On two-part tariff competition in a homogeneous product duopoly

We explore aspects of two-part tariff competition between duopolists providing a homogeneous service when consumers differ with respect to their usage levels. Competition in only one price component (the fee or the rate) may allow both firms to enjoy positive profits if the other price component has been set at levels different enough between firms. Fixing one price component alters the nature of competition, indirectly introducing an element of product differentiation. Endogenous market segmentation emerges, with the heavier users choosing the lower rate firm and the lighter users choosing the lower fee firm. When no price component can be negative, competition becomes softer, profits tend to be higher but there is also a disadvantage for the firm that starts with a higher fee than that of its rival.     

Bundling and Menus of Two-Part Tariffs

Inducing self-selection among different segments of consumers is an important issue in pricing. Some firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of two-part tariffs (e.g., different rate plans) and letting consumers select the tariff and quantity they prefer. Other firms induce self-selection by offering a menu of price-quantity bundles (e.g., different package sizes) and letting consumers select only from among these bundles. We show that bundling is more profitable absent cost considerations. Social welfare may be higher or lower with bundling.     

Strategic incentives when supplying to rivals with an application to vertical firm structure

We consider a vertically integrated input monopolist supplying to a differentiated downstream rival. With linear input pricing, at the margin the firm unambiguously wants the rival to expand—unlike standard oligopoly with no supply relationship—for either Cournot or Bertrand competition. With a two-part tariff for the input, the same result holds if downstream choices are strategic complements, but is reversed for Cournot with strategic substitutes. We analyze vertical delegation as one mechanism for inducing expansion or contraction by the rival/customer.     

SELLING ONLINE VERSUS LIVE*

A seller choosing between auctioning online and live faces a tradeoff: lower transaction costs online against more rents left with the bidders. We model this tradeoff, and apply the theory to auctions of art. The crucial parameter for whether the seller does better online than live is not the expected price but the valuation uncertainty.     

Regulating a monopoly with universal service obligations: The role of flexible tariff schemes

This paper's purpose is to study the problem of a utility monopoly's regulator, which has a universal service goal that is binding, in the sense that there is no two-part tariff that can induce efficient consumption, self-finance the firm, and guarantee universal access at the same time.     

Role of resource gap and value appropriation: effect of reputation gap on price premium in online auctions

In this study, we draw on the resource‐based view of the firm and on value‐based models of strategy to examine when firms appropriate value from their superior resources. We argue for the need to take into account the role of the resource gap between competitors rather than the absolute resource stock of the focal firm when examining the resource‐performance relationship. In particular, we investigate whether the ability of a reputable seller to command a price premium is influenced by the reputation gap (i.e., the reputation differences between the focal seller and its closest competitor standardized by the reputation stock of both sellers). We test our hypotheses on 72 matched pairs of online transactions screened from more than 2,000 auctions of new mobile phones on the Polish Internet auction site Allegro. We find that the ability of a reputable seller to command a price premium (1) increases with the size of the reputation gap between the focal seller and its matched competitor, and (2) becomes increasingly smaller for each additional unit of the seller reputation gap. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is collaboration a better way to develop trust after opportunism? Distinguishing firm and boundary spanner opportunism

Building on equity theory, we integrate trust-repair and response-to-opportunism studies to distinguish individual boundary spanner opportunism from firm opportunism and examine how these two types of opportunism influence the effect of collaboration on post-opportunism trust restoration, a crucial yet challenging context for trust development. We further examine the effect of two alternative strategies to collaboration: tolerance, and aggression on post-opportunism trust restoration. Using 574 confidential reports of senior managers working for 287 industrial buyers, we find that collaboration is the most effective strategy for post-opportunism trust restoration. More importantly, our findings show that although collaboration restores trust under both types of opportunism, it fits better with individual boundary spanner opportunism than with firm opportunism. In comparison, tolerance has a positive effect on trust restoration under boundary spanner opportunism but negatively affects trust under firm opportunism, while aggression hinders trust restoration even more under firm opportunism than it does under individual boundary spanner opportunism.     

Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium with endogenous bidder and seller participation

This paper characterizes the payoffs and pricing policies of auction hosting sites when both the bidders’ and the sellers’ participation is endogenous. Sellers have heterogeneous opportunity costs and make a listing decision depending on the listing fee and the expected revenue from the sale. On the other side of the market, factors such as facility in navigating an interface layout and prior bidding experience result in bidder heterogeneity with respect to participation costs. Bidders participate if their ex ante expected payoff from searching the site exceeds their participation costs. The auction site earns revenue by setting positive listing fees, trading off the increased revenue per seller resulting from a higher fee with the revenue reduction from the loss of sellers. Though this appears to be a classic monopoly problem, there are important differences. The reduction in the number of sellers participating in a site has feedback effects, as it affects the number of bidders who choose to visit that site, which in turn again affects the attractiveness of the site to sellers, and thus further reduces seller participation. In this environment the monopolist’s ability to extract rents is severely limited, even if one considers rent extraction from the seller side of the market only. It is demonstrated that the inverse demand curve is flatter than the demand curve obtained from the (inverse) distribution of seller costs. Moreover, the inverse demand curve has at least one and possibly multiple flat segments, leading to discontinuities in the profit function. Thus, small changes in the environment can lead to large changes in the optimal fee and market participation.     

