A Critical Review of Homo Economicus from Five Approaches

Neoclassical economics is based on and structured around the notion of homo economicus. The theory of consumer choice, the theory of the firm, industrial organization, and welfare theorems all require the assumption that agents act in accordance with the scheme of individualistic rational optimization. In this context, our contribution is threefold. First, we delimit the notion of homo economicus according to five characteristics or dimensions. Second, we critically review this anthropological scheme from five distinct approaches, namely, behavioral economics, institutional economics, political economy, economic anthropology, and ecological economics. Third, we conclude that the scheme of homo economicus is clearly inadequate and deficient. However, despite its inadequacies, it remains one of the fundamental pillars of the neoclassical paradigm in economics, which allows us to discuss why we have not yet overcome this paradigm.     

On the Economics of Moral Preferences

Abstract . The long‐standing critique of the “economic model of man” has gained new impetus, not least due to the broadening research in behavioral and experimental economics. Many of the critics have focused on the apparent difficulty of traditional rational choice theory to account for the role of moral or ethical concerns in human conduct, and a number of authors have suggested modifications in the standard model in response to such critique. This article takes issue with a quite commonly adopted “revisionist” strategy, namely, seeking to account for moral concerns by including them as additional preferences in an agent's utility function. It is argued that this strategy ignores the critical difference between preferences over outcomes and preferences over actions, and that it fails to recognize that “moral preferences” belong in the second category. Preferences over actions, however, cannot be consistently accounted for within a theoretical framework that focuses on the rationality of single actions. They require a shift of perspective, from a theory of rational choice to a theory of rule‐following behavior.     

A Reconsideration of the Rationality Postulate: 'Right Hemisphere Thinking' in Economics

A bstract . The cardinal postulate of neoclassical economics is that individuals and entrepreneurs seek to maximize their unique positions in the world. Yet behind this postulate is an even more fundamental premise: that men are rational and can discern their own best interests. From Adam Smith on, it has been accepted that reasonable men act to maximize their own pecuniary advantage and in most economic models even the potential for irrationality is ignored. Nevertheless, it is becoming increasingly obvious from the research conclusions of other disciplines ( psychology, philosophy, political science, and sociology in particular) that the simplistic notion of " economic man ," posited so often in the economics literature, is more fancy than fact. There is an implicit recognition that the neoclassical assumptions may not be correct in the developing area of economic behaviorism. The economic behaviorists, however, adopt a more general definition of rationality, substituting what might be called a "modified rationality postulate" for the global rationality assumed in neoclassical theory. As a result, their conclusions do not differ greatly from those of the neoclassicists. Fortunately, ideas are now crystallizing in psychology which may enable us to shed light on decisions which previously would have had to be classified as non-rational, irrational, or unexplainable. Some of those ideas are explored.     

房地产泡沫的形成机理——基于行为经济学视角的分析

运用行为经济学相关理论,通过分析房地产市场微观主体从泡沫形成至泡沫破裂各阶段的心理和行为过程,探究了房地产泡沫形成的内在机理,并揭示了泡沫非理性的本质.最后针对房地产市场存在的非理性行为,提出应通过制度设计及借助税收杠杆等政策工具来规范房产交易、抑制过度投机,从而有效地防范和控制房价过度增长.     

Rational expectations and the econometric modeling of markets subject to uncertainty: A Bayesian approach

Rational expectations theory is synthesized with Bayesian econometric theory to yield econometrically relevant models of competitive markets subject to uncertainty. The theory is used to derive both optimal estimators of the parameters of a Cobb-Douglas production function from time series data, and the equilibrium predictor of a future price. It is shown that a rational expectations price predictor is always an unbiased predictor, but that the converse is not true. It is also shown that the rational expectations equilibrium is a natural extension of the usual notion of a competitive equilibrium.     

The meaning and measurement of behavior

From aformal point of view, all behavior involves thechoice orselection of one from among a set of behavioral options. While this commits us to a probabilistic and quantitative approach to behavioral inquiry, it tells us neither whatbehavioral probabilities are, nor how we should measure them. From a material point of view, however, behavior essentially involveseffort, that is, the expenditure of materialresources. For it is this which makes behavior bring about any observable effect on the state of the agent or its environment. This article analyzes the relationship between these two viewpoints. In particular, it explores the possibility and implications of interpreting and measuring behavioral probabilities in terms of the relative amounts of resources spent or invested in behavior, an issue which turns out to be a good deal more complex than it might initially seem to be.     

