The Influence of Credit Union and Savings and Loan Competition on Bank Deposit Rates in Idaho and Montana

This study examines the effect of S & L and credit union competition on bank behaviorin Idaho and Montana. A structure-performance OLSmodel is used to estimate bank interest rates oncertain deposits. Two key independent variables arelocal market share of credit unions and S & Ldeposits. Overall, previous studies found littleevidence that thrift competition affects bankperformance. We found some evidence that thriftcompetition, especially from credit unions, resultsin higher interest rates for bank CDs. Theseresults have policy implications as banking groupscurrently seek to restrict credit union competition.     

Credit Unions: Fringe Suppliers or Cournot Competitors?

Recent work has demonstrated the competitive relationship between credit unions and banks in consumer financial services. One issue underlying the nature of competition between the two, however, concerns the most appropriate way to model their interactions.Two possible approaches are the dominant-firm price-leadership model and the generalized Cournot model. In the former model, credit unions act as fringe suppliers who are price-takers in a homogeneous product market. In the latter, they possess (limited) market power. Oneway to distinguish the two is by examining the impact of credit union market shares on their pricing, as the two models imply differing effects. Our results are more consistent with the ``credit unions as fringe suppliers' view. Using a pooled cross-section time seriesof 77 small local consumer lending markets throughout the U.S., each with 10 observations over 5 years, the focus is on a loan product ex ante thought to be sold in local markets, unsecured (non-credit card) loans. For this product, increasing credit union market sharesreduces credit union loan rates, consistent with a fringe supplier hypothesis.     

Credit Availability and the Structure of the Homebuilding Industry

We investigate the role of disruptions to the structure of the homebuilding industry due to fluctuations in the availability of bank credit. We find a sustained decline in the large private homebuilder market share series over the period from 1988 to 1993 when many banks with deteriorated health reduced their lending in order to raise capital ratios. Regression analysis at the metropolitan statistical area level supports the hypothesis that, in areas where banks were less well capitalized and had more problem construction loans, the market shares of large private homebuilders that relied primarily on bank credit to finance their production suffered at the expense of the public homebuilders that had better access to external funds, in large part due to their direct access to public capital markets.     

The Profit-Structure Relationship in Legally Protected Banking Markets Using Efficiency Measures

Our various tests suggest that our sample banks that are shielded from competition by severe intrastate branching restrictions have market power. This analysis has allowed us to test rigorously the adverse effects of legal and possibly market barriers to entry. We reject the notion that profits are a result of superior $x$-efficiency. We conclude if these results are corroborated by further research (e.g., using other measures of profit, efficiency, capital, etc), and if these and/or other barriers remain, the Federal Reserve should be concerned with the competitive impacts of rural, in-market bank mergers.     

Can Bank Lines of Credit Protect REITs against a Credit Crisis?

In a tight credit market, the primary concern of most real estate investment trusts (REITs) is the ability to access capital and maintain adequate liquidity. Bank lines of credit or loan commitments, which are legally binding contracts arranged to provide debt at the call of the borrowers under prespecified terms, have been theorized to provide insurance protection against a credit crisis. This article examines whether bank lines of credit can indeed provide some insurance for REITs and allow them to access credit during bad times. Covering three credit crunch events, both the origination and utilization patterns of commitment loans by 275 REITs publicly traded between 1992 and 2007 are analyzed. We find that bank lines of credit insulated REITs from credit rationing at both the broad market level as well as at the firm level. However, the insurance value is qualified in the case of smaller and risky firms which may not get to extend their credit limit or draw down on their existing credit lines in a credit crisis.     

表外业务下的CB-LM模型研究——CC-LM模型的新发展

随着商业银行表外业务的迅速发展,经济中出现了一种“表内信贷表外化”的趋势,这一趋势导致我国货币政策调控面临着更加严峻的挑战。针对这一经济问题,本文在理论分析和数学建模的基础上构建起了更加符合我国国情的CB-LM模型。CB-LM模型的优点在于它用整体信贷的概念取代了CC-LM模型中表内信贷的概念,并且它还同时考虑了信贷市场、商品市场和货币市场的均衡。另外,通过经济学分析,我们发现CB-LM模型下货币政策对产出的影响比CC-LM模型下的影响更加强烈。CB-LM模型的构建将在一定程度上促进我国货币政策调控理论的发展。     

信用监管、营商环境与区域经济增长

本文通过构建模型刻画不同地区信用监管水平对区域经济增长的边际效应,综合考虑营商环境等多维要素与信用体系建设的协同效应,利用1999~2018年中国省级城市面板数据和2017~2019年城市信用监测数据,通过实证分析得出以下结论:(1)地区信用监管水平对区域经济增长的边际贡献显著为正,说明信用监管对区域经济增长具有重要作用;(2)营商环境与信用监管水平的交互系数显著为正,说明在营商环境越好的地区,信用监管对区域经济增长的作用越大;(3)信用监管和营商环境有利于降低企业交易成本,促进潜在企业的市场进入,进而推动区域经济发展。     

