Market or limit orders?

In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal order placement of an asset listed on an exchange using both market and limit orders in a simple model of market dynamics. We seek to understand under which settings it is optimal to place limit or market orders. Limit orders typically lower transaction costs but increase the risk of incomplete order execution, whereas market orders typically have higher transaction costs but are guaranteed to be executed. Rather than considering order book dynamics to determine if a limit order is executed we rely on price dynamics for this. We look at implementation shortfall in this setup with market impact of trading and propose a dynamic program to find the optimal placement of both market and limit orders for risk-neutral and risk-averse traders. With this we find a bound on the expected cost of trading and show that a trader who behaves optimally should always expect to pay less to trade less. We then solve the dynamic program numerically and examine optimal order placement strategies. We find that the decision between market and limit orders is sensitive to price volatility, risk aversion, and trading costs.     

经济政策不确定性如何影响企业出口决策？——基于出口频率的视角

出口频率作为出口决策的重要一环,是企业出口扩张的新边际,也是出口变化的“晴雨表”。本文在随机存货模型的基础上,考察了经济政策不确定性对企业出口频率的影响及其传导渠道,并采用2000-2006年工业企业数据库与海关数据库的匹配数据进行实证检验,结果发现:目的国经济政策不确定性增加会显著降低企业出口频率,且这一影响存在部分惯性效应;经济政策不确定性通过贸易成本、存货成本和市场需求波动共同影响企业出口频率的中介效应十分显著,其中贸易成本是最重要的传导渠道,占比达到19%以上;如果进一步考虑目的国、产品和企业异质性,会发现出口目的国经济发展水平较高、出口产品为中间品和消费品的企业,其出口频率受经济政策不确定性的影响较小。因此,政府和企业应高度关注出口频率的变化趋势,合理应对经济政策不确定性对出口决策的外部冲击。     

Optimal trading strategy and supply/demand dynamics

In this paper, we study how the intertemporal supply/demand of a security affects trading strategy. We develop a general framework for a limit order book market to capture the dynamics of supply/demand. We show that the optimal strategy to execute an order does not depend on the static properties of supply/demand such as bid–ask spread and market depth, it depends on their dynamic properties such as resilience: the speed at which supply/demand recovers to its steady state after a trade. In general, the optimal strategy is quite complex, mixing large and small trades, and can substantially lower execution cost. Large trades remove the existing liquidity to attract new liquidity, while small trades allow the trader to further absorb any incoming liquidity flow.     

Limit order books and trade informativeness

In the microstructure literature, information asymmetry is an important determinant of market liquidity. The classic setting is that uninformed dedicated liquidity suppliers charge price concessions when incoming market orders are likely to be informationally motivated. In limit order book (LOB) markets, however, this relationship is less clear, as market participants can switch roles, and freely choose to immediately demand or patiently supply liquidity by submitting either market or limit orders. We study the importance of information asymmetry in LOBs based on a recent sample of 30 German Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) stocks. We find that Hasbrouck's (1991) measure of trade informativeness Granger causes book liquidity, in particular that required to fill large market orders. Picking-off risk due to public news-induced volatility is more important for top-of-the book liquidity supply. In our multivariate analysis, we control for volatility, trading volume, trading intensity and order imbalance to isolate the effect of trade informativeness on book liquidity.     

Trade credit and cost stickiness

Using a large sample of US data, we examine the relation between trade credit and cost behaviour and further investigate the moderating effects on this relation of agency problem, product market competition, and customer concentration. We find that firms using high levels of trade credit exhibit lower cost stickiness and this is prevalent in the high agency problem sub‐sample. In addition, in a non‐competitive market, where the agency problem arises owing to lack of competition, trade credit plays an external monitoring role by attenuating cost stickiness. However, high customer concentration curtails this monitoring ability.     

International business: determinants of interbank activities

This paper investigates the determinants of the international interbank market, a significant component of international trade in financial services. The sample encompasses both monthly and quarterly data from 1983 to 1993. The superiority of the monthly results suggest that the interbank market should be modelled within a short-term framework. This data interval captures the short-term movement of funds between currencies, Eurobonds, the nonbank market and the domestic banking market by banks to maximize returns. Moreover, the interbank market does not necessarily move in line with fundamental trade and income variables. Rather, the market is sensitive to return differentials, the relative cost of capital, the yield curve and international nonbank assets. The empirical results also indicate that nationality remains important in interbank trading because of the advantages it imparts on the home country in dealing in its home currency, particularly if that currency is a vehicle currency.     

