Demand for area crop insurance among litchi producers in northern Vietnam

This study examines the need for crop insurance for litchi production in northern Vietnam and how farmers might participate in such a program. Hypothetical insurance programs were developed which proposed all‐risk coverage based on area yields. This coverage was offered to farmers to determine both their interest in the program and how insurance features and farmer characteristics affected their decision to buy insurance. Farmers were also surveyed regarding their production practices, price and yield expectations, and financial and personal characteristics. Even before considering other program costs and government budget constraints, there is not a strong case for establishing a crop insurance program here. Results indicate that while farmer participation would be significant, crop insurance is not needed to achieve policy goals like raising farmer income or guaranteeing subsistence levels of income. Crop insurance is not needed to promote litchi production, which is already expanding rapidly due to its high profitability relative to other farm enterprises. In their choice of coverages, farmers preferred higher yield guarantee levels and lower indemnity prices. Estimated premiums were quite low when expressed as a percent of expected revenue, and farmers were not responsive to changes in premiums. Econometric analysis indicated that high income farmers were more likely to participate, but other farmer characteristics seemed to matter little. Anecdotal evidence suggested that farmers believed the expected area yields used to set insurance coverage levels were too low. Because litchi productivity varies significantly by tree age and the litchi planted area is expanding rapidly, determining appropriate values for expected area yields and insurance coverage levels appeared to be the biggest challenge in program design. It is hypothesized that additional farmer education about the relationship between area and farm yields and other aspects of area insurance could improve such a program's operation. Published by Elsevier Science B.V.     

Crop Insurance in a Political Economy: An Alternative Perspective on Agricultural Policy

Lawmakers often subsidize farmers in times of financial distress. This article models this political impulse as a constraint on government farm policy, describing how ex ante government farm insurance can deter ex post "disaster relief" and improve production incentives by countering the moral hazard that otherwise prevails. Absent ex ante government policy, ex post relief takes the form of revenue insurance, which prompts excessive entry into farm production and under-production by operating farmers. Ex ante government policy can raise economic and political welfare by buying out low productivity farmers and offering profitable farmers a combination of revenue insurance, price supports, and a program participation fee.     

Economic analysis of the introduction of agricultural revenue insurance contracts in Spain using statistical copulas

This article aims at determining how the introduction of agricultural revenue insurance contracts in Spain will affect the cost of purchasing insurance, relative to yield insurance schemes. We focus our empirical analysis on the apple and orange sectors in Spain. Statistical copulas are used to jointly model price and yield perils. Premium rates under revenue and yield insurance are simulated through Monte Carlo methods. Results indicate that revenue insurance is likely to reduce the price of agricultural insurance in Spain, which may result in higher acceptance and demand for agricultural insurance programs.     

Designing Optimal Crop Revenue Insurance

When the indemnity schedule is contingent on the farmer's price and individual yield, an optimal crop revenue insurance contract depends only on the farmer's gross revenue. However, this design is not efficient if, as is the case with available contracts, the coverage function is based on imperfect estimators of individual yield and/or price. The producer's degree of prudence and the extent of basis risks have important influences on the optimal indemnity schedule. In this broader context, optimal protection is not provided by available U.S. crop insurance contracts and may include combinations of revenue insurance, yield insurance, futures, and options contracts.     

The influence of direct payments on farmers’ hail insurance decisions

We analyze determinants of hail insurance use of Swiss farmers, using FADN panel data covering the period 1990–2009. Mixed effect logistic regression models are estimated to identify the most important farm and farmer characteristics that trigger insurance use. In addition, information on local hail risk is taken into account in these models. It shows that larger farms, with specialization in crop production, and with larger local hail risks are more likely to adopt the hail insurance. Moreover, insurance users are usually older and better educated. Since the early 1990s, Swiss agricultural policy has reduced price support and introduced general and ecological direct payments. This has led to a much higher importance of direct payments for farmers’ incomes. Our analysis shows that this development has contributed to decreasing hail insurance adoption rates in Switzerland over the period considered. Our results indicate that the larger the share of direct payments for total farm revenue, the less attractive is insurance as a risk management strategy for farmers. This interdependency should be explicitly considered by agricultural policy in the design of support mechanisms.     

