Monetary Policy and Financial Markets

Monetary policy and financial markets are intrinsically linked. Central banks conduct monetary policy by influencing financial market prices. Financial market prices reflect the expectations of market participants about future economic and monetary developments. Monetary policy works primarily through expectations. Transparency and credibility render monetary policy more effective. However, they are no substitutes for action. If a credible central bank uses words with the explicit aim of substituting them for action, it will risk losing credibility. To avoid what has been described as “the dog chasing its tail” problem, central banks must exercise caution in basing their monetary policy decisions on financial market information. The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against economic and monetary indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy.     

Financial institutions’ business models and the global transmission of monetary policy

Global financial institutions play an important role in channeling funds across countries and, therefore, transmitting monetary policy from one country to another. In this paper, we study whether such international transmission depends on financial institutions’ business models. In particular, we use Dutch, Spanish, and U.S. confidential supervisory data to test whether the transmission operates differently through banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. We find marked heterogeneity in the transmission of monetary policy across the three types of institutions, across the three banking systems, and across banks within each banking system. While insurance companies and pension funds do not transmit home-country monetary policy internationally, banks do, with the direction and strength of the transmission determined by their business models and balance sheet characteristics.     

全球金融周期、美国货币政策与“三元悖论”

全球金融周期存在的背景下“三元悖论”是否依然成立充满争议。本文通过构建包含银行与金融摩擦的两国DSGE模型,为考察全球金融周期的形成提供了理论依据。美国货币政策通过资本流动传导到外围国金融市场,使外围国信贷利率、银行风险承担以及杠杆率与美国银行趋同,形成全球金融周期。金融渠道的传导速度快于实体经济渠道导致外围国国内经济周期与金融周期相背离,外围国想要稳定经济就不得不与美国保持同向的政策利率变化,货币政策独立性将不再存在。随着全球经济一体化进程加速,估值效应的作用越来越明显,浮动汇率制度并不能隔离全球金融周期的影响也无法保证货币政策的独立性。在资本账户开放的情况下,外围国金融市场越不发达,受全球金融周期的影响越大,货币政策越不独立。     

The effect of industry consolidation and deposit insurance reform on the resiliency of the U.S. bank insurance fund

We examine the effects of structural change in the U.S. banking industry, as well as key regulatory changes, including recently enacted deposit insurance reform legislation, on the resiliency of the FDIC-administered bank insurance fund (BIF) by estimating and comparing the probability of BIF insolvency over time. We do this using a Markov-switching model that relies on historical patterns of BIF disbursements to define the probability of switching among three “states” of the banking industry's financial health. Monte Carlo simulations are then performed to project the financial condition of the BIF over a 50-year period. Our results indicate that the insolvency risk to the bank insurance fund has increased significantly due to industry consolidation, and is mainly due to the concentration of deposits in the 10 largest U.S. banking companies. We also find that recent deposit insurance reforms will cause only a marginal reduction in the risk of BIF insolvency. The increased risk associated with a more concentrated industry structure simply dominates the reform effect.     

德国中央银行监管角色及其对我国的启示

德国金融服务体系发达成熟,并一直奉行全能银行制度,实行混业经营,银行业、证券业、保险业可以在同一实体内运作。但是,德国金融系统的稳定性也是世界公认的,这与其严格谨慎的金融监管体系不无关系。德国中央银行在独立制定和执行货币政策的同时,一直扮演着金融监管的重要角色,成为德国金融稳定发展不可或缺的因素。本文分析了德国中央银行金融监管角色的演变及其履行监管角色的方式,揭示其对中国金融监管制度安排的若干启示。     

金融深化是化解民间借贷危机的根本途径

以温州为代表的民间借贷危机的发生,折射出我国金融体制方面的制度性问题。金融压抑是民间借贷危机的根本原因,银行大企业集团等参与民间放贷对危机发生推波助澜,紧缩的货币政策是民间借贷危机爆发的导火索。金融深化是化解民间借贷危机的根本途径。民间借贷危机爆发,也倒逼金融体制要加快改革步伐,现在到了该放开金融领域进入和利率管制,打破现有银行垄断体制,建立由市场资金供求决定各种利率水平的市场利率体系的时候了。     

央行财政存款缴存管理与货币政策执行效果的思考--以广西为例

金融机构缴存的财政存款作为中央银行的资金来源之一,对中央银行实施货币政策进行宏观调控具有重要作用。本文通过对近年来金融机构在人民银行缴存财政存款存在问题的分析,阐述其对银行体系流动性管理的影响,以及对央行货币政策执行效果的间接影响。因此,应通过加强对财政性存款缴存的管理,将财政政策和货币政策调控手段紧密结合,以提高货币政策执行效果。     