Endogenous pricing to market and financing costs

This paper explains why relative PPP should hold more tightly in emerging markets, and why pricing to market would be observed more frequently in the OECD countries. It studies the endogenous determination of pricing to market, in a real option model with time-dependent transportation costs, where the future terms of trade are random. Allowing time-dependent transportation costs adds a dimension of investment to the pre-buying of imports, implying that financial considerations determine the frequency of pricing to market, and the deviations from relative PPP. If the expected discounted cost of last minute delivery is higher than pre-buying, one exercises the option of spot market imports if the realized terms of trade are favorable enough. Pricing to market is observed in countries characterized by low terms of trade volatility and low financing costs. In these circumstances, imports are pre-bought, and the spot market for imports is inactive. In countries where the financing costs and the terms of trade volatility are high, few imports are pre-bought, the price of imports is determined by the realized real exchange rate, and a version of relative PPP holds. With an intermediate level of terms of trade volatility and of financing costs, a mixed regime is observed. If the realized real exchange rate is weak, pricing to market would prevail, increasing consumers’ welfare by shielding them from the adverse purchasing power consequences of weak terms of trade. If the realized real exchange rate is favorable enough, more imports are purchased in the spot market, and the relative PPP would hold. Higher financing costs increase the cost of pre-buying imports, reducing thereby the frequency of pricing to market, increasing the expected relative price of imports, reducing the expected deviations from relative PPP, and reducing welfare.     

企业生产效率异质性、汇率传递与净出口

汇率波动的价格传递以及对国际收支的影响与传统的理解存在差异。汇率波动如果影响了市场结构和企业生产效率分布,那么汇率传递具有长期效应。决定贸易顺差的关键因素是国内外市场需求特征和国内外相对生产成本的大小,汇率波动影响物价、贸易收支的大小取决于生产企业的效率分布状况和市场结构。     

Liquidity as a choice variable: a lesson from the Japanese government bond market

In Japan, almost identical government bonds can trade at largeprice differentials. Motivated by this phenomenon, we examinethe issue of the value of liquidity in markets for risklesssecurities. We develop a model of an issuer of bonds, a marketmaker, and heterogeneous investors trading in an incompletemarket. We show not only that divergent prices for similar securitiescan be sustained in a rational expectations equilibrium butalso that this divergence may be optimal from the perspectiveof the issuer. Price segmentation is possible because agentshave a desire to trade, but short-sale restrictions limit theirtrading strategies and prevent them from forcing bond pricesto be equal. Restricting the form of market making to excludeprice competition and unregulated profit maximization is alsonecessary to sustain price segmentation. The optimality of segmentationfrom the issuer's standpoint arises because of the issuer'sability to charge for the liquidity services provided to theinvestors.     

Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high‐risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low‐risk consumers. Insurers then have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate insurers for serving high‐risk agents. Second, we identify a trade‐off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low‐risk market to the less elastic high‐risk market. Third, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus further, at the cost of efficiency.     

Prospect theory and a manager's decision to trade a blind principal bid basket

We analyze asset managers' decisions to execute substantial baskets of stocks. Such transactions can be executed in two ways. The first method is through blind auctions with unique features known as blind principal bids (BPBs). The manager learns the trading cost once the auction process determines the commission. The second method is to use an agency trade. In this case, the asset manager faces an actual trading cost that is unknown before execution due to market impact uncertainty. Using proprietary data, we investigate the manager's choice between BPBs and agency trade in a natural experiment with large monetary stakes. The volume traded in each sample basket is significant, which can amount to over 0.5% of the NYSE daily share volume. Our findings show that managers' behavior is more consistent with prospect theory than the expected utility framework. When asset managers trade BPB baskets, they are reluctant to realize the potential higher cost of agency trade and opt for the fixed cost of BPBs instead. Thus, our results complement the literature on the disposition effect by demonstrating that managers' trading cost decisions exhibit “play it safe” behavior.     

The Costs of Restrictive Trade Policies in the Presence of Factor Tax Distortions

This paper uses a numerical general equilibrium model to examine the quantitative importance of pre-existing factor tax distortions for the welfare effects of tariffs and import quotas. The presence of pre-existing taxes can greatly raise the costs of these policies, possibly by over several hundred percent. For a tariff much of this extra cost can be offset if tariff revenues are used to reduce distortionary taxes. Hence there can be a large cost discrepancy between tariffs and quotas. The optimal tariff for a country with market power in trade can be reduced to zero, unless revenues finance cuts in distortionary taxes.     

Specialist participation and limit orders

We present a market microstructure model to examine specialist's strategic participation decisions in a security market where there are noise traders, limit order traders, an insider and a specialist. We argue that the specialist's participation rate depends on the depth of the limit book and its uncertainty. In particular, the specialist has incentives to trade against the market trend when the limit book depth is low and to trade with the market trend when the depth is high. Moreover, the specialist's participation rate is positively related to the limit book depth uncertainty and the asset price volatility, but is negative related to the average trading volume. We also discuss the specialist's participation strategies under the NYSE regulation that prohibits the specialist from trading with the market trend.     