Factors Affecting Farmers’ Crop Insurance Participation in China

China's latest crop insurance program, launched in 2007, provides an excellent opportunity to explore the factors affecting farmers’ crop insurance purchase decisions, particularly decision making when crop insurance was first introduced into rural communities. This study surveyed all households in Kuangjiaqiao Village, Changde, Hunan Province, China over a four‐year period, from 2007 to 2010. Using basic regression models for cross‐sectional analysis and advanced models to consider lag effects, this study identifies the dominant factors influencing farmers’ crop insurance decisions. Results indicate farmers developed a dynamic adaptive process toward the new crop insurance. Farmers initially made relatively arbitrary decisions that were significantly influenced by community insistence or pressure to conform. Then, farmers gradually established more rational decision‐making mechanisms in which yield volatility, education, and engagement experience became statistically significant. The focus on the initial stages of the crop insurance program from this study helps improve our understanding of the demands within this rapidly growing market in China.     

The impacts of multiperil crop insurance on Indonesian rice farmers and production

This article analyzes the effect of multiperil crop insurance policy for risk‐averse Indonesian rice farmers located in Tuban and Gresik Regencies of the East Java Province. Based on the model, comparative static analysis of a change in policy variables (coverage levels and premium subsidies) on input use through the coupling, wealth, and insurance effects are presented. The comparative static results are largely ambiguous and left as empirical questions. Consequently, the model is numerically simulated to quantify the effects of different coverage levels and subsidy rates on input use, expected net insurance payments, and certainty equivalents. The empirical analysis shows that MPCI crop insurance results in a decline in expected yield for coverage levels above about 82.5% for both regencies. Furthermore, higher subsidy rates amplify the reduction in input use and yield. Therefore, incomplete coverage with relatively low premium subsidies is the best policy to minimize the impact on input use and yield. However, from the farmers’ perspective, the optimal policy combination results from the highest coverage level and subsidy, which offer the largest expected net insurance payments and certainty equivalent.     

农户农业保险需求的影响因素研究——基于湖北省五县市342户农户的调查

本研究以湖北五县市342户农户为样本,对影响农户农业保险需求的各种因素进行了系统研究。研究发现,家庭农业人口数量、农业收入占比、贷款经验、对农业风险的认知、对农业保险的了解程度、保单产量保障水平、政府信任水平和政府补贴与农业保险需求显著正相关,个人承担保费水平与农业保险需求呈负相关关系,年龄与教育因素对农业保险需求的影响不显著。     

The paradox of plows and productivity: an agronomic comparison of cereal grain production under Iroquois hoe culture and European plow culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

Iroquois maize farmers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries produced three to five times more grain per acre than wheat farmers in Europe. The higher productivity of Iroquois agriculture can be attributed to two factors. First, the absence of plows in the western hemisphere allowed Iroquois farmers to maintain high levels of soil organic matter, critical for grain yields. Second, maize has a higher yield potential than wheat because of its C4 photosynthetic pathway and lower protein content. However, tillage alone accounted for a significant portion of the yield advantage of the Iroquois farmers. When the Iroquois were removed from their territories at the end of the eighteenth century, US farmers occupied and plowed these lands. Within fifty years, maize yields in five counties of western New York dropped to less than thirty bushels per acre. They rebounded when US farmers adopted practices that countered the harmful effects of plowing.     

Motivations to grow energy crops: the role of crop and contract attributes

Perennial energy crops are a promising source of bioenergy whose production involves production risks, long‐term commitment of land and need for crop‐specific investments without the coverage of crop insurance potentially available for conventional crops. We conduct a choice experiment in five states in the Midwestern and South‐central regions of the U.S. to examine the effect of crop‐contract attributes on the joint discrete‐continuous choice decisions to adopt an energy crop and convert acres to it from a status quo use, while controlling for the effect of various farmers’ risk and time preferences, sociodemographic characteristics, and availability of crop insurance for conventional crops. We find robust evidence that high discount rates, high upfront establishment costs and need for crop‐specific investments create disincentives for adoption and allocation of land to energy crop production. The effects of riskiness of returns and risk aversion are less robust across specifications. The effect of conventional crop insurance on the energy crop adoption decision differs across types of insurance; in particular, farmers with revenue insurance are statistically significantly less likely to adopt an energy crop. Our results have implications for the design of effective contracts and policy incentives to induce the production of energy crops.     