国有股权对我国银行信贷周期性的影响

基于中国106家商业银行1998～2014年的年度非平衡面板数据，利用动态面板系统广义矩方法，本文分析了国有股权如何影响我国商业银行信贷与宏观经济波动之间的周期性特征。实证结果表明，我国商业银行的信贷增速与宏观经济波动呈现出显著的负相关，这种逆周期性与银行的国有持股比例高度正相关，而银行资产负债表渠道的影响相对较小。另外银行信贷的逆周期性在经济紧缩期内表现更为明显，说明银行信贷是政府宏观调控的重要渠道。     

数字普惠金融与商业信用二次配置

商业信用二次配置是企业充当信用中介,将银行信贷等资金通过商业信用的渠道为供应链的上下游中小企业提供融资支持,这会导致资金供给链延长,加剧了供应链系统性风险,而数字普惠金融发展的重点在于为中小企业提供直接融资,因此,其能否抑制商业信用二次配置,对于防范金融风险和促进实体经济稳定发展具有重要意义。本文深入探讨了数字普惠金融对商业信用二次配置的影响及其作用机制,研究发现:数字普惠金融有助于降低商业信用二次配置,有效减少了企业利用商业信用把长期借款资金进行二次配置的行为,而且该抑制作用对于外部融资能力较强的企业更加明显。机制检验表明,数字普惠金融通过减少上市公司超额银行信贷抑制商业信用二次配置。进一步分析显示,在外部市场竞争程度较低、内部风险较低、现金持有水平较高以及非高科技企业中,数字普惠金融对上市公司商业信用二次配置的抑制作用更加明显;而且,数字普惠金融在降低商业信用二次配置的同时,对于促进企业创新投入具有一定的积极作用。本文研究表明,数字普惠金融通过增加中小企业直接融资,减少了资金供给的中间环节,进而抑制大型企业充当"影子银行"进行资金的二次配置。     

Recruitment,Retention and Exit from Union Membership. An Analysis of Member Flows in Swiss Union Locals

This article enquires into the causes of union growth and decline by analysing flows in and out of membership at the level of 70 Swiss union locals over 2006–2008. Gross flows in union membership are much larger than the resulting net changes: annual membership turnover of 10 per cent is a surprisingly constant feature across unions. Net changes in membership are primarily determined by inflows: successful and languishing union locals differ in their entry rates, whereas exit rates are similar. Variance in union locals' entry rates is not usefully explained by the labour market context, but by differences in union strategy.     

External Financing Constraints and Firm Innovation

We investigate the effect of individual banks affected by the recent financial crisis of 2008/2009 on the innovation activities of their business customers. Firms associated with a bank that relies strongly on the interbank market are more likely to be exposed to a credit supply shock during the financial crisis and therefore face external financing constraints. Exploiting both the extensive and the intensive margin, our difference‐in‐differences results imply that those firms which have a business relation to a bank with higher interbank market reliance reduce their innovation activities during the financial crisis to a higher degree than other firms. Tests for additional expenditures reveal that marketing expenditures show a lower or even no sensitivity to bank financing during the financial crisis.     

Multipoint competition,strategic similarity and entry into geographic markets

The objective of this study is to integrate both multimarket contact and strategic similarity in the analysis of entry decisions. We also analyze the role of the reciprocity of contacts, market concentration, and coordination mechanisms at moderating the relationship. Our hypotheses are tested through the analysis of entry behavior into new geographical markets in the Spanish savings bank market. Interestingly, our results offer an opportunity of conciliating conflicting evidence in both the multimarket–mutual forbearance and the heterogeneity–rivalry literatures and offer further support to the U‐inverted influence of multimarket contact on entry. Given the coordination assumption implicit in the theory and the possible presence of unobservable variables, we also offer a method to cope with the common‐actor problem. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Switching costs in local credit markets

Switching costs are a key determinant of market performance. This paper tests their existence in the corporate loan market in which they are likely to play a central role because of the complexity of contracts and the relevance of informational problems. Using very detailed data at bank-firm level on four Italian local credit markets we empirically show that firms tend to iterate their choice of the main bank over time. This inertia is not related to unobserved and time invariant firms' preferences across banks and can be attributed to the existence of switching costs. Moreover these costs are higher for single-bank firms. We also offer evidence that banks price discriminate between new and old borrowers by charging lower interest rates to the former in order to cover part of the switching costs. The discount amounts to about 44 basis points and is equal to 7% of the average interest rate. These results prove robust to a number of other potential identification drawbacks.     