Do brokers' recommendation changes generate brokerage? Evidence from a central limit order market

We examine the short‐term response to recommendation changes on the Australian Securities Exchange, a central limit order market. In both central limit order markets and dealer‐driven markets, clients may reward the recommending broker with increased trade volumes. But a central limit order market does not have mandatory market makers and hence provides greater opportunity to free ride. We find evidence supporting the hypothesis that recommending brokers are rewarded with higher trade volumes and brokerage commission. Consistent with the tipping hypothesis, these rewards are concentrated in the period shortly before the release. There is no evidence of free riding.     

Competition for Order Flow and Smart Order Routing Systems

We study the rivalry between Euronext and the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in the Dutch stock market to test hypotheses about the effect of market fragmentation. As predicted by our theory, the consolidated limit order book is deeper after entry of the LSE. Moreover, cross‐sectionally, we find that a higher trade‐through rate in the entrant market coincides with less liquidity supply in this market. These findings imply that (i) fragmentation of order flow can enhance liquidity supply and (ii) protecting limit orders against trade‐throughs is important.     

Monitoring and limit order submission risks

This paper presents a formal analysis of the relation between monitoring and limit order submission risk. With heterogeneous information, limit order traders face two types of risk. First, they may be “picked off” when prices change unexpectedly after the limit order is entered (known as free trading option risk). Second, they face the possibility that their limit order will not result in a trade. To mitigate these risks, traders can monitor information and prices and cancel or revise their orders as needed. But such monitoring is costly, resulting in a trade-off between the cost of monitoring and the risks of limit order submission. The model predicts that if the stock is actively traded, limit order submission risks and order cancellations/revisions are positively related. Further, shares with a wide bid-ask spread will tend to have a lower rate of order cancellations and revisions than shares with small bid-ask spreads. Finally, the model suggests that if larger capitalization stocks have lower costs of gathering information (and hence more intense monitoring of limit orders), there will be more cancellations and revisions in limit orders. A sample of 23 liquid stocks provides evidence that is consistent with these three main hypotheses.     

THE DYNAMICS OF QUOTED LIQUIDITY AROUND LARGE TRADES ON THE NYSE

Large trades have potentially disruptive effects on the continuation of subsequent trade. If the large trade executes against volume from limit orders or specialist quotations, continued trade may be unavailable until new liquidity enters the market. Evidence presented in this paper indicates that large trades on the NYSE are followed by decreases in quoted liquidity, which last for an average of fifteen minutes. Both the decreases in quoted liquidity and the time to its subsequent return are related to trade-specific factors. This evidence suggests that not all large trades have the same effect on the continuation of trade.     

Estimating the Gains from Trade in Limit-Order Markets

We present a method to estimate the gains from trade in limit‐order markets and provide empirical evidence that the limit‐order market is a good market design. Using observations on order submissions and execution and cancellation histories, we estimate both the distribution of traders' unobserved valuations for the stock and latent trader arrival rates. We use the resulting estimates to compute the current gains from trade, the gains from trade in a perfectly liquid market, and the gains from trade with a monopoly liquidity supplier. The current gains are 90% of the maximum gains and 150% of the monopolist gains.     

Mechanics of good trade execution in the framework of linear temporary market impact

We define the concept of good trade execution and we construct explicit adapted good trade execution strategies in the framework of linear temporary market impact. Good trade execution strategies are dynamic, in the sense that they react to the actual realisation of the traded asset price path over the trading period; this is paramount in volatile regimes, where price trajectories can considerably deviate from their expected value. Remarkably, however, the implementation of our strategies does not require the full specification of an SDE evolution for the traded asset price, making them robust across different models. Moreover, rather than minimising the expected trading cost, good trade execution strategies minimise trading costs in a pathwise sense, a point of view not yet considered in the literature. The mathematical apparatus for such a pathwise minimisation hinges on certain random Young differential equations that correspond to the Euler–Lagrange equations of the classical Calculus of Variations. These Young differential equations characterise our good trade execution strategies in terms of an initial value problem that allows for easy implementations.     

Characteristics of the order flow through an electronic open limit order book

We estimate and examine certain characteristics of the order flow through an electronic open limit order book, using order (not trade) data. In doing this, we bring out new evidence on order flow from a market with microstructure different from that of the NYSE. We find that the proportion of informed orders is less than 10%, lower than previous estimates. Informed traders choose smaller orders than uninformed traders, but do not materially differ in their choice of limit or market orders. The proportion of informed investors is similar between good and bad news days. Finally, there are U-shaped intraday patterns in order arrival, and the information content of the order flow appears to follow this pattern across the day.