Correlated bank runs,interbank markets and reserve requirements

This article extends the application of global games of Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) in the banking model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) to account for correlation in the quality of banks’ long term investment, when banks are linked through cross deposits and there is a central bank. The goal is to study how these elements affect the deposit contract that banks offer to depositors and the ex ante probability of a bank run. We show that the coexistence of a central bank, which determines banks’ reserve requirements, and an interbank market, which redistributes reserves, leads to a smaller probability of a bank run and to fewer inefficient bank runs, relative to the case with no central bank and no interbank market. By adequately choosing the level of reserves to store, the central bank can improve the equilibrium outcome and allow banks to offer a higher interim payment to depositors, relative to the situation with no cross deposits.     

The determinants of bank interest rate margins: an international study

This paper studies the determinants of bank net interest margins (NIMs) in six selected European countries and the US during the period 1988–1995 for a sample of 614 banks. We apply the Ho and Saunders model (Ho, T., Saunders, A., 1981. The determinants of bank interest margins: theory and empirical evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analyses 16, 581–600) to a multicountry setting and decompose bank margins into a regulatory component, a market structure component and a risk premium component. The regulatory components in the form of interest-rate restrictions on deposits, reserve requirements and capital-to-asset ratios have a significant impact on banks NIMs. The empirical results suggest an important policy trade-off between assuring bank solvency—high capital-to-asset ratios—and lowering the cost of financial services to consumers—low NIMs. The more segmented or restricted the banking system—both geographically and by activity—the larger appears to be the monopoly power of existing banks, and the higher their spreads. Macro interest-rate volatility was found to have a significant impact on bank NIMs; this suggests that macro policies consistent with reduced interest-rate volatility could have a positive effect in reducing bank margins.     

Chinese write-down bonds and bank capital structure

In this paper, we use a structural model to investigate a bank capital structure that contains deposits, straight bonds, Write-Down (WD) bonds and equity. We first explicitly give the default boundaries and the values of a deposit, straight bond, WD bond, equity and bank asset, and then use a numerical example to demonstrate the relations among leverage, deposits, WD bonds and bank value. Our results show that value-maximizing banks select the ratio of deposit, straight bond and WD debt so that endogenous default is consistent with exogenous bank closure. The bank increases its leverage by swapping both deposits and straight bonds for WD bonds. And the issuance of WD bonds not only reduces the expected bankruptcy loss and credit spread of straight bonds, but also improves the bank value. This indicates that WD bonds do help to stabilize banks. We also study the role of deposit insurance and the Chinese Financial Stability Bureau (FSB), and give a closed-form expression for the fair insurance premium. Lastly, to check the robustness of our results, we do the sensitivity analysis and investigate the effect of three sets of exogenous parameters on bank capital structure: WD parameters, bank business features, closure rules and insurance subsidy, and obtain some practically significant implications.     

结售汇如何影响银行风险承担水平?——基于银行资产负债表的视角

本文构建了一个基于银行资产负债表的理论模型,研究了结售汇对银行风险承担水平的影响机制,并采用结售汇报表数据进行实证检验。结果表明,为实现利润最大化,银行会将外汇流入创造的流动性用于投放较高风险的贷款,导致净结汇对银行风险承担水平有正向影响,异质性分析结果显示大型银行受影响程度高于中小银行。本文结论意味着,当考虑结售汇波动可能进一步加剧时,有必要出台更多结构性政策,补足外汇流入减少带来的货币缺口,优化存款市场结构,稳定金融机构流动性预期,以缓冲外需冲击可能带来的影响,并激励银行服务重心进一步下沉,为小微企业提供更多信贷支持,完成好金融服务实体经济的重要使命。     

Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

Governance by depositors,bank runs and ambiguity aversion

We investigate the theoretical relationship between ambiguity aversion and the decision to withdraw early from a deposit contract. We first document and define the concepts to illustrate our results. Then we extend the theoretical framework of Gorton (1985) to implement a model of maxmin expected utility to match the ambiguity aversion hypothesis. We observe that the most ambiguous depositors are more likely to mistakenly withdraw their deposits, reducing bank stability and leading to inefficient bank runs. We also show higher ambiguity levels negatively impact bank equity levels.     