Auction Platform Design and the Linkage Principle

This paper examines an auction platform in which the monopoly platform maximizes profits by adjusting participation fees and choosing an auction format. The seller has private information on the quality of the good, and each participating buyer receives a private signal about his valuation of the good. The choice of auction format determines the allocation of trading surplus between the seller and buyers. This paper shows that when the seller's type is affiliated with the buyers' signals, the platform can charge higher participation fees on both sides by choosing a first‐price or descending auction than a second‐price or ascending auction.     

How can business buyers attract sellers' resources?: Empirical evidence for preferred customer treatment from suppliers

This paper describes a study that investigates what makes a buyer attractive to a seller in a business-to-business buyer–seller relationship and encourages the seller to commit to and invest resources preferentially in the relationship. The study helps answer the question, “What is it that the buyer needs to do to create this attractiveness?” The perspective is somewhat unusual in the marketing literature for two reasons. Firstly, because it investigates how the supplier perspective of customer financial attractiveness affects the attitudes and actions of the supplier towards the buyer, rather than taking the buyer's perspective across the relationship. Secondly, the study has relationship attractiveness in terms of financial performance as an antecedent of its relationship constructs, whereas most relationship studies investigate performance as an outcome. The paper develops a model that proposes the seller's perception of customer financial attractiveness, seller satisfaction, and seller commitment as drivers of the seller's preferred customer treatment by allocation of resources to the relationship. The bases for the study's model are the resource-based view of the firm, the industrial marketing and purchasing (IMP) models, and related resource-focused theoretical streams. The study finds support for the model in the analysis of survey data.     

Toward a theory of entrepreneurial rents: A simulation of the market process

While strategy theory relies heavily on equilibrium theories of economic rents such as Ricardian and monopoly rents, we do not yet have a comprehensive theory of disequilibrium or entrepreneurial rents. We use cooperative game theory to structure computer simulations of the market process in which acts of creation and discovery disequilibrate and equilibrate the market over time. Using simulation experiments, entrepreneurial rents can be isolated from structural rents by keeping initial structural advantages constant. We impute entrepreneurial rents to underlying actions of creation and discovery under various combinations. Our results have relevant implications for entrepreneurship strategy, particularly for firm boundaries and resource allocation decisions. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

CEO compensation: A resource advantage and stakeholder‐bargaining perspective

This paper studies how CEO pay and its composition is shaped by strategic factors related to the firm's capacity to generate rents and value, the uncertainty of its resource advantage, and the competitive interaction between firm stakeholders and top management. This is done using an analytical framework in which the CEO and other firm stakeholders interact over the firm's resource surplus as utility‐maximizing claimants based on their relative bargaining power while providing shareholders their market‐based required return. Results from the model yield a number of cogent strategic insights and predictions on the causal interplay between CEO pay, firm growth and risk characteristics, stakeholder management, corporate strategy (e.g., offshoring production), and behavioral biases such as CEO optimism and overconfidence. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The hidden costs of outsourcing: evidence from patent data

Drawing on patent data for approximately 500 firms over 20 years, we advance recent theory on firm boundaries and test these propositions for the first time. We first provide evidence for the existence of knowledge complementarities between vertically related activities in a firm's value chain by showing that firms face increasing (decreasing) performance in conducting downstream activities (i.e., patent litigation) the less (more) they outsource related upstream activities (i.e., patent filing). We then propose and empirically demonstrate that vertical integration benefits through learning differ from vertical outsourcing costs through forgetting. We show that firms can partly offset these hidden outsourcing costs by sourcing similar upstream products from internal and external suppliers. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mutual commitment to support exchange: relation‐specific IT system as a substitute for managerial hierarchy

This paper examines the effects of information technology (IT) on the governance of vertically related firms. We propose that a highly relation‐specific IT system in inter‐firm transactions plays a key role in the resulting inter‐firm governance as a mutual sunk‐cost commitment, in terms of leading to both less vertical integration (i.e., a change in governance mode as a first‐order effect) and a smaller number of suppliers (i.e., a change within a governance mode as a second‐order effect). As a result, this highly relation‐specific IT system (bilateral investment) can be an alternative governance mode of electronic integration that acts as a substitute for managerial hierarchy and vertical financial ownership. From a strategic management perspective, this paper provides transaction costs and resource‐based explanations on IT systems' impact on the organizational boundary decision and its impact on the likelihood of the firm achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers

A striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms. Items on eBay, for instance, are frequently offered through auctions, posted prices, and buy-it-now auctions. In this article, I study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers. I specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets, in which I consider both sides of the market: On the demand side, buyers' choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game. On the supply side, sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices. I estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on eBay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets: the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed-price listings, respectively. I find that the addition of auctions to fixed-price markets hurts sellers and risk-averse buyers but benefits risk-neutral buyers. Additionally, the consumer surplus increases when buy-it-now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further. I discuss the intuition for the cause of this result.     