Revealed preferences of individual players in sequential games

This paper studies rational choice behavior of a player in sequential games of perfect and complete information without an assumption that the other players who join the same games are rational. The model of individually rational choice is defined through a decomposition of the behavioral norm assumed in the subgame perfect equilibria, and we propose a set of axioms on collective choice behavior that characterize the individual rationality obtained as such. As the choice of subgame perfect equilibrium paths is a special case where all players involved in the choice environment are each individually rational, the paper offers testable characterizations of both individual rationality and collective rationality in sequential games.     

行为金融视野下的资本结构研究及现实意义

资本结构理论是现代金融理论的重要基石之一。经典的资本结构理论以有效市场和理性人假设为基础,而一直忽视了对人心理活动及行为模式的研究,造成了理论与实际的背离。文章从行为金融角度出发,在一个全新的视野下,研究资本结构决策与非理性行为之间的关系,公司内部和外部行为阻碍对资本结构产生重要影响,在此基础上对我国公司投融资行为和股票市场实践有重要的现实意义。     

'Value Freedom' and the Scope of Economic Inquiry: II. The Fact/Value Continuum and the Basis for Scientific and Humanistic Policy

A bstract . Underlying the view of economic methodologists that the economist in his professional capacity is prohibited from making value judgments concerning policy ends is the assumption that there exists an irreducible gap between statements of fact and value judgments, such that value judgments are incapable of receiving support on the basis of scientific inquiry. Once a strict fact/value dualism is seen to be untenable, and once it is recognized that value judgments can be grounded in human needs and interests, the standard "purist" conception of the scope of economic inquiry can be rejected in favor of a "humanist" conception. It is argued that adoption of the wider "humanist" conception of the proper goals of economic inquiry is an important step in the development of an economic science responsive to the basic needs, interests, and aspirations of human beings.     

消费者的非理性行为及营销对策浅析

消费者的理性消费是无法完全实现的,只能集中在某个限度之内,现实中人们在做出消费决策时绝大部分时间不会考虑非常周全,非理性消费在所难免,这对于商家有不可或缺的意义,商家要正确看待非理性消费的特征,合理利用非理性消费诱因,积极展开营销活动。     

Production theory with profit-constrained revenue-maximization: The duality approach

This paper derives a general version of Baumol's production theory, where the main behavioral assumption is ‘revenue maximization subject to a profit constraint’ instead of ‘profit maximization’. This theory turns out to be analogous to the neoclassical (competitive) production and consumption theories. Employing the fruitful duality approach it is presented here in a unified and very economical form that provides a complete and general analysis of the comparative static behavior of Baumol's firm.     

The influence of exchange hazards and power on opportunism in outsourcing relationships

Service provider opportunism is widely noted as a principal risk with outsourcing. Indeed, economic theory regarding the factors which influence the outsourcing decision, treats opportunism as a core behavioral assumption. It is assumed that if given the opportunity, outsourcing providers will act in a self-serving manner despite the potentially negative impact it may have on their customer. Other researchers have suggested that opportunism is not an unwavering human behavior, but rather can be substantively influenced by the management practices which define the relationship. Building on these arguments, this study investigates the validity of these divergent positions. Hierarchical linear regression is used to examine dyadic data on 102 information technology, logistics, and other business process outsourcing relationships. We test a model which hypothesizes that the buying firm's reliance on different bases of inter-firm power will have differing effects on the risk of opportunism (shirking and poaching). These hypotheses are evaluated while concurrently examining the influence of exchange hazards (relationship-specific investments and technological uncertainty) on provider shirking and poaching. The results offer strong evidence that buyer reliance on mediated forms of power (i.e. rewards, coercive, legal legitimate) enhance the risk of both provider shirking and poaching, while non-mediated power (i.e. expert, referent) is associated with a diminished level of opportunistic behavior. Interestingly, relationship-specific investments have a significant effect on some forms of opportunistic behavior but not on other forms of opportunistic behavior. Technological uncertainty did not have a significant impact on provider opportunism.     