Asymmetric interactions between foreign and domestic banks: effects on market entry

An inverted U‐shaped relationship is thought to exist between the number of firms entrenched in a market and the rate of new entrants. This study examined early and late entry by foreign and U.S. banks into the California market following a deregulation in the banking industry in the early 1980s. The study was designed to elucidate the competitive interactions between foreign and domestic banks. Specifically, what response did the entry of foreign banks elicit from domestic banks and what influence did the entry of domestic banks exert on the evolution of the foreign banks in the market. Data covering the period from 1979 to 1988 demonstrate that the density of foreign banks operating in the market had a U‐shaped relationship with the rate of entry of U.S. banks, supporting the argument that foreign investment can encourage the expansion of domestic banks. Although foreign banks were not an obstacle to domestic bank entries, the presence of domestic banks deterred the entry of foreign banks. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry Strategies and Market Performance Causal Modeling of a Business Simulation

A key decision faced by marketing managers is the development of entry strategies for new markets. In addition to selecting which product market to enter, the manager must make decisions about the entry strategy itself. The entry strategy, whether managed actively or passively, affects the entrant's performance. In this article, Donna Green and Adrian Ryans discuss the three major components of an entry strategy: the timing of entry, the magnitude and areas of investment and the basis for competitive emphasis. They report that very little empirical research has focused on relationships between entry strategy and eventual product performance.     

Exploring Mediating and Moderating Influences on the Links among Cycle Time,Proficiency in Entry Timing,and New Product Profitability*

Development cycle time is the elapsed time from the beginning of idea generation to the moment that the new product is ready for market introduction. Market‐entry timing is contingent upon the new product's cycle time. Only when the product is completed can a firm decide whether and when to enter the market to exploit the new product's window of opportunity. To determine the right moment of entry a firm needs to correctly balance the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry. Proficient market‐entry timing is therefore defined as the firm's ability to get the market‐entry timing right (i.e., neither too early nor too late). The literature has produced divergent evidence with regard to the effects of development cycle time and proficiency in market‐entry timing on new product profitability. To explain these disparities this study (1) explores the mediating roles of development costs and sales volume in the relationships among development cycle time, proficiency in market‐entry timing, and new product profitability, respectively; and it (2) explores the moderating influence of product newness on the relationship between development cycle time and development costs and that of new product advantage on the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results from a survey‐based study of 72 manufacturers of industrial products in the Netherlands suggest that development costs mediate the relationship between development cycle time and new product profitability and that sales volume mediates the link between proficiency in market‐entry timing and new product profitability. In addition, the findings indicate that new product advantage strengthens the positive relationship between proficiency in market‐entry timing and sales volume. The results provide no evidence for a moderating effect of product newness. These results have important implications because to maximize new product profitability managers need to distinguish between costs and demand side effects of development cycle time and market‐entry timing on new product profitability. Keeping this distinction in mind should help them to better determine the relative profit impact of investments in cycle time reduction or improved entry timing. Moreover, the findings suggest that highly advantaged products that enter the market at the right time may have a highly attenuated sales volume. It also implies that new products with lower advantage may have very little leeway in hitting the “sweet spot” in market. The message is that “doing the right thing” (i.e., to develop a highly advantaged new product) may be at least as important as correctly balancing the risks of premature entry and the missed opportunity of late entry.     

Determinants of Entry and Profits in Local Banking Markets

This paper estimates a two equation model of market entry and profits, utilizing data on entry into over 2,000 banking markets over the period 1977--88. The entry equations measure whether entry depends on incumbent firms' profits and other market attributes that reflect the long-term attractiveness of markets for entry. Market profits, assumed to follow a partial-adjustment process, are affected by entry directly and indirectly through market structure. The model also corrects for an unavoidable source of error in market-level profits for the banking industry. The estimates suggest that a competitive process is at work in banking markets that limits the ability of supra-normal profits to persist. Entry is more likely in markets that have high profits, consistent with previous empirical results that market structure adjusts more quickly when profits are supra-normal. Population and population growth are also strong determinants of entry. Entry, in turn, reduces profits in rural markets.     

The impact of interfirm relationships on investment: Evidence from the Polish dairy sector

Financial constraints and credit market imperfections are a major constraint on investment, growth and poverty reduction in transition and developing countries. This paper analyses the impact on investments of financial assistance programs as part of interfirm relationships. Our empirical evidence is based on a two-stage survey methodology. Qualitative evidence on dairy companies’ assistance programs was gathered in the first stage through in-depth interviews at the level of the dairy companies. Quantitative data on 290 milk producing rural households in Poland was collected through a random survey in the second stage. The empirical analysis shows that dairy companies have played an important role in financial assistance, in particular for dairy-specific investments. In addition, they had an important indirect impact on farm activities and investments through feed supply and loan guarantee programs.     

Payment Systems and Interchange Fees

In a typical bank credit card transaction, the merchant's bank pays an interchange fee , collectively determined by all participating banks, to the cardholder's bank. This paper shows how the interchange fee balances charges between cardholders and merchants under imperfect competition. The privately optimal fee depends mainly on differences between cardholders' and merchants' banks, not their collective market power. In a non-extreme case, the profit-maximizing interchange fee also maximizes total output and producers' plus consumers' surplus. There is no economic basis for favoring proprietary payment systems, which do not need interchange fees to balance charges, over the cooperative bank card systems.     

Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study

This paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the Japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing. The empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements. This implies that commercial banks in Japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations. However, the evidence does not support the view that Japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of Fried and Howitt (1980). Furthermore, the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts. These empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members.