Power and firm profitability in supply chains: french manufacturing industry in 1993

The paper examines the relationships between the power of suppliers and buyers and the profitability of sellers who are situated in supply chains between both sets of firms. A review of the literature on power in exchange relations shows there are several power concepts which may have a different impact on seller profitability and whose impact possibly can offset each other. This may be the source of the conflicting evidence on this topic. A failure to distinguish among the concepts may also lead to an underestimation of industry effects relative to resource effects as drivers of firm profitability. The paper uses a new data base of the Banque de France on French manufacturing industry. The anlayses examine whether different power concepts may be empirically identified and what their relationships are with seller profitability. The findings point to the existence of multiple power concepts and indicate that, in the sample, industry effects are more important than firm effects (as measured by relative market share) in explaining seller profitability. The findings also suggest that buyer power explains a much larger percentage of the variance in seller profitability than supplier power. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do science and money go together? The case of the French biotech industry

Developing technological applications, entering exploitation alliances, and choosing between research‐ or service‐focused strategic orientations are decisions that high‐tech firms must manage concurrently. This article explores systematically the contrasting effects of these strategic determinants on rent generation and rent appropriation using the entire population of French biotech firms (1994–2002). Findings indicate that science and money do not unconditionally go together–the direct relationship between rent‐accruing resources (e.g., patents or articles) and rent appropriation varies depending on the type of resources and the strategic orientation. Moreover, the effects of strategic determinants differ for rent generation vs. rent appropriation: 1) technological application diversity undermines a firm's capacity to appropriate rents–in particular for research‐oriented firms; 2) exploitation alliances favor rent generation but hinder rent appropriation; 3) service‐oriented firms exhibit significantly better performance than research‐oriented firms. Such evidence challenges the emergence in the biotechnology industry of a ‘one‐best’ strategic trajectory, as represented by research‐intensive start‐ups funded by private money engaged in publishing and patenting races. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pricing process as a capability: a resource‐based perspective

Strategists following the resource‐based view argue that firms can generate rents through value creation. To create value, firms develop and use resources and capabilities that other firms cannot imitate, trade for, or substitute other assets for. Even a firm that has created value, however, may not capture the potential rents associated with that value. To capture rents, a firm must set the right prices for what it sells. Most views of pricing assume that a firm can readily set appropriate prices. In contrast, we argue that pricing is a capability. To develop the ability to set the right prices, a firm must invest in resources and routines. We base our argument on a study of the pricing process of a large Midwestern manufacturing firm. We show that pricing resources, routines, and skills may help or inhibit a firm in setting the right price—and hence in appropriating value created. Our view of pricing as a capability contributes to the resource‐based view because it suggests that strategists should consider the portfolio of value creation and value appropriation capabilities a firm uses to create competitive advantage. Our view also contributes to economics because it suggests that strategic decisions about pricing capabilities have important implications for a fundamental economic action, determining prices. Managers in firms without effective pricing processes may be unable to set prices that reflect the wishes of its customers, so the customers may misuse their resources. As a result, resources may be used ineffectively. Our view of pricing as a capability therefore takes the resource‐based‐view straight to the heart of what is perhaps the central economic question: the best use of resources. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

EVIDENCE ON THE ROLE OF FIRM CAPABILITIES IN VERTICAL INTEGRATION DECISIONS

The capabilities approach to the firm postulates that firms vertically integrate activities for which they possess capabilities that are superior to potential suppliers'. The comparative contracting approach, in contrast, emphasizes high asset specificity as leading to vertical integration. This paper compares the two sets of explanations on make-or-buy decisions made by a large firm. It finds that in some cases asset specificity alone is determinant, but in others capabilities and combinations of considerations are explanatory. Analysis of the data also provides insights about the mechanisms through which capabilities operate. In particular, the similarity of the knowledge bases associated with various activities, and the time required to acquire knowledge, appear as important indicators of the importance of capabilities to vertical integration decisions.     

The choice of organizational form: Vertical financial ownership versus other methods of vertical integration

Vertical integration is a fundamental corporate strategy of interest to the fields of strategic management and organizational economics. This paper synthesizes theoretical arguments and empirical findings from this literature to identify the underlying advantages and disadvantages of choosing vertical financial ownership relative to vertical contracts. It then suggests that in the absence of agency and transaction costs, vertical financial ownership and vertical contracting are equivalent governance structures for achieving corporate objectives. However, given a world of positive agency and transaction costs, the key theoretic question then becomes predicting when market mechanisms are sufficient, when intermediate forms of vertical contracting become necessary, and when vertical financial ownership becomes the preferred governance structure. The concluding section of the paper provides a framework for making this analysis based on a synthesis of agency and transaction costs perspectives.