Equity and efficiency considerations in area versus individual yield insurance

Equity and efficiency considerations in area versus individual crop insurance are investigated for 609 Ontario cash crop farms. Results show that the relationship between individual and area premiums and risk reduction are explained by systematic and non-systematic yield risk relationships. On average, area insurance premiums are much lower than individual yield insurance premiums, and in terms of efficiency in risk-reduction individual plans are superior to area plans. As it turns out arguments of asymmetric information which has lead some researchers to investigate area vs. individual yield insurance is not totally resolved. Inequities in the benefits of area plans across farmers are not equitably distributed, favouring high-risk producers. Adverse selection causes instability in the pooled contracts which will ultimately cause area insurance plans to fail.     

The efficiency of composite weather index insurance in hedging rice yield risk: evidence from China

As an economic and market‐transparent program, weather index insurance is expected to mitigate asymmetric problem. Capturing the relationship between yield and weather factor(s) is the basis of index insurance, but remains a challenge for weather index schemes. Meanwhile, composite weather index insurance is needed by farmers when their agricultural activities involve several risks, but is rarely studied. We aim to design a composite weather index insurance model and evaluate its efficiency in hedging yield risk by using the case of rice production in China. We divide the whole growth cycle of rice into six stages on the basis of agronomic knowledge, and use the average value of each weather factor in each stage to design a weather index. Then, the efficiency of composite weather index insurance is evaluated by mean‐semivariance and value‐at‐risk methods. First, we find that subdivision of the growth cycle helps to better capture the subtle relationship between rice yield and weather factors. Second, composite weather index insurance evidently reduces yield risk. Our findings help further adoption of weather index insurance in agricultural fields.     

Area Yield Index Insurance or Farm Yield Crop Insurance? Chinese Perspectives on Farmers' Welfare and Government Subsidy Effectiveness

We evaluate the performance of area yield crop insurance (AYCI) and farm yield crop insurance (FYCI) using farm-level yield data from China, focusing on their effects on farmers' welfare, and their cost-effectiveness in terms of government subsidy. Given a subsidy rate sufficient to generate a politically acceptable participation level, the price advantage of AYCI may no longer offset its higher basis risk, and consequently FYCI may be preferred by farmers. From the government's perspective, AYCI is the cheapest option to maintain reasonable farmer participation in insurance, but is not necessarily the most cost-effective choice. Our findings suggest that, contrary to an assumption that informs many developing country agricultural insurance programmes, AYCI schemes are not necessarily preferred to FYCI. Decisions on the structure of a national agricultural insurance programme should be based on careful consideration of local conditions.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

Revisiting revenue contingent loans for drought relief: government as risk manager

It is clear that Australian governments will provide assistance to farmers in drought, which is a rational political judgement supported by recent survey work suggesting strongly the pervasive existence among voters of agrarian sentiment. In this context, a reasonable question relates to what forms of assistance are most equitable for taxpayers and also have desirable properties for farm businesses. In this study it is argued that traditional and current approaches to drought assistance are not equitable and do not provide sufficient protection to farmers from default and thus insolvency risk. But there is an instrument available to government which can be designed to minimise taxpayer subsidies while at the same time delivering insurance for farmers against default: a Revenue Contingent Loan (RCL). Following the principles inherent in the Higher Education Contribution Scheme, a RCL is financial assistance repaid contingent on a farm's capacity to pay, meaning that loan defaults can be avoided. We model the revenue streams associated with a hypothetical loan of this type and illustrate the advantages for a farm business of these kinds of debt.     