The Regulation of Private Money*

Financial crises are bank runs. At root, the problem is short-term debt (private money), which while an essential feature of market economies, is inherently vulnerable to runs in all its forms (not just demand deposits). Bank regulation aims at preventing bank runs. History shows two approaches to bank regulation: the use of high-quality collateral to back banks’ short-term debt and government insurance for the short-term debt. Also, explicit or implicit limitations on entry into banking can create charter value (an intangible asset) that is lost if the bank fails. This can create an incentive for the bank to abide by the regulations and not take too much risk.     

Banking with nominal deposits and inside money

Bank runs in the literature take the form of withdrawals of demand deposits payable in real goods, which deplete a fixed reserve of goods in the banking system. That framework describes traditional bank runs based on currency withdrawals as occurred historically in the US and more recently in developing countries. However, in a modern banking system, large withdrawals typically take the form of electronic payments of inside money, with no analog of a depletion of a scarce reserve from the banking system. In a new framework of nominal demand deposits repayable in inside money, pure liquidity-driven bank runs do not occur. If there were excessive early withdrawals, nominal deposits would hedge the bank and flexible monetary prices in the goods market would limit real consumption. The maturity mismatch of short term liabilities and long term assets is not sufficient for multiple equilibria bank runs without other frictions. A key role of the bank is to ensure optimal real liquidity, which allows markets to optimally distribute consumption goods through the price mechanism.     

存款保险的行为金融分析

在银行挤兑和存款保险的理论研究方面,Byrant、Diamond和Gibbons等人提出的模型各有侧重,但都不能解释银行挤兑事件中的非理性行为.本文运用行为金融的期望理论和心理账户对低效率均衡出现的原因以及存款保险制度的作用和银行救助进行了分析,指出我国建立存款保险制度的必要性和意义.     

The interpretation of CBDC within an endogenous money framework

Central bank digital currency (CBDC) has increasingly received attention among policymakers and academics. From a theoretical perspective, the introduction of a CBDC arouses long-standing questions, foreseeing the possibility for the private (non-financial) sector to access the central bank reserves. The aim of this paper is to strengthen the understanding of the CBDC through the Endogenous Money Theory (EMT). The paper examines the balance sheets of the central bank, commercial banks, and the non-financial private system, tracking all the assets and liabilities of the macro-agents involved in the introduction of a CBDC. It explains the logical chain of relationships starting with the creation of bank loans from commercial banks, transformed into deposits, and ultimately converted into CBDC. Such a chain of relationships is also explained by amending the four quadrants model proposed by many post-Keynesian scholars.     

Commercial bank mutual fund activities: Implications for bank risk and profitability

This paper examines the risk structure of bank holding companies and the effect of mutual fund activities on bank risk and profitability over the period 1987–1994. Findings from structural change tests indicate a significant decline in bank risk occurred near the mid-point of the study. Results from a confirmatory factor analytic model employed to examine the impact of mutual fund activities on banks suggest that mutual fund activities moderated bank industry systematic risk during the sample period. Mutual fund activities also increased the profitability of banks. These results suggest that mutual funds represent a productive avenue of expansion for bank holding companies.     

How investor demands for safety influence bank capital and liquidity trade-offs

We construct a model of a bank’s optimal funding choice, where the bank negotiates with both safety-driven short-term bondholders and (mostly) risk-taking long-term bondholders. We establish that investor demands for safety create a negative relationship between the bank’s capital choices and short-term funding, as well as negative relationships between capital and common measures of bank liquidity. Short-term investors’ demands for safety force the bank to hold more collateral, which diminishes the demands by long-term bondholders for higher holdings of bank capital. Consistent with our model, our bank-level empirical analysis of these capital–liquidity trade-offs shows that bank liquidity measures have a strong and negative relationship to the capital ratio. Furthermore, we show that this trade-off does not appear to be regulation related and has diminished in size over time.     

Monetary policy effects in times of negative interest rates: What do bank stock prices tell us?

This paper investigates bank stock performance following different monetary policy actions in times of positive and negative interest rates. Controlling for the broader stock market, monetary policy announcements that cause an unanticipated downward shift in the yield curve and a flattening of the shorter-end of the yield curve are found to persistently reduce bank stock prices once the interest rate environment is negative. Consistent with the deposits channel of monetary policy, the effects are larger and more persistent for banks that are relatively dependent on deposit funding. By contrast, a surprise movement in the slope of the longer-end of the yield curve does not impact bank stock prices in times of negative interest rates. Accounting data confirm that a parallel drop in the yield curve following a monetary policy decision in a negative interest rate environment hurts banks through shrinking deposit margins.     