Survey evidence on the rationality of expectations

Data on expectations collected by business surveys offer the opportunity to test the rational expectation hypothesis. Tests directly based on qualitative data are not powerful because of the nature of the data. An alternative method is proposed in this paper. We apply the usual orthogonality conditions of rationality to the unobservable variables which are assumed to trigger the categorical responses of surveys when they cross certain thresholds. To implement the test, an original estimation method for latent variable models using indicators is required. The results show that the Hypothesis is not always rejected for the expectations of changes in demand drawn from surveys of French manufacturing industry.     

Gendered work engagement: qualitative insights from Jordan

Abstract

Work engagement is assumed, implicitly, to be gender-neutral where women and men have equal opportunities to demonstrate their engagement in the workplace. This paper questions this assumption and integrates gender into the notion of work engagement by investigating and contextualising the factors that affect the genderedness of work engagement. It uses gendered organisation theory and engagement theory to expose the gendered nature of work engagement. Interviewing thirty-six employees from three telecommunication companies in Jordan, it is found that the notion of work engagement is neither gender neutral nor universal, and that the presence of inequality regimes means that women may have less opportunity to experience engagement, and certainly the opportunity will vary across contexts.     

The Role of 'Good Conversation' In Strategic Control

Most current writers on strategic control, whether from the rational planning or processual schools, agree on the importance of dialogue and debate between the interested parties to the control process. This is particularly so when strategic control is regarded in a ‘warning bell’ sense, responding to a signal that all is not going according to plan, rather than as a behavioural constraint or as an element of agency theory practice. This paper advances a normative framework for ensuring the effectiveness of such discussions based on Bird's notion of a ‘good conversation’. Bird argued that the discussion of business ethical problems should be vocal, reciprocating, issues-oriented, rational, imaginative, and honest. It is argued here that these characteristics should also apply to the discussions within the strategic control process if the process is not to be dysfunctional.     

The Endogenous Economist:

A bstract . In the social sciences there exist links of communication and influence between the scientists and the actors of the modelled social systems. Social scientists are therefore endogenous parts of the systems which they study. Theories and models shouid be self-referential. The treatment of information in the rational choice models of the new classical theory, with its core assumption of rational expectations , has stopped short of extending the concept of endogeneity to the economists themselves. Economic theory proceeds on the assumption that it yields the true model and that the actors in the system share this same model even though economists have not yet agreed on this unique model. Moreover, it assumes that economists' disputes about the true model do not prompt the actors of the system to take positions and opt for one or the other of the discussed models. The use of a unique model perspective to interpret the response of financial markets to monetary announcements leads to inconclusive interpretations of the evidence. These findings are better interpreted as the result of multi model competition that has spilled over from academic science to the financial markets themselves.     

More hedging instruments may destabilize markets

This paper formalizes the idea that more hedging instruments may destabilize markets when traders have heterogeneous expectations and adapt their behavior according to performance-based reinforcement learning. In a simple asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs the introduction of additional Arrow securities may destabilize markets, and thus increase price volatility, and at the same time decrease average welfare. We also investigate whether a fully rational agent can employ additional hedging instruments to stabilize markets. It turns out that the answer depends on the composition of the population of non-rational traders and the information gathering costs for rationality.     

On the Use and Utility of the Reliability Coefficient in Social and Behavioral Research

This note discusses the use and utility of the reliability concept in social and behavioral research. The focus is on the meaning and limitations of the classical test theory reliability coefficient. Conditions are examined under which reliability is a meaningful notion, and the amount of information it can provide then. Issues pertaining to limitations of the practice of social and behavioral measurement and its implications for indices of measurement accuracy are subsequently discussed.     

Tests for bounded rationality with a linear dynamic model distorted by heterogeneous expectations

The purpose of this paper is to develop a methodology which will use economic data to detect the existence of boundedly rational economic agents. The bounded rationality model presented in this paper generalizes a linear dynamic rational expectations model by nesting two types of expectations. In this paper, it is claimed that the bounded rationality model as presented can be transformed into an optimal regulator problem with distortions. As a result, the methodologies developed by the optimal control theory can be used to solve the model. The likelihood function for the model is constructed by the Kalman filtering using the solution of the model. Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is performed to test for bounded rationality in the U.S. cattle market for the period from 1900 to 1990. The empirical results indicate that some fraction of economic agents in the market are boundedly rational.