2010年河南省金融稳定报告

2010年,面对复杂的国际国内经济环境,河南省辖区金融业总体保持了健康平稳发展.银行业继续保持良好运行趋势,不良贷款持续"双降",盈利能力不断增强,防范和化解风险能力进一步增强.证券业呈现加快发展态势,市场经营主体数量快速增加,上市公司质量显著提高.保险业市场运行安全稳健,经营效益明显改善,市场秩序持续向好.金融市场运行总体平稳,货币市场业务稳步发展.金融服务基础设施建设稳步推进,金融生态环境建设长效机制进一步确立,为促进河南经济金融健康发展、维护区域金融稳定提供了重要保障.然而,辖区金融业稳定运行面临的困难和挑战仍然较多,经济发展方式转变和结构调整压力更为突出,尤其在宏观调控政策效应进一步释放、流动性趋紧、不确定因素增多的情况下,金融运行中的新旧问题和潜在风险应引起足够重视.     

Interest rate smoothing and financial stability

Central banks smooth fluctuations in interest rates based on a belief that this policy promotes financial stability. This belief is based on a presumption that the direct effect of less interest rate volatility on a bank's likelihood of insolvency is the predominant effect of this policy. The main point of this paper is that these policies also give rise to indirect effects that lower financial stability. These indirect effects occur because the policy itself alters bank behavior. In effect, if the central bank provides (liquidity) insurance (at zero premia), it may introduce a classic moral hazard problem that encourages risk taking by banks. As a result, to maintain a given degree of financial stability, a bank regulator may, in fact, need to impose a higher prudential capital requirement when an interest rate smoothing policy is in place. The paper concludes that the link between interest rate smoothing policy and financial stability may be more complicated than is generally recognized.     

影子银行对货币政策的影响

随着2007年全球金融危机爆发,学界和社会公众再度提高对金融监管与宏观货币政策的重视。影子银行是金融创新的产物,在给资本市场和产品市场带来活力的同时也使得人们更加关注影子银行对货币市场和货币政策的影响。本文基于信用与宏观经济学理论并利用中国化宏观数据进行论证,将市场利率划分为商业银行体系利率与影子银行体系利率并以贷款基准利率作为商业银行的总体利率,以一年期国债到期收益率作为影子银行利率,以市盈利率作为整个经济体系的实际利率,并利用线性回归给出三者间的关系。结果表明我国的影子银行在一定程度上可以起到降低社会总体融资成本、促进经济增长的作用,但也给物价和金融稳定施加一定的压力,在短期内会加快我国的货币流通速度,降低我国货币政策有效性。     

政策连续性与商业银行系统性风险

本文基于2007年第一季度至2019年第四季度中国A股32家上市银行非平衡面板数据,从“冲击”和“传染”两个维度考察了政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响。实证结果表明,政策连续性程度的提高通过降低银行个体风险和减弱银行个体与系统的关联性进而显著降低了银行系统性风险。进一步分析发现,政策连续性降低了银行被动风险承担水平而非主动风险承担意愿,减弱了银行间接关联程度而非直接关联程度。异质性分析表明,经济下行和货币宽松时期,政策连续性对系统性风险的降低效应更大,并且本身破产风险越高、信息透明度越低的银行,其系统性风险受政策连续性的影响越大。区分不同类型的政策发现,货币政策、财政政策、汇率与资本项目政策的连续性上升均能显著降低银行系统性风险,其中货币政策连续性对银行系统性风险的影响力度最大。     

How successful are banking sector reforms in emerging market economies? Evidence from impact of monetary policy on levels and structures of firm debt in India

Many emerging markets have undertaken significant financial sector reforms, especially in their banking sectors, that are critical for both financial development and real economic activity. In this paper, we investigate the success of banking reforms in India where significant banking reforms were implemented during the 1990s. Using the argument that well-functioning credit markets would reflect a credit channel for monetary policy at work, we test whether a change in monetary policy has a predictable impact on borrowing behaviour of several types of firms, including business group affiliated, unaffiliated private firms, state-owned firms and foreign firms. The empirical results suggest that unaffiliated private firms have the most vulnerable to monetary policy stance during tight policy regimes. We also find that during tight monetary policy regimes, bank credit of smaller firms is more sensitive to changes in the interest rate than that of large firms. In an easy money regime, monetary policy and the associated change in interest rate does not affect change in bank credit, change in total debt and the proportion of bank credit in total debt for any of the firms. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.     

International spillovers of monetary policy: Lessons from Chile,Korea, and Poland

In this paper, we assess evidence on international monetary policy spillovers to domestic bank lending in Chile, Korea, and Poland, using confidential bank-level data and different measures of monetary policy shocks in relevant currency areas. These three emerging market economies are small and open, their banking systems do not have significant presence overseas, and they can be considered as price takers in the world economy. Such features allow for better identification of binding financial constraints and foreign monetary policy shocks. We find that the monetary policy shocks spill over into domestic bank lending, modifying the degree to which financial frictions tighten or relax, and this evidence is consistent with international bank lending and portfolio channels.     