Implications of the US Farm Bill of 2002 for agricultural trade and trade negotiations

The US Farm Bill of 2002 is the latest in a 7-decade history of farm subsidy laws that transfer funds to farmers and regulate and subsidize production of selected commodities. Fruit, tree nut, ornamental and vegetable crops, hay and meats remain outside scope of main subsidy programs. The new law continues many innovations of the 1996 Act, such as removal of authority for annual land idling and crop price floors accompanied by government stockholding. Government payments remain the primary focus of commodity programs. The total amount of these payments are likely to remain similar to the amount paid in the period 1999–2001, but with some changes in the form of the programs. For example, allowing owners to update acreage and yield payment bases creates additional incentives for farmers to link current planting decisions to anticipated farm subsidies. Similarly, the new program that ties "counter-cyclical" payments to the price of a specific crop also has production stimulus. A new program, estimated to add about 5–10 per cent to marginal milk revenue for smaller farms, makes 'deficiency' payments to dairy farms when milk prices are low. Despite the new programs with added links to stimulating production, new USA programs stimulate production only marginally more than the subsidies of the 1999–2001 period, which were replaced. Furthermore, the USA has flexibility to avoid explicitly violating its WTO commitments. Nonetheless, this US Farm Bill of 2002 has curtailed the previous trends toward lower farm subsidies and smaller production stimuli, and the negative publicity surrounding it has made negotiating reductions of farm trade distortions more difficult.     

An empirical analysis of the factors influencing farmer demand for forest insurance: Based on surveys from Lin’an County in Zhejiang Province of China

The lack of effective farmer demand is a major factor that restricts the development of China's forest insurance. To solve this problem, this study uses a Logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of relevant factors in the farmers’ demand for forest insurance, based on field survey data of Lin’an County, Zhejiang Province. The results show that the farmers’ understanding of forest insurance, the proportion of forestry revenues in the total household income, forest size, forest disaster frequency, forest insurance liability, insurance amount setup, and the farmers’ satisfaction regarding the premium subsidy policy, are the main factors that affect the farmers’ demand for forest insurance. Therefore, we propose to expand forest insurance promotion, raise the farmers’ income, rationally design insurance products, and optimize the forest premium subsidy policy to enhance the farmers’ willingness to participate in forest insurance.     

Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines

This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find evidence that farmers insured under COP contracts spend more on chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e. those inputs whose costs determine the indemnity payments). However, since these same COP insured farmers are still likely to use less inputs (like effort) whose costs do not enter the indemnity payment formula, and yield depends on both types of inputs (i.e. the determinants and non‐determinants of the indemnity payments), the final moral hazard effect of COP insurance on yields is ambiguous. Our analysis also suggests that farmers who tend to spend less on chemical fertilizers and pesticides are the ones with private information on soil conditions and pest incidence. These are the types of farmers who adversely select into COP contracts that only cover weather related losses.     

Coping with systemic risk in index‐based crop insurance

The implementation of index‐based crop insurance is often impeded by the existence of systemic risk of insured losses. We assess the effectiveness of two strategies for coping with systemic risk: regional diversification and securitization with catastrophe (CAT) bonds. The analysis is conducted in an equilibrium pricing framework which allows the optimal price of the insurance and the number of traded contracts to be determined. We also explore the role of basis risk and risk aversion of market agents. The model is applied to a hypothetical area yield insurance for rice producers in northeast China. If yields in two regions are positively correlated, we find that enlarging the insured area leads to higher insurance premiums. Unless capital market investors are very risk averse, a CAT bond written on an area yield index outperforms regional diversification in terms of certainty equivalents of both farmers and insurers.     

Producer Experience, Learning by Doing, and Yield Performance

Current crop insurance rating procedures consider only performance for the individual crop in question. Recent farm legislation has given producers considerable planting flexibility and, as a result, many have shifted to new crops. Producers without a production history for the new crop may be offered levels of insurance that do not accurately reflect their expected yields. Likewise, premium rates may not reflect a producer's actual risk for a new crop. We examine the extent to which information about expected yields may be gleaned from a consideration of historical performance on other crops. We also consider the extent to which yield performance exhibits learning by doing such that yields improve with experience. Though the results are mixed, we generally find that yield performance tends to improve with experience. However, when yields are conditioned on historical yield performance for other crops, the importance of experience is diminished significantly. Yield performance is related to a number of farm characteristics. Finally, we examine the extent to which yield variability is correlated across crops for individual farmers. Implications for crop insurance rating practices are discussed. The results demonstrate robust correlation between a farm's historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop—a factor largely ignored in current crop insurance contracts.