商业银行经营革命：流程银行的构想与现实

传统商业银行是典型的“部门银行”,其在业务流程、组织结构、管理方式以及企业文化上存在诸多缺陷。“流程银行”是一种全新管理模式,根据客户或市场需求设定业务流程,再根据业务流程设机构和配置人员;业务流程步骤经过整合,形成流程模块,可以避免重复劳作从而提高管理效率;围绕着业务流程,各环节配合衔接紧密,资源配置效率高。从“部门银行”向“流程银行”转型是中国商业银行经营改革的主导方向。     

How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.     

The positive side of bank wealth management products: Evidence from bank lending rate

The systemic risk and negative social impacts from bank-issued wealth management products (WMPs) are well studied by scholars and practitioners in China. Using hand-collected bank data, we find that WMPs help reduce banks’ cost of funds, which is then passed on to their borrowers as lower borrowing cost. This finding shows an upside of this controversial but increasingly popular bank product. We propose four mechanisms through which WMPs can lower banks’ cost of funds: structural change in deposits, cross-subsidization, liquidity effect, and related-party transactions. We find supporting evidence for those mechanisms, and their effects vary across state-owned, joint-stock, and city commercial banks. Those variations are consistent with the unique characteristics of each bank group. We further explore the competition for capital between state-owned and non-state-owned banks. The results suggest that state-owned banks offer significantly higher interest rates for deposits as non-state-owned banks expand in the same region. WMP issuance is likely a differentiation strategy in response to the competition for deposits.     

Liquidity crisis,relationship lending and corporate finance

This paper investigates the consequences of the liquidity shocks in wholesale funding markets during the 2007–2009 financial crisis on bank lending and corporate financing. We show that banks that relied more heavily on wholesale funding contracted lending more severely than banks that relied more on insured deposits. We then examine the effects of loan contraction on the financial positions of publicly traded firms. We find that both during and after the crisis, the change in leverage of bank-dependent firms is less than that of firms with access to public debt markets. In addition, bank-dependent firms rely more on cash than net equity issuance to finance operations. We also find that firms with established bank lending relationships weather the crisis better. Such firms are able to attain higher levels of leverage during the crisis, add to their cash holdings, secure new bank credit, and achieve higher profitability as a result.     

Resolving the deposit dilemma: A new DEA bank efficiency model

One of the weaknesses of current bank efficiency models is a disagreement as to the role of deposits in the bank production process. Some models view deposits as an input, while others view them as an output. Such disparity of approaches results in inconsistent efficiency estimates. In this study we propose an alternative Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) bank efficiency model that treats deposits as an intermediate product, thus emphasizing the dual role of deposits in the bank production process. Consequently, the effect of the amount of deposits on bank efficiency depends on the efficiency at both stages of the bank production process. The main advantage of our model is that it does not require a researcher to make a judgment call as to whether having more (production approach) or less (intermediation approach) deposits is “better” for bank efficiency. Our unified framework has the potential to produce more consistent efficiency estimates.     

中央银行沟通、实际干预与通货膨胀稳定

近年来,中央银行沟通已成为一种重要的货币政策工具。本文把中央银行沟通因素引入修正的卢卡斯总供给函数,发现加大中央银行沟通力度有利于引导通货膨胀预期,稳定通货膨胀。采用2003-2009年月度数据,利用结构向量自回归方法对中央银行沟通及实际干预在稳定通货膨胀中的作用进行实证研究,主要结论如下:(1)正的中央银行沟通冲击能有效降低通货膨胀预期以及名义通货膨胀率,且时滞短;(2)正的实际干预(包括银行贷款利率、央票利率及货币供应量)冲击,在短期内不但不能降低通货膨胀预期及名义通货膨胀率,反而会加剧通货膨胀,出现"价格之谜"现象。此外,本文对大多数情况下我国中央银行沟通模棱两可的合理性进行了解释。     

Deposit interest rates, asset risk and bank failure in Croatia

Financial deregulation, while beneficial in the long-term, seems to be linked to instability. Intense competition for deposits appears to be an ingredient in instability. We examine the aftermath of deregulation in Croatia, which included rapid growth of both deposits and deposit interest rates, followed by numerous bank failures.

Using panel regression techniques, we find evidence of “market-stealing” via high deposit interest rates. We connect high deposit interest rates to bank failure using logit models. High deposit interest rates were a reliable signal of risk-taking. When supervisory capabilities and powers are weak, deposit interest rate regulation may be worth considering.