金融稳定有关问题研究综述

金融稳定是一个古老而又现代、历久而又弥新的课题,其引起广泛关注是与 20世纪90年代以来世界各国频仍发生、带来惨重损失的金融危机及由此引发的社会动荡联系在一起的。金融稳定方面的理论研究在国內外尚处于起步的阶段。本文综述了国际上对金融稳定几个主要问题的研究进展状况,重点就金融稳定的框架、货币政策和金融稳定与中央银行和金融稳定等问题梳理、分析和评述了现有文献,以便促进金融稳定研究的进一步深入。     

The international transmission of monetary policy through financial centres: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Hong Kong

This paper explores the cross-border transmission of monetary policy by comparing and contrasting the results for two major international financial centres: Hong Kong and the United Kingdom. We examine the effect of monetary policy in the USA, euro area and Japan, on banks’ domestic lending behaviour. Using individual bank-level data we find that financial connections – in the form of lending to and borrowing from the country which changes monetary policy - play an important role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy. We are able to establish evidence for both a bank funding and bank portfolio channel of monetary policy, for both Hong Kong and the UK. These results contrast to the largely inconclusive results from previous studies, whose aggregate nature may have masked offsetting individual bank effects.     

Monetary policy and financial stability in a banking economy: Transmission mechanism and policy tradeoffs

The 2008 global financial crisis demonstrated that monetary policy and financial stability policy are more highly interrelated than previously thought. This paper analyzes the interactions between these policies using a non-linear overlapping-generations model with financial frictions in the form of banking financial intermediation. The paper embeds negative externalities due to contagion effects in physical investments which creates the need for financial stability policy. We show how the monetary policy transmission mechanism depends on financial stability policy tools as well as on regulatory and institutional constraints.We find policy tradeoffs in trying to accomplish both monetary and financial stability targets. The central bank must take these tradeoffs into account when selecting the tools in its policy toolbox. Another important finding is the interchangeability of price stability and financial stability policy tools.     

The Impact of Foreign Banks on Monetary Policy Transmission During the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–2009: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the impact of foreign banks on the monetary policy transmission mechanism in the Korean economy during the period from 2000 to 2012, with a specific focus on the lending behavior of banks with different types of ownership. Using bank-level panel data of the banking system in Korea, we present consistent evidence on the buffering impact that the foreign banks, especially foreign bank branches including US bank branches, on the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Korea from the bank-lending channel perspective during the global financial crisis of 2008–2009.     

Monetary policy and financial stability in the long run: A simple game-theoretic approach

Many theoretical central bank models use short horizons and focus on a single tradeoff. However, in reality, central banks play complex, long-horizon games and face more than one tradeoff. We account for these strategic interactions in a simple infinite-horizon game with a novel tradeoff: tighter monetary policy deters financial imbalances, but looser monetary policy reduces the likelihood of insolvency. We term these factors discipline and stability effects, respectively. The central bank's welfare decreases with dependence between real and financial shocks, so it may reduce costs with correlation-indexed securities. An independent central bank cannot in general attain both low inflation and financial stability.     

A New Development Database. Deposit Insurance around the World

In the past two decades, in a series of banking crises aroundthe world, banks have become systematically insolvent. Thesecrises have occurred in developed and developing economies alike.To make such financial system breakdowns less likely and tolimit their costs if they occur, policymakers feel the needfor financial safety nets. These include such policies as implicitor explicit deposit insurance, a lender of last resort functionof the central bank, bank insolvency resolution procedures,and bank regulation and supervision. Of these policies, explicitdeposit insurance has been gaining popularity in recent years.Since the 1980s the number of countries with explicit depositinsurance schemes almost tripled, with most OECD countries andan increasing number of developing economies adopting some formof explicit depositor protection. In 1994 deposit insurancebecame the standard for the newly created single banking marketof the European Union. Establishing an explicit deposit insurancescheme became part of the generally accepted best practice advicegiven to developing economies.     

Countercyclical Bank Capital Requirement and Optimized Monetary Policy Rules

Using BoC-GEM-Fin, a large-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with real, nominal, and financial frictions featuring a banking sector, we explore the macroeconomic implications of various types of countercyclical bank capital regulations. Results suggest that countercyclical capital requirements have a significant stabilizing effect on key macroeconomic variables, but mostly after financial shocks. Moreover, the bank capital regulatory policy and monetary policy interact, and this interaction is contingent on the type of shocks that drive the economic cycle. Finally, we analyze loss functions based on macroeconomic and financial variables to arrive at an optimal countercyclical regulatory policy in a class of simple implementable Taylor-type rules. Compared to bank capital regulatory policy, monetary policy is able to stabilize the economy more efficiently after real shocks. On the other hand, financial shocks require the regulator to be more aggressive in loosening/tightening capital requirements for banks, even as monetary policy works to counter the deviations of inflation from the target.