitter in weak ties and by providing empirical evidence on the theory of honest communication among competitors.